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In this dissertation, I highlight five points that contribute to the critical studies of 1 
Corinthians. First, the notions of honor and shame in a proprioceptive and communal culture. 
What I mean by proprioceptive is the embodied perception of the world in which everything and 
everyone are always already interrelated. We often forget that our perception of the world is 
embodied within, between, and among bodies. Too often we forget that our body feels and thinks 
too. This embodied perception of the world is not only highlighted in the works of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, it is also prominent in both the Chinese and Greco-Roman cultures. 
It is because of this proprioceptive quality that the notion of community is understood. A 
communal culture is group-oriented not because many individuals gather together. It is group-
oriented because everyone is always already interrelated with each other. We will come back to 
this in Paul’s notion of “the body of Christ” in my third point. It is because of this experience of 
proprioceptive and communal quality that I foreground what Western sociologists and 
anthropologists have mentioned since the 1960s that the value of honor is a “felt” (cf. 
heteronomy), “claimed” (cf. autonomy), and “paid” (cf. relationality) value. While problems 
arise when the value of honor is reduced to only a certain aspect, the “felt” aspect of honor is 
neglected in critical biblical studies. 
The “felt” aspect, the “claimed” aspect, and “paid” aspect of honor cannot be separated 
from each other. They are always interrelated. I express these various aspects of honor in terms 
of “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor paid.” The hyphens in this expression are indispensable. 
Not unlike how Paul portrays the various members in “the body of Christ” (1 Cor. 12:12-27), 
they signify simultaneous conjunction and disjunction, which I find manifesting a dynamic 
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interplay of singularity and plurality in Paul’s encounters with other “races”/ethnic groups, 
religions, and cultures. 
The “felt” aspect is proprioceptive. It is a heteronomy or a religious experience that is 
beyond logical articulation. The “felt” aspect is (self-evidently and non-demonstrably) “felt” to 
be good. It is manifested as a “claimed” honor and a “paid” honor, but it is not exhausted of its 
meanings. As such, the “felt” aspect is other-oriented and cannot be objectified. While the 
“claimed” aspect is individual-centered, the “paid” aspect is community-centered. It is critical to 
note that the value of honor always has these three aspects working together. It is also critical to 
note that the hyphens in “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor paid” show the conceptual gaps in 
the value of honor in concrete life situations. 
For me, these three aspects of honor correspond to the three modes of existence that 
frame the various meaning-producing dimensions in our discourse of knowledge: autonomy (or 
individual-centered), relationality (or community-centered), and heteronomy (or other-centered). 
To highlight these three aspects and to keep a dynamic tension among them, I find A. J. 
Greimas’s structural semiotics and scriptural criticism most helpful. It is crucial to note that these 
critical approaches are not a method. Rather, they are a style of questioning and thinking of how 
to make meaning, showing that meaning is always a meaning-effect in the sense that meaning is 
always relational and multidimensional, just like the notion of honor is a dynamic effect of the 
interaction of hyphens in “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor paid.” 
The second point (closely tied to the first point) that I want to underscore is the notion of 
middle voice in Paul’s semantic universe or system of convictions, which I find embodied in his 
notion of euangelizesthai, usually translated “to preach the gospel.” I find this translation 
problematic because it seems to suggest that the gospel can be owned, objectified, and as such 
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passed to others who lack it. But if the gospel can be objectified, it can then be manipulated for 
various agenda. My reading of Paul’s notion of euangelizesthai, however, shows that the gospel 
cannot be objectified. I am very concerned with the notion of euangelizesthai because Paul 
makes it very clear that Christ did not send him to baptize but to euangelizesthai, lest the cross of 
Christ be emptied of its power (1 Cor. 1:17). So the way we understand euangelizesthai affects 
how we understand Paul carries out his mission as an apostle to the Gentiles. While the middle 
voice is often treated as denoting a sense of self-reflexivity, my semiotic analysis of 1 
Corinthians leads me to agree with Charles Scott’s notion of middle voice that highlights a sense 
of “intransitive non-reflexivity.” That is to say, in the mode of middle voice, the identities and 
positions of the subject and of the object co-arise. Neither the subject is a subject per se, nor the 
object an object per se. Just like the hyphens in “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor paid,” the 
middle voice prevents the identity and position of the subject and of the object from being fixed 
and objectified. 
Therefore, in Paul’s notion of euangelizesthai, we can say that the “preaching of the 
gospel” takes place in the “preaching of the gospel.” The “intransitive” and “non-reflexive” 
features of the middle voice in euangelizesthai prevent us from properly speaking of an “object” 
(since it is intransitive) and a “subject” (since it is non-reflexive). In the mode of middle voice, 
there is no teleology (or preexisting or preprogrammed destiny). Neither is there a fixed origin 
and presence. To bring to the fore this “intransitive non-reflexive” feature of middle voice, I 
translate euangelizesthai as “to gospelize.” Let me illustrate this point through 1 Cor. 9:16-17. 
Paul writes: 
For if I gospelize (εὐαγγελίζωμαι), it is not for me a boasting because the 
necessity (ἀνάγκη) presses upon me; for woe to me if I do not gospelize 
(εὐαγγελίσωμαι); for if I do this willingly, I have a wage, but if not willingly, I 
have been entrusted the stewardship (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι). 
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For Paul, “to gospelize” does not mean to give the gospel to someone as if one possesses it. 
Rather, to gospelize means to manifest the gospel so that one may become its participant (ἵνα 
συγ-κοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι) (9:23). In the middle voice, Paul gospelizes as he is gospelized 
(thus the gospel presses upon him). This is why in 1:17 Paul is careful not to gospelize 
(εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) in the wisdom of logos. Paul is aware that he is only a medium of the gospel 
and as a medium he is vigilant that he is not the owner of the gospel, lest the (gift of the) gospel 
be emptied of its potentiality. 
 These two points lead to the third point that I foreground in my dissertation through my 
translation of 1 Cor. 12:27: “You are the body of Christ insofar as parts beyond a part.” This 
literal and strange translation of 12:27 is usually translated as “You are the body of Christ and 
individually members of it” (NRSV). For me, the second clause in 12:27 – καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους –
speaks of the middle voice of the body of Christ, in which the body members, in a hyphenated 
relation, are body members insofar as they are interrelated. This notion of “parts beyond a part” 
can be further illustrated through Alain Badiou’s use of the set theory. 
Let’s say a “cat” is a member of the set of living beings. While the cat is obviously a part 
of the living beings, inside the cat there are elements that are not parts of the set of living beings, 
such as the chemicals that constitute the cell. Can we count the chemicals as parts of the set of 
living beings? If not, then what do we do with the cat that is a part of the set of living beings? 
Herein lies the paradox. The cells are parts of the cat and yet, by the count of the set of the living 
beings, they are beyond the cat that is a part of the set of living beings. From my reading of 1 
Corinthians, this paradox is well embodied by Paul’s notion of the body of Christ as “parts 
beyond a part,” where the body of Christ is always in the discursive process of being defined 
anew, again and again. The body of Christ does not have a common property nor a preexisting 
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property. It is always yet to be defined as it comes into contacts with other people, other culture, 
other religion, etc. From what we have noted about the hyphenated relations in “honor felt”-
“honor claimed”-“honor paid” and the “intransitive nonreflexivity” in middle voice, the body of 
the Christ can be envisioned dynamically and holistically as “hand”-“leg”-“ear”-“eye”-“head”-
etc. where the singularity of individual body members is singular insofar as individual body 
members are hyphenated in a relation of simultaneous conjunction and disjunction. In this notion 
of the body of Christ, plurality is plurality insofar as it is also marked by singularity. 
By now, my choice of using structural semiotics and scriptural criticism as a style of 
questioning and thinking should become apparent. Just like structural semiotics and scriptural 
criticism, the middle voice and the hyphenated relations in “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor 
paid” and in the body of Christ also underscore the various meaning-producing dimensions. This 
awareness of meaning as meaning-effects can prevent our knowledge from being essentialized 
and objectified, which is a major concern for Paul in my analysis of his treatment of “the Lord’s 
Supper” conflict (11:17-34), the “idol food” issue (8:1–11:1), and the “spiritual gifts” problem 
(12:1–14:40). 
Contrary to many scholarly interpretations of 1 Corinthians that exclusively render Paul’s 
notion of love theologically, ethically, rhetorically, or ideologically, I find that each of these 
rendering is the result of making contextual, hermeneutical, and textual choices that foreground a 
certain textual dimension of 1 Corinthians that is most pertinent to the interpreter. Note, however, 
that the textual dimensions, which are put into bracket (as a result of foregrounding), do not 
disappear. They form the background to the textual dimension that is foregrounded. Because of 
these various meaning-producing dimensions, I acknowledge and emphasize the choices that I 
make in my critical interpretation of Paul’s love in 1 Corinthians. It is because I foreground the 
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“felt” aspect of honor – which for me, is closely tied to the “parts beyond a part” notion of the 
body of Christ – that I highlight the religious experience of Paul’s notion of love, which I find is 
performative, charismatic, and typological. Let me briefly explain.  
First, it is important to note that Christ sends Paul to gospelize (1:17). It is also important 
to note that what God has prepared for those who love God is in the order of love that cannot be 
perceived and received except in the spirit of God that is given by God (2:9, 11-12). Paul makes 
this point again in 8:1-3 when he says that those who love [God] are known [by God]. Paul does 
not say that those who love God will know God. There is no certainty in love. If there is, it is 
only in the form of hope and faith. Love is characterized by risk and promise. This is why Paul 
says that when the time comes, “I will fully know insofar as I am fully known” (13:12). The 
condition to know hinges upon to be known. These verses, in particular those in 1 Cor. 13 show 
that for Paul the notion of love has to be in a “present progressive tense” in the sense that it must 
be always on-going. Love is not a thing that can be possessed and objectified. It is a relationship 
that has to be embodied and performed again and again, everyday. Here I will not go into the 
details of these textual analyses, which my studies of “the Lord’s Supper” conflict (11:17-34), 
the “idol food” issue (8:1–11:1), and the “spiritual gifts” problem (12:1–14:40) further confirm 
even as they show that Paul’s notion of love in 1 Corinthians is other-oriented. 
This otherness-orientation or heteronomy comes to the fore in Paul’s positive notion of 
“heresy” in the Lord’s Supper. This is the fourth point that I highlight in my dissertation. While 
almost all scholars take the word “heresy” in 11:19 negatively, I argue that, for Paul, “heresy” in 
its primary and basic meaning as “a choice” is indispensable to prevent our knowledge from 
being fixed and objectified. In the face of “choices,” and hence “differences,” our horizon of 
vision can be challenged and transformed. Without such a challenge, we may fix and absolutize 
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our horizon of vision. Indeed, if for Paul, everyone has received from God (4:7), which means 
that everyone has something to contribute and to learn from each other, then “heresy” can help 
believers humble and alert to the unexpected works of God among them. It is for this reason that 
Paul in addressing the divisions (schismata) in the church of God urges believers to receive (food) 
from one another at the Lord’s Supper (11:33), instead of just to wait for one another or to 
welcome one another, as most translators argue. For Paul, “heresy” does not necessarily lead to 
divisions and conflicts. It can actually prevent them from taking root among believers. This 
notion of “heresy” echoes our emphasis on the various meaning-producing dimensions. 
The fifth point that I bring to the fore in my dissertation is Paul’s treatment of the “idol 
food” issue (8:1–11:1) and the “spiritual gifts” problem (12:1–14:40) in light of the theme of 
“non-objectifying knowing.” On the “idol food” issue, I argue that once the notions of “icon” 
and “idol” are clarified, we can see why Paul’s response to the issue may appear ambiguous and 
ambivalent. Likewise, on the “spiritual gifts” problem, I contend that once the notions of “giver,” 
“receiver,” and “given gift” are clarified in our notion of the “spiritual gift,” then we will see that 
Paul is concerned with how the “spiritual gift” may be used to objectify the spirit that gives the 
gift, the subject who receives and performs the gift, and the receiver who is at the receiving end 
of the subject who performs the gift. 
Now, do I find Paul’s notion of love problematic in his treatment of the Lord’s Supper” 
conflict (11:17-34), the “idol food” issue (8:1–11:1), and the “spiritual gifts” problem (12:1–
14:40)? Yes, when I read them from the interpretive lenses that render Paul’s love theologically, 
ethically, rhetorically, and ideologically. These readings can make Paul’s love individualistic, 
authoritative, and utilitarian, which is detrimental to the issues of singularity and plurality in my 
context. But, No, when I read them from the interpretive lenses that render Paul’s love in the 
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middle voice of heteronomy. However, I do not deny the legitimacy and plausibility of these 
other renderings of Paul’s love. Just as we have noted about the different aspects of honor, we 
have learnt from structural semiotics and scriptural criticism that meaning is always relational 
and multidimensional. It is this notion of meaning as meaning-effects that I want to highlight a 





Introduction – An Inter-course of Context, Text, and Hermeneutics in 
Paul’s Vision of Love in 1 Corinthians 
 
For I received from the Lord, which I delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus on the 
night that he was betrayed he took bread, and after giving thanks he broke it and 
said: “this is my body on behalf of you; do this for my remembrance” (1 
Corinthians 11:23-24). – Paul 
 
I remember how one day a foreman secretly gave me a piece of bread which I 
knew he must have saved from his breakfast ration. It was far more than the small 
piece of bread which moved me to tears at that time. It was the human 
“something” which this man gave to me – the word and look which accompanied 
the gift.1 – Viktor E. Frankl 
  
I. An Embodied and Dynamic Process of Meaning Production 
 How do we interpret (i.e., explain, understand, and apply) our lived experiences? How 
does a “small piece of bread” evoke such power for Frankl in the Nazi concentration camp? How 
can the “breaking of bread” stir up so much emotion, debates, and violence in Christian 
traditions? In asking these questions, we broach the issue of the process of meaning production. 
If meanings are produced in various ways, both actively and passively, we need to investigate the 
meaning-producing dimensions that we foreground and put in the background in our interpretive 
process (see the Methodological Appendix). In fact, if our textual analysis entails an interplay of 
three interpretive poles – i.e., contextual, textual, hermeneutical analyses (see the conclusion 
section) – then the meaning-producing dimensions that we highlight in each pole must not be 
overlooked.2 Indeed, if we are always already in relation with others in this world, we need to 
1 Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy. 4th ed. Translated by Ilse Lasch. 
Prefaced by Gordon W. Allport (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), 93-94. 
2 For example, see the Romans Through History and Cultures Series, with Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte as 
the general editors. Volume 1: Reading Israel in Romans: Legitimacy and Plausibility of Divergent Interpretations. 
Edited by Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000); Volume 2: 
Engaging Augustine on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation. Edited by Daniel Patte and Eugene 
TeSelle (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003); Volume 3: Navigating Romans Through Cultures: 
Challenging Readings by Charting a New Course. Edited by Yeo Khiok-khng (K.K.) (New York and London: T &T 
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assess the “modes of existence” (e.g., autonomy, relationality, and heteronomy) (see chapter 1) 
that we primarily assume and privilege in the framing of our analyses of the meaning-producing 
dimensions in each of the three interpretive poles. Not only do we need to be vigilant of the 
“modes of existence” primarily assumed in the text, we also need to pay attention to the mode of 
existence that we, ourselves, privilege in our contextual and hermeneutical poles. Albert 
Schweitzer’s critique of the “First Quest” of the “historical Jesus” that “’[t]here is no historical 
task which so reveals [an interpreter’s] true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus”3 should have 
warned us of our socio-cultural, gendered, religious, etc. presuppositions in our interpretive 
process (see the Methodological Appendix). When we become critical of the “modes of 
existence” and the meaning-producing dimension(s) that we primarily foreground in our 
interpretive process, we can be keen to the “distinctive interpretive lines of reasoning” 4 in 
various interpretations, lest we co-opt or uncritically reject any interpretations whose 
“interpretive lines of reasoning” are different from ours. We can also be critical of the kinds of 
arguments that we can make, lest our “interpretive line of reasoning” is not warranted by the 
meaning-producing dimensions that we focus on. 
Clark International, 2004); Volume 4:  Early Patristic Readings of Romans. Edited by Kathy Gaça and Larry L. 
Welborn (New York and London: T & T Clark International, 2005); Volume 5: Gender, Tradition, and Romans. 
Shared Ground, Uncertain Borders. Edited by Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte (New York and London: T &T 
Clark International, 2005); Volume 6: Medieval Readings of Romans. Edited by William S. Campbell, Peter S. 
Hawkins, and Brenda Deen Schildgen (New York and London: T &T Clark International, 2007); Volume 7: 
Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians. Edited by David Odell-Scott (New York and 
London: T &T Clark International, 2007); Volume 8: Reformation Readings of Romans. Edited by Kathy 
Ehrensperger and R. Ward Holder (New York and London: T &T Clark International, 2008); Volume 9: Greek 
Patristic and Orthodox Readings of Romans. Edited by Daniel Patte and Vasile Mihoc (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013); and Volume 10: Modern Readings of Romans: Tracking Their 
Hermeneutical/Theological Trajectory. Edited by Daniel Patte and Cristina Grenholm (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury T &T Clark, 2013). 
3 See Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. Translated by W. Montgomery. Preface by F. C. Burkitt 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005), 4. 
4 This phrase comes from Daniel Patte’s review of Romans Interpreted by Early Christian Commentators, translated 
and edited by J. Patout Burns Jr. and Father Constantine Newman, for The Review of Biblical Literature. For a great 
illustration of how this “distinctive interpretive line of reasoning” is at work, see Mieke Bal, Murder and Difference: 
Gender, Genre, and Scholarship on Sisera’s Death. Translated by Matthew Gumpert (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988). 
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 In short, we need to be critical of how we conceptualize our lived experience and how 
they inform, reform, and deform one another. Both our concepts and lived experience are 
integral to our making sense of the world. We cannot separate one from the other. Without the 
concept, our lived experience may be lost in translation. It cannot be articulated and critiqued. 
Without the lived experience, our concept may become emptied and ideologically driven. With 
Fernando Segovia I believe we need to stress the social locations and the role of the “flesh-and-
blood” reader in biblical interpretation.5 Yet we also need to consider the role of our flesh and 
body (including our feeling/mood) in interpreting our encounter with others (e.g., the divine, 
people, environment, social locations, texts, etc.). To clarify our interpretive process, we need to 
examine how we and the other/Other are constituted in our process of meaning production. 
 Why should we care about this examination of our structure of interpretation? Because 
how we explain and understand (1) ourselves, (2) the others, and (3) our process of meaning 
production have ethical and political impacts. 6 Not only does “how we interpret” affect the 
5 See Fernando F. Segovia, Decolonizing Biblical Studies: A View from the Margins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2000), 3-52. Also, see the trilogy that Segovia and Tolbert edit on the importance of the role of social locations in 
our biblical interpretations. Fernando F. Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert, eds., Reading from This Place. Vol. 1: 
Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in the United States (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995); idem., 
Reading from This Place. Vol. 2: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in Global Perspective (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1995); idem., Teaching the Bible: The Discourses and Politics of Biblical Pedagogy (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1998). 
6 Here, Marion’s notion of hermeneutics is noteworthy, which for him “does not operate on objects nor on sense 
data, of which it would modify at will, by arbitrary authority, the meaning – this attitude would rather define 
ideology. Hermeneutic practices a givenness of meaning on the given, from an appropriate meaning to the given, in 
such a way that the latter, instead of returning to its anonymity and remaining in hiding, is deliberately released and 
freed in its manifestation. Hermeneutics does not give a meaning to the given, by securing and deciding it, but each 
time, it gives its meaning, that is to say the meaning that shows that given as itself, as a phenomenon which is shown 
in itself and by itself. The self of the phenomenon rules in the final instance all the givenness of meaning: it is not a 
givenness by the ‘I’ of a meaning constituted by it into an object to this very object, but to let its own meaning come 
to the object, acknowledged more than known. The meaning given by hermeneutics does not come so much from 
the decision of the hermeneutic actor, as from that which the phenomenon itself is (so to speak) waiting for and of 
which the hermeneutic actor remains a mere discoverer and therefore the servant. The phenomenon is shown to the 
extent the hermeneutic actor gives to the given the most appropriate meaning of that given itself. Hermeneutics 
interprets not only the given in a phenomenon, but, to do so, it must leave the hermeneutic actor be interpreted by 
the given which has to be phenomenalized.” See Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Hermeneutics. Translated by 
Jean-Pierre Lafouge The Père Marquette Lecture in Theology 2013 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 
2012), 41, 43. 
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others, it also affects us in return. It is thus problematic to essentialize (or pigeonhole) and 
objectify any one of these aspects as if they are without interrelatedness and social locations. 
Under such an essentialization, the conditions for new possibilities are short-circuited because 
once we objectify the other/Other, we can claim and trade them for our purposes. The critique of 
Aimé Césaire that “colonization = ‘thingification’” is our reminder.7 Objectification can become 
an act of violence that reduces the otherness of the other/Other. 8  (While the wording 
“other/Other” may seem cumbersome, it has important hermeneutical and theological 
connotations that resist such objectification and essentialization. The question is: How can one 
really tell one from the other? It is not possible to distinguish the neighbor from the Lord, as 
Matthew 25:31-46 underscores, and doing so would be essentializing both God and neighbor). 
 Paul’s notion of “love otherwise than knowledge” also avoids such an essentialization. 
“Anyone who thinks (δοκεῖ) that s/he knows (ἐγνωκέναι) something does not yet know (ἔγνω) as 
s/he ought to know (δεῖ γνῶναι). But anyone who loves [God] is known (ἔγνωσται) [by God]”9 
(1 Cor. 8:2-3; cf. 13:9; Gal. 4:9). For Paul, if God is beyond our grasp (cf. 1 Cor. 8:6), then 
“what” do we love when we love God?10 Perhaps this question explains why Paul says that 
“anyone who loves [God] is known (ἔγνωσται) [by God].” The middle/passive voice of this 
perfect tense of ἔγνωσται is crucial. As the few textual variants indicate (in the omission of 
“God” and “by God”), ἔγνωσται can be a middle voice. That is to say, in “love,” knowing 
happens in its taking place. As Charles Scott points out, the “intransitive nonreflexivity” of the 
7 See Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism. Translated by Joan Pinkham. New Introduction by Robin D. G. 
Kelley: “A Poetics of Anticolonialism” (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 42. 
8 In his analysis of Western theological education, Palmer also makes similar observation about the violence of 
knowledge that centers on an individualistic objectification of the other. See Parker J. Palmer, To Know As We Are 
Known: Education as a Spiritual Journey (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1993). 
9 For a discussion of important textual variants of this verse, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2000), 625-27. 




                                                          
middle voice “constitutes our language’s historical expression of self-enactment with neither 
passivity nor active intention.”11 So a knowing that is in the mode of the middle voice does not 
objectify the knower and the “object.” It is a knowing that is not in the order of grasping or 
mastery.12 It is a dynamically relational knowing that takes place in the knowing. A knowing that 
subtracts itself in knowing (cf. 13:12). A knowing that happens in Christ giving his life for 
people (11:23-27; cf. Gal. 2:20; 2 Cor. 5:14; Rom. 5:6-8). Paul thus speaks of “the love of God” 
in terms of the love “in Christ Jesus our Lord” (Rom. 8:39).13 
 For Paul, love cannot be calculative and dialectical in the sense of objectifying and co-
opting the other/Other into the self. In drawing one out toward the other/Other, love suspends 
one’s intentionality and control. It exposes one to the other/Other, to the waiting and anxiety (cf. 
1 Cor. 13:4),14 as one does not know how the other/Other will respond. It is in the waiting that 
the other/Other is present, but present in terms of hope and faith (cf. 13:7). This presence is thus 
outside (the measurement of) time (cf. 13:8), despite the fact that love takes place in time and 
11 Charles E. Scott, “The Middle Voice of Metaphysics,” The Review of Metaphysics 42.4 (June 1989): 743-64 (745). 
Elsewhere Scott writes: “The middle voice suggests something that goes beyond subject-object formations. It is able 
to articulate nonreflexive enactments that are not for themselves or for something else. As a formation, it does not 
need to suggest intention outside of its movement or a movement toward an other. It does not oppose active and 
passive formations, but it is other than they are. It is the voice of something’s taking place through its own 
enactment. It remains hearable by us in some reflexive functions; we have seen that those functions often lack 
particularly the middle-voice value of intransitive processes of enactment. We have seen that in the middle voice a 
certain immediacy of presence can be expressed, but we have also seen that the presence of a complex, ambiguous 
verb or event, by virtue of its ambiguity and countervalences, may in its middle voice express not the immediacy of 
simple presence, but transition, ambiguity, and dissolution of presence. In such cases there is an excess vis-à-vis the 
meanings that constitute the event or word. That excess suggests that the presence of meaning is not a sufficient 
basis for thinking in relation to the event, that the excess necessitates something other than the language of meaning 
and presence for its articulation.” See Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 24. 
12 In emphasizing that Paul’s framework of knowing, where Paul is not as concerned with the content of knowing as 
with the way of knowing, Scott argues that “when Paul thought about theological matters his thoughts in fact had a 
narrative structure. He thought of actions and events which were both causally and temporally related, and which 
were all governed by the overarching plot of God’s rescue of his creation.” See Ian W. Scott, Paul’s Way of 
Knowing: Story, Experience, and the Spirit (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 118. 
13 Garland writes: “the cross of Christ as the manifestation of God’s love for the world … is the central defining 
reality for Paul’s understanding of ἀγάπη (agapē).” See David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker Exegetical 
Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 605. 
14  As Barthes writes, “The lover’s fatal identity is precisely: I am the one who waits.” See Roland Barthes, 




                                                          
space. Love, as such, interrupts one’s being with what is yet to come; nobody in love declares “I 
love you” with “the end of love” in mind. Yet such a declaration is fragile.15 There is a space of 
connection and separation between “I” and “You.”16 This in-between space has risk in character 
as no one can guarantee that, tomorrow, s/he will still love the other/Other. In fact, not only does 
the saying “I love you” imply the question “Do you love me?” to both the enunciator and the 
enunciatee, the question and response are elicited, again and again.17 Lovers are never tired of 
asking and answering: “Do you love me?” and “I love you.” Such uncertainty and risk actually 
already takes place when one somehow falls in love with the other/Other.18 The risk and lack of 
self-control in love may cause wound, but it is precisely the “beautiful risk”19 that one must take 
as it is also the very wound that opens oneself up to the joy of surprise (cf. Rom. 8:35-39). 
 For Paul, love has the quality of a “here and now but not yet” that demands one’s fidelity 
to the calling of God (cf. 1 Cor. 1:1, 6, and 26). It is a demand of a continual response-ability to 
love. A demand that splits and ties the love-captivated “I” to the other/Other whose signification 
is end-less. Love certainly has rules and regulations, but it is not reducible to them (cf. Rom. 
13:10; 1 Cor. 9:20-21).20 It goes beyond representations. It extends the first encounter, the first 
15 For an analysis of “I love you,” see Jean-Luc Marion, “The Unspoken: Apophasis and the Discourse of Love” 
(translated by Arianne Conty), Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 76 (2003): 39-56. 
Also see Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary of the Letter to the Romans. Translated by 
Patricia Dailey. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 132-36. 
16 For example, see Luce Irigaray, “I Love To You,” in I Love To You: Sketch for a Felicity within History. 
Translated by Alison Martin (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 109-13. 
17 See Jean-Luc Marion, “The Unspoken: Apophasis and the Discourse of Love,” 50-52. 
18 For example, see Roland Barthes, “Ravishment,” in A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, 188-94. As Badiou stresses 
that love is impossible without risk, fidelity becomes integral to turning the love encounter from a chance meeting 
into a destiny. Love, as such, “is both and encounter and a construction.” See the interview in 
http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2012/may/18/alain-badiou-life-in-writing (accessed July 5, 2013). Also, see 
Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love. Translated by Peter Bush (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2012). 
19 This expression comes from Levinas. See James H. Olthuis, The Beautiful Risk: A New Psychology of Loving and 
Being Loved (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2001), 74. 
20 Likewise, Rosenzweig writes, “Surely, love cannot be commanded; no third party can command it or obtain it by 
force. No third party can do this, but the One can. The commandment of love can only come from the mouth of the 
lover. Only the one who loves, but really he can say and does say: Love me. From his mouth, the commandment of 
love is not a strange commandment, it is nothing other than the voice of love itself. The love of the lover has no 
other word to express itself than the commandment. Everything else is already no longer immediate expression, but 
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touch of the heart. It implies a promise that “I will love you.” A specific “you.” Love does not 
happen in the abstract. It is a perseverance that leads to transformations (1 Thess. 1:3; Rom. 5:3-
5) in each declaration of “I love you.” Love, as such, is not merely “the ground of meaning.”21 It 
goes beyond it. As it carves out and shapes one’s existence and being, this beating of the heart in 
love grounds and ungrounds itself as well as (the relationship between) the self and the 
other/Other. Love, in short, is an event or a gift and grace of possibility of the impossible (see 
chapter 7). This is why love takes place in time and space and yet beyond time and space. It is 
specific and material and yet poetic and sentimental. It is protective and yet open to the unknown. 
It is fragile and exciting yet enduring and resilient. 
 Here, our usage of the word “poetics” follows the meanings of the Greek word “poiein” 
(to “make,” “produce,” or “create”).22 To say that love is poetics, not only do we follow the 
poetic description of love by Paul in 1 Cor. 13, we also want to highlight the metaphorical figure 
of love in Paul’s description, which shows that love has the capacity to “make” and “create.” 
This capability of “creating” means that love can re-describe or re-configure believers’ 
experience and interaction with the other/Other.23 In light of this poetic or creative capability of 
explanation – explanation of love. The explanation of love is very deficient, and like every explanation, it always 
comes after the event; and therefore, since the love of the lover is in the present, it really always comes too late.” See 
Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption. Translated by Barbara E. Galli. Modern Jewish Philosophy and 
Religion: Translations and Critical Studies (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 190-91. 
21 Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians. Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, 
KY: John Knox Press, 1997), 232. 
22 For example, see the discussion of Aristotle’s notion of poetics and mimesis in Poetics in Paul Ricoeur, Time and 
Narrative. Vol. I. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), 31-51. 
23 In speaking of love as a “feeling” (that is, a “gut feeling”), Ricoeur writes, “I have held off until this point any 
consideration of such expressions so as not to give in to the sirens of sentimentality. But now it is under the sign of 
the poetics of the hymn and the commandment that we can place this third feature, which I will sum up in terms of 
the power of metaphorization linked to the expressions of love.” See Paul Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” in Figuring 
the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Translated by David Pellauer. Edited by Mark I. Wallace 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 320. 
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love, it is not surprising that when Paul cites Isaiah 64:4,24 he writes that what God has prepared 
for those who love God cannot be seen, heard, and thought (1 Cor. 2:9; cf. Isaiah 52:15). The 
poetic nature of love cannot be objectified and reduced to certain propositions. Thus, regardless 
of the textual variants in 1 Cor. 2:1 (cf. 4:1),25 if the “mystery” or “witness” of God is taken as a 
subjective genitive, Paul makes it clear that he is only a medium through which the proclamation 
happens. Paul does not possess the proclamation, not to mention it is not a thing that can be 
objectified. Marked by such a “witness” or “mystery,” how can Paul not be in fear and trembling 
when preaching it (2:3-5)? No wonder that Paul and his co-workers speak of the hidden wisdom 
of God in mystery (2:7). What God has prepared can only be received in love through the spirit 
(2:10; cf. Rom. 5:5; Gal. 5:22). It is thus through love that faith produces effects (Gal. 5:6; cf. 1 
Thess. 1:3). With the performative notion of love that bears, trusts, hopes, and endures all things 
(1 Cor. 13:7) (see chapter 4), love is a condition of knowing. A knowing that our knowing is 
limited (cf. 13:2, 9). Following Paul’s lead and our ethical concern, we will briefly explain our 
notion of meaning production. What we want to highlight is a subject who is neither static nor 
fragmentary but dynamically holistic in her/his interactions with the other/Other in the world. 
The subject is a flesh-and-blood subject-with-others in the world. 
 
II. A Creative Distance between Concept and Lived Experience 
But history, like ordinary discourse presupposes much more than the sciences, for 
the historian makes judgments about men’s motives and values, national character, 
political trends, institutional capabilities, revolutions – none of which, precisely 
24 For an overview of the debates about the syntax and source of this verse, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, 248-52. Quoting Isaiah 64:4 (LXX and MT 64:3) and changing the verb “to wait for” 
(ὑπoμένω; הכח) to “to love” (God prepared for those who love (ἀγαπῶσιν) God) – note that the Septuagint is closer 
to 1 Cor. 2:9 as it says that God will do works for those who wait for God’s mercy (ἔλεον) – Paul highlights in 2:9 
an intimate relationship between love and understanding. Such an understanding, related to the wisdom of God in 
mystery which has been hidden (2:7), was revealed by God through the spirit for our benefit (2:10). This change of 
verb forecasts 13:7 where Paul writes that love always waits or waits for everything (πάντα ὑπομένει). 
25 For a discussion of these textual variants, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 207-08. 
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speaking, can be said to be the subject matter of a science … History … is not so 
much itself a field as a field-encompassing field.26 – Van Harvey 
 
 To highlight the messiness of the interpretive process that governs our reading of 1 
Corinthians, it is helpful to review the scholarship on hermeneutics since Rudolf Bultmann 
(1884-1976). In the field of Western critical biblical studies,27 Bultmann argued in 1957 that 
there is no exegesis without presuppositions,28 regardless of how scientific and objective we 
strive to be in our textual analysis.29 Before we analyze the biblical text, we already have a 
certain impression about it.30 Acknowledging that our existential concerns affect how we address 
our issues in our textual analysis,31 Bultmann touches upon the nature or mode of our existence 
in our structure of explanation and understanding. We interpret because of our desire to interpret, 
26 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief. With 
a New Introduction by the Author (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 81. 
27 I use the words “West” and “Western” as a “contact zone” to stress the dynamic interaction that takes place in the 
encounter of cultures, lest the meanings of these terms are essentialized. Pratt defines “contact zone” as “social 
spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of 
domination and subordination – like colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe 
today.” See Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London and New York: 
Routeldge, 1992), 4. 
28 Rudolf Bultmann, “Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of 
Rudolf Bultmann. Selected, translated and introduced by Schubert M. Ogden (New York: Meridian, 1960), 289-96. 
While Lancaster argues that Bultmann also thinks that exegesis without presuppositions is possible, the 
presuppositions here refer to prejudices that predetermine the meaning of the text. See Sarah Heaner Lancaster, 
“Scriptural Criticism and Religious Perception,” in Gender, Tradition and Romans: Shared Ground, Uncertain 
Borders. Romans through History and Cultures Series. Edited by Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte (New York 
and London: T & T Clark International, 2005), 275-76. 
29 In his cross-cultural reading of the Analects and Galatians, Yeo writes: “At best the ‘exegesis/eisegesis’ concern 
might be a construct that assumes a scholar can transcend his culture and detach himself from his own time and 
place, yet be able to become immersed in the past and know it with certainty. At worst, the ‘exegesis/eisegesis’ 
differentiation is a scholarly fear of living in partial knowledge, the insecurity of shared ownership of any text, or the 
alienation of self from the network of texts with which we all work.” See K. K. Yeo, Musing With Confucius and 
Paul: Toward a Christian Chinese Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2008), 54.  
30 For example, Bal writes: “Texts by definition being semiotic constructs, necessitating the active participation of 
readers or listeners for their existence, the textual object is dynamic, unstable, elusive. To study it we cannot be 
content with merely analyzing the text; it is after all the attribution of meaning that constitutes it ... It is naive to 
believe that we can analyze without interpreting, that we can work and live without lending meaning to the world 
around us.” See Mieke Bal, Murder and Difference, 135-36. 
31 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 50. The importance of 
questioning is also highlighted in Gadamer’s dialectic question and answer. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and 
Method. Second, revised edition. Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2004), 356-71. 
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for a reason. Interpretation, in other words, is our systematic attempt to broaden our vision so 
that we can explain and understand “something” better. 
 However, if this “something” (in particular, our “gut feeling”)32 exists before our formal 
inquiry, then the methods we use to analyze and interpret it is inevitably marked by our first 
impression of it.33 But, we are not passive recipients of this impression either, since it has to pass 
through our flesh-and-blood for it to register on us. Recall Paul’s saying of “anyone who loves 
[God] is known [by God].” Speaking of this impression, which we cannot perceive all at once, 
Bultmann rightly contends that we are inevitably dependent upon existing “conceptuality made 
available by tradition...” 34 In other words, while our tradition can help us conceptualize the 
impression in certain ways and representations, it may also prevent us from seeing other 
conceptualities that are foreign and strange to our tradition. The task at hand is how our tradition 
can expand, not contract nor just consolidating, our existing conceptuality. This task is a 
challenge that we must undertake repeatedly because once we stop, we could objectify our 
tradition and turn it into an idol that reflects our own image and blinds our vision (see our 
discussion of the quest of “the historical Jesus” in the Methodological Appendix).35 
32 This notion of “gut feeling” is particularly prominent in the notions of honor and shame, which for biblical 
scholars, are the pivotal values in biblical worldview (see chapter 1). 
33 In his review of the development of hermeneutics, Thiselton writes: “In the era of the Church Fathers (up to 
around A.D. 500) and from the Reformation to the early nineteenth century, hermeneutics was regularly defined as 
‘rules for the interpretation of Scripture.’ Among many writers, although not all, hermeneutics was almost 
equivalent to exegesis … Only in the nineteenth century with Schleiermacher and especially in the later twentieth 
century with Hans-Georg Gadamer … did the notion emerge that hermeneutics was an art rather than a science.” See 
Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2009), 2. For 
Thiselton, the “concern for whole process [of explanation and understanding] as it involves author, text, reader, as 
an act of event of communication, distinguishes hermeneutics from exegesis… As such, hermeneutics also … [asks] 
critically what exactly we are doing when we read, understand, or apply texts. Hermeneutics explores the conditions 
and criteria that operate to try to ensure responsible, valid, fruitful, or appropriate interpretation.” Ibid., 4. 
34 Rudolf Bultmann, “On the Problem of Demythologizing,” in New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic 
Writings. Selected, edited, and translated by Schubert M. Ogden (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984), 107. 
35 See Pelikan’s warning: “Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living.” See 
the interview cited in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaroslav_Pelikan (accessed November 11, 2013). 
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 The conceptuality that we use to make sense of our lived experiences is contingent for 
several reasons.36 It is essential to remember that whomever/whatever we try to interpret should 
not be objectified as if s/he/it must fit our horizon of understanding. Such objectification leads to 
a confidence which is dangerous because that which can be represented could then be calculated, 
manipulated, replaced, and even traded. If the otherness of the other/Other can be categorized 
and represented, the other/Other have to appear according to our interpretation. If we can foresee 
them without seeing them, there is nothing new under the sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9).37 But, the fact 
that we become aware of our experience of someone/something implies that s/he/it refuses our 
gaze. This confrontation contests our egocentric tendency to grasp the other/Other. Here, we are 
36 When Bultmann overstresses the existentiality of interpretation, his demythologizing project subjects mythology 
to the lived experiences of the “I” (without exploring different possibilities of how the “I” is constituted, namely, the 
modes of existence such as autonomy, relationality, and heteronomy), and reduces the mythological or religious 
dimension of the text. Hence, many argue that Bultmann’s interpretation can be individualistic and private when he 
forgets the locality of his “conceptuality.” See Jean-Luc Marion, “The Possible and Revelation,” in The Visible and 
the Revealed. Translated by Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 9-
10; Ernst Käsemann, Jesus Means Freedom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968); Brian K. Blount, Cultural 
Interpretation: Reorienting New Testament Criticism (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 28-39. Käsemann argues 
that such existential orientation reduces the eschatological aspect of Paul’s message, since Butlmann 
overemphasizes human decision in the present at the expense of the sovereign power of God in the present and 
future, in which humans are caught in different spheres of powers that influence us. See Ernst Käsemann, “On the 
Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,” in New Testament Questions of Today. Translated by W. J. Montague 
(London: SCM Press, 1969), 108-37. Also, see J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life 
and Thought (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1980), 11-19. 
37 See Jean-Luc Marion, “What We See and What Appears,” in Idol Anxiety. Edited by Josh Ellenbogen and Aaron 
Tugendhaft (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 152-68. In the study of signs, where the signified refers to the 
concept that the sound image (signifier) points to, the original sign can then be replaced by another sign with a 
different signifier, which could be associated with a different signified. As a result, the signification of the original 
sign is reassigned, as the relation between the original signifier and signified is obscured. Hence Bal warns, “The 
sign must not be split into signifier and signified that each goes its own way, for if this split is radical the former 
without the latter is empty, form only, and the latter risks escaping from underneath the signifier and becoming myth, 
doxa, prejudice, falsity.” See Mieke Bal, Loving Yusuf: Conceptual Travels from Present to Past (Chicago; London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 163. Or we can think of Marxist critique of alienation in the forces and 
relations of production in a capitalist economy. Singer writes: “Capital is nothing else but accumulated labor. The 
worker’s labor increases the employer’s capital. This increased capital is used to build bigger factories and buy more 
machines. This increases the division of labor. This put more self-employed workers out of business. They must 
then sell their labor on the market. This intensifies the competition among workers trying to get work, and lowers 
wages … The more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes the alien objective world which he 
fashions against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, the less there is that belongs to him … The 
externalization of the worker in his product means not only that his work becomes an object, an external existence, 
but also that it exists outside him, independently, alien, an autonomous power, opposed to him. The life he has given 
to the object confronts him as hostile and alien.” See Peter Singer, Marx: A Very Short Introduction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 33-34. 
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not suggesting that the other/Other can never be grasped (and hence we can be indifferent to 
them or be subjected to them), which contradicts our everyday life experience. To say so is to 
reify the other/Other into some obscure transcendental figures, not to mention it also indirectly 
affirms our egocentric view of the others.38 Rather, we are saying that we can never grasp the 
other/Other completely, not to mention we are not static beings since our mood and social 
locations change from time to time. 
 Furthermore, the fact that we experience something implies that we somehow already 
interpret/feel it, even though we may not be able to articulate it. If our articulation of this initial 
feeling necessarily foregrounds and backgrounds the information/sense that are familiar and 
unfamiliar to us, then our conceptuality inevitably misses out that which does not appear against 
our horizons. It is critical to examine the context of our conceptuality, lest we absolutize it as if it 
is universally applicable to any other contexts. Given this irreducible tension (or gap) between 
concept and lived experience, we turn to Van Harvey’s “historian’s morality of knowledge.” 
[I]t is less helpful to talk about the historical method than it is to explore … the 
historian’s morality of knowledge, or ethic of assent; that it is more confusing to 
try to define historical understanding than it is to ask how historians go about 
justifying their claims; that it is more misleading to ask how one can verify a 
historical assertion than it is to explore numerous and diverse kinds of judgments 
historians make and the kinds of assent they solicit from their colleagues and 
readers.39 
 
One may be surprised by Harvey’s strong emphasis on the “historian’s morality of knowledge,” 
as it seems to hold the historians responsible and accountable for their critical historical inquiry. 
But, can we speak of the “historian’s morality of knowledge” in our critical historical inquiry? 
38  For example, see Daniel Patte’s comments on Gerald O. West’s project in “Reading with Gratitude: The 
Mysteries of ‘Reading Communities Reading Scripture,’” in Reading Communities Reading Scriptures: Essays in 
Honor of Daniel Patte. Edited by Gary A. Phillips and Nicole Wilkinson Duran (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 2002), 377-79. 
39 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, 33. 
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Why is our critical historical inquiry so intertwined with our “morality of knowledge”? In light 
of Stephen Toulmin’s structure of argument (i.e., “field of argument”) in which we use warrants 
from various fields to justify our argument, Harvey rightly contends that if “the historian’s canon 
for judgments about the past is the same canon he uses in making judgments about the 
present,”40 then “[t]he real issue is not whether history can be objective or a science but whether, 
in particular cases, diverse kinds of claims can achieve an appropriate and relevant 
justification.”41 If the distinction between “how we come to know something and how we go 
about justifying what we have come to know”42 cannot be fused, even though they may be 
intertwined, then the social locations, and in fact, the very body through which we “come to 
know something” cannot be sidelined in critical biblical studies. 
 
III. An Inter-Corporeal Hermeneutics 
The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I 
have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is 
inexhaustible.43 – Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
 In critiquing Edmund Husserl’s overemphasis on the “transcendental ego” that tends to 
overlook our kinetic facticity or situatedness in the constitution and essence of objects as they 
40 Ibid., 98. 
41 Ibid., 55. For Harvey, the tension between “secular historiography and traditional Christian belief … is best seen, 
not when we focus on the nature of historical explanation as such, but when we ask about the kinds of justifications 
that are appropriate for certain kinds of historical statements … By concentrating on the problem of the justification 
of historical assertions, it is possible to throw into relief the subjective process of judgment itself, and only when this 
process of judgment is understood does it become clear why the basic but unspoken issue between the historian and 
the believer is a difference concerning intellectual integrity, the morality of knowledge.” Ibid., 46-47. 
42 Ibid., 91. Harvey writes: “This distinction is important, because some historians who insist that history is the 
reenactment of past thought or experience sometimes talk as if the historian had some special intuitive powers by 
virtue of which he could ‘get inside’ other minds in a self-authenticating fashion. They argue that the historian does 
not infer what the agent is thinking or feeling but grasps it immediately and directly. Moreover, these historians 
sometimes insist that they historian does not have merely a thought or experience similar to the subject he is 
investing, but an identical one. He does not only rethink the thought of a past agent but has the identical thought.” 
Ibid., 92. 




                                                          
appear to one’s consciousness, 44  Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) (Husserl’s former assistant) 
argues for one’s embedded-ness in the world. The focus is shifted from how an object appears to 
our intentionality to how an object gives itself from itself to itself. For Heidegger, whose lectures 
Bultmann attended as he attended Bultmann’s at the University of Marburg, as human beings 
(Da-sein, “being-there”) are already there, “thrown” (geworfen) into the “world” (Welt), we are 
always vulnerably in relations with others in our own contexts.45 We cannot help but be marked 
by our tradition and language. Our consciousness of “something” is already affected before we 
are conscious of that “something.” We cannot bracket out our anxiety and care for the “world” in 
our analysis of the meaning of our existence, as Husserl suggests. We are inevitably affected in 
the act and process of bracketing, 46 not to mention what we bracket out the frames of our 
meaning production. We should not mistake the manifestations of Being (Sein) in beings 
(Seienden) for Being itself (i.e., the transcendental condition for being which is also nothing 
apart from beings), as the Being is that which gives and allows the beings “to be.” 
 Although Heidegger also stresses relationality (viz., “being-with-others” in the manner of 
“being-for-one-another”) in his attempt to elucidate the meaning of Being (of beings) through the 
44 I highlight “tends to” because Husserl does mention our situatedness and embodied perception of the world as the 
result of intersubjectivity. For example, see Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Translated by David Carr (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970); idem., Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy. II: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz 
and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002). Nonetheless, the critique of Huserl’s lack of 
consistent examination of one’s situatedness is still valid. See Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientation, 
Objects, Others (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 1-64. 
45 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: 
HarperSanFranciso, 1962). See pages 78-86 (§12). The sense of relationality in terms of “being-with” others in the 
world is not always maintained, however. For instance, see the critique of Jean-Luc Nancy in “The being-with of 
being-there,” Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2008): 1-15. 
46  In light of this situatedness, Porter and Robinson thus write: “no matter how thorough and objective the 
interpretation may seem [which the authors argue is the aim of interpretation set by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-
1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), and Husserl (1859-1938)], it will always be at least partially determined by 
presuppositions and prejudgments.” See Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to 
Interpretive Theory (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 10. Indeed, whatever that we bracket out 
recedes to the background, informing and framing whatever that we do not bracket out. 
14 
 
                                                          
analysis of the “not worldless” (weltlose) Dasein, he focuses on the (universal) individual as the 
one who must make the decision in the face of possibilities of life situations. This focus back to 
the self is problematic. It suggests a self that is self-controlled, sufficient, and even alienated 
from the world. In his analysis of colonial discourse, Edward Said stresses the interrogation of 
the “worldliness” of the critics and texts.47 For Said, if we are the product and the production of 
our “worldliness,” 48  we must examine the material conditions of our “being-in-the-world.” 
Regardless of how we render our “being-in-the-world,” our “worldliness” or relation with others 
is both a gap and a link to our understanding of ourselves and others, since in our “thrownness,” 
we are inextricably both the “subjects” and the “objects.” 
 Working on the “being-with-others-in-the-world” insight of his teacher Heidegger, Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) further highlights the importance of questioning that can challenge, 
broaden, and open up our horizon of understanding. Following Heidegger, Gadamer argues that 
our pre-understanding (or “preliminary understanding,” as Anthony Thiselton puts it) 49  is 
indispensable to our interpretation of the text and life situation. Whatever we try to make sense 
of, we have to start somehow, somewhere (or anywhere) that can help us relate to the text at 
hand.50 Our pre-understanding mediates and enables us to have further (and hopefully, better) 
understanding, so on and so forth.51 Through the metaphor of an ongoing “fusion of horizons” 
47 See Edward W. Said, The World, The Text, And the Critic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); 
idem, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
48 Or as Berger points out, in making sense of our world, we constantly demythologize and remythologize our 
symbolic world. See Peter L. Berger, A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovering of the Supernatural 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969); idem, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. 
Reprint (New York: Anchor Books, 1990). 
49 See Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 12, 32. 
50 “A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as 
soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the 
text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is 
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there.” See 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 269. 
51 This hermeneutical circle is comparable to Ricoeur’s notions of first and second naïveté. See Paul Ricoeur, The 
Symbolism of Evil. Translated by Emerson Buchanan (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), 351. 
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(like a dialectic dialogue or an open-ended hermeneutical “circle”) that makes new horizon 
appear,52 Gadamer argues for the possibility of understanding (the fusion between the past and 
the present as well as the fusion between the interpreter and the text). He also stresses that our 
understanding is always contextual, dynamics, and incomplete. For Gadamer, if a conversation 
“has a spirit of its own,” then vulnerability and the risk of “fall[ing] into conversation” 53 
characterize our process of understanding. A genuine understanding, in other words, is what 
happens to us; it cannot be pre-designed, as if we can control it. It is an event that grasps and 
holds us open to the spirit of conversation. 54 As such, the process of interpretation can be 
unpredictable and messy. 
 Highlighting the messiness of our interpretive process, Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) 
speaks of a con-fusion of horizons that argues that the fusion of horizons is not harmonious but 
interruptive, since the fusion may suggest that the other can thus be co-opted and fused.55 But, 
fused according to whose horizon in this “con”-fusion? The otherness of the other/Other cannot 
be reduced. S/he/it is not an instrument that helps one to understand oneself better. In the 
language of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-95), the face of the other/Other cannot be dis-regarded; 
52 I put “circle” in quotation marks because “circle” seems to indicate a sense of totality, neatness, continuity, and 
lack of space and time in our process of making sense of our experience, which I do not wish to suggest. 
53  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 385. Emphasis added. One may critique Gadamer for being too 
optimistic since the “fusion of horizons” assumes that people will want to undertake the “fusion” to correct 
themselves in their understanding of the other. Gadamer, however, wants to argue that a dialogue or conversation, in 
a Platonic style, can at least allow horizons to come into contact with each other. This contact can initiate and 
encourage further conversation, and thus, possibly results in a better understanding of each horizon. 
54 In the words of Porter and Robinson concerning Gadamer’s notion of understanding, “understanding is not 
something [that which] we grasp through experimental isolation and interrogation but that which grasps us as an 
experience or an event of meaning outside of our control.” See Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson, 
Hermeneutics, 10. 
55 For example, see the debate between Gadamer and Derrida: Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida 
Encounter. Edited by Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1989). For an overview, see Chantélle Swartz and Paul Cilliers, “Dialogue Disrupted: Derrida, Gadamer and the 
Ethics of Discussion.” S. Afr. J. Philos. 22 (2003): 1-18. 
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the face of the other/Other confronts us and commands us: “Thou shalt not kill.”56 The face that 
we abuse or simply ignore will haunt us and mark our own face in return. Indeed for Derrida,57 
the trace of the other cannot be erased or incorporated into any horizon of understanding. We can 
only speak of the other in terms of a trace or a possibility of condition.58 Once the other is named, 
s/he/it disappears: s/he/it has to appear according to the horizon that identifies it “as such.” In 
fact, for Derrida, the self or the subject does not have a pure self-presence. We are always 
already in relations with others. So even when we speak of an intersubjective “fusion,” we need 
to clarify how the subject and the other are constituted, lest we erase or reify the other. This 
Levinasian shift to an asymmetrical position in which one is always already addressed by the 
other59 can, however, lead to exploitation when the other is objectified and represented.60 
 Our purpose in highlighting both the positive and negative aspects of this prior calling or 
address of/by the other – the positive concerns preventing one from being egocentric and the 
negative entails subjecting one to the power of the other – is to stress that one is always already 
56 See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, 
PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 187-219; idem, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 
Translated by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985). 
57 Derrida finds hints of violence in this focus on alterity through the use of language. See Jacques Derrida, 
“Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” in Writing and Difference. Translated 
with an Introduction and Additional Notes by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 79-153. 
58 Derrida writes: “The trace (of that) which can never be presented, the trace which itself can never be presented… 
Always different and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting 
itself, muffles itself in resonating...” See Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy. Translated, with 
Additional Notes by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 23. 
59 A similar argument is also made by Jean-Louis Chrétien, “The Wounded Word: The Phenomenology of Prayer,” 
in The Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2000), 147-76. 
60 One can think of the Althusserian notion of “interpellation,” where we are “always-already interpellated by 
ideology as subjects.” See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation),” in Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 1984), 50. While one can certainly ignore the vocative 
hailing, as Butler suggests in light of Foucault’s argument that power is exercised from multiple locations and 
directions, the ability to disregard the interpellation often assumes that the hailed is of similar power position as that 
of the hailer, which is not necessarily the case. Nonetheless, the fieldworks of James Scott tells us that even the 
oppressed may exercise power indirectly against the dominant power. See Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A 
Politics of the Performative (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 
Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 81-102; James C. Scott, 




                                                          
in relationships with others in the world. From the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), 
we further learn that the experience of our sensation and perception of the world is also always 
already embodied.61 It is through our flesh-and-blood body that we feel, think, sense, comport 
ourselves, and act.62 This body’s operative intentionality in terms of an intertwining phenomenon 
of the visible and the invisible foregrounds the vital and most apparent but neglected aspect our 
interpretive process: our flesh-and-blood body. 
 Not only is our perception of the world bodily oriented, our body also feels, thinks, and 
acts. As such, our notion of intersubjectivity cannot ignore the body and flesh in its social 
location. Hence, an intersubjective hermeneutic is necessarily an inter-corporeal hermeneutic. 
Why? Because we are always already “thrown” into the world together with each other insofar 
as the world is part of us. In their studies of various interpretive models in cognitive science, 
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch agree with Merleau-Ponty and argue that 
our experience is both “emergent” and “enactive” in the sense that our mind is a part of the very 
world that it experiences, discovers, and makes sense of.63 Our mind is not only embodied in the 
world of bodies that it seeks to understand, it also co-arises with it in the sense that our 
perception of the world is bodily or proprioceptively embedded in the world. This fundamental 
61 In fact, Merleau-Ponty writes that our body is “enveloped” in the world in such a way that “If my arm is resting 
on the table I should never think of saying that it is beside the ashtray in the way in which the ash-tray is beside the 
telephone. The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is because its parts 
are inter-related in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other.” See Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 112. 
62 “Perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up of a position; it is the 
background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed by them. The world is not an object such that I have in 
my possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit 
perceptions.” Ibid., xi-xii. 
63 They write: “Minds awaken in a world. We did not design our world. We simply found ourselves with it; we 
awoke both to ourselves and to the world we inhabit. We come to reflect on that world as we grow and live. We 
reflect on a world that is not made, but found, and yet it is our structure that enables us to reflect on this world. Thus 
in reflection we find ourselves in a circle: we are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that 
world is not separate from us.” See Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: 
Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA; London, UK: The MIT Press, 1993), 3. 
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feature of our flesh-and-blood body in interpretive process, according to Julia Kristeva, is also 
inevitably inscribed in our writings. 
 Adapting the “mirror stage” of Jacques Lacan (1901-81) where the identity of the subject 
is split in the beginning stage of her/his awareness of her/himself, Kristeva argues for a caring 
split in terms of an intertwining of “the semiotic” and “the symbolic” in our signifying process.64 
For her, “the semiotic” is the pre-linguistic and rhythmic aspect of our bodily drive and feeling 
that undergird “the symbolic,”65 which are the grammar, rules and regulations that categorize 
and organize our bodies and society. Even though “the semiotic” is prior to “the symbolic,” as 
the latter seeks to regulate the former, they cannot be separated. Without “the semiotic” element, 
the society will suffer from the lack of creativity and imagination and becomes mechanical and 
monotonous. Without “the symbolic” element, the society will become chaotic. A functional 
person, family, or society requires both “the semiotic” and “the symbolic.” In his analyses of 
Ancient Near East and Egyptian legal papyri, Yochanan Muffs even shows how certain formal 
and legal terms and formulas are emotive and poetic in character (see chapter 1).66 Likewise, in 
his clinical studies, Antonio Damasio finds that “certain aspects of the process of emotion and 
64 I use “holistic” because as Oliver argues, the split is not the result of hostility but love because it allows the 
subject grow as an individual. See Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-Bind (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 68. 
65 See Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language. Introduction by Leon S. Roudiez. Translated by Margaret 
Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 13-106. 
66 See Yochanan Muffs, Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri from Elephantine. Prolegomenon by Baruch A. Levine 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). Elsewhere, Muffs writes: “Law is a synthesis of form and content, yet it is formal 
only on the surface … I passionately disliked the proscriptive element in what was usually called law – the coercive, 
the anti-life, the limiting. Then, suddenly, I realized that ancient legal documents were telling a story, and that they 
told this story by a series of interrelated metaphorical clauses, clauses that had about them a poetic quality… For 
example, in ancient sale documents we come across three interrelated terms: ‘My heart is satisfied,’ ‘I remove 
myself from you,’ and ‘You are now in control of the property.’ I was shocked to realize that in the supposedly rigid 
and prosaic context of a sale document, one regularly found such metaphorical terms. I assumed that the ancients 
knew what they were doing, and that ‘satisfaction of the heart’ must refer to something well-defined and specific, 
binding yet not deadening, a mid-ground between primal feeling and abstraction.” See idem, Love and Joy: Law, 
Language and Religion in Ancient Israel (New York and Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 
1992), 1. I want to thank Dr. Annalisa Azzoni for bringing this to my attention. 
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feelings are indispensable for rationality,”67 since they help us make distinctions and decisions. 
Feelings are not only “as cognitive as other percepts,”68 they are also “the direct perception of a 
specific landscape: that of the body,”69 where “our most refined thoughts and best actions, our 
greatest joys and deepest sorrows, use the body as a yardstick.”70 With his notion of “themata,”71 
Gerald Holton, likewise, argues for the role of convictions (which cannot be demonstrated 
logically) in the field of science.72 In the words of a charismatic Christian philosopher, this 
conviction is a way and a kind of precognitive knowing that is “I know that I know that I 
know,”73 in which “we [Pentecostal/Charismatic Christians] feel our way around the world more 
than we think about it, before we think about it.”74 
 In the language of sign that delineates the relation between the signified and signifier, the 
notions of embodied mind and feeling in our perception of the world can be illustrated in terms 
67 See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 
1994), xiii. 
68 Ibid., xv. 
69 Ibid., xiv. 
70 Ibid., xvi. Damasio writes: “(I) The human brain and the rest of the body constitute an indissociable organism, 
integrated by means of mutually interactive biochemical and neural regulatory circuits (including endocrine, 
immune, and autonomic neural components); (2) The organism interacts with the environment as an ensemble: the 
interaction is neither of the body alone nor of the brain alone; (3) The physiological operations that we call mind are 
derived from the structural and functional ensemble rather than from the brain alone: mental phenomena can be fully 
understood only in the context of an organism's interacting in an environment. That the environment is, in part, a 
product of the organism's activity itself, merely underscores the complexity of interactions we must take into 
account.” Ibid., xvi-xvii.  
71 That is, “fundamental presuppositions, notions, terms, methodological judgments and decisions … which are 
themselves neither directly evolved from, nor resolvable into, objective observation on the one hand, or logical, 
mathematical, and other formal analytical ratiocination on the other hand.” See Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins of 
Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein. Rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA; London, England: Harvard University Press, 
1988), 41. 
72  Holton writes: “Cases abound that give evidence of the role of ‘unscientific’ preconceptions, passionate 
motivations, varieties of temperament, intuitive leaps, serendipity or sheer bad luck, not to speak of the incredible 
tenacity with which certain ideas have been held despite the fact that they conflicted with the plain experimental 
evidence, or the neglect of theories that would have quickly solved an experimental puzzle. None of these elements 
fit in with the conventional model of the scientist; they seem unlikely to yield to rational study; and yet they play a 
part in scientific work.” Ibid., 8. 
73 See James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids, 
MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2010), 48-85. 
74 Ibid., 72. 
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of an obscure distance between the signified and signifier.75 The obscure distance implies a pre-
linguistic phenomenon, in particular when our perception of the world is inevitably embodied. In 
the experience of such embodied perception, we can only think of the relations of signs (instead 
of the distinction into the signified and signifier), as Aline Patte and Daniel Patte suggest in their 
analysis of deep values or religious convictions of the biblical text.76 It is the pattern of relations 
that we need to flesh out when the signified and signified of a sign are so intertwined together. 
 In chapter 2, we will see that this pattern of relations is typological and metaphorical in 
nature. As a “[m]etaphor turns the novel familiar (by the familiar), so as to turn the familiar 
novel (by the novel now-turned-familiar),”77 it also concretizes or abstractizes the signification 
of a metaphor. Using speech-act theory, we can venture to say that a metaphor is simultaneously 
locutionary (utterance), illocutionary (performative speech), and perlocutionary (effects of 
speech).78 Addressing the metaphorical language of Egyptian love poems and the Song of Songs 
in the Hebrew Bible, Michael V. Fox writes: “Without a bond between the terms, metaphorical 
predication is not comprehensible, but without significant metaphoric distance it is banal.”79 
Implied in this observation is that the interpretation of a metaphor needs to be imaginative and 
contextual (e.g., the measurement of engine power in terms of “horse-power”). The metaphor 
engages the interpreter as s/he tries to interpret it, in particular if one argues that language is 
75 Why such an obscurity? Because when the signified and signifier are simultaneously denotative and connotative, 
our determination for a referential marker, which the sign, signified, or signifier tries to point to and hinge one, can 
become really messy. 
76 See Aline Patte and Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice (Exegesis of Mark 15 and 16: 
Hermeneutical Implications) (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978), 101-02. 
77 Kuang-Ming Wu, On Metaphoring: A Cultural Hermeneutic (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2001), 3. 
78 For example, see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
79 Michael V. Fox, “Love, Passion, and Perception in Israelite and Egyptian Love Poetry,” JBL 102/2 (1983): 226. 
In her study of Ancient Near Eastern love lyrics, Westenholz points out the “extreme plasticity” and “capacity” of 
metaphors and symbols “to refer to several levels of perception at the same time. Not only can the same metaphor be 
used in different contexts with quite different meaning, but it may even have several meanings at the same time in 
the same text.” See Joan Goodnick Westenholz, “Love Lyrics from the Ancient Near East,” in Civilizations of the 
Ancient Near East. Vol. 4. Edited by Jack M. Sasson et al (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1995), 2483. 
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metaphorical in nature. A metaphor that makes a certain sense in one context may signify 
something else in another context. Since a term of the metaphor can be viewed in terms of 
something other than itself, there is a creative and tensive relation between the two terms. 
Because of this dynamic tension in the metaphor, what a metaphor signifies cannot be reduced to 
whether it is factually real or true. 80 A metaphor does not allow us to control its range of 
referential markers in its signification since it figuratively and rhetorically suspends and 
transforms the literal relation between the two terms of juxtaposition. 
 Now, if a metaphor can extend, retract, and create new meaning through the juxtaposition 
of two terms, without erasing their individual distinctions, then one can say that a “metaphor is a 
self-transcending thrust to and fro between the self and the other, the familiar and the novel, to 
inter-change all of them,”81 as Kuang-Ming Wu argues in his analysis of Chinese embodied and 
(complementary) yin-yang worldview.82 That is to say, as a metaphor facilitates the comparison 
of two terms of different semantic fields, it can foreground the obscure aspects of each thing that 
will otherwise remain hidden. Once the obscurity is brought to light, both the similarities and 
differences between them become less rigid but more dynamic. What is foreign in the others may 
surprisingly be found in the self and what is familiar in the self may be strangely discovered in 
the other. A metaphor not only transforms the relations between the self and the other, it also 
80 For example, Brümmer writes, “all the metaphors and models employed in God-talk are primarily relational: they 
are intended to indicate the ways in which we are to relate to God. If we call God a rock, this is meant primarily to 
indicate the way in which we can depend upon God and only in a secondary, implied sense to make the factual 
statement about God, that he is the kind of Being on whom we can depend in this way.” See Vincent Brümmer, The 
Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 19. 
81 Kuang-Ming Wu, On Metaphoring, 3. 
82 Here, I find Smith’s notion of worldview, following the definition of worldview propounded by James Olthuis, 
close to that of our Chinese understanding as “a framework of fundamental beliefs,” in which “to speak of a 
worldview is to speak about our most fundamental orientation to the world; a framework that operates even prior to 
thought; a passional orientation of our imagination that filters and explains our experience of the world. It operates 
unconsciously at the very core of our identity.” See James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues, 29. 
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transforms one’s vision of the other and the self. In fact, each time a metaphor is interpreted (by 
a flesh-and-blood person), it becomes a different metaphor. 
 Thus regardless of how much we may want to suppress and eliminate emotions and (gut) 
feelings from reason – such an urge is also a manifestation of that which we seek to eradicate83 – 
feelings, emotions, and reasons are metaphorically intertwined because of the shared flesh-and-
blood body. Likewise, regardless of how much we seek to order and articulate our feelings in 
writings, the grammar cannot contain the dynamic bodily drive in feelings.84 By restoring the 
flesh-and-blood feature of body into our interpretive process, we cannot fix our process of 
meaning production (unless our social location, mood, and feeling are static) and treat the 
characters in the text as if they are static and without flesh-and-blood characteristics. The 
representation that results from the signifying process, if it can be formulated, has to be tentative. 
The challenge lies in how to flesh out these characteristics in/of the texts. 
 
IV. A Dynamic Inter-Corporeal Hermeneutics in Action 
 In his later works on structural semiotics, A. J. Greimas (1917-92) takes feelings 
seriously in his description of the way the subject and the other are constituted in the subject’s 
interpretation of texts. This notion of “feeling” is the “gut feeling,” the feeling of absolute 
83 Attempts to rule out what cannot be categorized and justify the exclusion of the strangeness and otherness of the 
other are well illustrated in Kristeva’s notion of “abjection” and Agamben’s notion of “state of exception” (i.e., the 
“inclusive exclusion”). For example, see Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by 
Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); idem, Strangers to Ourselves. Translated by Leon 
S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
84 As Kristeva points out, a text can be described in terms of a “genotext” that highlights the “semiotic” process of 
bodily drive and a “phenotext” that enforces the operation of the syntax. It is important to note that both of these 
types of texts are present in a same text, even though one may be more prominent than the other. See Julia Kristeva, 
“Genotext and Phenotext,” in Revolution in Poetic Language, 86-89. 
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dependence,85 or the mysterium tremendum et fascinans (the tremendous and fascinating mystery 
that evokes awe)86 that scholars try to describe and analyze. What stands out in this approach is 
the interpenetration of the border between the “semantics” (i.e., “gut feeling”) and the “syntax” 
(i.e., grammar) in the process of meaning production (see the Methodological Appendix), where 
the intersection of the “semantics” and “syntax” is also dynamic. So while the subject is 
dislocated from a nominative “I” to an accusative “me” or a vocative “me,” s/he needs to be able 
to register the encounter in order to respond to it. 
 In the language of Jean-Luc Marion, the subject is a dative “to me” in the sense that the 
subject is constituted in response to what happens to her/him (cf. 1 Cor. 4:7; Gal. 2:20; Rom. 
6:3-4). In a group-oriented culture, the dative “to me” not only addresses me as a part of the 
community, it also shows that my experience takes place in the abandoning of my egocentricity. 
In the language of Paul, it is in the encounter with the other/Other that I receive myself, where I 
no longer live, but Christ lives in me (cf. Gal. 2:20). Indeed, the dative “to me” or “to my flesh 
and blood” speaks of a dynamic space between the subject and the other. The response, however, 
need not be a conscious one; some responses are beyond the subject’s control. As my flesh-and-
blood body can instinctively respond to a confrontation without my awareness and decision, my 
flesh delivers me to myself, making me sense/feel the encounter. The traumatic shock from an 
accident, the feeling of falling in love, the overwhelming ecstasy and sorrow are some obvious 
examples. The encounter can also individuate the subject and the other not only because it 
happens in a specific encounter but also because it simultaneously brings to light personal appeal 
85 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Translated by Richard Crouter 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and idem, The Christian Faith. Edited by H. R. MacKintosh and J. 
S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989). 
86 See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy. Translated by John W. Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958). 
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and resistance. Through such an “en-counter,” as the word’s etymology suggests, things may 
then appear differently to both the subject and the other. 
 The sense of dative “to me” in one’s subjectivity in her/his social location is well 
encapsulated in Greimas’s structural semiotics that highlights the conditions of possibility of 
meaning in our interpretation of texts. 87 As the preposition “to” indicates, our understanding of 
the other and self is always an ongoing process. There is a non-reducible distance between the 
subject and the other (or the text) as well as a distance within the subject her/himself. The subject, 
in a sense, is “subjected” to the other, including her/his bodily drive and feeling that cannot be 
entirely controlled. So, even though “I” seeks to grasp the other (including the “self” of the 
other), “I” always finds the other slip away. The “I” is an integrated “I.” This inevitable slippage 
can prevent the other from being objectified. In the language of Luce Irigaray, the “indirection” 
of “to” is an interstitial space that sustains the distance of mystery between the subject and the 
other while connecting them.88 In other words, this paradoxical notion of “to” is a meeting site of 
a co-arising “we” that speaks of “I” and the other. It is an “I” in terms of a “we” and an “other” 
in terms of a “we” because we are always already interconnected from the beginning.89 
 Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) also shows how the interpreter goes through stages of liminal 
experience in her/his reading of a text, from “prefiguration” to “refiguration” through 
87 See Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical 
Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990), 25-72. Also, see Ronald Schleifer, A. J. Greimas and the Nature of 
Meaning: Linguistic, Semiotics and Discourse Theory (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), xviii-xxv. 
88 See Luce Irigaray, “I Love To You,” in I Love To You: Sketch for a Felicity within History, 109-13. 
89 Or as Olthuis put it, “The birth of a self and an identity is a bestowal of the love of others, birthed in and through 
the love shown by others. The human self is intersubjective: in the we there is the I; in the I there is the we. The self 
finds its center in mutuality. Consequently, the healthy decentering of the modernist self as self-centering need not 
lead to the postmodern non-self, but to a recentering of the self in relations of love in community.” See James H. 
Olthuis, “Crossing the Threshold: Sojourning Together in the Wild Spaces of Love,” in The Hermeneutics of 
Charity: Interpretation, Selfhood, and Postmodern Faith: Studies in Honor of James H. Olthuis. Edited by James K. 
A. Smith and Henry Isaac Venema (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 34. 
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“configuration” or immersing oneself in the “emplotment of character.”90 That is to say, the 
interpreter receives a new sense of self and the text as s/he inhabits the text and becomes 
contemporaneous with the “world of the text.” Or as Paul put it, one is refigured through the 
configuration of the cross (cf. 1 Cor. 15:35-36; Rom. 6:1-14). Such re-configuration is not 
without discordance. The formation of one’s identity is always in process. As in the operation of 
a metaphor, both the interpreter and the text address and transform one another. While the 
interpreter can certainly control her/his reading of the text and refuses to receive anything from 
the text, the resistance is still a reaction to the text. The reaction suggests that the text has 
addressed the interpreter. A certain sense or meaning has been made with the text. Even if it is 
nonsensical and nonsense, it is still felt by the interpreter; this suggests that the interpreter is not 
simply a passive recipient of that which is felt. It is this attention to the “felt” dimension of 
meaning and its articulation in different ways that draws me to Greimas’s theory of meaning. 
 Without presupposing a model of the communication process, as Umberto Eco initially 
did, 91  Greimas emphasizes that meaning is relational and multidimensional. This notion of 
meaning as meaning effect suggests that the textuality of a text and its effects are beyond one’s 
intentionality. As the interface or face-to-face encounter between the “semantics” (i.e., “gut 
feeling”) and the “syntax” (i.e., grammar) constantly interrupts each other’s limits, the limits 
become the sites of tension, creativity, and transformation. As anything can become meaningful 
to the enunciator and enunciatee, the signifying process is fluid and endless. The process of 
meaning production is unpredictable. It cannot be neatly calculated and formulated. A sight (or a 
90 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Vol. I., 52-87. 
91 While Eco first focuses on the communication process on how meaning is coded and decoded, with meaning 
understood in terms of communication and representation, he later stresses the contextual role of the reader in the 
communication process. That is to say, if the reader is a flesh-and-blood reader whose decoding of the text is 
unpredictable though delimited by the textual syntax, then meaning needs to be studied contextually. Any model of 
communication already assumes and privileges certain pre-understanding that is always already socio-culturally 
characterized. See Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979); idem, 
The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984). 
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smell, touch, taste, sound/noise, feeling, thought, saying, doing, etc. of something or someone) 
can surprisingly evoke and generate (unintended) meaning. Such a sense of meaning, moreover, 
is not static. The flesh-and-blood readers always are in the process of changing – an insight 
found at the core of Greimas’s theory.92 The center is always elsewhere, dynamic, in the midst of 
the flux of changes. So, in his “generative trajectory” (parcours génératif), Greimas makes it 
clear that the generation and transformation of meaning is always discursive and contextual.93 As 
meaning is felt and engendered from the dynamic interactions of various factors such as the 
reader’s social locations, moods, literary competency, etc. in deciphering the text, meaning is 
therefore a “meaning effect.” In other words, meaning is the meaning effect of difference. 
 The implication of such “discursivization” is significant. For example, while some may 
find Paul’s writing contradictory,94 such inconsistencies may not be incoherent if we consider the 
flesh-and-blood readers in the structure and condition of meaning production. A good illustration 
is J. Christiaan Beker’s notions of the contingency and coherence of the gospel in Paul’s letters95 
92 This point is highlighted in Algirdas Julien Greimas and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions: From 
States of Affairs to States of Feeling. Translated by Paul Perron and Frank Collins. Foreword by Paul Perron and 
Paolo Fabrri (Minnesota, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). The focus on the qualification of the 
characters/actants in the text is also emphasized in structural exegesis in biblical studies since late 1970s. See Aline 
Patte and Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice. 
93 See Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Joseph Courtés, “Generative Trajectory,” in Semiotics and Language: An 
Analytical Dictionary, Vol. I. Translated by Larry Crist, Daniel Patte, James Lee, Edward McMahon II, Gary 
Phillips, and Michael Rengstorf (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 132-34. 
94 For example, see Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983). 
95 See J. Christiaan Beker, Paul The Apostle. For a condense version of the book, see idem, The Triumph of God: 
The Essence of Paul’s Thought. Translated by Loren T. Stuckenbruck (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990). 
Here, Keck’s clarification about Paul’s logic of argument is noteworthy: “Still, arguments adduced to persuade 
others are not to be confused with the persuader’s own thinking about the subject matter the arguments reflect. To 
recognize this distinction is not to accuse Paul of thinking one thing and saying another but rather to acknowledge 
the difference between cognition and persuasion. The track along which Paul sought to move his readers’ thinking is 
not necessarily the same track along which his own thinking had already moved.” See Leander E. Keck, “Paul as 
Thinker,” Interpretation 47.1 (January 1993): 27. In his discussion of the Greco-Roman reciprocity system in Paul’s 
“collection project,” which is related the notion of gift in Paul’s vision of love (see chapter 7), Joubert writes, “In 
terms of the so-called ‘coherence-contingency’ scheme of Paul’s hermeneutic, he used the ‘stable, constant 
elements’ which underlay the ‘ideological’ basis of his gospel to persuade his communities to participate in the 
collection. He also employed new strategies and theological motives, which were necessitated by specific situations 
that he had to deal with, in order to reveal the ‘true’ nature of the collection. In this regard, Paul constantly 
emphasized the religious nature of this project which involved his communities in a reciprocal relationship not only 
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or Patte’s notions of the warranting and dialogical levels in Paul’s didactic discourse (see 
chapters 3 and 4).96 The fluidity of meaning suggests that a text is more than a text. Depending 
on when, where, why, and how we read it, we focus on certain textual elements and aspects. As a 
result, a printed page can produce many texts. This phenomenon of “textualization” should not 
surprise us.97  It is not unlike the way we can have different witness accounts of a same event. 
Hence, in Paul’s letter to the Corinthian believers, to take a simple example, we should not 
confuse the contingent/dialogical dimension with the coherent/warranting dimension of the letter, 
which is often symbolic, metaphorical, or typological in nature.98 As the former seeks to express 
with Jerusalem, but also with God. Although the theological principles basic to Paul’s convictional framework, such 
as the impact or God’s grace and the Christ-event on the lives of believers, played a central role in his understanding 
of the collection, he also intertwined his thinking with praxis.” See Stephan Joubert, Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, 
Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 200), 6. Joubert’s notions of 
ideology, convictional framework, and theological principles are not clearly differentiated and clarified, however. 
96 See Daniel Patte, “Method for a Structural Exegesis of Didactic Discourses: Analyses of 1 Thessalonians,” 
Semeia 26 (1983): 85-129. For the result of such interpretive approach, see idem, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the 
Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). 
97 This “textualization” phenomenon is comparable to Derrida’s notion of “doubling commentary”: “This moment of 
doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in a critical reading. To recognize and respect all its classical 
exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition and this 
respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything. 
But this indispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading. Yet if reading must not be 
content with doubling the text, it cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a 
referent (a reality that is metaphysical, historical, psychobiographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside the text 
whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, that is to say, in the sense that we give 
here to that word, outside of writing in general.” See Jacques Derrida, “… That Dangerous Supplement …,” in Of 
Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
press, 1976), 158; idem, “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” in Limited Inc. Edited by Gerald Graff 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 111-54. Ricoeur also speaks of a similar idea in terms of first 
trait and second trait of reading. He writes: “I would like to consider the act of reading as a dynamic activity that is 
not confined to repeating significations fixed forever, but which takes place as a prolonging of the itineraries of 
meaning opened up by the work of interpretation. Through this first trait, the act of reading accords with the idea of 
a norm-governed productivity to the extent that it may be said to be guided by a productive imagination at work in 
the text itself. Beyond this, I would like to see in the reading of a text such as the Bible a creative operation 
unceasingly employed in decontextualizing its meaning and recontextualizing it in today’s Sitz-im-Leben. Through 
this second trait, the act of reading realizes the union of fiction and redescription that characterizes the imagination 
in the most pregnant sense of this term.” See Paul Ricoeur, “The Bible and the Imagination,” in Figuring the Sacred, 
145. 
98 Beker writes: “Paul’s coherent center must be viewed as a symbolic structure in which a primordial experience 
(Paul’s call) is brought into language in a particular way. The symbolic structure comprises the language in which 
Paul expresses the Christ-event. That language is, for Paul, the apocalyptic language in Judaism, in which he lived 
and thought…” See J. Christiaan Beker, Paul The Apostle, 15. Likewise, Patte speaks of the warranting level in 
Paul’s letter in terms of a convictional pattern or self-evident truth that cannot be demonstrated logically. See Paul’s 
Faith and the Power of the Gospel, xiii-30. 
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the latter in a concrete way that is understandable to a targeted audience, it is a specific and 
contextual manifestation of the latter.  
 Now if the Corinthian believers already accepted the gospel that Paul proclaimed, then 
the letter probably aims to either affirm and strengthen the belief-practice or redirect and 
transform the belief-practice that Paul thinks has gone astray. So while the coherent/warranting 
dimension remains more or less the same in various letters (as, after all, it evinces Paul’s 
fundamental conviction), the contingent/dialogical dimension in these letters can vary according 
to Paul’s perception of the need of the group. Within the same letter, the contingent/dialogical 
dimension may also have layers of discourses that aim to reinforce the coherent/warranting 
dimension that Paul has initially taught the believers, in brief, his convictions that are 
paradoxically marked and embodied in the power and message of the cross of Christ (1 Cor. 
1:17-18).99 For Paul, the cross is not a predestined event, since if the rulers of “this age” had 
known the hidden wisdom of God, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (2:8). Rather, 
the cross reveals the wisdom and power of God that the world rejects as foolishness and 
weakness (1:24).100 Yet, this paradox exposes and deconstructs the doxa of differentiation and 
categorization that crucifies Christ and dehumanizes believers into nothing. As a result, that 
which does not and cannot appear according to social norms can now appear and be honored 
99 See Alexandra R. Brown, The Cross and Human Transformation: Paul’s Apocalyptic Word in First Corinthians 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995); Raymond Pickett, The Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the 
Death of Jesus. JSNT Supplement Series 143 (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997); Wenhua Shi, 
Paul’s Message of the Cross as Body Language (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); V. Henry T. Nguyen, “The 
Identification of Paul’s Spectacle of Death Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4.9,” NTS 53.4 (October 2007): 489-501. 
100 Ricoeur writes: “For all God’s power, God only gives Christians the sign of divine weakness, which is the sign of 
God’s love. To allow myself to be helped by the weakness of this love is … to accept that God can be thought of 
only by means of the symbol of the Suffering Servant and by the incarnation of this symbol in the eminently 
contingent event of the cross of Jesus.” See Paul Ricoeur, “‘Whoever Loses Their Life for My Sake Will Find It’,” 
in Figuring the Sacred, 284. 
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according to the foolishness and weakness of God (1:28).101 This paradox of the cross that the 
world cannot make sense of and tries to annul ends up imploding the system or doxa of the 
Roman Empire. 
 This paradox characteristic of Paul’s conviction also saturates the contingent/dialogical 
dimension. It is not limited to the coherent/warranting dimension of Paul’s discourse. In the 
Lord’s Supper discourse (11:17-34), for example, while we can view Paul’s allusion to the 
tradition of the Lord’s sayings as rhetorically manipulative – and thus a part of the 
contingent/dialogical dimension of his discourse – we cannot conclude that through its use Paul 
is necessarily authoritative and imposing as he tackles the discrimination in the church. The 
allusion can be figurative in signification – a part of the coherent/warranting dimension of the 
discourse – in particular when we give attention to the play of words on giving and receiving 
(see chapters 3 and 4). A portrayal of Paul as a rhetorician suggests that Paul “cunningly” uses 
the cross as a means to rein in the troublemakers.102 While Paul may be sincere in his rhetoric, 
we get the impression from the contingent/dialogical dimension of his discourse that the cross 
becomes a mere tool for him to exhort the others, as if it was not applicable to him. This of 
course would contradict the coherent/warranting dimension of Paul’s discourse, including his 
confession that Christ died for all (cf. 8:11, 15:9-10; Gal. 2:20, Rom. 5:6-12). Indeed, it would 
contradict his own conviction and concern that the “cross of Christ might be emptied of its 
power” (1 Cor. 1:17). From what we have learnt about the intertwining coherent/warranting and 
contingent/dialogical dimensions – which is similar to Kristeva’s notions of “the semiotic” and  
101 See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Foreword by David 
Tracy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 88-95. 
102 I am not using the adverb “cunningly” negatively to reflect Paul’s character. Rather, I am thinking of Given’s 
notion of Paul’s rhetorical strategy in terms of ambiguity, cunning, and deception. See Mark D. Given, Paul’s True 
Rhetoric: Ambiguity, Cunning and Deception in Greece and Rome. Emory Studies in Early Christianity (Harrisburg, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 2001). For Given, Paul’s strategy reflects “a mysterious, ambiguous, and finally 
sophistic God, who cares enough to be cunning and is devoted enough to be deceptive. Of that God, Paul is the True 
Apostle.” Ibid., 181. 
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“the symbolic” and Greimas’s “semantics” and “syntax” – we need to clarify which dimension of 
the letter that we view as most significant in our interpretation and what difference does it make 
to choose one rather than the other. 
 
V. Conclusion: Scriptural Criticism (An Interplay of Singularity-Plurality) 
 We end this chapter by way of scriptural criticism because it highlights the interpretive 
choices that we make in our biblical interpretation. Developed by theologians, biblical scholars, 
and church historians,103 this critical approach not only accentuates our “thrownness” into the 
world, it also stresses that all interpretations are contextual. This acknowledgment of our 
contextuality is important to dialogue as it can prevent us from absolutizing and relativizing any 
interpretation. The three main interpretive aspects and choices are: 
• three basic modes of interpretation (methodologies): the analytical, 
contextual-pragmatic, and hermeneutical-theological modes used for the 
interwoven interpretation of the three poles. 
 
• three poles (what is interpreted): the scriptural text, the believers’ life-context, 
and the believers’ religious perception of life, which are interdefining each 
other on the basis of the believer-interpreter’s three modes of existence. 
 
• three modes of existence (aspects of the believer-readers’ existence): 
autonomy, relationality, and heteronomy – that is, respectively, each believer-
reader’s sense of personal identity; her or his place in the web of social 
relations, including power/authority relations; and her or his religious 
experience, including encounter or lack of encounter with the holy and a sense 
of the presence or absence of the divine.104 
 
 Eugene TeSelle further summarizes scriptural criticism as thus: 
103  See the ten volumes in “Romans Through History and Culture Series.” For the theoretical and pragmatic 
reflections on this approach in textual analysis, see the first and the tenth volume: Reading Israel in Romans and 
Modern Interpretations of Romans. 
104 Cristina Grenholm, and Daniel Patte, “Overture: Receptions, Critical Interpretations, and Scriptural Criticism,” in 
Reading Israel in Romans, 35. 
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On the basis of a consideration of the actual practice of interpretation, they 
[Grenholm and Patte] find  
three “poles” (what is interpreted): the scriptural text, the believer’s life 
context, and the believer’s religious perception of life. 
 They root these in 
three modes of existence on the part of the reader or believer: autonomy, 
relationality, and heteronomy, 
 and they defend, furthermore, the legitimacy of 
three basic “modes of interpretation” or methodologies: analytical, 
contextual-pragmatic, and hermeneutical-theological, 
 which in each scriptural interpretation, is reflected by 
three interpretive frames: analytical, contextual, and hermeneutical.105 
 
 While it may not be apparent in the citations above, Grenholm and Patte actually 
associate (1) the scriptural text (one of the three interpreted poles) with autonomy (one of three 
modes of existence) and the analytical mode of interpretation, (2) the believer’s life context with 
relationality and the contextual-pragmatic mode of interpretation, and (3) the believer’s religious 
perception of life with heteronomy and the hermeneutical-theological mode of interpretation. Let 
us unpack these sentences.106 
 First, the word “scriptural” in scriptural criticism simply foregrounds the fact that the 
Christian Bible has been interpreted as the Word to live by for/by the believing communities. 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s notion of “Scripture” as a “bilateral term” that speaks of the dynamic 
relationship between the holy/sacred text and its community of believers is pertinent here.107 As 
such, both the “Scripture” and the community are understood dynamically in terms of a living 
relationship with each other throughout the ages. The notion of a community as a group of 
believers should not be simply assumed and essentialized. Neither should the meaning of 
105 Eugene TeSelle, “Introduction – Engaging Scripture: Patristic Interpretation of the Bible,” in Engaging Augustine 
on Romans: Self, Context, and Theology in Interpretation, 1. 
106 See Daniel Patte, “A Western Biblical Scholar Reading Romans with Greek Fathers and Eastern Orthodox 
Biblical Scholars,” in Greek Patristic and Eastern Orthodox Interpretations of Romans, 207 
107 As a “bilateral term … that inherently implies … a relationship,” the scripture is “a human activity” that reveals 
“the relation between a people and the universe, in the light of their perception of a given text.” See Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, What is Scripture? A Comparative Approach (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 17, 18. 
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“Scripture” be fixed. Furthermore, the word “Scripture” does not necessarily denote and connote 
a confessional stance. Scriptural criticism respects and acknowledges that, for believers, these 
scriptures are inspired writings that hold invaluable place for them. It seeks to avoid objectifying 
these writings since they embody and reveal a living and dynamic relationship between believers 
and divine. To let the other be the other in our critical attempt to understand the other, we need to 
clarify our interpretive process. This leads to our second point. 
 As David Pellauer highlights Ricoeur’s notion of the autonomy of the text,108 we note 
that the text also creates its own world, apart from the (possible) intention of the writer and the 
reader.109 Of course, the intention of the writer and the reader cannot be dismissed. But, as we 
have argued, meaning is multidimensional and relational in the sense that it arrives through a 
dynamic con-fusion of horizons between text and reader. The meaning of the text is not entirely 
at the mercy of the reader. As such, not only the social locations and worldview of the text 
should be analyzed, the social locations and worldview of the interpreters must also be critically 
examined. This leads to our third point. 
 In connecting the believer’s religious (or lack of religious) perception of life with 
heteronomy and the hermeneutical-theological mode of interpretation, scriptural criticism 
highlights the inevitable “thrownness” of humanity in the world with others. That is to say, the 
world is outside and inside us. Thus as human beings, regardless of how critical we strive to 
become in our critical analysis of the texts, the meaning effects of the text and our own embodied 
perception always saturate and overflow our attempts to articulate them. The otherness of the 
108 David Pellauer, “The Significance of the Text,” in Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Edited by Charles E. 
Regan (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1979), 107. 
109 See Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in The Rustle of Language. Translated by Richard Howard 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 49-55; Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” in 
The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 102-20. 
33 
 
                                                          
text and even of ourselves somehow disrupts our control and mastery. We can silence it, reduce it, 
order it, reject it, and even marginalize it, but the otherness remains, nonetheless. 
 Why am I so concerned with our interpretive process? Because it can kill or bring life to 
people. Having grown up in a multiracial, multireligious, and multicultural environment in 
Malaysia, I experienced discrimination caused by the configurations of power relations of 
“races,” “religions,” genders, cultures, politics, and economics. For me, the study of critical 
theories is not an abstract exercise. These theories are performative. They have concrete impacts 
on the quality of life. Given this situation, my question is: How can diversity be celebrated 
without absolutizing it by representing it as a pure singularity (when diversity is “fixed as an 
absolute”)? 110  How can diversity retain its dynamic without being assimilated into a static 
universal? Or without being subjugated to a static universal? Can love be a potential answer to 
this question? These questions are pertinent to our reading of 1 Corinthians, in particular if the 
main concern of Paul in the letter is to promote and maintain concord, order, and unity of the 
community.111 
 It is, however, important to note that singularity cannot be absolutized.112 In the words of 
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Identity is by definition not an absolute distinction, removed from everything 
110 As Glissant would say, when writing about the notions of Relation and creolization in Martinican language, 
ethnic and national identities to avoid a nostalgic ideology that asserts essences and excludes differences. For 
Glissant, contradictions in Relation are important for social changes. While Glissant endorses totality, he uses 
science such as the Relativity Theory to describe it as not totalitarian: “not imposed a priori, not fixed as an absolute. 
And, consequently, for the mind, it is neither a restrictive dogmatism nor the skepticism of probabilist thought.” See 
Edouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation. Translated by Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 
134. 
111 See Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and 
Composition of 1 Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991). 
112 Nancy writes, “The absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness, or not be at all. In other words: to be 
absolutely alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone being alone – and this of course is contradictory. 
The logic of the absolute violates the absolute. It implicates it in a relation that it refuses and precludes by its 
essence.” See Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Inoperative Community,” in The Inoperative Community. Theory and History 
of Literature 76. Edited by Peter Connor. Translated by Peter Connor (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991), 4. 
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and, therefore, distinct from nothing: it is always the other of another identity.”113 In other words, 
there is no pure identity. So when the Malaysian government in 1970s designated the Malays 
(the majority of the population who must be Muslims by birth)114 as the bumiputera” (meaning, 
“prince of the earth”), since the government wants to promote diversity and unity of the country, 
the Malays should not be isolated and singled out from the rest of the people. Singularity takes 
place at the limit or in the face of the others. The naming that aims to help the Malays to compete 
with Chinese and Indians by granting them preferential treatments at the expense of other ethnic 
groups is problematic when it is reified and essentialized instead of being pragmatic. In a recent 
article, Michael Schuman finds that this “affirmative-action program has become so ingrained in 
the Malaysian psyche that it is akin to a national ideology,” where “3 in 4 of the poorest people 
in Malaysia are still bumiputera.”115 When the designation is reified, it may lock the bumiputera 
113 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Eulogy for the Mêlée (For Sarajevo, March ipps),” in Being Singular Plural, Translated by 
Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 149. “It is not that there is 
no ‘identity.’ A culture is single and unique. (If this is what one must settle for in the word ‘culture,’ which seems to 
identify already that with which it is concerned. But this word identifies precisely nothing. It is to settle for short-
circuiting all the difficulties that bear down en masse if one tries to say ‘people’ ‘nation,’ ‘civilization,’ ‘spirit,’ 
‘personality’)” (152). “A pure identity cancels itself out; it can no longer identify itself. Only what is identical to 
itself is identical to itself. As such, it turns in a circle and never makes it into existence” (153). When it seeks to 
identify itself nonetheless, as in the case of the Nazi, “it drags the other along in order to carry it into the abyss. The 
absolute and vertiginous law of the proper is that in appropriating its own purity, it alienates itself purely and 
simply” (154). 
114 According to World Christian Encyclopedia, Malaysia’s population as of 2007 is 27.17 million, where Muslims 
occupy 60.4% of the population; Buddhists, 19.2%; Hindus, 6.3%; Confucians, Daoists, and Chinese folk 
religionists, 2.6%, and Christians, 9.1% (Roman Catholics, 3.3%; Protestants, 3%; Anglicans, 0.9%; Independents, 
0.8%). Quoted from Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity. Edited by Daniel Patte (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 757. 
115 Schuman writes, “After Kuala Lumpur was struck by race riots in 1969, a shaken leadership determined that 
communal peace was impossible without economic balance. The result was the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
introduced in 1971, which aimed to raise the Malays’ share of the economic pie. Malays were given preferential 
access to public contracts and university scholarships. Any company listing on the stock market had to sell 30% of 
its shares to bumiputra investors ... Malays even receive special discounts on home purchases.” See Michael 
Schuman’s article in Time magazine entitled “To Modernize, Can Malaysia Move Beyond Race?” at 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2013695-1,00.html (accessed on September 15, 2013). 
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into a fixed identity and category of experience, sealing them off from the very transformation 
that the naming seeks to effect.116 
 Indeed, if singularity is marked by dynamic relations in the face of the others, then 
singularity must be contextual. This contextuality does not mean that singularity will become 
relativism. But as Alain Badiou says, speaking of love: “There is singularity only insofar as there 
is universality.”117 That is to say, singularity is not a particularism and universality must be able 
to address singularity as it is the interplay of singularities. Nancy also places love at the heart of 
this singular-plural dynamic. For him, it is in love, in the beating of the heart, or in the chiastic 
touching-being touched where the subject is a being-with-others.118 Perhaps this is why Paul 
speaks of believers as the σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους (12:27),119 where καί functions 
116 Agamben’s notion of “example” also shows that by naming something as an example, “it transforms singularities 
into a member of a class, whose meaning is defined by a common property.” See Giorgio Agamben, “Example,” in 
The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt. Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993), 9. This “common property” may reduce singularities within the bumiputera, resulting in 
the silencing of differing voices within the group. 
117 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Cultural Memory in the Present. Translated by Ray 
Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 97. 
118 See Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” in The Inoperative Community. Translated by Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney, 82-109; idem., “An Experience of Heart,” in Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity. 
Translated by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, and Michael B. Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 75-80. 
119 What do these two neutral nouns μέλος and μέρος mean? For μέλος, the basic meanings are: a limb of the body 
(both literally and metaphorically) or a form or a feature in music such as the tune or melody (both literally and 
metaphorically) (LSJ Supplement, 1099). For example, a person can be a member of a family or be out of tune in 
what s/he is doing. A sense of (or lack of) harmony is implied in the usage of μέλος, in particular when the body and 
its members are often analogized as the polis (“city”) and its citizens. As of μέρος, it can mean (1) a share or portion, 
(2) a heritage or lot, or one’s turn of doing something (as in ἀνὰ μέρος), or a part from the whole (as in ἐκ μέρους), 
(3) a category, (4) a district, and (5) a “species or element in Neo-Platonism” (LSJ Supplement, 1104-105). Whether 
there is a sense of hierarchy and belonging embedded in the uses of μέλος and μέρος, μέλος and μέρος can be 
subsumed into serving the whole. The part and the whole may mutually support one another (cf. 12:19-20), as Chang 
tries to argue, but the categorization of the part and the whole can be problematic. See Kei Eun Chang, The 
Community, The Individual And The Common Good: Τὸ Ἴδιον and Τὸ Συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman World and 
Paul (New York and London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), 10-13. Concerning the metaphor of the body as the 
city, Mitchell writes, “It has long been acknowledged by New Testament scholars that the metaphor of the body for 
the society or state was extremely common in ancient political literature, and must have influenced Paul’s Christian 
formulation of it in 1 Cor 12.” See Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 157. Horst, however, 
argues that “[t]here can be no question in Paul of any essential influence of the Greek concept of organism or of any 
mystical and speculative broadening of the metaphor into Gnosticism” (565). Rather, “the unity of a body with many 
members [which are “already integrated” (564)] … is the ongoing act of the creative will of God” (563). All the 
quotes come from J. Horst, “μέλος,” in TDNT 4: 555-68. 
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epexegetically. Namely, believers are “the body of Christ” insofar as they are μέλη ἐκ μέρους in 
living out the body of Christ.120 
 Regarding μέλη ἐκ μέρους, most translations render it as believers individually or each 
person (for his/her part, cf. BDF §212) constitutes the body of Christ (ESV, NAB, RSV, NRSV, 
KJV, NKJV, NIV, and NIB). Joseph Fitzmyer further thinks the Vulgate “strangely reads the 
second clause as: et membra de membro, ‘and members from a member.’”121 While Thiselton 
finds the “syntax of the verse [12:27] fittingly combines singular and plural,”122 he does not 
elaborate further. Likewise, in arguing for an “organic part-whole connective ethic” in Paul’s 
political-soteriological notion of τὸ συμφέρον, “a term widely used in ancient political, rhetorical, 
philosophical, and ethical contexts,”123 Kei Eun Chang does not address this peculiar clause. He 
does, however, argue that “τὸ συμφέρον … is unthinkable until believers grasp the value of 
ἀγάπη in their part-whole relationship”124 with others. Love, in other words, not only connects 
the part and whole together in τὸ συμφέρον, it also characterizes τὸ συμφέρον. 
 In the clause of μέλη ἐκ μέρους, we note that the preposition ἐκ can signify a “beyond,” 
an “outside,” an “opening up,” a “de-parting,” a “means,” or a “spacing.” These possibilities not 
only highlight the connection and separation in the touching and spacing of the body parts, they 
also avert a fixed source of the origin and a totality. The preposition ἐκ in μέλη ἐκ μέρους reveals 
and conceals simultaneously the interface of μέλη and μέρους. So even if the body of Christ is an 
120 Although Kim does not address μέλη ἐκ μέρους, his notion of the “body of Christ” in terms of the cross of Christ 
and the cruciform lifestyle, instead of an organic body and organization which implies fixed boundaries and 
membership works well with my reading of μέλη ἐκ μέρους. See Yung Suk Kim, Christ’s Body in Corinth: The 
Politics of a Metaphor. Paul in Critical Contexts (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). 
121 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Yale 
Bible 32 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 482. 
122 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1012-013. 
123 See Kei Eun Chang, The Community, The Individual And The Common Good, 3. He explains: “By a rhetoric of 
the part-whole, l mean a traditional Greco-Roman ethical discourse in which the community (‘whole’) and/or the 
seeking the advantage of the whole (τὸ συμφέρον) become the criterion for the proper behavior of its individual 
members (‘parts’).” Ibid., 11. 
124 Ibid., 192. 
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organic whole, μέλη ἐκ μέρους prevents it from being turned into an identity in and for itself. 
The body of Christ is always in touch with the others. It is a body broken that gives birth to life. 
Indeed, a life that gives birth to lives at the limit of the body. That is to say, the body of Christ is 
members beyond a member precisely because it is a crucified and resurrected body, taking place 
at the limit of humanness. In fact, like the features of a metaphor, the μέλη ἐκ μέρους create and 
extend the body of Christ. As Paul stresses in the tradition of the Lord’s Supper, the body of 
Christ is a gesture of thanksgiving, broken, given, and shared among people. It is not a sterile 
body. Nancy writes: “That’s why the body, bodily, never happens, least of all when it’s named 
and convoked. For us, the body is always sacrificed: eucharist.”125 Perhaps we can say that a 
body of Christ that is broken is a “community without community”?126 It happens each time in 
every thanksgiving, breaking, sharing, eating, drinking, and proclaiming until the Lord comes 
(11:26). 
 This relationship between one and many in 12:27 is already mentioned in 12:12 when 
Paul writes that “for just as the body is one, namely (καί), it has many members, all the members 
of the body are one body, just as Christ is also.” In case we subsume everything under this 
oneness, Paul clarifies that “indeed, the body is not one member but many” (καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα 
οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν μέλος, ἀλλὰ πολλά) (12:14). Paul even speaks of the relations of members in terms 
of suffering and rejoicing together (12:26), just as love rejoices with the truth (13:6) and endures 
all things (13:7). Paul does not say what the foot, hand, eye, or ear is or should do, as if a hand 
can perform its function without other members. A hand is not just a hand. It cannot be just a 
125 See Jean-Luc Nancy, “Corpus,” in Corpus. Translated by Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), 5. 
126 See Deconstruction In A Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. Edited with a commentary by John D. 
Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 106-24. 
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hand. It has many parts. It is a hand precisely because it is also a hand-foot-ear-eye-etc.127 As 
such, the members of a member are beyond a member. Thus no members can decide who should 
or can be a part of the body (12:18), unless they want to sever themselves from existence. The 
hyphens are indispensable. They simultaneously signify a touch in connecting and separating, a 
touch that reveals and conceals that limit at the touch. 
 Using Badiou’s example (in set theory) of the cat’s cells in a set of elements of living 
beings, we can think of the cells as parts from a part (i.e., cat) in the counting of living beings. 
Yet, the cells are also outside and beyond the element “cat” in the set since they have chemicals 
that are not parts of the living beings.128 This is why the body of Christ, in light of μέλη ἐκ 
μέρους, cannot be objectified. A certain part will always be in excess of the counting operator or 
the definition. In Badiou’s language, we can say that the body of Christ is not an event but an 
“evental site,”129 where the event of μέλη ἐκ μέρους may take place. The translation of καὶ μέλη 
ἐκ μέρους into et membra de membro is indeed strange. It is a strangeness that let the other be 
the other as we speak of the other; a strangeness that keeps the individuality of the body 
members from being absorbed into a generality (or an economy of exchange) that measures and 
polices the relations among them. Without being exposed to the limit at members beyond a 
member, the body of Christ can become a means to hierarchy, abuse, and exploitation. But as 
each member realizes its singularity at the limit (in the face of the other), it also realizes its need 
127 This was my personal experience when I broke my right foot in the summer of 2009 and had to spend six months 
recuperating from the injury which left me with a platinum plate and six screws implanted onto my bone. When I 
started to learn to walk again, I realized that my body and mind also need to help my right leg to walk. 
128 See Alain Badiou, Number and Numbers. Translated by Robin MacKay (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2008), 62-63, 71-72. 
129 Badiou writes: “I will term evental site an entirely abnormal multiple; that is, a multiple such that none of its 
elements are presented in the situation. The site, itself, is presented, but ‘beneath’ it nothing from which it is 
composed is presented. As such, the site is not a part of the situation. I will also say of such a multiple that it is on 
the edge of the void, or foundational.” See Alain Badiou, Being and Event. Translated by Oliver Feltham (London 
and New York: Continuum, 2005), 175. 
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of the others. This is why the limit at the semiotic and symbolic (Kristeva) or semantics and 
syntax (Greimas) in the process of signifying must not be overlooked and con-fused.130 
 Commenting on 1 Cor. 12:27, Giorgio Agamben thus says that “the remnant [μέλη ἐκ 
μέρους?] is precisely what prevents divisions from being exhaustive and excludes the parts and 
the all from the possibility of coinciding with themselves.”131 The “division of divisions” in μέλη 
ἐκ μέρους is ongoing; it cannot be incorporated into any system.132 It is a division that gives birth 
to division; a division that renews itself, again and again. Is this not the situation of most of the 
believers: discounted and abandoned by the Empire and yet called into existence in Christ (1:26-
28)? Does Paul not call himself and his co-workers the “refuse of the world” (4:13)? 
Paradoxically, what is unaccounted for or “[t]he remnant is therefore both an excess of the all 
with regard to the part and of the part with regard to the all.”133 The body of Christ cannot be 
objectified; after all it is God who calls people into the fellowship of Jesus Christ (1:9). The 
“parts beyond a part” are the body of Christ as they identify with the foolishness and weakness 
of God: the crucified Christ. It is an identification empowered and revealed by the spirit (2:10-
12). No wonder Paul speaks of the gifts of the spirit in the same chapter in a very similar manner 
that he speaks of the body (12:7-11; cf. Rom. 8:9-11). 
 In other occurrences where ἐκ μέρους appears (1 Cor. 13:9, 10, and 12), we find a sense 
of continuity and discontinuity interrelated: connection and separation at the same time. 
Believers are not in solitary but solidarity, as Edouard Glissant would say.134 But such solidarity 
does not erase differences. It is a solidarity of “division of divisions.” This capacity for the 
130 See Juri Lotman, “On the Semiosphere” in Signs Systems Studies 17 (1984): 5-23. 
131 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 56. 
132 In the words of Agamben: “The people is neither the all nor the part, neither the majority nor the minority. 
Instead, it is that which can never coincide with itself, as all or as part, that which infinitely remains or resists in 
each division, and, with all due respect to those who govern us, never allows us to be reduced to a majority or a 
minority.” Ibid., 57. 
133 Idem. 
134 See Edouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 131. 
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“division of divisions” without predicates is the name of love for Agamben. He writes, “Love 
does not allow for copulative predication, it never has a quality or an essence as its object. ‘I love 
beautiful-brunette-tender Mary,’ not ‘I love Mary because she is beautiful, brunette, tender’ in 
the sense of her possessing such and such an attribute.”135 Notice the “hyphens” in “beautiful-
brunette-tender Mary.” They embody the sharing and separation at the same time that somehow 
already takes place towards Mary in the love of “I.”136 For Badiou, this co-existing of “the Two” 
in love cannot be reduced, lest the couple is assimilated by the other or the third person.137 In 
emphasizing “the Two,” Badiou highlights the “scene” or the world created together by the love 
couple singularly, a point that Patte also emphasizes.138 
 Hence when we emphasize unity or the so-called homogenizing “melting pot” of racial, 
cultural, and other differences (as the Malaysian government has been trying to do through its 
education systems, which cause the pervasive phenomenon of “brain drain”), we note that the 
common good implies singularity. Without differences there is no differentiation, which means 
there is no need to speak of the common good. The common good spoken in terms of the 
“melting pot” may sound good, but “melted” according to whose measurement and for whose 
benefit? Paul’s concern about the schisms in the church is a case in point since each group strives 
to be the “melting pot” of others. As believers make their own groups according to their own 
criteria,139 dividing up and using Paul, Apollos, Cephas, and Christ for their own purposes (1:12-
13) instead of letting the Lord doing the assignment (3:5; cf. 12:11, 18), they objectify and 
135 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 128. 
136 This notion of “somehow already” is highlighted in Agamben’s analysis of Heidegger’s notion of facticity of Da-
sein. See Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Edited and 
translated with an Introduction by Daniel Heller-Rozaen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 183. 
137 See Alain Badiou, “The Scene of Two” (translated by Barbara P. Fulks), lacanian ink 21 (Spring 2003): 42-55. 
138 See Daniel Patte, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the Gospel, 72-76. 
139 See Andrew D. Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 
1 Corinthians 1-6 (Leiden; New York; Köln: Brill, 1993). 
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“pigeonhole” themselves.140 They become their own master by enslaving themselves to their 
own criteria. With their wisdom, they empty out the power of the word of the cross. But the cross 
of love cannot be co-opted. It is nothing: not a thing that can be objectified. It is an aporia, a 
kenōsis. Consequently, those who embody the cross cannot objectify and be objectified. They are 
kenotic in character in terms of excess (cf. Gal. 2:20). The kenōsis takes place as the human 
wisdom annuls itself when it rejects the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:19-25). By rejecting the 
wisdom of God the human wisdom disqualifies itself as wisdom and crucifies Jesus (2:8). Thus 
not only does Paul write: “By the grace of God I am who I am” (15:10a), he also stresses in 
15:9a that he is the least of the apostles (“Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ὁ ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστὀλων”). It appears 
that as μέλη ἐκ μέρους, the body of Christ (viz., the crucified and the resurrected body), 
universalizes and singularizes at the same time. 
 The body of Christ is not a “melting pot,” however. There are always remainders. In 
evoking the name of “melting pot,” do we posit that it is supposed to take place or that it is not 
already in process?141 Betraying its own name, the “melting pot” does not melt away differences. 
Neither can it reify differences, as if we are not already interrelated. It makes differences go 
underground and, as such, heightens them. At best, it mixes differences together and becomes 
polyphonous in character. At worst, it ignores them and short-circuits any potential dialogue. But, 
what stands out in this dynamic play of singularity and plurality is the flesh-and-blood person 
with her/his social locations, agency, responsibility, and mood/feeling. The concreteness and the 
changing situations of the person mark the flesh-and-blood person. A person is always an inter-
140 While it is difficult to reconstruct the socio-historical situation about the divided groups based upon the slogan in 
1:12, it is unlikely that the factions were made up by Paul as the issue of factionalism seems to be predominant in 1 
Corinthians. For an overview of different reasons that cause the divisions (whether theological, social-economic, or 
political), see Oh-Young Kwon, 1 Corinthians 1-4: Reconstructing Its Social and Rhetorical Situation and Re-
Reading Its Cross-Culturally for Korean-Confucian Christians Today (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2010), 14-58. 
141 See Jean-Luc Nancy, “Eulogy for the Mêlée (For Sarajevo, March ipps),” in Being Singular Plural, 145-58. 
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corporeal person, as we receive our body from our mother and father as well as from their fathers 
and mothers. As an inter-corporeal being, we receive our body from the love of our parents. 
Love, felt in the beating of our heart, opens us up toward the other and what is yet to come. It is a 
dynamic condition that sustains our faith and hope in our relatedness with one another. Without 
this beating of the heart, there is no (continuation of) life. 
 A society or a community is not just consisted of separate individuals coming together, 
but of individuals who are always already interrelated with many others.142 An individual is 
always already an individual-with-others.143 An individual’s individuality is, likewise, always an 
individuality-with-others. Our being-with-one-another does not erase and discount our 
individuality. It accentuates it. This “being-with” is at the limit (or intersection) where continuity 
and discontinuity and similarity and difference take place. We may resemble our parents in many 
ways, but we also differ from them in no fewer ways. Singularity and plurality need not be 
oppositional. They sustain one another at the limit. Such a co-existing is not dialectical. There is 
no teleological synthesis, a static returning to the self, or essentialization of the other. The self 
and the other co-arise in a dynamic relationality, unpredictable and inexhaustible. In chapter 2 
and the Methodological Appendix, we will elaborate on this differential quality of singularity 
when we discuss the concept of “typology,” using the notion of “narrative semantics” in 
142 See the conversation between Paul Tillich and some Buddhists in Japan, analyzed by Choan-Seng Song in Third-
Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings. Rev. ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991), 21-22. As 
Jacobsen points out, people in ancient near eastern cultures usually “operate in terms of collectives rather than 
pluralities made up of individuals. A family or a people is not a congregation of individuals each with their own life 
and fortunes but rather a living organism, and what happens to any part helps or harms the whole.” See Thorkild 
Jacobsen, “Foreword,” in Love and Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel, xviii. One may critique the 
use of the metaphor of “a living organism” to describe a society, as Campany points out, but what Jacobsen says 
about the “collectives” character still holds. See Robert F. Campany, “On the Very Idea of Religions (In the Modern 
West and in Early Medieval China),” History of Religions, vol. 42, no. 4 (May 2003): 287-319 (295-96). 
143 “And we ourselves [Chinese] are communal first before being individuated into isolate units. Our individual 
integrity is communal by nature; to take us as lone insular individuals destroys our personal individuality. In fact, it 
is unnatural (against our grain, against nature) for us to first think of units, then add those units to make up a 
totality.” See Kuang-Ming Wu, On The “Logic” Of Togetherness: A Cultural Hermeneutics (Leiden; Boston; Köln: 
Brill, 1998), 17. 
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Greimas’s and Patte’s structural semiotics. This emphasis on “typology” comes from our very 
embodied existence in the world, as Merleau-Ponty first points out and then expanded at the 
social level by Pierre Bourdieu (see chapter 2). As we will see in chapter 1, this embodied 
perception of the world and the focus on typology is in tune with the Chinese yin-yang holistic 
and dynamic worldview, a non-dualistic worldview also found in Greco-Roman cultures.144 In 
chapters 3-7, we will argue, with case studies, that Paul’s notion of love also embodies the 
“being-with” quality: “the (singular plural) condition of presence in general [understood] as 
copresence.”145 This notion of “with” is vital to Paul. As Paul speaks of how the Son of God 
loves him and dies for him and how he no longer lives but Christ lives in him (Gal. 2:20), we see 
the notions of “with” and limit at work in Paul’s understanding of love. Elsewhere Paul even 
writes: “we are always carrying with us the death of Jesus (τὴν νέκρωσιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) in the body, 
so that the life of Jesus may appear in the body of ours (ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι 
ἡμῶν φανερωθῇ)” (2 Cor. 4:10). It is with this character of love that Paul responds to his calling 









144 Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 3-37. 
145 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 40. 
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Chapter 1 – Scholarly Interpretations of Paul’s Vision of Love:  
The Modes of Existence of Interpretations 
  
My argument is: yes, “natives” are represented as defiled images – that is the fact 
of our history. But must we represent them a second time by turning history 
“upside down,” this time giving them the sanctified status of the “non-duped”?1 
  – Rey Chow 
 
[T]he body, as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame of 
reference for the neural processes that we experience as the mind; that our very 
organism rather than some absolute external reality is used as the ground 
reference for the constructions we make of the world around us and for the 
construction of the ever-present sense of subjectivity that is part and parcel of our 
experiences; that our most refined thoughts and best actions, our greatest joys and 
deepest sorrows, use the body as a yardstick.2 – Antonio R. Damasio 
 
I. Why a Renewed Study of Paul’s Discourse of Love in 1 Corinthians? 
 In the previous chapter, we learned of the importance to examine the mode of existence 
that we primarily assume or privilege in each of the three interpretive poles (e.g., contextual, 
textual, and hermeneutical) in our biblical interpretation. In this chapter, we will, through our 
review of scholarly interpretations of Paul’s notion of love in 1 Corinthians, further show how 
our modes of existence affect the way we see, formulate, and address the questions that we find 
in our interpretation of Paul’s notion of love. Since Paul speaks of the “call” in the beginning of 
1 Corinthians and since honor and shame are pivotal values in ancient Mediterranean cultures, 
we will demonstrate that the “call” and the value of honor can, likewise, be interpreted in the 
framework of either autonomy, relationality, or heteronomy. Here, we should not be surprised 
that the ancient texts cited by scholars to support their interpretations of Paul’s love can, 
similarly, be interpreted in different modes of existence. 
1 Rey Chow, “Where Have All the Natives Gone?” in Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 54. 




                                                          
(i) The Multi-dimension of Religious Phenomena 
Religion is at all times more or less both traditional and individual; both external 
and internal; both institutional, rational, and volitional. It always answers more or 
less to the needs of authority and society; of reason and proof; of interior 
sustenance and purification.3 – Baron Friedrich von Hügel 
 
 How do we respond when we witness Hindus bearing the kavadi that has metal skewers 
pierced to their bodies, cheeks, and tongues without causing much damage to the body?4 How do 
we feel in the midst of the act of spirit possession in Chinese temples,5 which perhaps resemble 
Iamblichus’s description of “divine inspiration and possession” as the result of “divine descent 
and illumination” and “human ascent and receptivity”? 6 How do we understand this double 
identity in the same body in one’s relationship with the divine (cf. Gal. 2:20)? How do we make 
sense of such charismatic phenomena as prophesying, profound songs writing (by the 
“unschooled”), tongues speaking, etc. in many Chinese churches? The liminality of these 
numinous or religious experiences that overwhelm our bodily feeling/sense and rational thought 
can certainly be described and analyzed. But, it cannot be adequately articulated. In pointing out 
that reason lacks “purely rational accounts of reason” but relies on supplements outside itself,7 
William Franke argues that for reason “to fully realize itself, [it] must be kept open to the infinite 
3 Baron Friedrich von Hügel, The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and Her 
Friends. Vol. 1: Introduction and Biographies (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co; London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1923), 
54. For von Hügel, the three intertwining elements of religion are: (1) “authoritative, historical, traditional 
institutional” (cf. relationality) (ibid., 51), (2) “reasoning, argumentative, and abstractive” (cf. autonomy) (ibid., 52), 
and (3) “experimental and mystical” (cf. heteronomy), where religion “is rather felt than seen or reasoned about, is 
loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power, rather than either external fact or intellectual 
verifications” (ibid., 53). 
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thaipusam (accessed November 20, 2013). 
5  For example, see Alan J. A. Elliott, Chinese Spirit-Medium Cults in Singapore. Monographs on Social 
Anthropology, No. 14 (England: Department of Anthropology of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 1955), 26-29; Jean DeBernardi, The Way that Lives in the Heart: Chinese Popular Religion and Spirit 
Mediums in Penang, Malaysia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
6 Crystal Addey, “Divine Possession and Divination in the Greco-Roman World: The Evidence from Iamblichus’s 
On the Mysteries,” in Spirit Possession and Trance: New Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Edited by Bettina E. 
Schmidt and Lucy Huskinson (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), 171-85. 
7 William Franke, Poetry and Apocalypse: Theological Disclosure of Poetic Language (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 47. 
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and indefinable that operates within it and yet is not comprehended by it. Reason must be willing 
to sacrifice any finite identity or definition of itself.”8 For reason to be reason-able, it cannot 
close itself off from “the infinite and the indefinable.”9 From the field of neurobiology, Antonio 
Damasio even argues that reason, emotions, and feelings are inseparably intertwined.10 
 If these numinous experiences cannot be just dismissed and demonized as superstitious 
and delusionary, we need to articulate them with the awareness that what appears to be “strange” 
to us may be quite “normal” for others, and vice versa. The interweaving of (religious/poetic) 
“feeling” and manifestations of such “feeling” in religious beliefs and practices about one’s 
meaning, concern, and relationship with the other/Other in the world, as Ninian Smart highlights 
in his descriptions of religion – (1) doctrinal and philosophical, (2) ritual/practical, (3) 
mythic/narrative, (4) experiential/emotional, (5) ethical/legal, (6) organizational/social, (7) 
material/artistic, and (8) political11 – should warn us not to be reductive in our interpretation of 
religious phenomena. So even if “feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic 
and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations of a text into another 
tongue,” 12  the critique of “religion” as an ideologically constructed category to order and 
8 Ibid., 48. 
9 Using Agamben’s language, we can think of all potentiality is always already impotentiality in the sense that “there 
is truly potentiality only where the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes folly into it as such. 
This does not mean that it disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality. What is 
truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such.” See 
Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Edited and translated with 
an Introduction by Daniel Heller-Rozaen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 183. 
10 From his “[t]wo decades of clinical and experimental work with a large number of neurological patients,” 
Damasio finds that “reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were, that emotions and feelings 
may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all … The strategies of human reason probably did not develop … 
without the guiding force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and feeling and notable 
expressions.” See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human, xii. This intertwining 
of emotion and reason echoes what we find in Plato’s second speech in Phaedrus. 
11  Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1996). 
12 William James, “Lecture XVIII: Philosophy,” in The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. 
(Megalodon Entertainment LLC, 2008), 365. 
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represent one’s “feeling” and lived experience should not be overlooked.13 The tension between 
“feeling” and the articulation of “feeling” in religion cannot be reduced. Given the ambiguity and 
ambivalence in feeling, I associate it with “gut feeling,” mood (Stimmung), 14  bodily drive, 
religious experience,15 conviction, etc. 
 In analyzing the power relations in the strategic use of “stereotype,” Homi Bhabha 
foregrounds the creative tension in how concepts represent one’s lived experience and how the 
latter strains the explanatory power of the former.16 In her poignant experience (see the epigraph), 
Rey Chow also points out how the “natives” have to iterate, internalize, and perform the 
stereotypes for the gaze of the West. Stereotypes are never innocent, in particular when 
economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capitals can be interchanged.17 The twist and turn in the 
13 For example, see Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’ 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 35-61; Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
14 For example, see Giorgio Agamben’s exposition of Heidegger’s notion of love or passion in “The Passion of 
Facticity” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, 185-204. 
15 As Caputo puts it, “if the impossible is the condition of any real experience ... and if the impossible is a defining 
religious category, then it follows that experience itself, all experience, has a religious character, whether or not you 
march yourself off to church on Sunday morning now that your mother is no longer there to get you out of bed. That 
religious edge to experience, that notion of life at the limit of the possible, on the verge of the impossible, constitutes 
a religious structure, the religious side of every one of us, with or without bishops or rabbis or mullahs.” See John D. 
Caputo, On Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 11. 
16 See Homi K. Bhabha, “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism,” in The 
Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 66-83. 
17 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of A Theory of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 159-97. One recent instance we can refer to is the prohibition of the use of the term “Allah” for God in 
Christian publications. On December 31, 2009, when a Malaysian High Court overturned the Malaysian 
government’s ban on the use of the Arabic word “Allah” in Christianity-related materials, several Christian churches 
were firebombed and vandalized as a consequence. Several Hindu temples were also damaged. As the violence 
targeting non-Islamic worship places escalated, the court on January 6, 2010 suspended the ruling, awaiting the 
government’s appeal. Malaysian non-Muslims cannot use the term “Allah” in their publications until further notice. 
Regarding this controversy, Malaysia’s Attorney General Abdul Gani Patail calls it “a matter of national interest.” 
This “national interest” is significant; certain laws in Malaysia even allow the authority to detain any suspects 
indefinitely without formal charges. In this case, the government – or more accurately, the predominant Malay-
Muslim party in the coalition government – maintains that the term “Allah” for God is exclusive to Muslims and that 
it is misleading for Christians to employ the word to signify their Christian God. Although Indonesia and other 
Arabic countries allow the usage of this noun for God in Christian-related materials, Malaysia’s Home Ministry 
secretary, General Mahmood Adam insists that the situation in Malaysia must be treated differently. On October 14, 
2013, after the government won the general election in May by a slight margin, the court ruled that the word “Allah” 
cannot be used in translation. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/world/asia/12malaysia.html?fta=y (accessed 
on March 16, 2013); http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24516181 (accessed on October 20, 2013). 
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public and hidden transcripts of the dominant and the marginalized in the public sphere further 
complicate the deposit, stagnancy, exchange, and expenditure of these capitals.18 But, if the word 
“capital” already implies converted relations, the interchangeability of capitals should not be 
taken for granted. Whether we speak of a Bataillean “principle of loss” or a Marxian “use value” 
or “exchange value,” we cannot leave out the concrete contexts. In my case, the intertwining of 
religious elements in socio-political and economic beliefs and activities both in Malaysia and in 
Roman Corinth.19 Not unlike all kinds of mosques in Malaysia, where five times a day, from 
sunrise to sunset the adhan broadcasts from mosques’ loudspeakers and mass media calling 
Muslims to worship and pray, “the imperial cult [was] the most widespread and ubiquitous 
religious practice [in Corinth] … [where] the imperial presence even came to dominate public 
space at the very center of urban life, the arena for political and commercial activity.”20 
(ii) The Multi-dimension of Paul’s Notion of Love 
 With this caveat, what is Paul’s notion of love in 1 Corinthians when, in addressing 
multiple conflicts, he affirms love as the most excellent way (καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν) (12:31b)? 
Which mode of existence is privileged in his notion of love? While one can treat this “most 
18 See James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1990). For an example of how such practices work in the Roman Empire, see Neil Elliott, The 
Arrogance of Nations: Reading Romans in the Shadow of Empire (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). 
19 For example, in Roman Corinth, temples were dedicated to Zeus (or Jupiter), Apollo, Asklepios (or Asculapius), 
Aphrodite (or Venus), Demeter (or Ceres), Tyche (or Fortuna), Poseidon (or Neptune), Hermes (or Mercury), 
Artermis (or Diana), Dionysos (or Bacchus). See Donald Engles, Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the 
Classical City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 92-120; John R. Lanci, A New Temple for Corinth: 
Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to Pauline Imagery (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 25-43; Nancy 
Bookidis, “Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E.,” in Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches. Edited by Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 141-64; John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 
Corinthians 8:1-11:1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2003), 49-157; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, St. Paul’s Corinth: 
Texts and Archaeology. 3rd revised and expanded edition (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2002). 




                                                          
excellent way”21 as a rhetoric pathos to manipulate the audience’s feeling,22 for Paul love marks 
believers fundamentally, as Christ dies because of his love for them. So regardless of how 
competent, gifted, and knowledgeable a believer is, s/he is nobody without love (13:1-3). As 
Paul put it in Gal. 2:20: “I no longer live (ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ), but Christ lives in me.” The 
nominative “I” becomes a dative “I,” not just a vocative or an accusative “I.”23 Addressing love 
figuratively (1 Cor. 13:4-8), Paul exhorts believers to do everything in love (16:14; cf. Gal. 5:14, 
Rom. 13:8-10).24 Facing group divisions (1 Cor. 1:5–4:21), problems of eating “idol food” (8:1–
11:1), and conflicts over spiritual gifts (14:1-40), Paul uses the love language. In the end of his 
letter, Paul even invokes a curse upon anyone who does not love (φιλεῖ) the Lord (16:22). 
 What is love? Why does Paul switch his uses of agapē and agapan to one instance of 
phileō in the end of the letter?25 Does the invocation of curse in 16:22 contradict love? Or, does 
it actually manifest love, as curse and love are parts of the covenantal language in 
21 Fitzmyer argues that although kath’ hyperbolēn is used as an adverb in Gal. 1:13; 2 Cor. 1:8, 4:17; Rom. 7:13 “to 
mark the surpassing quality of something,” it is used as an adjective in 1 Cor. 12:31b “because as an adverb it would 
ill suit the verb deiknymi.” See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary. The Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 484. 
22 For example, see Lauri Thurén, “‘By Means of Hyperbole’ (1 Cor 12:31b),” in Paul and Pathos. Edited by 
Thomas H. Olbricht, and Jerry L. Sumney. SBL Symposium Series 16 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 
2001), 97-113. This overstatement in 12:31b, according to Thurén, is due to Paul’s “personal attributes” (105) to (1) 
to “manipulate the audience’s emotions” or “to create or intensify positive emotions among the addressees” (108), (2) 
“to support the surrounding argumentation by adding to it some emotional thrust” (109), (3) to waken the audience’s 
interest in the case” (109), (4) to affect “the audience’s ability to absorb the message” (110), and (5) to provide 
“intellectual comprehensibility, which also makes the listener more attentus … Especially in persuasion, where 
emotions are involved, the purer and clearer the ideas, the easier it is to convince others of their validity” (110). 
Thurén, however, does not spell out the notion of emotion or pathos in the kind of rhetoric that he privileges. 
23 See our discussion in section 4 “A Dynamic Inter-Corporeal Hermeneutics in Action” in “Introduction” chapter. 
24  The word “believers” is one of the expressions that Paul uses to describe the “followers of Christ” in 1 
Corinthians (1:21; cf. 7:12-15; 10:22). 
25 Furnish thinks φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν may be used interchangeably in 1 Cor. 16:22 and suggests that the meaning of 
φιλεῖν is enriched by the association with ἀγαπᾶν. See Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the New 
Testament (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1972), 226, 231. Moffatt, on the other hand, cites this verse as one of 
the examples to show that φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν “had become practically synonymous in classical Greek by the time of 
Xenophon, although occasionally distinctions were drawn between them,” but “in Hellenistic Greek the distinction 
had been gradually fading.” See James Moffatt, Love in the New Testament (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1930), 45. 
Also, see C. C. Tarelli, “ἈΓΑΠΗ,” Journal of Theological Studies NS 1 (1950): 64-67. 
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Deuteronomy?26 Is there an inevitable tension or a dialectic between the imperative and poetic 
aspects of love?27 If Paul’s description of love in 1 Cor. 13 is in the genre of poetry, then can we 
ignore the poetic framework of Paul’s command to love? Also, will any element of love be 
missed out or reified in asserting love? Is there a danger in idealizing love (without a concrete 
context)? Or is it because of these various possibilities that love, a subject’s particular response 
to grace in fidelity to the event of love, can prepare the condition for a non-conformist 
universality?28 Or is it because of one’s experience of the limit of “potentiality/impotentiality” 
that love is capable of, that we can speak of a “coming community” without (objectified) 
common properties?29 
 What do people experience (or do not experience) in love? How are they constituted and 
transformed in love? What do they give and receive in loving? How are the giving and receiving 
performed? How does Paul conceptualize and configure love in tackling the issues of singularity 
and plurality in religious, racial, gender, socio-political, and economic conflicts in the church? 
26 William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of Love in Deuteronomy,” The Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 25 (1963): 77-87 (83-84). 
27 Highlighting the textual framework of the commandment to love in the Christian Scriptures, Ricoeur writes: 
“Only sundered from its source – the commandment to love – is there any scandal in an interhuman love (a 
‘horizontal’ love, so to speak); that a lover’s love obliges is a surprise, but not a scandal.” See Paul Ricoeur, 
“Theonomy and/or Autonomy,” in The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann. Edited by 
Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas Kucharz (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1996), 289. 
Here, we see that Ricoeur agrees with Franz Rozensweig that “the commandment to love springs from the bond of 
love between God and the individual soul. The commandment that precedes every law is the word that the lover 
addresses to the beloved: Love me! This unexpected distinction between commandment and law makes sense only if 
we admit that the commandment to love is love itself, commending itself, as though the genitive in the 
‘commandment of love’ were subjective and objective at the same time. Or, to put it another way, this is a 
commandment that contains the conditions for its being obeyed in the very tenderness of its objurgation: Love me!” 
See Paul Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination. Translated by 
David Pellauer. Edited by Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 319. Likewise, when 
addressing Aristotle’s to philein in the Rhetoric, Konstan finds that “there is no tension between the sentiment of 
love and the requirement or even the demand that one help others in achieving the goods to which they aspire. For if 
loving (to philein) as an emotion just is the wish to provide such assistance, then the failure to aid another convicts 
one of a want of love itself.” See David Konstan, “Love,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in 
Aristotle and Classical Literature (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 176. 
28 See Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Cultural Memory in the Present. Translated by 
Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
29 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary of the Letter to the Romans. Translated by Patricia 
Dailey. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005). 
51 
 
                                                          
 One may cite 1 Cor. 13:4-8a to answer “What is love?” But this citation needs to be 
fleshed out. If Paul is dramatically transformed by the love of God through Christ (15:9-10; cf. 2 
Cor. 5:14-15; Rom. 5:8), then love can shock and reboot the world of believers. Such a shock 
cannot be thematized (cf. 1 Cor. 1:17). The site of the shock is utterly cruel and shameful in the 
ancient Mediterranean world: the crucifixion.30 The shock exposes the world of its contradictions; 
after all how can a condemned criminal become the Lord? With Christ living in him, the shock 
exposes and reconfigures Paul (Gal. 2:20; Rom. 6:1-14, 8:9-11). Love becomes a call and 
response of this shock. A call and response that does not thematize but embody the shock. In the 
language of Jean-Luc Nancy, perhaps we can say that the call and response is the beating of the 
heart.31 Like the beating of the heart, the call and response are rhythmically intertwined. The 
liminality of call and response is even ritualized in the meal gathering of believers when the 
libation that is supposedly dedicated to the Roman god, goddess, or emperor is now poured out 
in honor of the crucified Christ (1 Cor. 11:23-31).32 
 In traditional biblical studies, it is thus not a surprise that the condition of possibility or 
impossibility of love be duly noted in a diversity of interpretations: Paul’s love is rendered in 
theological, ethical, rhetorical, and ideological ways. However, from the perspective of a group-
oriented culture (from where I come) where numinous experience is not uncommon, I find the 
religious experience or feeling in Paul’s notion of love sidelined.33 If the interconnection of body 
30 See Martin Hengel, Crucifixion: In the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross. Translated by 
John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977). 
31 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” in The Inoperative Community. Translated by Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney, 82-109. 
32 For example, see Hal Taussig, In the Beginning was the Meal: Social Experimentation and Early Christian 
Identity (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 135-43. 
33 See David E. Fredrikson’s recent work that highlights the resistance to the erotic dimension of love in the critical 




                                                          
and mind, 34 the continuum of invisible and visible worlds,35 and the embeddedness of individual 
identity in community are somewhat similar in Chinese culture and in the ancient Mediterranean 
world,36 then a dualistic worldview is questionable. We are “thrown” into the world along with 
others in the world. The religious, theological, ethical, rhetorical, and ideological issues cannot 
be compartmentalized. As scriptural criticism stresses, how we analyze our contextual problems 
and how we perceive the primary root problem (e.g., wrong/lack of knowledge, will, ability, 
ideology, vision, etc.) that undergirds them influence the role of scripture that we privilege in our 
choice of critical theory and methodology to analyze the dimensions of the text that we deem 
most pertinent to our interpretation.37 
(iii) Interpretations of Paul’s Love in 1 Corinthians 
 Just as a religion can be perceived in different modes of existence, Paul’s notion of love 
in 1 Corinthians can also be interpreted through different modes of existence. In biblical studies, 
we find that while theological and ethical interpretations of Paul’s love often frame their textual 
analysis in the mode of autonomy, the social-scientific, rhetorical, and ideological interpretations 
usually prioritize the mode of relationality as their primary framework. However, a heteronomy-
oriented interpretation of Paul’s love, foregrounded by continental philosophers like Alain 
Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, etc.,38 is often sidelined, if not treated suspiciously. Because of my 
contextual concerns regarding the issues of singularity and plurality in an honor-and-shame 
34 See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 3-37. 
35 See Kabiro wa Gatumu, The Pauline Concept of Supernatural Powers: A Reading form the African Worldview. 
Foreword by James D. G. Dunn (Milton Keynes; Colorado Springs; India: Paternoster, 2008). 
36 See Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Kentucky: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1993), 63-89. 
37 We discuss the multiple dimensions of a text and the creation of many texts out of this text in the “Introduction” 
chapter and the Methodological Appendix. Also, see Daniel Patte, Monya A. Stubbs, Justin Ukpong, and Revelation 
E. Velunta, The Gospel of Matthew: A Contextual Introduction for Group Study (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
2003). 
38 For example, see Alain Badiou, Saint Paul, 12-15, 54, 86-98, 107-111; and Giorgio Agamben, The Time that 
Remains, 76-77, 108, and 128. 
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group-oriented culture, I interpret Paul’s notion of love through the mode of heteronomy. Here, it 
is critical to note that we are not dismissing interpretations that are not heteronomy-oriented. In 
fact, neither are we advocating exclusively for a heteronomy-oriented interpretation. Rather, as 
scriptural criticism foregrounds the discursiveness of contexts (of both the text and the 
interpreter), we are arguing for a primary mode of heteronomy (which may secondarily include 
the modes of autonomy and relationality in our interpretation of Paul’s love). Here, if all 
interpretations are contextual and ideological, it is only critical and ethical for interpreters to 
clarify the “distinctive interpretive lines of reasoning” in the choices that they make in each of 
their three interpretive poles. The contextuality of interpretations, however, does not mean that 
all interpretations are valid and valuable. As the word “contextuality” signals, the validity of an 
interpretation must be evaluated contextually. That is to say, as a context is dynamically 
intersected with various socio-cultural, political, gendered, religious, economic, etc. issues, all 
interpretations must be assessed again and again, lest they be objectified. With this note of 
clarification, let us now turn to various interpretations of Paul’s love that prioritize different 
modes of existence, whose meanings will be further clarified in the next section. 
 Traditionally biblical scholars read Paul’s notion of love in theological and ethical terms 
concerning the love of God to people, the love of people to God, and the love among people. A 
major concern in such interpretations is to dissociate love from passion and feeling so that love 
does not become egocentric, which can then lead to moral laxity, self-righteousness, empty 
words (e.g., flattery and dissimulation), unsustainable commitment, or uncritical compliance to 
the norms and trends of the world. To address the potential problems that could be caused by the 
“feeling” aspect of love, these scholars rationalize the intense passion of love when they assert 
that believers should imitate the cross because the nature and will of God are necessarily 
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affirmed and manifested in the cross. They stress the historical context of the cross (to counter 
any form of “Docetism,” “spiritualization,” and comparison with Greco-Roman “mythical 
religions”),39 but the purpose is to reinforce the necessity, possibility, and goodness of obedience 
and fidelity to the cross. The goal is to receive “atonement,” “redemption” (in the sense of 
forgiveness”) and “salvation” (which are usually not rigorously defined) through habits of 
obedience in fidelity to the grace and love of God.40 These features of theological interpretations 
of Paul’s love correspond to von Hügel’s “reasoning, argumentative, and abstractive” element of 
religion, which we find echo the mode of autonomy.41 
 The issue of “authority” in social positions does not worry these scholars. Paul’s 
authority is assumed to be good for believers. The believers’ concerns are viewed through the 
character/actant of Paul, assumed by the interpreters. As such, even when ethics is emphasized 
when discussing Paul’s notion of love, the framework of such ethics is individualistic, top-
down.42 While the notion of “authority” (conveyed in the form of a letter),43 intimately tied to 
the notion of power, needs to be clarified (see below about the modes of existence),44 these 
39 For example, see James Moffatt, Love in the New Testament, 58-63. 
40 Moffatt writes, “In the Pauline theology faith is more than either surrender to Christ’s love and grace or mental 
assent to the truth of the gospel; it is trust and it is belief, but as both it has active functions in life … The God who 
meets us in Christ, Paul teaches, is a God of love who forgives sins because He loves men. The response to this free 
and forgiving love is believing trust, such trust as carries love with it. All love implies trust, and trust in Another 
implies love, the love that devotes itself to the ends of that Other and identifies itself freely and fully with His 
purpose … Paul prefers often to speak of this devotion towards God or Christ as ‘faith,’ reserving ‘love’ for the 
human side.” Ibid., 171-72. 
41 See n. 3. 
42 The different models of ethics (e.g., deontological, perfectionist, consequentialist, womanist, etc.) show that our 
notion of ethics can be individual-centered, communal-centered, or other-oriented. See Thomas W. Ogletree, The 
Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); Sharon D. Welch, A Feminist Ethic of Risk. 
Revised edition (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000). 
43 Consider this, for example: “Letters are usually thought simply to convey information. They re-present the writer 
and simulate his or her voice … [but] letters are also objects like photographs or locks of hair that bring loved ones 
into presence only then to reiterate their absence. In the ancient world, letters were reread, wept over, kissed, and 
placed in bed in order to soothe the longing desire they never failed to rekindle. Modern scholars, however, have 
approached Philippians as if the letter were only Paul’s παρουσία and ὁμιλία, and they read his writing as only the 
expression of his ideas or the concerns of his commands.” See David E. Fredrikson, Eros and the Christ, 28. 
44 For example, see John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority. New Introduction by Wayne 
A. Meeks (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 1-34. For different notions of “power” explicated 
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scholars do not address the authoritative features of Paul’s use of rhetoric to exhort believers to 
be considerate to one another. 45 They do not see Paul as an authoritative figure subjecting 
believers to his apostleship. Neither do they stress the possibility that Paul, via the language of 
agapē, confronts the ideology of Roman Empire (cf. 1 Cor. 1:22-23, 2:6-9).46 While there are 
concerns for the lack of emphasis on the ethical demands of love,47 the socio-cultural, political, 
and economic impacts upon believers generally do not receive much attention. 
 Foregrounding the role and function of rhetoric in constructing and upholding the power 
positions between Paul and the Corinthian believers, an increasing number of biblical scholars 
recently treat Paul’s language of love as socially conditioned, utilitarian, authoritative, and 
manipulative. Here, von Hügel’s “authoritative, historical, traditional institutional” element of 
religion, which resembles the mode of relationality, is notable.48 But, similar to those who focus 
on the theological and ethical aspects, many of these scholars are suspicious and wary of the 
in biblical studies, see Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991); Kathy Ehrensperger, That We May be Mutually Encouraged: Feminism and 
the New Perspective in Pauline Studies (London and New York: T&T Clark International, 2004); and Yung Suk 
Kim, “‘Imitators’ (Mimetai) in 1 Cor. 4:16 and 11:1: A New Reading of Threefold Embodiment,” Horizons in 
Biblical Theology 33 (2011): 147-70. 
45 For an overview of the potential problems in the use of ancient rhetoric to analyze Greco-Roman letters such as 
Paul’s letters, see Jae Hyun Lee, Paul’s Gospel in Romans: A Discourse Analysis of Rom 1:16-8:39. Linguistic 
Biblical Studies 3 (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 17-22. Also, see the essays in Rhetoric and the New 
Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference. JSNTSup 90. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Thomas H. 
Olbricht (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993). Concerning the genre of 1 Corinthians, Mitchell writes, 
“deliberative rhetoric was common employed within epistolary frameworks in antiquity. Because deliberative 
rhetoric is compatible with the letter genre, Paul’s use of it in 1 Corinthians is not anomalous in ancient literature…” 
See Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and 
Composition of 1 Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), 20. 
46 Although Nygren does not address this issue, he does repeatedly stress that “Agape is like a blow in the face to 
both Jewish legal piety and Hellenistic Eros-piety.” See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros. Part I: A Study of the 
Christian Idea of Love. Part II: The History of the Christian Idea of Love. Translated by Philip S. Watson 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), 200. 
47 For example, see Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command in the New Testament, 198-205. 
48 See n. 3. 
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“feeling” or religious aspect of Paul’s love. Let us review some examples from social-scientific, 
rhetorical,49 and ideological interpretations. 
 In-scribing love in “an anti-introspective, nonpsychologically minded, collectivistic 
society,” Bruce Malina and John Pilch argue that “the word agapē is best translated as ‘group 
allegiance.’”50 According to them, in such a culture, “[t]here may or may not be affection, but it 
is the inward feeling of attachment, along with the outward behavior bound up with such 
attachment, that love entails.”51 By de-fining the feeling and idea of love as a “group allegiance,” 
Malina and Pilch may assume an agonistic “we vs. them” notion of “community” when love is 
not present. By focusing on “the outward behavior” of love, they also assume a direct 
correspondence between “the outward behavior” and “the inward feeling,” which presupposes 
that we can define and analyze “the inward feeling” without reducing it. This issue is further 
complicated in cross-cultural dynamics, such as Greco-Roman notions of emotions and feelings, 
which David Konstan argues are intertwined with one’s “very idea of a self.”52 
 The social function of love is also highlighted in Gerd Theissen’s notion of “love-
patriarchalism” (Liebespatriarchalismus).53 Comparing two kinds of “itinerant preachers” in the 
49 Summarizing George Kennedy’s “new rhetoric,” Watson writes: Kennedy’s “methodology has five interrelated 
steps: (1) determine the rhetorical unit; (2) define the rhetorical situation; (3) determine the rhetorical problem or 
stasis and the species of rhetoric, whether judicial (accusation and defense), deliberative (persuasion and dissuasion), 
or epideictic (praise and blame); (4) analyze the invention, arrangement, and style (‘invention’ is argumentation by 
ethos, pathos, and logos). ‘Arrangement’ is the ordering of the various components, such as the exordium 
(introduction), narratio (narration of the facts), probatio (main body), and peroratio (conclusion). ‘Style’ is fitting 
the language to the needs of invention and includes such things as figures of speech and thought; and (5) evaluate 
the rhetorical effectiveness of the rhetorical unit in meeting the exigence.” See Duane F. Watson, “New Testament 
Rhetorical Criticism,” in Methods for Biblical Interpretation. Foreword by Douglas A. Knight (Nashville: Abingdon, 
2004), 192. For a critique of “new rhetoric,” see Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 6-16. 
For an overview of these debates, see Troy W. Martin, “Investigating the Pauline Letter Body: Issues, Methods, and 
Approaches,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Sean A. Adams. Pauline Studies 
Series 6 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 185-212. 
50 Bruce J. Malina and John J. Pilch, Social-Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2006), 116. 
51 Ibid., 376. 
52 For example, see David Konstan, “Pathos and Passion,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 3-40. 
53 For example, Theissen writes: “This love-patriarchalism takes social differences for granted but ameliorates them 
through an obligation of respect and love, an obligation imposed upon those who are socially stronger. From the 
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history of early Christianity – i.e., the itinerant charismatics in the synoptic tradition and the 
community organizers in urban Mediterranean areas like Paul and Barnabas – Theissen finds that 
Paul follows the social patterns of “community organizers” that promote solidarity but do not 
challenge the very structures that create and sustain social stratifications of the marginalized 
whom he supports. For Margaret Mitchell, this love-patriarchalism reflects a compromise for the 
common advantage to maintain concord in the church.54 A few questions arise, however. If Paul 
did go through trials and tribulations (e.g., 1 Cor. 4:11-13; 2 Cor. 11:23-28) in responding to the 
call of God as an apostle to the Gentiles,55 and if Paul is who he is by the grace of God (1 Cor. 
15:10a), will he practice love-patriarchalism for the sake of concord and unity of the church? 
What happen to the message of the cross that is the power of God (1:18)? Or is it precisely 
because of the gospel (9:23) that Paul compromises so that he may please all in all things to save 
many (10:33)? Is this compromise a form of opportunism? What is the notion of gospel? 
 To reinforce the view that Paul’s love language points to solidarity and group allegiance, 
scholars recently emphasized its rhetorical, sociopolitical, and ideological features. For example, 
in demonstrating that 1 Corinthians is thematically and literary-rhetorically a cohesive unit,56 
Mitchell shows that the letter is “filled with terms and topoi derived from politics which are 
directly related to the issue of factionalism.”57 She argues that it is Paul who relates all the 
weaker are required subordination, fidelity, and esteem.” See Gerd Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline 
Christianity: Essays on Corinth. Edited and Translated with an Introduction by John H. Schütz (Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress Press, 1982), 107. As such, “love-patriarchalism allows social inequities to continue but transfuses them 
with a spirit of concern, of respect, and of personal solicitude.” Ibid., 139.  
54 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 127 n. 382. 
55 Henry T. Nguyen, “The Identification of Paul’s Spectacle of Death Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4.9,” NTS 53.4 
(October 2007): 489-501. 
56 Mitchell notes that the “deliberative argumentation” in ancient deliberative literature has four characteristics that 
are also present in 1 Corinthians: “1) focus on future time as the subject of deliberation; 2) employment of a 
determined set of appeals or ends, the most distinctive of which is the advantageous (τὸ συμφέρον); 3) proof by 
example (παράδειγμα); and 4) appropriate subjects for deliberation, of which factionalism and concord are 
especially common.” See Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 23. 
57 Ibid., 15. 
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problems to factionalism.58 As a “deliberative letter” that “employs deliberative rhetoric in the 
letter body” 59  to create unity, 1 Corinthians is neither a forensic rhetoric nor an epideictic 
rhetoric.60 Rather, in using “future-directed statements” and “imperatives,” Paul urges believers 
to aim for the common advantage (τὸ συμφέρον) of the community (which is also the τέλος of 
deliberative rhetoric).61 
 For Mitchell, the shift of τὸ συμφέρον from “personal to communal advantage,”62 readily 
seen in the metaphors of the “body” and “building (up),”63 “is at the heart of the entire argument 
in 1 Corinthians.”64 As Paul speaks of love as not seeking one’s own advantage (13:5), Mitchell 
links συμφέρειν and οἰκοδομεῖν with love (cf. 8:1), which as “the principle of social cohesion”65 
“is the mortar between the bricks of the Christian building, the ἐκκλησία.”66 Love, in short, is an 
antidote to factionalism.67 As 13:4-7 portray “a one-to-one precise correspondence with Paul’s 
description of Corinthian factional behavior,”68 the description of love is not so much a praise of 
58 Ibid., 301. 
59 Ibid., 22 n. 5. 
60 For an overview of the roles and functions of rhetoric in the Greco-Roman world, see Ben Witherington III, 
Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI; 
Cambridge UK: Eerdmans, 1995), 40-48. 
61 Mitchell writes, “by definition, an argument which focuses particularly upon τὸ συμφέρον, the advantageous 
course to follow in the future, is deliberative.” Ibid., 28. 
62 Ibid., 143. 
63 Ibid., 37. Mitchell agrees with Kitzberger’s linguistic analysis that the verbs συμφέρειν and οἰκοδομεῖν are 
synonymous. See Ingrid R. Kitzberger, Bau der Gemeinde. Das paulinische Wortfeld οἰκοδομή(ἐπ)οικοδομεῖν. 
Forschung zur Bibel 53 (Würzburg: Echter Verlag, 1986). 
64 Ibid., 36. Although Mitchell concludes “that the term συμφέρειν is clearly a part of the technical vocabulary of 
deliberative rhetoric texts” (32), she also clarifies that the term is “used in a wide range of ethical and political 
discussions in antiquity, one attestation of which is the writings of Stoic philosophy” (33). Chang further finds the 
term “widely used in ancient political, rhetorical, philosophical, and ethical contexts.” See Kei Eun Chang, The 
Community, The Individual And The Common Good: Τὸ Ἴδιον and Τὸ Συμφέρον in the Greco-Roman World and 
Paul (New York and London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), 3. 
65 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 178. In discussing Paul’s exhortation in 14:1b-40, 
Mitchell even says that the common advantage is “synonymous with love.” Ibid., 279-80. 
66 Ibid., 171. See page 180 for a list of terms and phrases in 1 Corinthians that Mitchell finds are closely related to 
the issues of factionalism and concord in ancient Greco-Roman literature. 
67 Ibid., 165-71. 
68 Ibid., 170. 
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love as a check list targeting the specific faults of believers.69 Yet Mitchell does not elaborate on 
why love has such a cohesive function, although the self-reference of Paul throughout the letter 
seems to suggest an answer. Not only is Paul the expert builder (4:10), he is also the exemplar of 
not seeking one’s own advantage (9:1-27) for the sake of τὸ συμφέρον.70 Even when Paul’s self-
reference is evident in 1 Cor. 13, as “much of the chapter is written in the first person,”71 “he is a 
hypothetical negative example to be rejected.”72 With this mixture of actual and hypothetical 
conditions, Paul’s advice may appear to be more acceptable. 
 Following this work of Mitchell, many commentators allude to this functionalist view of 
love. For example, as Ben Witherington III argues for the “character of Christian agapē” in 
terms of a “behavior, not feeling,”73 he agrees that “[t]he concept of love was often used in 
arguments for social concord and against factiousness.” 74  Likewise, Richard Hays endorses 
Mitchell’s interpretation, as he claims, in stressing judgment/discernment and the unity of the 
church, that “the purpose of this chapter [1 Cor. 13] is straightforwardly ethical … to promote 
69 Or as Sigountos argues that praise and blame in encomium are “two sides of the same coin” in rhetorical practice, 
the praise of love can also be a critique of “virtually every behavioral problem at Corinth is mentioned in vv. 4-7” 
See James G. Sigountos, “The Genre of 1 Corinthians 13,” New Testament Studies 40.2 (April 1994): 246-60 (256). 
70 In pointing out the importance of the use of praise and examples in deliberative rhetoric, Mitchell finds that 
“Paul’s self-references in 1 Corinthians almost amounts to a summary of the contents of the letter.” Ibid., 54. 
71 Ibid., 58. Holladay strongly argues that the “I” is an autobiography that serves as a warrant to Paul’s exhortation. 
See Carl R. Holladay, “1 Corinthians 13: Paul as Apostolic Paradigm,” in Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays 
in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe. Edited by David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1990), 80-98. Collins also thinks that the “I” in 13:1-3 does not refer to “the generic human 
being,” but Paul himself. He writes, “The structural parallelism of chs. 12-14 with chs. 8-10 confirms the 
autobiographical and self-referential character of the first subunit in Paul’s digression (vv. 1-3). Of course, Mitchell 
would disagree with Collins that 1 Cor. 13 is a digression. See Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina 
7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 472. Contra Holladay, Mitchell, and Collins, see Joseph A. 
Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 492. 
72 Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 273. 
73 Ben Witherington, III, Conflict and Community in Corinth, 269. He writes, “Note the profoundly social character 
of the love that Paul is speaking about. In all these verses [in chapter 13] Paul is talking about love in action, not 
mere feelings. Real Christian love does not amount to mere pious platitudes about love, but doing love. Nor is Paul 
exhorting his audience to have warm feelings about others, since he believes that one can love someone that one 
does not feel attracted to or even like.” Ibid., 272 n.38. 
74 Ibid., 265. 
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the character formation of the members of the Corinthian community.” 75  Similarly, David 
Garland stresses that Paul “does not appeal to it [love] simply because of its utilitarian benefit to 
bring about concord,” 76 he refers to Mitchell’s view of love in combating factionalism and 
promoting church unity. In the same line, Raymond Collins suggests a functionalist notion of 
love, even though he emphasizes the eschatological quality of love as the power of God.77 For 
instance, in addressing the triad of “faith, hope, love” in 1 Corinthians and 1 Thessalonians 1:3 
and 5:8, Collins differentiates the former from the latter in terms of factionalism among the 
Corinthian believers. He writes: “They were a community torn by a spirit of factionalism and the 
disdain of some by others within the community. So Paul writes to them about love, whose 
proper object … is other members of the Christian assembly (cf. 1 Thess. 3:12; 4:9-10).”78 
 This notion of love as a means to an ends is also found in Laura Nasrallah’s analysis of 
Greco-Roman and Paul’s taxonomy of ecstatic or spiritual gifts and “periodization of history,” as 
she sees Paul using love to trump the wisdom boasted by the pneumatikoi. She writes, “Paul’s 
praise of love in chapter 13 deliberately displaces and controls the Corinthians’ interest in 
wisdom, as chapters 1-4 had done before.”79 This critique of Paul’s language of love echoes 
Lauri Thurén’s argument about the rhetorical function of pathos in 1 Corinthians 12:31b as an 
75 Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians. Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, 
KY: John Knox Press, 1997), 221-22. Hays writes: “Love is not a higher and better gift; rather, it is a manner of life 
within which all the gifts are to find their proper place. Second, love is not merely a feeling or an attitude; rather, 
‘love’ is the generic name for specific actions of patient and costly service to others. If we attend closely to what 
Paul actually says in this chapter, all sweetly sentimental notions of love will be dispelled and replaced by a rigorous 
vision of love that rejoices in the truth and bears all suffering in the name of Jesus Christ.” Ibid., 222. 
76 See David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2003), 604. 
77 Collins stresses that Paul’s love is different from the love in the category of virtues in Hellenistic Judaism. See 
Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, 483-84. 
78 Ibid., 485. 
79 Laura Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity. Harvard Theological Studies 
52 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 90. Wire, moreover, argues that these pneumatikoi are 
women prophets who were prominent in the ekklēsia and as such posed threat to the patriarchal structure of the 
ekklēsia. See Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990). 
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“overstatement” and “rhetorical cautionary introduction” to influence the believer’s feeling.80 A 
more critical view of Paul’s notion of love comes from Elizabeth Stuart, who in referring to the 
work of Graham Shaw (which Krister Stendahl on the back cover of the book describes as “a 
wonderfully troublesome book”),81 strongly says that Paul uses 1 Cor. 13 as a “guise” to “assert 
his authority over the Corinthian community by identifying himself with that divine, self-giving 
love (agapē) whilst at the same time revealing how alienated the Corinthians themselves are 
from that love through having rejected the exclusive authority of Paul.”82 This concern of Stuart 
about “authority” gone wrong cannot be simply dismissed. Let us cite Shaw at length. 
[T]he appeal to God distracts attention from the human speaker. Heaven is silent, 
and when men’s [sic] attention is directed towards it, we easily fail to notice that 
human lips are moving. This is not to dismiss all talk of God as deceit, but it does 
suggest that we fix our eyes most carefully on the human speaker, and treat with 
caution any confusion of identity between man [sic] and God. Wherever a man 
[sic] cannot speak in his own name but buttresses his speech with divine authority, 
suspicion is certainly in order. Is the human speak benefiting by this device, and if 
so, how?83 
 
It is important to note that Shaw is not seeking “to dismiss all talk of God as deceit.”84 Rather, he 
is arguing for a “use of power which encourages the independence of others, and an exercise of 
authority which seeks the response of others rather than their silence.”85 Given this concern, 
Shaw finds Paul’s description of a “personified love” allows him “to say everything he needs to 
80 Lauri Thurén, “‘By Means of Hyperbole’ (1 Cor 12:31b),” in Paul and Pathos, 97-113. 
81 See Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983). 
82 Elizabeth Stuart, “Love is … Paul,” The Expository Time 102 (June 1991): 264-66 (264). 
83 Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority, 15-16. Emphasis added. 
84 To do so could end up claiming a high ground outside the system, which Liew in his analysis of the critique of the 
power structure in the Gospel of Mark has warned us not to repeat the very structure that we critique in our criticism. 
See Tat-siong Benny Liew, Politics of Parousia: Reading Mark Inter(con)textually. Biblical Interpretation Series 42 
(Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 1999). 
85 Graham Shaw, The Cost of Authority, 22. That is to say, an authority “which recognizes the temporary nature of 
its position of power [that] is not threatened by the outlook and experience of others,” which “can therefore adopt a 




                                                          
say to his critics without either exposing himself or taking direct responsibility.”86 Stuart wants 
to push Shaw’s reading further. For her, “1 Cor 13 is Paul at his most manipulative. Its message 
is that it is only through Paul that the Corinthians can experience the love of God in Christ 
because only Paul, no other Christian teacher, possesses that love. In short, love is Paul.”87 Stuart 
may be too critical in her reading of Paul’s love,88 but Shaw is right to highlight an alternative 
notion of authority.89 But if authority is “the interpretation of power,” and if “power is directed 
toward specific goals and transformed from natural to a social concept,”90 then what matters in 
the critique of authority is the interpretation of power. 
 However, if power “is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that 
one holds on to or allows to slip away…,”91 as Michel Foucault stresses, then power is not a 
“thing” that can be objectified. Rather, power must be understood as a dynamic power relation 
that cannot help but be constantly thematized and configured in various ways.92 This tension 
between power and its configuration is illustrated in John Schütz’s analysis of Max Weber’s 
86 Ibid., 92. 
87 Elizabeth Stuart, “Love is… Paul,” 265. 
88 For a critique of Stuart’s interpretation, see Cecil J. Waters, “‘Love is … Paul’ – A Response,” The Expository 
Times 103.3 (December 1991): 75. However, just as Waters argues that “[i]t is always difficult to try to fathom other 
people’s motives,” Waters’ interpretation also faces similar challenge. 
89 Patte reminds us that authority “means not sheer power but legitimate power. Authority exists only insofar as 
those who submit to it do so by acknowledging the legitimacy of those who are in a position to use institutional or 
other power and/or to speak authoritatively. In Christian thought, authority belongs first to God, then to Christ, then 
to those who are authorized by God and Christ (prophets, apostles) to transmit the Christian tradition, and to the 
writings that were gathered together as Scripture and, for Christians, the NT as canon within the canon. How is the 
divine authority transmitted form Christ to his followers? What is received as authoritative? Differing answers to 
these questions have occasioned many church conflicts…” See Daniel Patte, “Authority in/of the Church,” in The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity. Edited by Daniel Patte (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 87. 
Also, see John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 9-21. 
90 John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 13. For Schütz, while authority seeks to make 
power accessible, legitimacy seeks to interpret and make authority accessible in concrete forms. Ibid., 16. 
91 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 3 vols. Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 94. 
92 For example, Foucault finds that “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process 
which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support 
which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions 
and contradictions which isolate them from one another, and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, 
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, 
in the various social hegemonies.” Ibid., 92-93. Emphasis added. 
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three types of authority: “rational (legal), traditional, and charismatic.”93 According to Schütz, 
Weber’s notion of authority presupposes “the idea of legitimacy,”94 which assumes the notion of 
charisma. Here, we see that the charisma has a dual role: it is one type of authority and yet prior 
to authority. Charisma, as such, can stabilize and revolutionize the tradition. Schütz writes: 
“charisma is not merely one of three types of legitimate authority, but a constituent element in all 
legitimate order.”95 This “exclusive inclusion”96 of charisma in defining authority and power is 
probably due to the fact the first two bases of legitimacy cannot be fully articulated.97 Not unlike 
our discussion of μέλη ἐκ μέρους in the end of the “Introduction” chapter, the paradox of 
charisma destabilizes our concepts of power and authority. And, if Paul’s notion of love is 
intimately tied to the concepts of power and authority, as rhetorical and ideological approaches 
highlight, then our interpretation of love needs to pay attention to this paradox as well. 
 
II. The Modes of Existence: Autonomy, Relationality, and Heteronomy 
Without the integration of sensation, feeling, and thinking, our dialogues with 
each other and the shape of our efforts toward liberation will be imprisoned 
behind ideologies that erase our sometimes contradictory and paradoxical 
experiences.98 – Rita Nakashima Brock 
 
93 John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 17. For details, see Max Weber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press, 1978), 3-62. 
94 The bases of legitimacy are “(a) tradition: valid is that which has always been; (b) affectual, especially emotional, 
faith: valid is that which is newly revealed or exemplary; (c) value-rational faith: valid is that which has been 
deduced as an absolute; (d) positive enactment which is believed to be legal.” See Max Weber, Economy and 
Society, 36. Quoted from John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 17-18. 
95 John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, 19. 
96 This expression is given by Agamben to describe the operation of “example.” He writes: “ What the example 
shows is its belonging to a class, but for this very reason the example steps out of its class in the very moment in 
which it exhibits and delimits it (in the case of a linguistic syntagm, the example thus shows its own signifying and, 
in this way, suspends its own meaning).” See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. 
Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 22. 
97 See n. 94. 
98 Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New York: The Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 1988), 42. 
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 One important lesson that we can glean from various interpretations of Paul’s notion of 
love and his notion of power is that our meaning production cannot be reduced to only a certain 
meaning-producing dimension. Moreover, if depending on the mode of existence that we 
prioritize, we can conceive of power relations in terms of “power-over” (cf. autonomy), “power-
with” (cf. relationality), or “power-lessness” (cf. heteronomy), then our interpretation of Paul’s 
love may also display similar characteristics of “power-over,” “power-with,” and “power-
lessness.” To decide which notion of love is more valid than the others, we need to assess their 
value and effect in concrete contexts. Now, let us consolidate what we have learnt so far about 
these modes of existence. 
(i) Autonomy 
 According to The New Oxford American Dictionary, the word autonomy comes from two 
Greek words auto (“self”) and nomos (“law”). It refers to “the right or condition of self-
government,” “freedom from external control or influence; independence,” or “(in Kantian moral 
philosophy) the capacity of an agent to act in accordance with objective morality rather than 
under the influence of desires.”99 Cristina Grenholm notes that “[a]s a political term dating back 
to antiquity and the Stoics, autonomy referred to free city-states and free men.”100 This idea of 
autonomy, according to Grenholm, is not only affirmed by Paul as “a gift from God for all, 
including slaves and women (Gal. 3:28, 5:11),”101 it is also asserted by the church in the late 
Medieval against the political/military regime, 102  by the Protestants against the Catholic 
papacy,103 and by scholars against ecclesial institutions during the European Enlightenment. In 
99 “Autonomy,” in The New Oxford American Dictionary. 2nd ed. Edited by Erin McKean (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 108. 
100 Cristina Grenholm, “Autonomy,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity, 89. 
101 Idem. 
102 See Joseph H. Lynch, The Medieval Church: A Brief History (London and New York: Addison Wesley Longman 
Limited, 1992). 
103 See Euan Cameron, The European Reformation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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his discussion of the prescriptive feature of the law in the framework of the biblical narrative, as 
Paul Ricoeur argues for a dialectic tension between theonomy and autonomy,104 we need to note 
that our assessment of autonomy must be contextual. Yes, when viewed exclusively by itself, 
autonomy can lead to imperialism and colonialism, as it promotes a great confidence in one’s 
ability and will power to know and to do the universal good (cf. deontological ethics), 105 
nevertheless it should not be completely dismissed. In the case of those attempting suicide, a 
sense of self-worth and self-sufficiency is indispensable for their survival and transformation. So 
in our evaluation of an autonomy-centered love, while a self-centered love that focuses on the 
giver can be dangerous,106 as it can objectify the “I” and “you” from an “I-Thou” relation into an 
“I-It” relationship,107 it need not be always negative. A sense of self-independence can be a 
remedy to a love that con-fuses the self and the other, thereby leading to an abusive relationship. 
In this situation, autonomy can help keep a healthy distance between the lover and the beloved. 
(ii) Relationality 
 Without denying that autonomy has its place in cultures which are not individual-
centered, in a group-centered society such as ancient Mediterranean world, relationality becomes 
primordial. For many Chinese in Malaysia too, it is our relationship with others that defines our 
social identity. There is no “self” outside the community. The community lives in the “self.” A 
104 See Paul Ricoeur, “Theonomy and/or Autonomy,” 284-98. 
105 This ethics assumes that once everyone learns of the truth, s/he will put the truth into practice. But, who decide 
this truth? Moreover, while it presumes that we will harm not people, it does not tell us from whose perspective do 
we perceive harm. What we consider helpful may become harmful to others. Ogletree argues that the weakness of 
deontological ethic lies with “the abstractness of the principles and rules we formulate to express the content of our 
moral obligation” and the assumed universality of these moral principles. See Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use of the 
Bible in Christian Ethics, 26. 
106 For example, Brock points out that “[t]he Christian attitude toward charity is often built on the idea of the 
superior helping the inferior, which locks paternalism into the relationship. Rather than seeing our capacity to give 
to the poor as part of a social-economic system that produces poverty and hunger, much Christian charity is 
designed to help others into the exploitive system.” See Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart, 8. 




                                                          
“community is not based on the principle of the separation of individual identities.”108 To stress 
autonomy in a group-centered culture can be taken as disdainful of one’s relationship with others, 
as if one is ashamed of them. 
 In a culture where one is indebted to others and to one’s heritage and ancestors, 
autonomy is defined in terms of one’s relation with others. For Grenholm, this orientation is 
neglected by Western churches, where “relationality is commonly viewed as secondary, because 
theologies tend to emphasize the autonomy and sovereignty of God as a person, known to 
humans as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but the relationality of the Trinity is fundamentally 
hidden from humans. Thus, individuals are ideally autonomous, as God is.”109 In this description, 
Western theologies not only “emphasize the autonomy and sovereignty of God as a person” – 
and the autonomy of each person within the Trinity (each person being defined by a particular 
role) – they also want the church and her members to share such qualities. But, if “the 
relationality of the Trinity is fundamentally hidden from humans” (cf. Augustine’s Dei Trinitate), 
then relationality is secondary to autonomy and heteronomy. 
 Relationality, however, can be conceived of in many ways. After World War II, in the 
aftershock of Shoah/Holocaust,110 as biblical scholars re-examine the Jewish-Christian relations, 
we see a perspectival and analytical shift from an individual-centered autonomy to a community-
centered relationality. In Pauline studies, for example, the rise of the “New Perspective” stresses 
the unique salvific position of Jews in Pauline letters.111 In addition to the beginning of French 
108 Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings. Revised edition (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1991), 21. 
109 Cristina Grenholm, “Relationality,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity, 1062. Emphasis added. 
110  See Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust. Edited by Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999); Robert P. Ericksen, Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and 
Universities in Nazi Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
111 For an excellent review of this historical trajectory, see Magnus Zetterholm, Approaches to Paul: A Student’s 
Guide to Recent Scholarship (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009). For some odd reasons, the work of Patte 
which makes similar argument to that of E. P. Sander is always omitted in the review of the “New Perspective.” See 
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poststructuralist critique of Western metaphysics in 1960s, biblical scholars in the wake of 
various ideological criticisms also began to interrogate ideologies in biblical interpretations, and 
how ideologies justify and reinforce certain domination and marginalization in different spheres 
of human living conditions.112 Relationality becomes a term that negotiates and highlights the 
tensions of various configurations of power relations and social positions in society. 
 While we want to advocate mutuality in relationality, Bonnie Miller-McLemore cautions 
us to be concrete and specific in our definition. In pointing out the process, transition, and 
direction or goal in a relationship, she reminds us that “mutuality takes on different meanings in 
different contexts.”113 The term “mutuality” should not be objectified into a slogan, as if it means 
the same thing in all situations. To do so is to essentialize the notion of mutuality and ironically 
erase relationality. She asks: “Does mutuality mean mutual intimacy, equal power, agency, or 
regard, or shared responsibility and just love? Or isn’t it more accurate to say that it means all of 
these in different times and places?”114 A relationship of mutuality between parents and children 
is different from that of between lovers or between friends or between employer and employee, 
etc. In fact, not all relationships should aim for mutuality in all stages.115 In the words of Miller-
McLemore: “mutuality is more a verb than a noun; it describes an always-evolving process 
rather than an object that people obtain.”116 In short, to address the issue of mutuality, “we must 
pay better attention to several commonly overlooked dimensions: (1) the reality of temporary 
Daniel Patte, Early Jewish Hermeneutics in Palestine. Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 22 
(Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975). Note that this was Patte’s dissertation in 1971. 
112 See “Ideological Criticism,” in The Postmodern Bible: The Bible and Culture Collective (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1995), 272-308. A very good overview of works by Said, Spivak, and Bhabha 
remains Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London and New York: Verso, 
1997). 
113 Bonnie Miller-McLemore, “Sloppy Mutuality: Just Love for Children and Adults,” in Mutuality Matters: Family, 
Faith, and Just Love. Edited by Herbert Anderson, Edward Foley, Bonnie Miller-McLemore, and Robert Schreiter 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 126. 
114 Idem. 
115 Ibid., 128. Even “power-over relationships” “are not destructive in and of themselves; they are harmful when 
they are ‘unchanging.’” Ibid., 127. 
116 Ibid., 132. 
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inequality and ‘transitional hierarchies,’ (2) the role of duty, responsibility, authority, and even 
sacrifice on the part of the adult and qualified self-centeredness on the part of the child; and 
finally (3) the inevitability of failure, harm, and reconciliation.”117 Grenholm, likewise, makes 
this point rather clear in her notion of “motherhood” when she, through concrete life examples of 
the relationship between a mother and her baby in different stages of life, argues that 
“asymmetry is not identical with inequality” and “vulnerability must not be confused or equated 
with either weakness or exposure.”118 Deploying the Korean concepts of “han” (“deep regret,” 
“brokenness”) and “jeong” (“a sticky feeling and relation”),119 Wonhee Anne Joh also argues for 
an asymmetrical and mutual notion of love. Using postcolonial theory that highlights a neither-
nor interstitial space and Julia Kristeva’s notion of “abjection” through the lens of Kelly Oliver’s 
reading (see chapter 2), Joh shows that a jeong-love not only exposes the oppressive power and 
structure, it also heals the psychical damage of both the oppressed and the oppressor.120 Likewise, 
in his analysis of the Hebrew word ḥesed (“loyalty,” “loving-kindness”), Uriah Kim highlights 
the iconoclastic notion of jeong in ḥesed and argues that it is not limited to an act of will to be 
117 Ibid., 127. 
118 Cristina Grenholm, Motherhood and Love: Beyond the Gendered Stereotype of Theology. Translated by Marie 
Tåqvist (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), xiii. 
119 “One cannot succinctly define jeong without losing the depth of its multiple and shifting dimensions. Moreover, 
jeong embodies the invisible traces of compassion in relationships and is most often recognized when we perceive 
our very own self, conscious and unconscious, in the mirrored reflection of the other. Jeong is a Korean way of 
conceiving an often complex constellation of relationality of the self with the other that is deeply associated with 
compassion, love, vulnerability, and acceptance of heterogeneity as essential to life. It not only smooths harsh 
feelings, such as dislike or even hate, but has a way of making relationships richly complex by moving away from a 
binary, oppositional perception of reality, such as oppressor and oppressed.” Wonhee Anne Joh, Heart of the Cross: 
A Postcolonial Christology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), xxi. In terms of “han,” Joh points 
out that while it can be a won-han or a hu-han. “She writes: “Won-han is distinctive for its deep awareness of 
injustice and justice seeking” (Ibid., 25). But this won-han can turn into a hu-han when the unjust situation remains 
the same. “Hu-han [therefore] has given up on justice as a possible goal and seeks instead retaliation and violent 
revenge” (idem.). Following the analysis of Lee, Joh agrees that “han is double-edged in its embodiment of love and 
hate … When hate gets stronger, it becomes won-han, whereas when love becomes the stronger force, han turns into 
jeong-han” (Ibid., 23). For Joh’s allusion to the notion of han, see Jae Hoon Lee, The Exploration of the Inner 
Wounds – Han. AAR Academy Series 86 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1994). 
120 For a short version of Joh’s Heart of the Cross that specifically addresses Spivak’s notion of “planetary,” see W. 
Anne Joh, “Love’s Multiplicity: Jeong and Spivak’s Notes toward Planetary Love,” in Planetary Love: Spivak, 
Postcoloniality, and Theology. Edited by Stephen D. Moore and Mayra Rivera (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2011), 168-90. 
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faithful within pre-existing relationship. Rather, as ḥesed comes from the heart, it is also an “act 
of ‘affection and kindness’ that a person can perform for another for the sake of God or for the 
sake of human solidarity, irrespective of whether or not there is a close relationship between 
them.”121 In his review of ḥesed in scholarship, Kim shows how a concept can be approached so 
differently, depending on the modes of existence that one privileges and assumes. 
 The attention to the specific context of mutuality is crucial, lest we think that it must be a 
strict symmetrical or equal reciprocity between two parties. In their critique of the patriarchal 
and hierarchical views of love, Rita Nakashima Brock and Carter Heyward also do not rule out 
asymmetrical relationships in mutuality.122 Mutuality is not a calculation of reciprocity. If we 
demand for a strict reciprocity, a love relationship can become an economy of exchange and a 
form of autonomy. But, as relationality addresses the interaction between the self and others, it 
heightens our awareness to the power relations in love. It then shows that love is more than a 
relationship between two individuals. Love affects each other’s current and future families and 
friends, whether socially, materially, or psychically. In this framework, one cannot ignore the 
opinions of those associated with the beloved. In this mode of love, it is not merely an individual 
giving love to another individual. Rather, in giving love to the beloved, the lover is already the 
recipient of love that s/he receives in her/his encounter with the beloved. Our notion of 
relationality, in other words, must not be reduced to just an economy of exchange. 
 
121 Uriah Y. Kim, Identity and Loyalty in the David Story: A Postcolonial Reading (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press, 2008), 27. For a very helpful review of scholarship on ḥesed, see pages 30-60. 
122 For example, Brock writes: “Erotic power is the power of our primal interrelatedness. Erotic power, as it creates 
and connects hearts, involves the whole person in relationships of self-awareness, vulnerability, openness, and 
caring.” See Rita Nakashima Brock, Journeys by Heart, 26. Likewise, Heyward writes: “What is ‘in’ me is not 
simply ‘in’ me. My feelings, thoughts, commitments, beliefs are not solely mine. They have been/are being shaped 
in me by forces and factors that are not me at all but that participate in forming me – parents, teachers, friends, 
enemies, forces known and unknown to me, ancient and modern, near and distant, familiar and alien to my 
awareness.” See Carter Heyward, Touching Our Strength: The Erotic as Power and the Love of God (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1989), 12. 
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 (iii) Heteronomy 
 Heteronomy is an asymmetrical relationality. It underscores vulnerability and mutuality. 
As “hetero” means “one or the other of two” or “other than should be,” it suggests an element of 
otherness. The Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines 
heteronomy as a lack of control, where one is subjected to others, whether in politics or in 
“lacking moral freedom or self-determination.”123 This feature of otherness is rather apparent in 
our feeling, mood, religious experience, and bodily drive, which we have emphasized, cannot be 
totally grasped and articulated. 
 Given this otherness in heteronomy, it can thus lead to exploitation. Grace Jantzen, for 
example, critiques the otherness of mysticism when we do not check “whether involvement in 
spirituality might actually deflect attention from the real needs of people, offering palliatives to 
individuals rather than attending to the social causes of injustice.”124 Likewise, Daphne Hampton 
argues that the church, instead of addressing social oppression and injustice, relegates social 
activism to the domain of revelation, monotheism, and ecclesial institution.125 Heteronomy as 
such is dangerous, as it is set beyond any possible critical assessment when it is treated as 
divinely revealed. Grenholm writes, “Heteronomy is oppressive when it smothers mutual 
relations and fails to respect the individual.”126 However, Grenholm continues: “heteronomy is 
also the positive empowering that occurs when one ultimately abandons control of oneself, 
trusting God (rather than relying on oneself or human [relational] institutions) or receiving the 
123 “Heteronomy,” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 1063. 
124 See Grace M. Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 18. 
125 Daphne Hampton, “On Autonomy and Heteronomy,” in Swallowing a Fishbone?: Feminist Theologians Debate 
Christianity. Edited by Daphne Hampton (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1996), 1-16. 
126 Cristina Grenholm, “Heteronomy,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity, 511. 
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gift of love.”127 In other words, if heteronomy as a human condition is embedded in autonomy 
and relationality, then it also needs to recognize their otherness. 
 Examining the heteronomy in Christian creeds, Sarah Coakley takes note of Hampton’s 
concern and her view of kenōsis (“emptying out”), but she critiques them through her detailed 
analysis of Philippians 2:5-11 and of early Christian creeds and mystical prayer. Coakley 
recognizes the transformative power of kenōsis practiced in silent prayer or contemplation. She 
writes: “we can only be properly ‘empowered’ here if we cease to set the agenda, if we ‘make 
space’ for God to be God.” 128 Of course, this “silent waiting on the divine in prayer” will 
“involve great personal commitment and great personal risk.”129 But, Coakley insists that this 
vulnerability in heteronomy “is not an invitation to be battered, nor is its silence a silencing.”130 
To be silent does not mean to do nothing, to give up, or to give in to the situation. Silence is not 
meaningless. It recognizes the monstrosity of injustice and realizes that in order to not repay evil 
with evil we need to be empowered in our vulnerability or woundedness. 
 Speaking of the silence of God at the cross, C. S. Song wonders whether Jesus’ God was 
shocked and reduced to silence by the brutality of humans against humans. The silence of God 
must also be a protest, just as Jesus protests with silence before the religious and political leaders. 
The silence is not a sign of resignation and despair. Song writes: 
After so much horror and grief protest is not easy. This is our [Taiwanese and 
Chinese] experience. Horror renders you numb, and grief sucks out of your life 
force. There is precious little left to do anything else. You continue stupefied and 
your grief seems to have no end. To protest injustice, we have to have moral 
courage. To protest brutality we have to have spiritual power … And on top of all 
these we have to have physical strength to protest injustice, brutality, and 
inhumanity … Protest does not have to be done with words and action, however. 
127 Idem. 
128 Sarah Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion: On the Repression of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist Writing,” in 
Swallowing a Fishbone?, 107. 




                                                          
There are situations in which protest has to be done in silence. Then that silence 
becomes powerful silence, ominous silence, frightening silence … In silence God 
is in profound agony with Jesus and through Jesus with victims of human 
atrocity.131 
 
The power in silence: such power in vulnerability may seem absurd and delusional to many. Yet, 
it is a transformative silence that preserves our human dignity and integrity without being 
degraded into paying wrong for wrong. It sounds absurd when injustice rampages and stares at us 
starkly. Yet, do we not see similar absurdity in womanist theology,132 Black theology,133 Latin 
liberation theology,134 etc. in the face of the monstrosity of violence and injustice? 
 Thus it is not a surprise that Coakley finds tremendous power and meaning in silence 
where she sees vulnerability as an impossibility manifested in the event of kenōsis, in the cross 
of Christ. Coakley argues that kenōsis or vulnerability is not “a negation of self, but the place of 
self’s transformation and expansion into God.”135 Like a ritual, this prayer space/time is a liminal 
space/time that lets the other be other, God be God (cf. 2 Cor. 1:3-11).136 So instead of feeling 
powerless, heteronomy or the “ethics of risk,” as Sharon Welch puts it, reminds us that “strength 
131 C. S. Song, Jesus, The Crucified People (Lima, OH: Academic Renewal Press, 2001), 115-17. 
132 See Katie Geneva Cannon, Katie’s Canon: Womanism and the Soul of the Black Community. Foreword by Sara 
Lawrence-Lightfoot (New York: Continuum, 1995). 
133 See James H. Cone, The Cross and the Lynching Tree (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2011). 
134 For example, see Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. Revised edition 
with a new introduction. Translated and edited by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1988); Alexander Nava, The Mystical and Prophetic Thought of Simone Weil and Gustavo Gutiérrez: 
Reflections on the Mystery and Hiddenness of God (New York: State University of New York, 2001). Also, see Ada 
María Isasi-Díaz, En la Lucha: In the Struggle: Elaborating a Mujerista Theology: A Hispanic Women’s Liberation 
Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993). 
135 Sarah Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 108. 
136 Similarly Chrétien finds the vocal prayer the religious phenomenon par excellence. Treating prayer as a speech 
act, Chrétien thinks that not only do we reveal ourselves before the invisible other in prayer, we also respond to the 
call as we pray. For Chrétien, this response to the call is what “dispossesses us of our egocentrism.” But, who call us? 
To whom do we pray? An invisible other. Is our prayer a soliloquy? No. It is a speech act; a communal act in fact, 
we could add. In praying, not only do we address the unknown, we also address ourselves. Perhaps more 
importantly, in prayer and contemplation we pay heed to our voices, voices that struggle with other voices in our 
heart and head, voices that reverberate through our body, as we face the other and wonder how to proceed. See Jean-
Louis Chrétien, “The Wounded Word: The Phenomenology of Prayer,” in The Phenomenology and the 
“Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 153. 
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is not founded on certainty, but on trust and belief,”137 where strength is measured “in its ability 
to continually call forth hope and righteous agency.”138 Heteronomy, vulnerability, risk, etc. are 
not passive in the face of injustice. A heteronomy-oriented love is risky and can be exploited. 
But it is also hospitable to creativity and transformation that do not reify any category. As such a 
love cannot be objectified, it must be examined and committed again and again. 
 
III. Different Modes of Existence in the Felt, Claimed, and Paid Aspects of Honor 
[H]onor is too intimate a sentiment to submit to definition: it must be felt, it 
cannot be analyzed except by the anthropologist. It is therefore an error to regard 
honor as a single constant concept rather than a conceptual field within which 
people find the means to express their self-esteem or their esteem for others.139  
   – John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers 
 
If honor and shames are pivotal values in ancient Mediterranean cultures, then how we 
understand them can greatly affect our interpretation of 1 Corinthians, including its passages 
about love. In fact, if the modes of existence (i.e., heteronomy, autonomy, and relationality) 
correspond respectively to the three aspects of honor (i.e., honor felt, honor claimed, and honor 
paid) then our interpretations of 1 Corinthians must take into account of the role of modes of 
existence in our textual analysis. 
Since 1960s anthropologists and sociologists have noted that in a collective culture, 
“[h]onour is at the apex of the pyramid of temporal social values and it conditions their 
hierarchical order. Cutting across all other social classifications it divides social beings into two 
137 Sharon D. Welch, A Feminist Ethic of Risk, 35. 
138 Ibid., 36. 
139 See John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology. Edited by 
John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge, UK; New York; Victoria, Australia: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 4. 
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fundamental categories, those endowed with honour and those deprived of it.”140 Following these 
field studies, biblical scholars also notice how honor and shame were “pivotal values of the first-
century Mediterranean world.” 141  Halvor Moxnes writes: “[p]atronage, slavery, economic 
practices, purity rules, meal practices, and even the peculiar Mediterranean sense of identity that 
derives from group membership must likewise be understood in terms of honor and shame.”142 
In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, Anthony Thiselton cites Witherington approvingly: 
“Corinth was a city where public boasting and self-promotion had become an art form. The 
Corinthian people thus lived with an honor-shame cultural orientation, where public recognition 
was often more important than facts …”143 In his recent monograph on honor and conflict in 1 
Corinthians, Mark Finney also argues that the conflicts in the church of God in Corinth “is a 
crisis of social identity” that comes “directly from the cultural ‘power’ of φιλοτιμία [love of 
honor].”144 And, as the value of honor is associated with the endowment of divine favor, it is not 
140 John G. Peristiany, “Introduction,” in Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. Edited by John 
G. Peristiany (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 10. 
141 Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World, 28-62. Downing, however, argues that honor “is only occasionally 
pivotal and is often negligible, if it is present at all.” See F. Gerald Downing, “‘Honor among Exegetes,” Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 61 (1999): 53-73 (68). 
142 Halvor Moxnes, “Honor and Shame,” in The Social Sciences and the New Testament Interpretation. Edited by 
Richard L. Rohrbaugh (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), 20. For a dynamic view of patron-client 
relationships in the Roman Empire, see the articles in Patronage in Ancient Society. Edited by Andrew Wallace-
Hadrill (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). Also, see Richard A. Horsley, “Patronage, Priesthoods, and 
Power: Introduction,” in Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society. Edited by Richard A. 
Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), 88-95; Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, “Patronal 
Power Relations,” in Paul and Empire, 96-103; John K. Chow, “Patronage in Roman Corinth,” in Paul and Empire, 
104-25.  
143 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI; 
Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2000), 13; Ben Witherington, III., Conflict and Community in Corinth, 8. 
144 Mark T. Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World: 1 Corinthians in its Greco-Roman Social Setting. 
Library of New Testament Studies 460 (London and New York: T &T Clark International, 2012), 3. To address the 
problem, Finney contends that “Paul’s presentation of the cross of Christ is offered (or insisted upon!) as the only 
paradigm in which the social lifestyle of the Christ-movement can adequately proceed.” Ibid., 4. 
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surprising that honor is “in essence, the pre-eminent social value in the Roman world.”145 In his 
summary of the notion of value in Greco-Roman world, Finney writes: 
the drive for personal honour operated strongly amongst the vast majority of men, 
especially those engage in public life and, even more … the loss (or potential loss) 
of honour aroused the very deepest feelings. Greeks and Romans were lovers of 
honour and competitive in their quest for privilege and esteem; any attack on 
one’s τιμή was an attack on the very basis of one’s life and well-being.146 
 
Note that drive and feeling of φιλοτιμία are so intense that “any attack on one’s τιμή was an 
attack on the very basis of one’s life and well-being” (cf. heteronomy). In his reading of the 
Platonic erōs, Olivier Renaut further argues that as thumos (“passion”) is at the very heart of 
philotimia (“love of honor”), love and honor are not only interwoven and marked by heteronomy, 
the self is also marked by heteronomy.147 This feeling dimension of honor is of great importance 
to our understanding of honor and love. 
In his well-known works that introduce and integrate anthropology in biblical studies, 
Bruce Malina also defines honor as “a person’s (or group’s) feeling of self-worth and the public, 
social acknowledgement of that worth … It is the basis of one’s reputation, of one’s social 
standing, regardless of gender.” 148 Consequently, “any human group worthy of belonging to 
humankind, needs to have shame, to be sensitive to its honor rating, to be perceptive to the 
opinion of others” 149  in maintaining and acquiring its honor. Despite Malina’s mention of 
“feeling” in his definition of honor, he surprisingly does not explore the feeling dimension of 
145 Ibid., 37. “Roman life was a public affair and the pursuit of honour subsisted under the constant scrutiny of those 
within one’s own social class, who invariably concerned themselves with the calculation of a person’s honour, 
relative both to themselves and others.” Idem. 
146 Ibid., 48. 
147 See Olivier Renaut, “Challenging Platonic Erôs: The Role of Thumos and Philotimia in Love,” in Erôs in Ancient 
Greece. Edited by Ed Sanders, Chiara Thumiger, Chris Carey, and Nick J. Lowe (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 95-110. 
148 Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World, 50. 
149 Ibid., 51. 
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honor. He focuses on the social functions of honor,150 which we saw earlier is also present in his 
definition of Paul’s love. As such, the value of honor is reduced to a functionalist account (cf. 
relationality). But, as Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers point out, “honor is too intimate a sentiment to 
submit to definition: it must be felt.”151 Secondly, while Malina clearly stresses that honor is a 
group-oriented value, his notion of collectivity is strangely individual-centered.152 In light of 
150 Malina writes: “Values are about the quality and direction of behavior. Since values are essentially qualities that 
inhere in something else, what that something else might be is always open to dispute within social limits, of 
course.” Ibid., 53. To analyze the inherent qualities of values, Malina then focuses on the “functions” of honor and 
shame. But since “functions” are representations (symbols) of values, as Julian Pitt-Rivers notes, such analysis is 
indeed “open to dispute.” See Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in Honour and Shame, 26. 
151 John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology. Edited by J. G. 
Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1992), 4. 
152  In his Windows on the World of Jesus, for example, Malina proposes potentially very helpful concrete 
illustrations of honor and shame that seek to highlight a necessary interconnectedness of individuals in the social 
networks in an honor and shame culture. But Malina’s formulation of these illustrations is quite ambivalent, as he 
remains influenced by the individual-centered Western perspective from which he writes. As concrete illustrations 
taken from a community-centered culture are most helpful, as Malina has recognized, we will follow his lead by 
providing similar, but very different, illustrations from an honor-shame culture – Malaysia – which is not unlike the 
Mediterranean-Judean culture. For details, see Jackson Wu, “The Honor of God in the Shame of Christ for Salvation: 
A Theological Contextualization from Chinese Culture” (Ph.D. diss., Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
2012), 148-92. Notice that Wu also alludes to the importance of feeling dimension of face (“mianzi” and “lian”) in 
the value of honor and shows how this heteronomy can be translated into different forms of relationality in the social 
area of morality. 
Now, in “Window 11,” Malina tells a story of how some Mediterranean-Judean parents were upset that 
their children did badly in a teacher’s class. They confronted the teacher (Frank), “‘I know my child is bright and if 
he got a D on your test then there must be something wrong with your teaching,’ or ‘Why do you dislike my child so 
much?’” See Bruce J. Malina, Windows on the World of Jesus: Time Travel to Ancient Judea (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 29. 
Note that this story is told from an individual-centered viewpoint. The Mediterranean-Judean parents would 
probably say “we know our child” and “Why do you dislike our child so much?” While Malina rightly points out 
that “in first century Palestine, poor performance in school is thought to reflect faulty upbringing” (idem), he does 
not flesh out the implication of this interconnectedness. Just as a child is a child-with-others-in the-society, a grade 
is tied to many other things. This is why honor and shame are collective values.  
In a communal culture, a teacher’s relationship with the student goes far beyond the classroom. If the 
teacher knows the student’s family, then giving the student a bad grade may make his relationship with the family 
awkward. Even if he may not know the student’s family, his family and friends may know the family. In a group-
oriented culture, everyone is interconnected. In addition, the student’s bad grade may reflect the teacher’s teaching 
competency, which may affect his reputation among the colleagues, unless the student is already known for getting 
bad grade. Now, if a person’s reputation is intertwined with everything that s/he is and does, then would people not 
want to maintain harmony as much as possible, at least on the surface? Because when one offends someone, one 
may also indirectly offend people and groups that are associated with oneself. As such, would people not want to 
avoid unnecessary conflicts? Malina’s assessment that honor and shame are “agonistic” is accurate, but the 
competition is subtle and comes in various ways and forms.  
Let me use Wu’s illustration: “When disputes do occur, how do [honor and shame] influence matters of 
reconciliation and forgiveness in China? The legal system is not the preferred way of handling problems. Since 
harmony is of utmost importance, it is not surprising that Chinese prefer to avoid open conflict. In fact, many 
problems can be avoided simply by using indirect communication. On the whole, Chinese show a great deal of 
reluctance to extend forgiveness, as has been verified in numerous empirical studies. For one reason, to openly 
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these two aspects of honor, our notion of love needs to consider the modes of existence and the 
very different ways in which human interactions are perceived.153 
Now, we may not be able to describe and define the value of honor except by examining 
its expression and manifestations in human behaviors and interactions. Yet, if honor and shame 
“are the reflection of the social personality in the mirror of social ideal,”154 then there is a gap 
(i.e., “reflection”) between the practice and the ideal. In the words of Pitt-Rivers: “Honour, 
therefore, provides a nexus between the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the 
individual through [the individual’s] aspiration to personify them.”155 As a nexus between the 
ideals of society and the individual, honor works like this: “the sentiment of honour inspires 
conduct which is honourable, the conduct receives recognition and establishes reputation, and 
reputation is finally sanctified by the bestowal of honours. Honour felt becomes honour claimed 
and honour claimed becomes honour paid.”156 That is to say, honor felt (i.e., heteronomy) is 
manifested in honor claimed (i.e., autonomy) and acknowledged in honor paid (i.e., relationality). 
As this sentiment, feeling, or drive is further tied to the divine favor, cosmic order, or the 
sacred,157 it explains why the value of honor can be so powerful that some cultures even consider 
discuss the problem leads to someone losing face. Secondly, some suggest Chinese relationships have higher 
expectations and emphasis on sacrifice than do many other cultures. This results in greater hurt when there are 
serious fissures in relationship.” See Jackson Wu, “The Honor of God in the Shame of Christ for Salvation,” 168. 
153 Wu rightly points out that our views of honor and shame “largely depend on whether one appeals to an 
‘independent self-concept’ or “interdependent self-concept.”153 See Jackson Wu, “The Honor of God in the Shame 
of Christ for Salvation,” 172. 
154 See John G. Peristiany, “Introduction,” in Honour and Shame, 9. He writes, “A study of the value judgements 
concerning honour and shame involves the study of the supreme temporal ideals of a society and of their 
embodiment in the ideal type of man. It is also a study of the basic mould of social personality.” Ibid., 10. 
155 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in Honour and Shame, 22. 
156 Idem. 
157 See Mark T. Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World 12-13; Jackson Wu, “The Honor of God in the 
Shame of Christ for Salvation,” 160; John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace 
in Anthropology, 2-3; John K. Campbell, “Honour and the Devil,” in Honour and Shame, 141-70. This connection to 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
it “more important than life itself.”158 For Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers, this is why honor is also 
related to grace (see the discussion of charis in section 5 below). No wonder there is a gap 
between the practice and the ideal. No wonder Finney, in his review of Greco-Roman notion of 
honor, finds that “any attack on one’s τιμή was an attack on the very basis of one’s life and well-
being.”159 Concerning this notion of the sacred, Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers write: 
One is perhaps chary of talking loosely about “the sacred” today … yet we 
nevertheless require a word to denote the fact that there is a realm of mental 
behavior where the extraordinary is opposed to the ordinary and where accepted 
truths are placed beyond question by a conviction, impervious to reasoning 
because it lies deeper than consciousness; it commands an attachment that springs 
from the bottom of the self, refusing the logic of everyday conduct. This is where 
the sentiment of honor arises …160 
 
In saying that the sentiment of honor that arises from the sacred is “impervious to reasoning 
because it lies deeper than consciousness,” the authors give us a definition of conviction. What 
counts as an honor is a conviction, a self-evident truth that cannot be demonstrated. This 
conviction comes to the fore in the tension between honor precedence (i.e., relationality) and 
honor virtue (i.e., heteronomy). 
 In her critique of Malina’s notion of honor that focuses on honor precedence, Louise 
Lawrence gives a list of exceptions to his definition in the Gospel of Matthew that display honor 
virtue, an honor that comes not from social conventions but contradicts them as it is grounded in 
the divine.161 Lawrence rightly points out that Pitt-Rivers does speak of this honor virtue in 
158 See Jackson Wu, “The Honor of God in the Shame of Christ for Salvation,” 154; John G. Peristiany and Julian 
Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, 2. 
159 See Mark T. Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World, 48. 
160 John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, 2. 
161 See Louise Joy Lawrence, An Ethnography of the Gospel of Matthew: A Critical Assessment of the Use of the 
Honour and Shame Model in New Testament Studies (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003), 29-30, 89-92,142-80. In her literary-
ethnographic analysis of Matthew, Lawrence problematizes the rigid categories that Malina sets up in his social-
scientific analysis of cultural values and practices in the ancient Mediterranean world. She finds such use of model 
risks pre-determining one’s textual analysis, as one analyzes the text by mapping the model onto the text. 
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tension with the agonistic honor precedence, even though Malina neglects it.162 This distinction 
between honor precedence and honor virtue is also found in Chinese notion of honor in the 
figures of mian-zi and lian (both mean “face” in Chinese).163 Jackson Wu writes: “Mianzi [honor 
precedence; relationality] can simply mean one is well known or has impressed others, regardless 
of moral grounds (e.g., athletes, singers, CEOs). A poor person could have lian [honor virtue; 
heteronomy] but little mianzi.”164 While Wu finds that “a sharp distinction should not be pressed 
too far,”165 Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers argue that the distinction is not dualistic. They write: 
The paradox that honor is at the same time a matter of moral conscience and a 
sentiment on the one hand, and on the other, a fact of repute and precedence, 
whether attained by virtue of birth, power, wealth, sanctity, prestige, guile, force, 
or simony … implied that honor could not merely be reduced and treated as an 
epiphenomenon of some other factor, but obeyed a logic of its own which could 
dispel the paradoxes.166 
 
Here, understanding the “logic of its own” involved in honor may “dispel the paradoxes” in the 
recognition and operation of honor, but such a logic is felt or religious oriented. The paradox 
needs to be examined in terms of each context where the value of honor is at work, lest the felt 
aspect is reduced to the claimed and paid aspects. 
162 She writes: “Biblical scholars who have relied solely on Malina’s definition of honor (largely corresponding to 
‘’honor precedence’) have remained unaware of Pitt-Rivers’s twofold definition of the concept of honor and have, 
accordingly, labeled anything different from this model as deviant or countercultural.” See Louise Joy Lawrence, 
“‘For truly, I tell you, they have received their reward’ (Matt 6:2): Investigating Honor Precedence and Honor 
Virtue,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 64 (2002): 687-702 (690); Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status,” in 
Honour and Shame, 31, 42-43, 61-63, 72. 
163  Wu writes: “Far from being limited to China, face is a universal human phenomenon, a fundamental 
consideration in social interactions. In fact, face must be protected and given in order to maintain harmony in a 
group. In different contexts, the rules and signs for recognizing face may differ. A person loses faces when he or she 
claims to have certain characteristics but others do not acknowledge that claim.” See Jackson Wu, “The Honor of 
God in the Shame of Christ for Salvation,” 152. 
164 Ibid., 157. 
165 Idem. 
166 John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, 5. Pitt-Rivers 
continues: “It would appear that there are in Western civilization two opposed – and ultimately complementary – 
registers: the first associated with honor, competition, triumph, the male sex, possession, and the profane world, and 
the other with  peace, amity, grace, purity, renunciation, the female sex, dispossession in favor of others, and the 
sacred.” See Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript: The Place of Grace in Anthropology,” in Honor and Grace in 
Anthropology, 242. Emphasis added. 
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 To conclude. The intertwining of feeling or sentiment and social function of honor is 
central to Pitt-Rivers’s understanding of honor, as he repeats the following sentence in several 
places: “Honour felt becomes honour claimed and honour claimed becomes honour paid.”167 
From my experience growing up in a group-oriented honor and shame culture, it is important to 
clarify that we cannot easily tell apart these aspects of honor. The relation among them is not a 
causal relationship, in particular when there is a gap between honor felt and honor claimed and 
honor paid. That is to say, the value of honor is an “honor felt”-“honor claimed”-“honor paid” 
value. As we noted in the end of the Introduction chapter, the hyphen is indispensable. It 
signifies a metaphorical distance that associates, divides, extends, retracts, and creates meanings. 
As such, to claim that honor is a collective value is not denying that it is also a felt value, that is, 
a proprioceptive value. The value of honor therefore has both subjective and communal elements 
intertwined, together. How do we address this felt dimension of honor? We need to address this 
question because as soon as we articulate its felt aspect, honor is no longer felt; it becomes 
claimed and paid, which are important aspects of honor. If honor is only a felt value without any 
articulations, then it cannot be claimed and paid. The felt aspect needs to be manifested in the 
claimed and paid in order for honor to be publicly affirmed, acknowledged, and operative in the 
society. At the same time, however, as the claimed and paid aspects of honor are affirmation of 
the felt honor, they both represent and misrepresent the felt aspect. The claimed and paid aspects 
of honor are not the felt aspect itself. The felt aspect can be represented in many forms, 
depending on how the individuals and the groups claim and pay for it. 
167 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honor,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills. Vol. 6 
(New York: Macmillan, 1968), 503-511 (503). Also, Pitt-Rivers includes his long chapter in Honour and Shame 
(1966) in The Fate of Shechem or The Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean (London; 
New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2. 
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 This limitation in representation comes to the fore when we occasionally find certain 
practices of the felt honor contradict the claimed and paid honor. An example is Paul’s message 
of the cross which is foolishness to those who are perishing but the power of God to those who 
are saved (1 Cor. 1:18). Or the tension between honor precedence and honor virtue. Or the gap 
between mianzi and lian. The incoherency does not necessarily mean that the practices are 
counter-cultural. The crack in representation of claimed and paid honor could point to the 
conviction or the proprioceptive/felt feature of honor. So the conflicting practices may appear to 
be dishonorable in terms of the claimed and paid aspects, but they could still be honorable in 
terms of the felt aspect. Does this mean that the felt aspect and the claimed and paid aspects of 
honor are incompatible? Not necessarily. Rather, as Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers put it: “It is … an 
error to regard honor as a single constant concept rather than a conceptual field within which 
people find the means to express their self-esteem or their esteem for others.”168 
 
IV.  Different Modes of Existence in the Notion of “Call” 
Paul, called (κλητὸς) to be an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God… (1 
Cor. 1:1) 
  
 The different modes of existence or aspects of honor are also applicable to Paul’s notion 
of “call” in the beginning of 1 Corinthians, as interpreters also privilege different modes of 
existence in their interpretations. We choose to focus on this notion of “call” because as Philip 
Tie puts it, “How an author decides to open his or her letter sets the tone for the letter’s 
168 See John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, 4. Emphasis 
added. The felt aspect is, however, rendered differently by Malina. While he writes that “honor felt is honor paid, 
and honor paid indicates what ought to be felt … [and] honor causes a society to derive what ought to be done from 
what in fact is done. That is, the social order as it should be is derived from the social order as it is,” he subsumes 
the felt aspect under the paid aspect. He does not clarify what he means by “what in fact is done” or “the social order 
as it is.” See Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World, 48. From our discussion about the felt value, the predicate 
“is” is not an ontological “is.” Rather, it is a felt “is.” As a felt “is,” then the ethic in terms of “what ought to be 
done” or “the social order as it should be” is also a felt ethic. 
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contents.”169 Indeed, for Peter Arzt-Grabner, the “opening parts of the letter body” are “much 
more than mere formulaic expressions of closeness or formal receipts for oral or written 
news.” 170 David Pao even argues that “one can no longer speak of a Hellenistic epistolary 
introductory thanksgiving section in in papyrus letter contemporary to Paul.”171 Rather, it is “a 
part of the formula valetudinis as occasioned by specific contexts or events.”172 
 In introducing himself, as one called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of 
God and Sosthenes his adelphos as the co-writer of the letter (1 Cor. 1:1),173 Paul may appear to 
be flashing his apostolic badge to the Corinthian believers.174 He may appear as an authority 
169 See Philip L. Tie, “How to Begin, and Why? Diverse Functions of the Pauline Prescript Within A Greco-Roman 
Context,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 59. Tie notes that “[t]he additions and expansions in letter prescripts 
are intentional or unintentional discursive acts that carry persuasive force.” Ibid., 65. Likewise, when it comes to the 
greetings, “Not only does Paul establish a mutuality of religious identity with his recipients by means of the 
salutatio, he also uses the greeting to reinforce aspects of his positional moves earlier in the prescript.” Ibid., 74. 
170 See Peter Arzt-Grabner, “Paul’s Letter Thanksgiving,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 156; Peter Arzt, 
“The ‘Epistolary Introductory Thanksgiving’ in the Papyri and in Paul,” Novum Testamentum 36 (1994): 29–46. 
171 David W. Pao, “Gospel Within the Constraints of An Epistolary Form: Pauline Introductory Thanksgiving And 
Paul’s Theology of Thanksgiving,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 114. Agreeing with Arzt that “the use of 
the verb εὐχαριστῶ in connection with such formula valetudinis in introductory paragraphs appears only in the 
second century C.E.” (Ibid., 106), Pao argues that “unless one is able to point to a substantial number of papyrus 
letters that do contain thanksgiving formula(s) similar to the ones that appear in the Pauline epistles, to identify 
isolated examples throughout these few centuries would not be sufficient to show that Paul is relying on Hellenistic 
epistolary convention.” Ibid., 109. Contra Arzt and Pao, Collins finds that “the functional and formulaic similarities 
between Paul’s epistolary thanksgivings and those of the extant papyri letters give ample, though admittedly limited, 
evidence that Paul’s thanksgivings lie fully within with the tradition of Hellenistic letter-writing.” See Raymond F. 
Collins, “A Significant Decade: The Trajectory of The Hellenistic Epistolary Thanksgiving,” in Paul and the 
Ancient Letter Form, 182. 
172 See David W. Pao, “Gospel Within the Constraints of An Epistolary Form,” 112. For Pao, what causes Paul to 
give thanks is witnessing Christ at work among the Corinthian believers. Paul’s thanksgiving not only shows an 
“intense focus on God,” it also focuses on the “spiritual well-being” of believers and their relationship with God 
(ibid., 120-21). Highlighting the relationality of thanksgiving, Pao finds that “Paul is not concerned primarily with 
Christian etiquette or a proper emotional state, he is rather calling God’s people to be faithful to their God” (ibid., 
126). For Paul, the “acts of thanksgiving are acts of worship, and a life of worship is manifested in the way 
Christians are to act out their confession” (ibid., 125). 
173 In arguing that Paul uses the metaphor of sibling only for believers, Aasgaard writes: “The most central role that 
Paul attributes to the Christians … is that of Christian siblingship: the Christians are one another’s siblings, i.e. 
brothers and sisters.” As such, believers not only need to help each other as siblings, they also need to preserve the 
honor of the family. See Reidar Aasgaard, “‘Role Ethics’ in Paul: The Significance of the Sibling Role for Paul’s 
Ethical Thinking,” New Testament Studies 48.4 (October 2002): 513-30 (515). 
174 Adams finds that “Paul did not randomly include people in his letters as co-senders, but strategically integrated 
them within his letters … Paul’s use of cosenders was tailored to the recipient of the letter.” See Sean A. Adams, 
“Paul’s Letter Opening and Greek Epistolography: A Matter of Relationship,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 
44. Adams also find that “[i]n general, the use of a title within the Pauline letter is connected to the relationship and 
83 
 
                                                          
figure when he addresses “the church of God in Corinth … with everyone calling upon the name 
of our Lord Jesus Christ in every place, both their Lord and ours” (1:2).175 Sean Adams thus 
argues that “Paul opens his respective letters with a reminder that his authority was bestowed 
upon him by God and that he has been sent to instruct them in the message of the gospel”176 (cf. 
autonomy). While some can stress the communality of Paul in mentioning Sosthenes, “everyone 
calling upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ in every place,”177 and those who greet believers 
in the end of the letter (16:19-20) (cf. relationality),178 others can still claim that Paul actually 
invokes them to boost his credential and authority (cf. autonomy). But, if Paul “is attempting to 
use rhetoric to enhance his position, and consequently, the importance of the letter,”179 it is also 
possible that the “importance of the letter” may be the reason for his use of rhetoric. 
 As believers are called by God into a partnership of Jesus Christ (1:9), we can, however, 
take the genitive of the “apostle of Christ Jesus” and the “will of God” as a subjective genitive. 
That is to say, an “apostle of Christ Jesus” is not an apostle about Christ Jesus, but an apostle 
the experiences that Paul had with that particular church and that Paul is drawing on this relationship to connect with 
the letter recipients.” Ibid., 54. 
175  However, in noting the difficulty of interpreting the prepositional clause “with everyone calling upon the 
name …,” Fitzmyer thinks that the clause “is best understood as modifying ‘the church of God that is in Corinth.” 
See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 126. 
176 Sean A. Adams, “Paul’s Letter Opening and Greek Epistolography,” 52. Likewise, Tie writes: “Given the 
schismatic problem in 1 Cor 1:10–17 and Paul’s call for unity, the challenge to Paul’s authority by some in Corinth 
while upheld by others, the expansion in the superscriptio is both a claim to authority (‘an apostle’) and one 
grounded ‘through the will of God.’ Thus, in the prescript Paul uses himself to set up the tone of the letter: i.e., to 
direct attention away from internal divisiveness or charismatic leaders, and rather towards the mutual calling that 
they share in ‘the will of God’ …” See Philip L. Tie, “How to Begin, and Why?” 83-84. 
177 Finding that “Paul’s letters are not entirely official or personal, yet both show their influence on his writing” (38), 
Adams further thinks that “a sizable introduction with title was used almost exclusively by those in the highest 
authority, namely, royalty ... [As such,] Paul, by lengthening his self-introduction, is attempting to exert his 
influence on the hearer by increasing his epistolary presence.” See Sean A. Adams, “Paul’s Letter Opening and 
Greek Epistolography,” 50. 
178 In pointing out the important of each five sections of Pauline letter closings (e.g., the “peace benediction,” 
“hortatory section,” “greetings,” “autograph,” and “grace benediction”), Weima argues that they “function much like 
the thanksgiving section, but in reverse. For as the thanksgiving foreshadows and points ahead to the major concerns 
to be addressed in the body of the letter, so the closing serves to highlight and encapsulate the main points 
previously taken up in the body.” See Jeffery A. D. Weima, “Sincerely, Paul: The Significance of the Pauline Letter 
Closings,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 309. 
179 Sean A. Adams, “Paul’s Letter Opening and Greek Epistolography,” 51. 
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whom Christ Jesus sends and through whom Christ/God works. The difference between the two 
is tremendous. While the objective genitive renders Paul as an apostle who proclaims a message 
about Christ Jesus (cf. autonomy and relationality), the subjective genitive shows Paul as a 
servant through whom God works (3:5-10; cf. 4:1) (cf. heteronomy), and as such, Paul needs to 
study and follow the direction of God and Christ Jesus (cf. 8:6). Paul cannot objectify his 
mission. He is not the owner of the mission. He is a co-worker who needs to be in the power of 
the Spirit to work with God, Christ, and other believers (cf. 9:19-23; 10:32-33). He is anxious to 
avoid taking the call for granted, becoming lax, and even being disqualified (9:27). This is why 
the believers’ response to the call of God is vital to their relationship with God and others. God 
calls and people respond (cf. 15:9-11).  
 Concerning this call, J. Brian Tucker contends that Paul wants believers to “remain in the 
situation they were in when God called them” (7:17, 20, and 24).180 That is to say, “rather than 
seeking to obliterate existing social identities, [Paul] is seen as one drawing from these to form 
diverse expression of Christ-movement identity.”181 For Tucker, this remaining in one’s situation 
“was Paul’s way of saying that the appreciation and acceptance of difference reflects the way the 
God of Israel accepted each of them, as brothers and sisters for whom Christ died.”182 But, if the 
situations are oppressive, should believers still remain there? This question challenges the notion 
of “call” in the modes of autonomy and relationality from being appropriated by anyone. 
 Thus, in calling the notion of “as not” in 1 Cor. 7:29-31 as “the ultimate meaning of 
klēsis,” Giorgio Agamben points out that “[t]he messianic vocation is the revocation of every 
180 J. Brian Tucker, “Remain in Your Calling”: Paul and the Continuation of Social Identities in 1 Corinthians 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 227. 
181 Idem. 
182 Ibid., 231. 
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vocation.”183 In other words: “Vocation calls for nothing and to no place.”184 It is not that Paul 
wants believers to remain in the situations in which they were called. Rather, he asks them to 
remain there with God (παρὰ θεῷ) (7:24). When Paul says, “let those who have wives as if they 
do not have, let those who bewail as if they do not bewail…” (7:29-31), the “as not” self-
deconstructs any representations and makes the “call” heteronomous. The “vocation coincides 
with the movement of the calling toward itself.”185 As such, “something remain unchanged but is 
radically changed nevertheless … That which is changed is not the meaning of the relation and 
even less so its content.”186 In the words of Agamben: 
The Christian way of life is in fact not determined by worldly relations [i.e., not 
relationality] or by their content, but by the way, and only by the way, in which 
they are lived and are appropriated in their very impropriety. Nonetheless, for 
Paul, what is at stake is not appropriation [i.e., not autonomy], but use, and the 
messianic subject is not only not defined by propriety, but he is also unable to 
seize hold of himself as a whole [i.e., heteronomy], whether in the form of an 
authentic decision or in Being-toward-death.187 
 
These words of Agamben echo the message of the cross. The cross cannot be appropriated (1:17-
25). Like the cross, Agamben’s notion of the use is a use that can be used only when it un-uses 
itself each instant it is used. They also echo the resurrection event, as it is a mystery (15:51). Yet, 
it is a (heteronomous) mystery that is at work now in the lives of believers, since what one sows 
does not come to life unless it dies (15:36). Paul thus trains himself as if he were a Roman athlete 
preparing for the contest (9:24-27), 188  since the calling calls for a constant vigilance and 
response. Paul thus has to remind believers of their calling, lest they objectify it (1:26-31). If 
183 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 25. Tucker, on the other hand, focuses on an apocalyptic notion 
of “as if.” See J. Brian Tucker, “Remain in Your Calling,” 208-13. Regarding the notion of “as if,” see Giorgio 
Agamben, The Time that Remains, 35-37. 
184 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 25. 
185 Ibid., 33. 
186 Ibid., 34. 
187 Ibid., 34. 
188 See James R. Harrison, “Paul and the Athletic Ideal in Antiquity: A Case Study in Wrestling with Word and 
Image,” in Paul’s World. Pauline Studies 4. Edited by Stanley E. Porter (Leiden, 2008: Brill), 81-109. 
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God is the one who calls, who can grasp the calling? The calling already dislocates the subject 
from her/his ego. This is why the response cannot be objectified either. 
 This discussion of the “call” shows that, in a call and response relation between God and 
believer(s), the relationship can be conceived of in different modes of existence. From an 
individual-centered perspective, the call signals the charisma of the believer, making her/him a 
figure of authority. From a communal viewpoint, the call can be configured and locked into a 
system of reciprocity (cf. relationality). From a heteronomous outlook, as the call cannot be 
grasped, it cannot be objectified and the believer, as a result, must always be vigilantly 
responsive to the call. While all these notions of call can be textually grounded – and thus 
legitimate and plausible – they are not all valid. An interpretation that is textually legitimate and 
hermeneutically plausible can be valid (valuable) in one context but not in another. Besides 
examining the textual support and hermeneutical plausibility of an interpretation, most 
importantly, we also need to investigate how and in what mode of existence are the questions of 
the context (of both the text and the interpreter) perceived, formulated, and addressed.  
 
V. Different Modes of Existence in Various Notions of Love in Some Ancient Texts 
 In our review of rhetorical and ideological reading of Paul’s love, we find that when 1 
Corinthians is read as Paul’s attempt to battle factionalism, with 1:10 as the thesis of the letter, 
one tends to render love as a means to an end to promote harmony and concord.189 This political 
notion of love – a relational view – is only one possible representation of love.190 Plato, for 
189 Note that the word “harmony” comes from Greek “harmozein,” meaning to join, a covenantal and political term. 
See Moshe Weinfeld, “Covenant Terminology in the Ancient Near East and Its Influence on the West,” Journal of 
the American Oriental Society, Vol. 93, No. 2 (April-June 1973): 190-99 (190 n. 2). This relation between love and 
harmony is already told by Hesiod who wrote that Terror, Fear, and Harmony were born of Aphrodite and Ares. 
190 Renaut writes, “A close reading of the central part of the charioteer's myth in the Phaedrus shows that thumos is 
actually the seat of many erotic effects. It is then necessary to address a discourse to thumos in order to persuade it to 
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example, speaks of different aspects and types of erōs (cf. Symposium 205b10-d8; Phaedrus 
252c6-e1; Laws 837a3-d9), 191 with the Platonic love as the ideal that can guide the sexual 
appetite for common good. These different types of love depend on how the self is educated 
philosophically in her/his love relationship with the other and how the beloved appears to the self. 
This relationship is not just intersubjective. It is dynamically inter-corporeal, privileging the 
heteronomous mode of existence and its “madness.” 
 In explaining Socrates’s palinode in Phaedrus, Terence Irwin argues that Plato “treats 
eros as a type of madness that belongs to the rational part [of the soul] … because he rejects the 
conception of the rational part that confines it to instrumental prudence,”192 which can turn love 
into a calculative means to an end. Of course, desire and love may not be easily regulated, but 
they can be moderated (cf. Laws 835e2-842a2). Although the causal relationship between love 
and beauty is hard to determine, when beauty fails to inspire divine madness, the love that is 
essential to the common good can become a mere observance of moral rules and teachings. 
While erōs can certainly be a self-centered passion (cf. autonomy), it can also be a genuine 
concern for the good of the other/Other, as the sight of beauty may captivate and inspire one to 
let go of one’s desire to grasp the beloved.193 In this love, the beloved may even be inspired by 
care for the rational part of the soul, the ‘true self,’ represented by the coachman. Plato keeps thumos as a mover, but 
neutralizes its propensity to corrupt intellectual love.” See Olivier Renaut, “Challenging Platonic Erôs: The Role of 
Thumos and Philotimia in Love,” 104. According to Renaut, “The thumos plays a twofold role: as the first and 
immediate function of the soul to feel the effects of love, thumos is the main addressee of erotic discourses; but, as 
an intermediary, it defeats (or tries to defeat) sexual desires, builds a relationship founded on mutual love and 
respect, and helps give rise to philosophical love. In focusing the description of the effects of love from the 
viewpoint of thumos, Socrates tries to convert its motivational force into philosophy.” Ibid., 106. For Renault, 
Aristotle in book 7 of his Politics, also “makes thumos the function of the soul whereby we feel philia.” Ibid., 109. 
191 For example, see Kathy L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reform in Greek 
Philosophy and Early Christianity (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2003), 23-41. 
For an overview of love in Laws, see Seth Benardete, Plato’s Laws: The Discovery of Being (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 238-46. For an interpretation of love in Symposium and Phaedrus, see A. W. 
Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 15-102. 
192 See Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 304. 
193 For example, the continual struggle between the charioteer and the good horse on the one hand, and the bad horse 
on the other, in beholding, loving, caring, and edifying the beloved is evident in Phaedrus 246a8-257b8. With 
88 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the beauty of the lover toward Beauty and Goodness.194 Erōs need not be selfish, acquisitive, and 
motivated by the value of the desired object,195 as Anders Nygren insists.196 In linking erōs and 
concord together, Mitchell indirectly highlights this feature of erōs. Mitchell, however, only 
focuses on the rational and practical part of love for the common good (cf. relationality). She 
does not address the non-rational and heteronomous aspects of love as well as the intertwining of 
love and reason in the accent of Platonic love toward the form of the Beauty or Good.197 She 
does not mention why and how erōs can motivate people to such a lofty goal. 198  While 
Mitchell’s emphasis on the relational/political dimension of Paul’s rhetorical discourse 
(including what it says about love) legitimately chooses as most significant aspects of the 
discursive syntax of Paul’s letter (see the Methodological Appendix), which address an audience 
in a city of the Roman Empire, as any other interpretive choice it brackets out other meaning-
producing dimension of the letter, including Paul’s semantic universe. But for me and my 
respect to this other-oriented feature of erōs, I agree with Marion that erōs and agapē are “two names selected 
among an infinity of others in order to think and to say the one love.” See Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon. 
Translated by Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 2007), 221. 
194 “If Plato’s erotic theory escapes … the charge of promoting the exploitation of desired persons and objects, it 
does so not because erōs … at the moral improvement of the erōmenos … but because both lover and beloved, 
aroused alike by their visions of an identical beauty emanating (apparently) from each other and driven by the 
intensity of their separate desires to new labors of visionary creativity, make simultaneous and reciprocal, though 
independent, progress toward the contemplation of the Forms.” See David M. Halperin, “Plato and Erotic 
Reciprocity,” Classical Antiquity, Vol. 5, No. 1 (April 1986): 60-80 (75). 
195 See A. H. Armstrong, “Platonic Eros and Christian Agape,” The Downside Review 79, no. 255 (Spring 1961): 
105-21; Lowell D. Streiker, “The Christian Understanding of Platonic Love: A Critique of Anders Nygren’s Agape 
and Eros,” The Christian Scholar 4 vol. 47 (1964): 331-40 (339). 
196 It is, however, important to note that when Nygren makes such a strong distinction between agapē and erōs, he is 
actually talking about two different semantic universes of Plato and the New Testament writers, as is evident in his 
explanation of his “motif research” methodology. See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, 30-40. 
197 Irwin writes, “In the Phaedrus Plato combines his different claims about eros in the Republic and the Symposium. 
He insists that, as the Symposium claims, one sort of eros belongs to the rational part. But he also argues that this 
eros shares some of the intensity and apparent irrationality of non-rational appetites; that is why ‘eros’ is the right 
name for it.” See Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, 306. In Phaedrus’ praise of love in Symposium, even if philotimia 
(“love of honor”), which arises from thumos, may be the wrong basis for love, Renaut argues that “Diotima rightly 
points out the efficiency of philotimia as lever to virtuous behaviour. Indeed, the three examples of Alcestis, 
Achilles, and Codrus are illustrious ones; what is therefore questioned is not the effect of philotimia but the way 
those heroes have misconstrued the image of the object of love.” See Olivier Renaut, “Challenging Platonic Erôs: 
The Role of Thumos and Philotimia in Love,” 102. 
198 This silence on the tremendous power of erōs is striking, especially given the overpowering influence of erōs in 
popular ancient Greek thoughts. See Kathy L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication 65-67. Also, see Ethelbert Stauffer, 
“ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 35-55 (35). 
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cultural and religious contexts this is leaving out the most significant and valuable dimensions of 
Paul’s discourse on love: the poetic quality of Paul’s notion of love is reduced to a function and a 
command, and love becomes a tool to maintain the concord of the community. 
 A very different notion of love appears when one takes into account that Erōs is born of 
Poros and Penia;199 this dynamic hybridizing of excess and poverty makes love rather fluid 
(Symposium 203b1-204c7). There is no final destination and synthesis of erōs. Love is a 
movement between excess and poverty. We can perhaps say that love defers and differs from 
itself and the other/Other. This heteronomy of love is not only found in how the Greek word erōs 
is used by Plato in the Symposium – it is also present in such words as philia and agapē. Plato 
even calls such a loss of self in the bedazzlement of the beauty of the beloved not an erōs but a 
philia (Phaedrus 255e1; also see 256e2). From our reading about erōs, this distinction is not so 
much an opposition between autonomy and heteronomy as an intertwining of autonomy, 
relationality, and heteronomy in erōs. In fact, such a Platonic philia is interwoven with erōs.200 It 
does not sublimate and replace erōs, as Aristotle would argue.201 
 The meaning of philia also includes components that belong to different modes of 
existence, with different ones emphasized in different interpretations. As “the most general and 
widely used term for ‘love’” in classical Greek,202 philia denotes different kinds of love, loyalty, 
199 For a review of the stories of Aphrodite and Erōs, see Martin S. Bergmann, The Anatomy of Loving: The Story of 
Man’s Quest to Know What Love Is (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 21-35. 
200 In light of this feeling of erōs on the part of the beloved toward the lover, Halperin finds that “the Platonic 
approach all but erases the distinction between lover and beloved, between the active and the passive partner – or, to 
put it better, the genius of Plato’s analysis is that it eliminates passivity altogether: according to Socrates, both 
members of the relationship become active, desiring lovers; neither remains solely a passive object of desire.” See 
David M. Halperin, “Plato and Erotic Reciprocity,” Classical Antiquity, 68. 
201 “Aristotle even goes so far as to consider the myth of Plato’s Aristophanes (Symposium 189d-193d) to be an 
illustration of the power of philia: what specifically gives rise to binding unions, such as the union between two 
lovers, is in Aristotle’s view the intense philia generated by the erotic relationship, rather than the erōs that 
generates it (Politics 2.1262b8-17). But Plato, in certain passages at least, insists on using erōs, not philia, as the 
basis for an ideal intellectual fellowship.” Ibid., 71. 
202 Ibid., 169.  
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and solidarity in family, marriage, friendship, political alliance, etc.,203 that is, it has different 
relational features that can be the focus of the interpretation. So while Konstan agrees with 
Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive or evaluative approach to the study of emotions in Greco-Roman 
philosophy,204 he also stresses the affective aspect of the response to the stimulus in influencing 
one’s judgment (cf. heteronomy),205 and contends that philia “was fundamentally an affective 
bond in ancient Greece and Rome, just as it is today.”206 Note that as Konstan argues that the 
Greeks view the emotion as a response to the stimulus, “love” (categorized by Aristotle as an 
emotion) is thus a response, regardless of whether it is mutual or unilateral. While such a 
response may or may not anticipate a reciprocity, the response is not coerced and calculative. 
 Among the phil-terms that Aristotle uses to describe love,207 Konstan finds that Aristotle 
reserves the word philia for a mutual love (cf. relationality), while philêsis and to philein (or 
eunoia) for a unilateral love,208 with philêsis as an affection toward inanimate objects and to 
203 See Gustav Stählin, “φιλέω κτλ.,” in TDNT 9: 149-54. 
204 See David Konstan, “Pathos and Passion,” 20-40; Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence 
of Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Konstan writes: “Aristotle offers no explicit 
indication of how emotions affect judgments, but given his cognitive approach to emotion, we may hazard the guess 
that the kinds of beliefs that elicit emotions … when excited by the accompanying sensations of pleasure and pain, 
influence in turn other beliefs or decisions … The role of evaluation in emotion is thus not merely constitutive but 
dynamic: a belief enters into the formation of an emotion that in turn contributes to modifying some other belief or, 
perhaps, intensifying the original one. In the latter case, the emotion would act on belief in such a way as to confirm 
the emotion itself.” See David Konstan, “Pathos and Passion,” 37. 
205 According to Konstan, Aristotle’s notion of emotion is consisted “of two basic elements: first, every pathos is 
accompanied by pain and pleasure; second, the pathê are, in Aristotle’s words, those things ‘on account of which 
people change and differ in regard to their judgments.’” Ibid. 27. 
206 See David Konstan, “Love,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 170. 
207 We have these different terms because “classical Greek lacked an ordinary noun corresponding to the English 
‘friendship’ (or to the Latin amicitia, for that matter), which uniquely designates mutual affection as opposed to the 
individual sentiment … Hence, he presses philia into serving as the name of the former, and finds other terms to do 
duty for the simple emotion, whether the nonce words philêsis and antiphilêsis, or eunoia (temporarily), or the 
verbal noun to philein.” See David Konstan, “Love,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 174. 
208 For example, in Rhetoric 2.3.4, Aristotle writes: “Let loving (ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν), then, be defined as wishing for 
anyone the things which we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far 
as lies in our power.” I am using the translation from Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric. Translated by John Henry 
Freese. The Loeb Classical Library 193 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 193. 
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philein toward people.209 This one-directional love (that privileges the autonomy of the lover) 
highlights a phil-related love goes beyond a sense of duty or obligation toward the other. It is a 
desire to love the others for themselves and wishes them good for their own sake.210 As a mutual 
love that is primarily centered on goodness, philia is thus a heteronomous emotion and a 
personal relationship (cf. relationality) as well as a selfless desire and an “altruistic wish for the 
good of another, like to philein” 211  (that privileges the autonomy of the lover). Given this 
“altruistic wish” feature of philia, “the failure to assist in time of need, whether on the part of 
friends or relatives, proves the absence of the wish and hence the love itself.”212 
 Konstan also argues that “philia is produced by a service or favour (charis), especially 
when it is not demanded and when one does not publicize it, since in this way it seems to be 
performed for the other and not for some auxiliary motive.”213 Philia, as such, is related to the 
feeling of gratitude toward “a service or favour.” Now, if gratitude (kharin ekhein) is inspired by 
acts of generosity – that is to say, accidental acts or acts aimed to gain something in return is not 
a charis, insisted by Aristotle214 – then philia is not a relationship of duty or obligation between 
the giver and receiver of charis. One’s response to the recognition of charis may indicate the 
social norms and positions implied in the giving and receiving of charis, but it does not 
209  Konstan further finds that “Aristotle explicitly contrasts eunoia with both philia and philêsis as rather a 
dispassionate form of affection (cf. Eudemian Ethics 7, 124la3-14).” See David Konstan, “Love,” in The Emotions 
of the Ancient Greeks, 173. 
210 Konstan argues that in a world where “one was always defending one’s status against insult, intimidation, or 
disapproval …  resenting the unfair advantage of others (envy, indignation), or being conscious of one’s debt to 
them (gratitude) … friendship appeared as the locus of a selfless desire for another person’s welfare that went 
beyond the demands of reciprocity or duty. It was still marked, of course, by a concern with want and security … 
[and hence was] embedded in the world of social exchange … But the love between friends nevertheless looked 
beyond the self, and in this resembles, for all the differences, the idea of love we have today.” Ibid., 183-84. 
211 Ibid., 178. For major differences in the notion of friendship between the ancient Greece and Rome and today’s 
world, see David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 14-23. 
212 David Konstan, “Love,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 182. 
213 Ibid., 175. 
214 See David Konstan, “Gratitude,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 161-62. 
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necessarily put charis into an economy of exchange 215 (contra Zeba Crook’s argument that 
Paul’s notion of charis should be understood in terms of an asymmetrical reciprocity in the 
Greco-Roman system of patronage and benefaction, even though he cites Konstan’s notion of 
emotion). 216  For Konstan, to be grateful for the charis that one receives is not a “social 
obligation to repay a service,”217 in particular if charis is “bestowed precisely with no ulterior 
intention of gain on the benefactor’s part.”218 The “emotion of gratitude is distinct from the act 
of reciprocation: it is felt, not due as compensation … Gratitude is never owed” 219  (cf. 
relationality in the framework of heteronomy). We may not be convinced by this distinction, 
since it is hard to distinguish whether an “act of reciprocation” is a heartfelt response or an 
obligated demanded by the social norms, not to mention there are equal and unequal philia, 
depending on one’s social standing.220 But, it should be clear from Konstan’s reading of charis 
215 Konstan writes: “Whereas Greeks of the classical period demanded and repaid kharis (or a kharis) in the sense of 
the good turn deserved by another … the terms for asking or paying back are never found in connection with kharin 
ekhein or eidenai.” See David Konstan, “Gratitude,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 167. 
216 See Zeba A. Crook, Reconceptualization Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of the 
Ancient Mediterranean (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter), 42-43. In a later article, Crook disagrees with 
Konstan’s notion of charis. See Zeba Crook, “Fictive Giftship and Fictive Kinship in Greco-Roman Society,” in The 
Gift in Antiquity. Edited by Michael L. Satlow (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 68-70. While Crook insists on this 
functionalist notion of charis, he writes, “Patronage and benefaction worked in harmony with the values of honour 
and shame, for without the importance attached to accruing honour and without the hope of doing so within one’s 
own lifetime, patronage and benefaction would not have existed in the form or to the extent it did. Consider, for 
example, that Dio Chrysostom connected benefactions with a hunger for honour, going so far as to claim, satirically 
probably, that people would endanger their well-being and survival, spending all their wealth and selling their 
belongings in the hope of accruing honour through grand benefactions (1 Glar. 2; De lege 7).” See Zeba A. Crook, 
Reconceptualization Conversion, 68. Here, Crook’s notion of honor and shame relies on Malina’s definition of 
honor and shame. But, as iscussed, Malina’s functionalist definition of honor does not address honor as honor felt 
even though he does highlight the feeling component of honor. 
217 See David Konstan, “Gratitude,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, 168. 
218 Idem. 
219 Ibid., 167. 
220 In the beginning of Eudemian Ethics 7.9.5, for example, Aristotle writes: “Since equality is according to number 
and proportion (Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), there will also be various kinds of 
justice, friendship, and partnership (τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνία)” (cf. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 8.7.2-6). 
Welborn writes: “Aristotle attests the antiquity of the proverb ‘Friendship is equality’ (ἰσότης ἡ φιλότης). Again, 
according to Aristotle, the true friend is ‘equal and alike’ (ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος). To be sure, Aristotle recognizes that few 
friendships qualify as the best kind, in terms of equality and likeness. Yet Aristotle insists that ‘equality’ remains the 
goal of unequal friendships, and he elaborates ratios for achieving it. Aristotle explains that ‘there are two sorts of 
equality,’ corresponding to the two species of friendship. In a friendship between equals, whether in wealth or virtue, 
equality is ‘numerical’ (κατ’ ἀριθμόν), ‘as it is measured by the same standard.’ But in a friendship between 
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in the works of Aristotle that this sense of heteronomy in gratitude also characterizes philia. 
Given our discussion of honor in terms of honor felt-honor claimed-honor paid and the intimate 
relationship between honor and charis, can we describe charis in terms of “charis felt”-“charis 
claimed”-“charis paid”? 
 Indeed, if philia is about loving the others for themselves, one needs to address how the 
modes of existence in one’s understanding of how the self and the others are constituted so that 
the otherness of the others is not reduced. A. W. Price thus argues that Aristotle’s notion of 
philia is related to his “ethical conception of the self, and the life (mental and physical) that 
constitutes it in action, as being rooted in but not exhausted by the identity of the living physical 
substance that is a man.”221 We will not let this issue sidetrack us; it should be clear that philia, 
like erōs, can also be conceptualized through different modes of existence, whether it is self-
centered, other-oriented, or mutually negotiated. We can make similar remarks about agapē, in 
particular if the semantic of this noun for love is not sharply distinguished from that of erōs and 
philia, as James Barr argues.222 
unequals, such as that between benefactor and beneficiary, ‘equality’ must be ‘proportional’ (κατ’ ἀναλογίαν), 
‘since it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares.’” See L. L. Welborn, 
“‘That There May Be Equality’: The Contexts and Consequences of a Pauline Ideal,” New Testament Studies 59.1 
(January 2013): 73-90 (76). Aristotle, however, also writes, “Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be 
like quality in matters of justice. In the sphere of justice, ‘equal’ (fair) means primarily proportionate to desert, and 
‘equal in quantity’ is only a secondary sense; whereas in friendship ‘equal in quality’ is the primary meaning, and 
‘proportionate to desert’ only secondary. This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises between two friends in 
point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else … It is true that we cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up 
to which two men can still be friends … but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote from 
man, it can continue no longer” (8.7.3-5). See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. The 
Loeb Classical Library 73 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 479. 
221 See A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, 105. For a better understanding of philia, it is thus 
important to clarify Aristotle’s notion of the self, the ground of friendship (e.g., utility, pleasure, and virtue; 
Eudemian Ethics 7.2, 1236a8-b27), and how a virtuous person through hexis (or bodily disposition) is “realized in 
sequences of, especially, desire, choices, actions, and results.” Idem. 
222 James Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” in The Glory of Christ in the New Testament: Studies in 
Christology. In Memory of George Bradford Caird. Edited by L.z D. Hurst and N. T. Wright (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 3-18. 
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 In his book Agape and Eros, which many Christians still like to cite to show the radical 
difference between agapē and erōs, Nygren is not making a distinction between these two words 
of love on a linguistic basis.223 Rather, the distinction is argued theologically.224 Nygren writes, 
“Eros and Agape are the characteristic expressions of two different attitudes to life, two 
fundamentally opposed types of religion and ethics. They represent two streams that through the 
whole history of religion, alternately clashing against one another and mingling with one another. 
They stand for what may be described as the egocentric and the theocentric attitude in 
religion.” 225  In other words, the difference between a heteronomy-oriented Agape and an 
autonomy-centered Eros is not so much a textual as a hermeneutical/theological and/or 
contextual/ethical distinction. It seems that this dichotomy between Agape and Eros, which many 
have criticized as reifying, can be Nygren’s attempt to prevent the heteronomy of Agape, which 
at times may appear to be in the mode of autonomy, from being reduced and incorporated into 
the autonomous and relational mode of existence. 
 Indeed, for Nygren, even if Agape and Eros are distinctively different from one another, 
we tend to mix these two ideas together. For example, in Nygren’s explanation of the use of 
agapan in 1 John 2:15,226 he explains that “the difference between the two kinds of love is 
determined simply by reference to their objects, in the one case the world, in the other God. Then 
Agape, which otherwise is a love that gives and sacrifices, and the very opposite of acquisitive 
223 Barr writes, “Nygren was not seeking to describe all linguistic usage, but to draw the contrast between two 
profound theological motifs.” Ibid., 4. 
224 As the translator of Agape and Eros writes: “There is no suggestion that, wherever the Greek word eros or the 
Greek word agape occurs, it must necessarily have the same meaning as it bears here, or that this meaning cannot be 
represented on occasion by other words. Nor is there any suggestion that every form of love that existed in the 
Hellenistic world, or that exists in the non-Christian world generally, must be classified as Eros … The question 
under discussion is not how the Greeks or the primitive Christians actually loved, but what they thought about love, 
their ideas or theories of love.” See Philip S. Watson, “Translator’s Preface,” in Agape and Eros, viii. Also, 
Watson’s final remarks are also noteworthy: “merely to consider formal statements of doctrine is not enough; we 
must discover the underlying religious motif, the real motive forces behind them.” Ibid., xv-xvi. 
225 See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, 205. 
226 1 John 2:15: Μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κὀσμον μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κὀσμῳ. ἐάν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ 
πατρὸς ἐν αὐτῷ. 
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love, becomes itself a species of acquisitive love.”227 Barr, however, highlighting the inconsistent 
usage of the agap-words in the New Testament, argues that “though Nygren acknowledged this 
[inconsistency], it cannot be said that his recognition of it and its implications was adequate in 
detail or in profundity.”228 
 Philologically, the noun agapē is almost absent outside the biblical literature.229 Its verbal 
form, agapan, however, is rather common in Greco-Roman literature. A search for agap-words 
on the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database yields hundreds of entries, beginning with the ones 
in Homer’s Illiad and Odyssey. Sometimes agapan and philein or agapan and eran appear 
together.230 Sometimes agapan and philein are even used interchangeably.231 In general, scholars 
227 See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, 157. In terms of the word usage, Boer finds that Paul uses the agap-words 
“in an unqualified sense, without distinction in meaning, whether it is God, Christ or human beings who love, and 
whether the human love is for God, for Christ, or for fellow human beings.” See Hendrikus Boers, “Ἀγάπη and 
Χάρις in Paul’s Thought,” CBQ 59 (1997): 697. 
228 See James Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” 4 n. 4. It is not clear the “implications” that Barr mentions 
are about the idea or the usage of the word (which of course affects the idea too). One may take Nygren’s 
explanation as not addressing how agapan may contradict his idea of “Agape,” but this is not an illegitimate move, 
given that while agapan in the New Testament can denote a good or bad love (e.g., Luke 11:43; John 3:19; 2 Tim. 
4:10; 2 Pet. 2:15), agapē always has a positive connotation. It can refer to the Lord’s Supper (e.g., Jude 1:12), the 
love of God (e.g., Luke 11:42; John 5:42; Rom. 5:5; etc.) – for three ways of reading the genitive (e.g., love by God, 
love for God, love from God), see Catherine Osborne, Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 24-51 – the love of the spirit (e.g., Rom. 15:30), the love of Jesus or Christ (e.g., 
John 15:9-10; Rom. 8:35; etc.), the love of the disciple (e.g., 1 Cor. 4:21, 16:24; 1 Thess. 3:6; etc.), the love for one 
another (e.g., John 13:35; Rom. 14:15; Col. 1:4; etc.), the personified love (e.g., 1 Cor. 8:1, 13:1-4; etc.), etc. Or we 
can take Nygren’s explanation as actually confirming his idea of “Agape.” That is to say, the agap-words should 
indeed not be used in such a manner that is not directed toward the good. As such, the use of agap-words for wrong 
object is an irony that deserves to be critiqued. For example, Greenlee points out that as “only God and each human 
being are proper objects of ἀγάπη. Improper objects of ἀγάπη αre condemned in the NT: chief seats in the 
synagogue (Luke 11:43), the darkness (John 3:19), Balaam’s love for the wages of unrighteousness (2 Pet. 2:15), 
and the sinful world system (1 John 2:15).” See J. Harold Greenlee, “‘Love’ in the New Testament,” Notes on 
Translation, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2000): 49-53 (50). As Greenlee puts it, the author “in 1 John 2:15, urges his readers not 
to love (ἀγαπάω) the world (the sinful world-system) – that is, not to regard it as being of surpassing value” (ibid., 
51). Perhaps this is why Nygren writes that “the love in question [in 1 John 2:15] is not Agape, but acquisitive love.” 
229 See Ethelbert Stauffer, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 37. In his analysis, Spicq argues that “the term agapē, derived 
from agapaō (and not from agapēsis) is proper to the Koine. If the LXX gave the word its theological density, it also 
existed in the pagan language, but it is not attested before the first century AD.” See Ceslas Spicq, “ἀγάπη,” in 
Theological Lexicon of the New Testament. 3 vols. Vol. 1: ἀγα – ἐλπ. Translated and edited by James D. Ernest 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrikson Publishers, 1994), 18. 
230 Stählin gives a list of texts where agapan and phileō appear together: Plato’s Lysis 215a-b, 220d; Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric 1.11. (p. 171a, 21); Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethic 9.7 (p. 1167b, 32), 9.8 (p. 1168a, 28-30); Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia Socratis 2.7, 9; Philo’s Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres sit 44; Dio Cassius Cocceianus 44, 48, 1; 
Claudius Aelianus’ Varia Historia 9, 1. See Gustav Stählin, “φιλέω κτλ.,” in TDNT 9: 117. 
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agree that the meaning of agapē derives from that of agapan.232 Barr points out that even if 
agapē is “a neologism morphologically” in the Septuagint, “the actual form of ἀγάπη was less 
important in the LXX than one might imagine.”233 In the LXX, it appears that the usage of erōs, 
philia, agapē is not sharply differentiated. 234  Moreover, given its wide semantic range and 
popular usage,235 agapan appears more frequently in the LXX than eran and philein. With agap-
words being used for various love relationship, including erotic love,236 Barr argues that the 
“words of the ἔρως group were not much used … because the general all-purpose word for love, 
ἀγαπᾶν with its related nouns, already itself covered the semantic ground that the ἔρως group 
covered.”237  
231 Tarelli even argues that “ἀγαπάω in the New Testament … has in fact come to express all that was once meant by 
φιλέω.” See C. C. Tarelli, “ἈΓΑΠΗ,” 67. 
232 Ibid., 8. Barr finds that agapan “already in classical times was used with senses quite close to those found in the 
LXX and the New Testament, and this is still more obvious in Hellenistic usage.” Idem. 
233 Idem. 
234 Ibid., 10, 13, 14. Also, see Ethelbert Stauffer, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 37. Quell argues that “in Hebrew … there is 
absolutely no possibility of expressing … the distinction between the two magnitudes of ἔρως and ἀγάπη. This 
means that the element common to both must have controlled the conceptions of the OT authors so strongly that 
they did not feel any need for verbal variation.” See Gottfried Quell, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 21-35 (24).  
235 Agapan “was used because it was already a normal and very natural term in the language and well established in 
the two connections that were most important, namely that of one person loving another like a child or a close friend 
and, even more, that of a human loved by a god. The LXX in this respect is one manifestation of that general rise of 
ἀγαπᾶν to prominence much of which is most fully documented in later writers, Josephus being the most obvious: he 
uses ἀγαπᾶν very much more frequently than φιλεῖν.” See James Barr, “Words for Love in Biblical Greek,” 7. 
Tarelli points out that “in Modern Greek ἀγάπη is the ordinary word for ‘love’ in all its senses, and indeed 
practically the only word.” See C. C. Tarelli, “ἈΓΑΠΗ,” 65. 
236 Barr writes, “In it [i.e., LXX] almost all cases of the noun ἀγάπη concern erotic love, especially if we include 
those in the Song of Songs: there are only a handful that are not erotic … Indeed, it is likely that the use of these 
words in Bible translation had the effect of actually increasing their degree of erotic reference: since Hebrew used 
almost only one word for many kinds of love, including erotic love, the Greek translation, tending to use the same 
equivalences throughout, expanded the extent to which the terms were used of erotic love.” See James Barr, “Words 
for Love in Biblical Greek,” 10. 
237 Ibid., 11. “The difficulty about ἔρως and its group was not that they designate a different sort of love from that 
designated by ἀγαπᾶν, but that they express only a very limited portion of the range and spectrum of love – whether 
good or bad, approved or disapproved – that ἀγαπᾶν normally expressed. They tended to be inchoative: they 
expressed falling in love, desiring, beginning to love, or they expressed unlawful lust: but ἀγαπᾶν expressed all this 
and a good deal more.” Idem. Likewise, Tarelli writes: “it seems safe to assume that the word [ἀγάπη] by which they 
expressed their meaning was already current in popular speech for expressing all that men were capable of thinking 
about love, a word which in fact had superseded in the language of the people, both φιλία and ἔρως.” See C. C. 
Tarelli, “ἈΓΑΠΗ,” 66. 
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 For Ceslas Spicq, however, the meaning of agapē is clearly different from that of erōs 
and philia. There is no overlapping of meaning. For him, agapē “is the most rational kind of love, 
inasmuch as it involves recognition and judgment of value, whence its frequent nuance of 
‘preference’”238 (cf. autonomy). As opposed to erōs that “brings endless suffering and disaster,” 
agapē “is accompanied by contentment.”239 As opposed to philia that “is properly used only of a 
relationship between equals,” agapē “links persons of different conditions … it is a disinterested 
and generous love, full of thoughtfulness and concern.”240 While Greenlee stresses that different 
kinds of love do appear together in a relationship – for instance, philein is more personal and 
affectionate than agapan, which is more formal and respectful, recognizing the object of love is 
of “surpassing value” – he argues that the words that describe love have their own distinctive 
meaning and are not used interchangeably. He “insist[s] that neither word is ever used in the NT 
inconsistently with its basic sense.”241 From our review of erōs and philia, it is however difficult 
to make such a clear distinction. As a result, in our analysis of Paul’s conceptualization of love in 
1 Corinthians, we will have to focus on a synchronic or paradigmatic reading that allows us to 
see what kind of semantic universe undergirds Paul’s notion of love and how it links love with 
other ideas in Paul’s conviction (see chapters 3 and 4). 
 Now, let us turn to the Ancient Near Eastern literature and the Hebrew Bible that 
Mitchell cites to support a political notion of love. William Moran gives multiple examples of 
how the word “love” was used in the Hebrew Bible (’āhabh, ’ahabhāh) and Ancient Near 
Eastern treaties and legal documents to indicate friendship, loyalty, service, and obedience 
between the sovereign and vassals or between God and people in domestic and international 
238 See Ceslas Spicq, “ἀγάπη,” 12-13. Also, see Ethelbert Stauffer, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 36. 
239 See Ceslas Spicq, “ἀγάπη,” 13. 
240 Idem. 
241 See J. Harold Greenlee, “‘Love’ in the New Testament,” 52. 
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relations (cf. relationality).242 That is to say, to say that “A” loves “B” means that “A” is loyal to 
“B.” Hence we have expressions that say that the subjects must love their king. To not love or 
hate the king is to oppose him. In the case of Egypt, Moran points out that just as the “Pharaoh is 
expected to love his vassal … the vassal must love the Pharaoh.”243 In the story of Jonathan 
loving David (’ahabh in MT and agapan in LXX) (1 Samuel 18:1, 3; 20:17), Moran argues that 
a similar notion of love is also at work.244 Confirming Moran’s argument, Moshe Weinfeld 
shows that such words as oath, bond, faith, goodness, grace (or kindness, favor), friendship, 
peace, etc.245 also denote one’s commitment to the treaty and covenant in both Ancient Near 
Eastern and Greco-Roman worlds. He writes: “The identity in covenant formulations and 
idiomatic expressions in Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine, Anatolia, Greece and Rome seems to 
point towards a common origin of the treat terminology in the ancient world.” 246  While 
Yochanan Muffs agrees that “the covenant between the [Israel] people and God, the concrete 
manifestation of God’s transitivity and involvement, was based on Near Eastern legal 
patterns,”247 he finds the notion of love too stifling and proscriptive.248 
242 William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of Love in Deuteronomy;” The Amarna Letters. 
Edited and translated by William L. Moran (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xxiv, 
18-19 (EA 9: “Ancient Loyalties, New Requests”), 41-42 (EA 17: “A Mittani Bid for A Renewed Alliance”), 43-46 
(EA 19: “Love and Gold”), etc. Quell argues that “there can be no doubt that the thought of the covenant (διαθήκη) 
is itself an expression in juridical terms of the experience of the love of God. Hence the concept of love is the 
ultimate foundation of the whole covenant theory.” See Gottfried Quell, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 27. 
243 William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of Love in Deuteronomy,” 79. 
244 Ibid., 82 n. 33. 
245 Moshe Weinfeld, “Covenant Terminology in the Ancient Near East and Its Influence on the West;” idem, 
Deuteronomy and The Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 69, 81-83, 140, etc. 
246 Moshe Weinfeld, “Covenant Terminology in the Ancient Near East and Its Influence on the West,” 197. He 
further argues that “[t]he fact that most of the idioms sprang up in the middle of the second millennium, the time 
when international relations on a global scale started to crystalize (contacts between Assyria and Egypt and between 
Egypt and the Hittite empire) teaches us that the origin of the treaty terminology is to be sought in the East, at the El 
Amarna period.” Ibid., 198. Moran agrees: “By the Amarna period ‘love’ (râmu/ra’āmu and derivatives) had 
become part of the terminology of international relations.” See The Amarna Letters, xxiv n. 59. 
247 Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel (New York and Jerusalem: The 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992), 6. 
248 Concerning the legal aspect of love, Quell uses Lev. 19:18 (“you shall love your neighbor as yourself”) to argue 
that “although couched in the legal style of the usual demand, and containing the legally very closely circumscribed 
term not really a legal statement, because the attitude denoted by the word  ַעֵר, is not really a legal statement, because 
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 Highlighting the “primal feelings underlying the law” in his philological analysis (cf. 
heteronomy),249 Muffs writes: “Like most personal relationships, the divine-human encounter, 
once formalized, was often experienced in legal terms, as a covenant between overlord and 
vassal, between father and son; or between husband and wife.”250 If the laws of social relations 
are drafted and institutionalized to order and govern human relations, then they should not be 
mistaken for the human relations. Just as our lived experience can be perceived in various ways, 
human relations can also be thematized and configured in many ways. This distance between 
concept and lived experience is perhaps what Muffs seeks to articulate: “Law is a synthesis of 
form and content, yet it is formal only on the surface.” 251 The love language is certainly a 
covenantal and political term for loyalty and service (cf. relationality), but it is also used 
metaphorically, alongside the more frequently used word “joy” (simḥah, ṭov), to signify the inner 
attitude of volition and willingness (cf. heteronomy). 252  (Note: citing Epictetus 4.4.45 and 
the attitude denoted by the word בהא is one of natural feeling which cannot be legally directed … If the concern of 
the legislator is to order social life, he knows that all his ordinances in this direction can only be half measures if 
they are purely legal, and that the thought of power will always have a disruptive effect on society. Hence, whether 
or not he perceives its legal incongruity, he formulates the paradoxical command to love.” See Gottfried Quell, 
“ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 25. 
249 Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 1. 
250 Ibid., 165. Muffs argues that “[t]he religious life of the ancients – Mesopotamian and Hebrew alike – was less a 
quest for salvation or union with a metapersonal godhead than an ongoing personal relationship, of different degrees 
of stability and intimacy, between man and his god(s).” Idem. Likewise, Quell writes: “The wealth of hymnic motifs 
which we find in the OT allows us to deduce the high significance and rich cultivation of this form of piety in the 
religion of Yahweh, which we might otherwise fail to appreciate … when the formal concept of love occurs … it is 
almost always turned to exhortatory or confessional use and thus seems to be more of a rational product than is 
really the case.” See Gottfried Quell, “ἀγαπάω,” in TDNT 1: 29. 
251 Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 1. That is to say, the symptom and disease may be related, but a same symptom 
can be a manifestation of several illnesses, just as different symptoms can be caused by a same illness. 
252 In summary, “the volitional metaphors of love and joy found in a wide range of legal situations, but their 
distribution in seemingly non-legal contexts is much wider than the traditional legalist would ever expect: not only 
Deuteronomy and Chronicles, but Ben Sirah and Philo, the sermons of Paul, early and late rabbinic midrash and 
piyyut, Jewish and Christian liturgy, Samaritan marriage documents and early Arabic deeds of sale.” Ibid., 122. 
According to Muffs, “[t]he earliest examples of expressions of joy to indicate volition come from Old Babylonian 
deeds from Susa (ca. early 19th century BCE), where the clause ina ṭūbātišu ina nar’amātišu, literally ‘in his joy 
[Akkadian ṭȗb = Hebrew ṭov], in his love’ [Akkadian râmu = Hebrew/Aramaic rḥm], is rendered idiomatically by 
almost all interpreters as ‘of his own free will and voluntarily.’” Ibid., 144. 
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Plutarch Theseus 17.2, Spicq argues that “[i]n the secular language, ἀγαπάω and χαίρω are 
already often synonyms”).253 
 This inner attitude is expressed in the “brilliance of face” and the alacrity in the joy that 
one does something.254 If one does something quickly and happily, it implies that one does it 
willingly, “without having been forced, without having been coerced.”255 When it comes to one’s 
giving in love, this willingness and volition becomes vital in the acts of giving and receiving, 
especially if “the validity of ancient Near Eastern donations was dependent to a great degree on 
the intention and good will of the donor; if his feelings of affection towards the donee happened 
to change, the legal basis of the transfer was weakened, and the gifts may have been demanded 
in return.”256 Likewise in receiving the donations, one receives them “in the spirit with which 
they were given: with thankfulness, if the recipient be human; with ‘favor,’ if the recipient be 
divine.”257 Thus, “even those sacrifices that are obligatory (that is, not voluntary contribution) 
must be brought freely and with complete willingness. It is raṣon [“favor”] that makes an 
offering acceptable; without proper intention an offering is nothing more than fire on the 
altar.”258 Implied in this giving is to give according to one’s means, lest the giving becomes 
burdensome, and leads to unwillingness, as God rewards those who give willingly (cf. Deut. 
15:10).259 For Muffs, these three features of giving – giving freely in one’s means resulting in 
God’s blessing – are notable in 2 Cor. 9:5 where Paul “insists that donations be given hōs 
253 Ceslas Spicq, “ἀγάπη,” 13 n. 28. 
254 Muffs writes: “the inner attributes of generosity or niggardliness expressed by the joy or sadness of the subject 
were metaphorically transferred to his outer agents, his handbreadth or fingers. Thus, a measure measured with a 
smile – happily and willingly – engendered the metaphorical expression a ‘smiling (i.e., generous) measure.’” See 
Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 147. 
255  Ibid., 128. For philological evidence, see Yochanan Muffs, Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri from 
Elephantine. Prolegomenon by Baruch A. Levine (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003). Muffs finds that “the Akkadian, 
Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic sources all know and employ in virtually identical legal contexts the metaphor of joy 
as an expression of uncoerced willingness.” See Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 148. 
256 See Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 166. 
257 Idem. 
258 Ibid., 179. 
259 Ibid., 178-80. 
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eulogian kai mē hōs pleoneksian, ‘not as an exaction, but as a willing gift.’” 260  As the 
conjunction hōs (“as”) indicates, the issue at hand is not the gift itself, but how the gift is given. 
One may give abundantly, but if one gives unwillingly, the gift is not valid. This explains why 
Paul continues to say that “as each person decides (to give) in her/his heart, do not give out of 
sorrow or necessity, for God loves a cheerful giver (ἱλαρὸν γὰρ δότην ἀγαπᾷ ὁ θεός)” (2 Cor. 9:7; 
Prov. 22:9).261 So, how do we give willingly from the heart? 
 Thus far we see that the gift, giving, receiving, and reciprocity cannot be systematized 
into any formulation. If the gift is given in spontaneous willingness, then what counts and 
qualifies the gift is the heart, which cannot be reified and objectified. With this dynamic 
character of the gift, it appears that the gift cannot be used to objectify and define (the social 
position of) the giver and receiver, just as neither can the giver nor the receiver use it to objectify 
each other. At the very core of the gift, giving, and receiving is the heart of willingness that is the 
mode of heteronomy. Then, the identities of the gift, giver, and the recipient cannot be 
objectified even though we can still speak of them. Indeed, if the gifts are accepted “in the spirit 
in which they were given” and if they are given without ulterior motives, the gifts and the acts of 
giving and receiving may not be reduced to the economy of exchange.262 
260 Ibid., 182. 
261 Muffs writes: “God really only wants that which is offered freely. If you are generous within your means, then 
God will favor you by seeing to it that you always have enough, even enough to be able always to give charity. The 
idea that through the giving of charity one will win the blessing of always being well enough off to give more 
charity is a common Jewish motif … In this eloquent fundraising sermon, Paul again shows his deep Jewish roots … 
To sum up: Paul’s sermon in 2 Corinthians 8-9 clearly reflects our triple complex of ideas, saying, in effect, ‘I don’t 
want you to overdo it like your brothers elsewhere. God does not want to impoverish you. You don’t have to give 
under duress and coercion, nor do you have to give more than you have; after all, God loves a joyful giver. And if 
you give in this spirit, God will provide you with the ability to give more.” Ibid., 182. 
262 It appears that Derrida’s concern about the economy of gift is noted in this use of the word “love” in the acts of 
giving and receiving to highlight the impossibility of the gift as the condition of the gift. See Jacques Derrida, Given 
Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Translated by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1992); idem., The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret. 2nd ed. Translated by David Wills (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago, 1995). 
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 At the same time, since the gift largely depends on the feeling and intention of the giver, 
there is a need to “insure the donation against its inherent instability.”263 There are two ways to 
do so through the language of love to prevent the gift from being objectified into a calculated 
exchange. The donee (or the recipient of the gift) can offer a counterdonation to the donor’s gift, 
“thereby assimilating the donation to the more stable vehicle of sale” or the donor can declare 
her/his volition in the donation.264 The word “love,” as such, is a double bind: it expresses a 
sense of spontaneity and a feeling of willingness that cannot be stipulated and formalized and yet 
must be declared. This notion of love echoes our notion of honor as “honor felt”-“honor 
claimed”-“honor paid,” in which one can still speak of the function of honor without reducing 
and erasing the felt aspect of honor. Of course, once the language of love is institutionalized and 
used to serve the validity of the gift, it risks being crafted and manipulated. Nonetheless, love 
embodies the “inherent instability” of the gift, giving, and receiving. 
 This polyphonous meaning of love should not surprise us; after all, “love, the emotion, 
and sexuality, the physical attraction … were not perceived as separate forces” in the Ancient 
Near East.265 When we turn to the figurative language of love in Sumerian,266 Egyptian,267 and 
263 Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy, 166. 
264 Idem. 
265 See Joan Goodnick Westenholz, “Love Lyrics from the Ancient Near East,” in Civilizations of the Ancient Near 
East. 4 vols. Edited by Jack M. Sasson. Vol. 4: Language, Writing, and Literature (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1995), 2471. 
266 “Most Sumerian love songs are written in the female voice, even if they were composed by male singers.” See 
The Literature of Ancient Sumer. Translated and introduced by Jeremy Black, Graham Cunningham, Eleanor 
Robson, and Gábor Zólyomi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 88. For the Sumerian love songs and 
narratives, see pages 63-99, 188-209. Likewise, Leick writes: “In Mesopotamian literature, the woman’s voice 
dominates the poetic discourse. She speaks of her desire and demands the gratification of her sexual needs, while the 
male voice is often an imagined response to her pleas.” See Gwendolyn Leick, Sex and Eroticism in Mesopotamian 
Literature (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 56. Westenholz further writes that “Sumerian love poetry can 
he arranged into three categories: (l) deities assume the role of lovers; (2) individual Sumerian kings are praised as 
they unite with their consorts or with the goddess Inanna; and (3) lovers are not gods or kings.” See Joan Goodnick 
Westenholz, “Love Lyrics from the Ancient Near East,” 2472. For the meanings of the Sumerian word for love, ki-
ág, and the Akkadian word for love, rāmu, see A. O. Haldar, “בַהאָ,” in TDOT 1: 100-01.  
267 See Michael V. Fox, The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love Songs (Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985), 3-81. 
103 
 
                                                          
Israel-Palestinian love poems and dramas,268 the different modes of existence embodied and 
expressed by erotic passion and conflicts are rather evident. In Sumerian love poems such as “A 
Love Song for Šu-Suen,” we read about Inana’s highly explicit erotic love for Šu-Suen, “the 
fourth king of the Third Dynasty of Urim” (2112–2004B.C.E.),269 but in the song of “Inana and 
Išme-Dagan,” we see the terrifying power of Inana in warfare.270 Such erotic enchantment and 
destructive force of Inana are juxtaposed in “A Hymn to Inana.” 271 This portrayal of Inana 
delineates an intertwining of a relational/political and a heteronomous erotic aspect of love.272 
Gwendolyn Leick further points out that, in the Sumerian love lyrics, the female body and sexual 
268 See Michael V. Fox, The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love, 82-177; idem., “Love, Passion, And 
Perception in Israelite and Egyptian Love Poetry,” Journal of Biblical Literature 102.2 (1983): 219-28. 
269 See The Literature of Ancient Sumer, 88. The translators writes: “This song may surprise us by its intimate tone 
and sexually explicit words, but it is typical of Mesopotamian love poetry of this period. The sticky sweetness of 
honey is used as a vivid metaphor for Inana’s sexual arousal.” Ibid., 89. In lines 1-14, for example: “Man of my 
heart, my beloved man, your allure is a sweet thing, as sweet as honey. Lad of my heart, my beloved man, your 
allure is a sweet thing, as sweet as honey. You have captivated me (?), of my own free will I shall come to you. Man, 
let me flee with you – into the bedroom. You have captivated me (?); of my own free will I shall come to you. Lad, 
let me flee with you – into the bedroom. Man, let me do the sweetest things to you. My precious sweet, let me bring 
you honey. In the bedchamber dripping with honey let us enjoy over and over your allure, the sweet thing. Lad, let 
me do the sweetest things to you. My precious sweet, let me bring you honey.” Idem. 
270 For example, in lines 7-16: “Holy Inana was endowed by Enlil and Ninlil with the capacity to make the heavens 
shake, to make the earth tremble, to hold the four directions in her hand and to act grandly as their lady, to shout 
with wide open mouth in battle and combat and to wreak carnage (?), to butt all at once valiantly (?) like a wild bull, 
to make the earth drink the blood of enemies like water and to pile up their bodies, to take captive their 
overwhelmed (?) troops and to make them serve, to make the people ascend from below to above, to make the 
foreign people change their place, and to turn light to darkness and darkness to light.” Ibid., 91. 
271 In lines 132-54, for instance, “… mercy and pity are yours, Inana … are yours, Inana. To cause the … heart to 
tremble … illnesses are yours, Inana. To have a wife … to love . . . are yours, Inana. To rejoice, to control (?) … are 
yours, Inana. Neglect and care, raising and bowing down are yours, Inana. To build a house, to create a woman’s 
chamber, to possess implements, to kiss a child’s lips are yours, Inana. To run, to race, to desire and to succeed are 
yours, Inana. To interchange the brute and the strong and the weak and the powerless is yours, Inana. To interchange 
the heights and valleys and the . . . and the plains (?) is yours, Inana. To give the crown, the throne and the royal 
sceptre is yours, Inana. (12 lines missing).” Ibid., 96. 
272 We also have love lyrics that speak of love and well wishes of a mother and of a son in “A Lullaby for a Son of 
Šulgi,” and “Lu-diğira’s Message to His Mother.” Ibid., 190-95. 
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pleasure are also more prominent that that of the male (e.g. “Ploughing with the Jewels,”273 “A 
Love Song for Šu-Suen,” etc.).274 
 When it comes to the Egyptian love songs and the Song of Songs in the Hebrew Bible,275 
the modes of relationality and heteronomy of love are also apparent. However, compared to the 
Song of Songs, the male and females speeches in the Egyptian love songs are actually 
monologues, as the male and female characters do not address and respond to the words of each 
other.276 Both of these love songs, however, use nature and artifacts to address the intense feeling 
of love and the beloved in vivid imageries and metaphors.277 Through these metaphors, we see 
273 In lines 36-40, for instance, “Ama-usumgal-ana [i.e., Dumuzid] answers the mistress: ‘It is for the mistress, it is 
for my spouse the mistress – I am ploughing with them for her! For holy Inana, the priestess – I am ploughing with 
them for her!’ He of the suba stones [Dumuzid’s semen or the precious stone worn by Inana?], he of the suba stones 
will indeed plough with the suba stones! Ama-usumgal-ana, he of the suba stones, will indeed plough with the suba 
stones.” See The Literature of Ancient Sumer, 85. 
274 See Gwendolyn Leick, Sex and Eroticism in Mesopotamian Literature, 125. When it comes to the few extant 
Akkadian texts on love, however, Leick finds “the tone of [the love] poetry is more solemn and official” and the 
subject of sexuality is “presented obliquely, less as the result of personal experience than as an issue to be reflected 
upon.” Ibid., 178. However, also see Martti Nissinen, “Love Lyrics of Nabȗ and Tašmetu: An Assyrian Song of 
Songs?” in “Und Mose schrieb dieses Lied auf”: Studien zum Alten Testament und zum Alten Orient. Festschrift für 
Oswald Loretz zur Vollendung seines 70. Lebensjahres mit Beiträgen von Freunden, Schülern und Kollegen 
(Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 1998), 585-634. Nissinen argues that “[e]ven a cursory reading shows the structural, 
metaphorical and literary affinity between the Love Lyrics of Nabȗ and Tašmetu and the Song of Songs. The overall 
structures of both texts have two significant features in common: the dialogical structure and the poetic form. Moreover, 
individual passages of both texts arc analogous to a high degree, for instance those employing the wasf type of body 
description, the garden imagery, and the topos of the nocturnal yearning of the woman. In addition, there are parallels on 
individual lines throughout the Love Lyrics of Nabȗ and Tašmetu.” Ibid., 597. For Akkadian love lyrics, narrative, 
charms, and incantations, see Benjamin R. Foster, Before the Muses: An Anthology of Akkadian Literature. Vol. 1: 
Archaic, Classical, and Mature. 2nd ed. (Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 1996). 
275 For the meanings of the Egyptian word for love, mry, see Jan Bergman, “בַהאָ,” in TDOT 1: 99-100. As of the 
Hebrew word usually used for love, ’ahabh, see Gerhard Wallis, “בַהאָ,” in TDOT 1: 101-18. Wallis emphasizes the 
pragmatic and socio-ethical aspects of love affection. 
276 Fox writes: “The love poets consistently choose monologue because they are presenting personality and emotion 
rather than a complete relationship. They create a variety of personalities (often more finely nuanced than the lovers 
in Canticles) and study each one in isolation. They see love as a state of pleasant harmony within an individual, a 
state brought about mainly by the presence of the beloved and by sensual contact.” See Michael V. Fox, “Love, 
Passion, And Perception in Israelite and Egyptian Love Poetry,” 221. 
277 For example, in P. Harris 500, group A no. 3, boy: “The vegetation (?) of the marsh (?) is bewildering, [The 
mouth of] my sister is a lotus, her breasts are mandragoras, [her] arms are [branches (?)], [her] — are —, her head is 
the trap of ‘love-wood,’ and I – the goose! The cord (?) is my …., [her ha]ir is the bait in the trap to ensnare (me) 
(?).” See Michael V. Fox, The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love, 9. Or in the Song of Songs 4:1-5, boy: 
“How beautiful you are, my darling, how beautiful! Your eyes are doves seen through your veil. Your hair is like a 
flock of goats streaming down Mount Gilead. Your teeth are like a flock of shorn sheep, come up from the wash, all 
of whom bear twins, none of whom miscarries. Like a thread of scarlet are your lips, and your mouth is lovely. Like 
a slice of pomegranate is your cheek, seen through your veil. Your neck is like the Tower of David, built in courses. 
A thousand shields are hung upon it, all sorts of warriors’ bucklers. Your two breasts are like two fawns, twins of a 
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the power, longing, pleasure, pain, jealousy, and the violence of love manifested in concrete 
expressions. In “The Crossing” in The Cairo Love Songs, in trying to cross to the other side of 
the river where his beloved is, the boy says: “I found the crocodile (to be) like a mouse and d the 
face of the waters like dry land to my feet. It is her love that makes me strong. She’ll cast a water 
spell for me!”278 This power of love is so strong that Song of Songs 8:6-7 even speaks of love 
“… as strong as death, jealousy as hard as Sheol … Mighty waters cannot extinguish love, nor 
rivers wash it away. Should one offer all his estate for love, it would be utterly scorned.”279 
 For Michael Fox, the use of metaphors in love lyrics is very significant. Not only do they 
help depict the intense, complex, and even paradoxical feelings and thoughts of love, they also 
preserve room for imagination. 280  Noting the “extreme plasticity [of metaphors] and their 
capacity to refer to several levels of perception at the same time,”281 Joan Westenholz points out 
that if “the same metaphor [may] be used in different contexts with quite different meaning,” it 
can then be “understood differently by different individuals, without any single understanding 
being more ‘correct’ than the others.”282 
 This frequent usage of metaphor in love songs is not insignificant. While we will discuss 
the semantic and syntactic characteristics of a metaphor in chapter 2, we see that the metaphors 
in these love songs can extend and create meanings in the juxtaposition of two terms of different 
gazelle, which graze among the lilies.” Ibid., 86-87. Also, see W. G. Lambert, “Devotion: The Language of Religion 
and Love,” in Figurative Language in the Ancient Near East. Edited by M. Mindlin, M. J. Geller, and J. E. 
Wansbrough (London: School of Oriental and African Studies at University of London, 2005), 21-36. 
278 See Michael V. Fox, The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love, 32. 
279 Ibid., 167. 
280 Fox writes: “What a shared trait [between two terms in a metaphor] does is to bridge the terms of a metaphor and 
allow their qualities to penetrate one another, but that trait is not the meaning of the metaphor. A metaphor depends 
for its meaning – its full contextual meaning with its new and unparaphrasable connotations – not only on the traits 
shared by image and referent but also on the ‘metaphoric distance’ between these terms, that is, on the degree of 
dissonance or incongruity between the juxtaposed elements. Greater metaphoric distance produces greater 
psychological arousal, a component of aesthetic pleasure However, distance to the point of detachment of image and 
referent prevents communication.” See Michael V. Fox, “Love, Passion, And Perception in Israelite and Egyptian 
Love Poetry,” 226. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
semantic universes. Here, the newly created meanings can be fluid because the feature of “like 
and unlike” in the metaphor can help prevent them from being ossified. For example, in saying 
that love is as strong as death, what imagery or meaning does Song of Songs 8:6 try to evoke or 
create in juxtaposing the semantic universe of love with that of death? In what sense can love 
and death be juxtaposed? Moreover, as different contexts may have different feelings and 
understandings toward love and death, the created meaning from the metaphorical relation will 
also vary. Consequently, the meanings of a metaphor are contextual and discursive. This “like 
and unlike” feature of a metaphor is like the hyphen that joins and disjoins the different aspects 
of honor. It connects and separates honor felt from honor claimed and honor paid. As a result, we 
cannot reduce honor to only a certain aspect or meaning-producing dimension of honor. As we 
find that the modes of existence (e.g., autonomy, relationality, and heteronomy) correspond 
respectively to honor claimed, honor paid, and honor felt, we use the modes of existence to help 
us analyze various interpretations of Paul’s love in 1 Corinthians, in particular since honor and 
shame are pivotal values in ancient Mediterranean cultures. Lastly, as the notion of love is tied to 
charis and since charis is undergirded by the notion of honor, we suggest that charis can perhaps 
be conceived of in terms of “charis felt”-“charis claimed”-“charis paid,” especially when the 
notion of charis (or gift, grace, favor) has been argued by different scholars as located within or 
without the sphere of exchange and reciprocity.283 Here, the modes of existence can also help us 
analyze different conceptualization of charis, not to mention Paul situates his discussion of love 
in 1 Cor. 13 in the complete discourse unit of 1 Cor. 12:1–14:40 (see chapter 7). 
 
 
283 In the US popular cultures, the relationship between love and charis is further foregrounded when the altruistic 
love (agapē) and self-interested love (erōs) seems to resemble the debates on whether charis is altruistic (freely 
given) or self-interested (in the economy of exchange). 
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VI. Conclusion 
We have learned to exercise a “hermeneutic of suspicion” on the ready-made 
theologies and missiologies produced by Western theologians who are 
“genetically” incapable of knowing what it means to live in the world of Buddhist 
culture, Hindu culture, or Confucian culture. 284 – Choan-Seng Song 
 
We call for a “renewed study” of Paul’s love because the felt, bodily, and communal 
dimensions of 1 Corinthians are often sidelined in Western biblical interpretations. To flesh out 
these meaning-producing dimensions of the text, we go over different conceptualizations of love. 
This review highlight the modes of existence in the contextual, hermeneutical, and textual 
choices that we privilege and assume. This reading with others foregrounds the dynamics of the 
“hermeneutical circle” that Juan Luis Segundo describes as the “continuing change in our 
interpretation of the Bible which is dictated by the continuing changes in our present-day reality, 
both individual and societal.”285 This sense of “continuing changes” is expected; after all, we are 
flesh-and-blood beings. Ada María Isasi-Díaz and Yolanda Tarango even use a spiral figure to 
highlight how our analysis of both our context and text is always continually in light of each 
other, from context to text and from text to context.286  
As human beings, we are “thrown” into the world with others. Our interpretation, as such, 
cannot help but be contextual. As long as we cannot come to term with our embodied humanness, 
we cannot be touched by love to feel and practice love. The temptation to be in control of our 
feelings and actions, which could lead to dominating others who confront such a control, 
prevents love from addressing, challenging, and transforming us. A love felt reduced and limited 
284 Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology, 6. 
285 Emphasis added. Segundo continues, “the circular nature of this interpretation stems from the fact that each new 
reality obliges us to interpret the word of God afresh, to change reality accordingly, and then to go back and 
reinterpret the word of God again, and so on.” See Juan Luis Segundo, Liberation of Theology. Translated by John 
Drury (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002), 8. 
286 The authors speak of four recurrent movements in doing Hispanic women’s liberation theology in terms of 
strategy, liturgizing, analysis, and sharing our stories. See Ada María Isasi-Díaz and Yolanda Tarango, Hispanic 
Women: The Prophetic Voice in the Church (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 97. 
108 
 
                                                          
to a love claimed and a love paid cannot be love. While a love felt may expose us to vulnerability, 
but as Sarah Coakley points out, vulnerability is not “a negation of self, but the place of the self’s 
transformation and expansion into God.”287 This may still sound naïve and idealistic, but citing 
Matthew 5:43-45, Martin Luther King, Jr. finds that even loving one’s enemies “is an absolute 
necessity for our survival.”288 How can it be? While Dr. King offers us his answers from his 
Civil Rights Movement experience, our common sense tell us that it does not make sense to love 
one’s enemies. How can we love someone or something that is not only not lovable, but also 
detestable? Herein lies the paradox embodied by the cross of Christ. The cross which, for Paul, 
goes beyond the calculation and normalcy of the claimed and paid aspects of honor, is actually 
the wisdom and power of God (1 Cor. 1:18-25), where “God shows God’s love toward us, in that 
while we were still sinners Christ died for/concerning us” (Rom. 5:8). 
Now, how can we flesh out the felt (or religious) dimension without reducing it to the 
claimed and paid aspects? That is to say, since the felt dimension is heteronomy-oriented, what 
kind of hermeneutical framework and critical methodology can help us engage the otherness of 
the other without reducing it to an object? The challenge is significant because if honor and 
shame are pivotal values in ancient Mediterranean cultures, they necessarily mark the writing 
and interpretation of 1 Corinthians. We can neither ignore this vital meaning-producing 
dimension (especially in such a religious text as 1 Corinthians) nor overemphasize it at the 
expense of the claimed and paid meaning-producing dimensions. So, how can we maintain the 
creative tension among the felt, claimed, and paid meaning-producing dimensions? We will 
address this contextual concern in chapter 2 (the hermeneutical pole) and in the methodological 
appendix (the textual pole). In chapter 2, we will explain our hermeneutical approach to highlight 
287 Sarah Coakley, “Kenōsis and Subversion,” 108. 




                                                          
the proprioceptive and communal aspects of the text. In the Methodological Appendix, we will 
show how A. J. Greimas’s “Generative Trajectory,” which we find embody such a hermeneutics, 
can help us foreground the dynamic interplay of the semantic (cf. heteronomy) and syntactic (cf. 






















Chapter 2 – An Inter-Corporeal Hermeneutics of Paul’s Discourse of Love: 
The Inter-twining of Past, Present, and Future in Typology 
 
[H]ermeneutics never deals first with the text (vision of its meaning), but with the 
intra-worldly being opened to and by the possibility (the avenue for the coming of 
the interpreter).1 – Jean-Luc Marion 
 
Texts by definition being semiotic constructs, necessitating the active 
participation of readers or listeners for their existence, the textual object is 
dynamic, unstable, elusive. To study it we cannot be content with merely 
analyzing the text; it is after all the attribution of meaning that constitutes it ... It is 
naive to believe that we can analyze without interpreting, that we can work and 




Focusing on the hermeneutical pole of our interpretive process to show how a reading of 
Paul’s discourse of love in the mode of heteronomy is plausible, we will in this chapter first refer 
to the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Julia Kristeva, which we find echo the 
proprioceptive and correlative worldview in Chinese cultures, which as we shall see, is also a 
prominent feature in ancient Mediterranean cultures. Next, as Paul uses the word typos in 1 Cor. 
10:6, 11 in addressing the “idol food” issue in 1 Cor. 8:1 –11:1 (see chapter 6), we will argue for 
a semantic, rather than syntactic, notion of metaphor and typology (cf. see Narrative Semantics 
in section 3.3.a in the Methodological Appendix) as our hermeneutical lens to flesh out the 
heteronomous and middle-voice notion of love in 1 Corinthians. This focus on the “semantics” 
also means that our notion of habitus is semantic, unlike the syntactic notion of habitus in the 
works of Pierre Bourdieu. For us, the semantic notions of metaphor and habitus are exemplified 
1 Jean-Luc Marion, Givenness and Hermeneutics. Translated by Jean-Pierre Lafouge The Père Marquette Lecture in 
Theology 2013 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2012), 49. This notion of hermeneutics aims to 
foreground the dynamics of interpretation, lest it becomes a form of ideology. Here, both the text and the interpreter 
open up an “avenue” of interpretation when they come together. Hermeneutics, in other words, is a “coming 
together” that cannot be objectified. 
2  See Mieke Bal, Murder and Difference: Gender, Genre, and Scholarship on Sisera’s Death. Translated by 
Matthew Gumpert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 135-36. 
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in Paul’s notion of the body of Christ as “parts beyond a part” (see the conclusion section in the 
Introduction chapter), where Paul speaks of “preaching the gospel” – or “gospelizing” 
(εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) – not in an active voice, as if one is in charge of the gospel, but in a middle 
voice in the sense that one manifests the gospel insofar as one is gospelized. As we will argue 
that such a middle voice also quality marks the semantic notion of typology, Paul’s usage of 
typos is against any form of anti-Judaism. 
 
II. An Embodied Worldview in the Cruciform Love 
The language of love is impossible, inadequate, immediately allusive when one 
would like it to be more straightforward; it is a flight of metaphors – it is 
literature.3 – Julia Kristeva 
 
The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always 
forms part of a ‘field.’ A really homogeneous area offering nothing to be cannot 
be given to any perception ... The pure impression is, therefore, not only 
undiscoverable, but also imperceptible and so inconceivable as an instant of 
perception ... A visual field is not made up of limited views. But an object seen is 
made up of bits of matter, and spatial points are external to each other.4  
      – Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
 
The notion that our perception of the world is a perceptual field where “an object seen is 
made up of bits of matter, and spatial points are external to each other” (Merleau-Ponty) is 
noteworthy. There is a space and distance between the subject and the others that s/he sees. This 
distance is not an empty space, however. If we are always already “thrown” into the world with 
others, our seeing is always already relational. Our seeing is not an isolated vision of just a 
particular object. It is a “visual field;” a field “not made up of limited views,” but of 
interconnected views. This is why our “perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of 
3 Julia Kristeva, Tale s of Love. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 1. 
4 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Collin Smith (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 4. 
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something else.” The space between the subject and the others is both connecting and separating; 
a space that respects the self and the others. Otherwise the seeing is a seeing that sees the others 
as the reflection of the self. Paul is well aware of such a pitfall in our seeing. He writes: “For 
now we are seeing through a mirror in enigma, but then [we will see] face to face. For now I 
know out of a part (ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους), but then I will know fully insofar as I am fully 
known (τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην) (1 Cor. 13:12). 
Let us note that καθὼς and καὶ reinforce one another by stressing the comparison when 
we take καί epexegetically. Paul does not tell us by whom “I will be fully known.” The future 
passive of ἐπεγνώσθην may be a divine passive. But, as the future deponent of ἐπιγνώσομαι 
indicates, this passive/middle form can highlight an “intransitive nonreflexivity.” 5  Thus 
ἐπιγνώσομαι can signify a kind of knowing that takes place in the knowing itself. By not stating 
the object of ἐπιγνώσομαι and the agency of ἐπεγνώσθην, Paul embodies an ethic of “intransitive 
nonreflexivity.” Paul thus says that “now I know out of a part.” The issue is not that I will know 
fully when the time comes. For Paul, even if “I will know fully,” I will only know fully “insofar 
as I am fully known” or insofar as I am open to be known fully will I know fully. 
Such an intensity and intimacy of knowing can be intimidating and risky. But it is a risk 
that one needs to take if one wants to know fully. Knowing is a process; it is relational. Our 
knowing cannot be an objectifying knowing. This is why in 1 Cor. 13:2 by comparing “now” 
with “then” and “through a mirror in enigma” with “face to face,” Paul qualifies “then” with a 
“face to face” encounter. Paul does not mention the object of our seeing. What matters is how we 
5  “The middle voice suggests something that goes beyond subject-object formations. It is able to articulate 
nonreflexive enactments that are not for themselves or for something else. As a formation, it does not need to 
suggest intention outside of its movement or a movement toward an other. It does not oppose active and passive 
formations, but it is other than they are. It is the voice of something’s taking place through its own enactment…” 
See Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 24. 
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see. It is a seeing that is seen at the same time. Our seeing should not fix and objectify the others. 
If we do, the others will protest in our face. A face-to-face seeing exposes each other. Such a 
face is not an abstract face. It is a flesh-and-blood face. To prevent us from objectifying what we 
see, Paul writes: “now we see through a mirror in enigma.” 
Note that Paul does not say that a seeing through the mirror is bad. Rather, he is talking 
about a seeing through the mirror in enigma (ἐν αἰνίγματι). While scholars generally agree that 
ancient mirrors can provide good images,6 in particular as “Corinth was well known for the 
production of good quality bronze mirrors,”7 many argue that Paul is talking about the reflection 
of the mirror. That is to say, Paul is juxtaposing the indirectness of our seeing through the mirror 
with the directness of seeing in face-to-face. However, if the ancient mirrors have religious and 
philosophical connotations,8 then by comparing a mirror-seeing with a face-to-face seeing, Paul 
highlights a personal and intimate seeing that also entails the others (i.e., a face-to-face seeing); a 
seeing that is not self-centered. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty writes: “The perceptual ‘something’ is 
always in the middle of something else” (see the epigraph). Jean-Luc Marion points out the 
obvious in our everyday life experience when he writes, “The fact of seeing in no way entails a 
vision, that is to say, what we see most often does not appear.”9 As such, the issue is not so much 
with the medium of seeing as with the attitude and manner of seeing.  
6 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Yale 
Bible (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 499; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker 
Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 624; Anthony C. 
Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, 
UK: Eerdmans, 2000), 1068. 
7 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1068. For ancient documents on the well reputed 
bronze products of Corinth, see Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, St. Paul’s Corinth: Texts and Archaeology. 3rd edition 
and expanded edition (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 2002), 201-18. 
8 See Mark Pendergrast, Mirror | Mirror: A History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection (New York: Basic 
Books, 2003), 1-27; Miranda Anderson, ed., The Book of the Mirror An Interdisciplinary Collection exploring the 
Cultural Story of the Mirror (New Castle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007). 
9 See Jean-Luc Marion, “What We See and What Appears,” in Idol Anxiety. Edited by Josh Ellenbogen and Aaron 
Tugendhaft (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 153. Marion continues, “Why does what we see not appear? By 
‘does not appear’ I mean that it does not draw the gaze, does not focus it, does not captivate it. The gaze passes, 
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Joseph Fitzmyer writes about 1 Cor. 13:12: “the quality of the mirror is not the issue: it is 
rather that in a mirror, whether good or poor, one sees only a reflection or image of the thing, not 
the thing itself.”10 I want to push this point by underscoring that the problem is not that the 
reflection is bad. Rather Paul is concerned that believers might mistake the reflection of the thing 
for the thing itself, and henceforth, stop seeing.11 Whether we can tell the reflection from the 
thing that the mirror reflects is not as important as stopping seeing. Once we fix our horizon of 
seeing, we think that what we see is what it is. But, whether what we see is what it is depends on 
the way we see it. With our seeing intimately tied to our knowledge,12 which is what 13:12 is 
about, such a seeing can lead to a wrong knowledge; a knowledge that objectifies and subjugates 
the others. Indeed, such a seeing that objectifies the others, can in return, objectify us. It is a 
vicious loop. Paul’s reminder that we now see and know out of a part does not discredit our 
seeing and knowing. It simply points out that our seeing is perspectival. A face-to-face seeing 
helps counter an objectifying seeing, where the others can address us and disrupt our gaze and 
subjectivity. It is not a coincidence that Paul would speak of this face-to-face seeing in the 
context of love, because a vision of love is a seeing that let the other be the other. It is a seeing 
passes over what it sees and moves to the following visible, as if the visible had given up its spatial determination to 
take on a temporal determination. This means that the visible is not the visible in front of us, but is the visible for a 
moment and we move on. In this sense, the visible does not appear, the gaze does not even allow it the time to 
appear, we have already moved on...” Idem. 
10 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 499; also, see Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the 
First Epistle to the Corinthians. Translated by James W. Leitch. Hermeneia – A Critical and Historical Commentary 
on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 228; Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First letter to the 
Corinthians. The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2010), 658-60. 
11 Collins further finds that “Plutarch … and other ancients used the metaphor of a mirror and the image on it in a 
way that is similar to Paul's. They used the metaphor to express the difficulties encountered by humans who try to 
understand the deity.” See Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical 
Press, 1999), 486-87. 
12 Besides pointing out that in early Christian usage, “ἐπιγινώσκειν is often used instead of γινώσκειν with no 
difference in meaning” (703), Bultmann finds that in the Greek usage, “the link between the verbs γινώσκειν and 
εἰδέναι shows that knowledge is regarded as a mode of seeing, for εἰδέναι means ‘to know on the basis of one’s own 
observation’” (691). See Rudolf Bultmann, “γινώσκω κτλ.,” in TDNT 1: 689-719. 
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that desires to be seen in seeing. It is a genuine regard for the others, inviting the others 
addressing oneself in one’s seeing. 
(i) Maurice Merleau-Ponty: An Embodied Perception of the World 
For Merleau-Ponty, as “I am thrown into a nature, and that nature appears not only as 
outside me … but it is also discernible at the center of subjectivity,”13 it only makes sense that 
my “body … is the point of view upon the world.”14 Thus Merleau-Ponty writes: 
To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves, and they would 
not do this if they could not be hidden behind each other or behind me. In other 
words: to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this habitation to grasp all 
things in terms of the aspect which they present to it. But in so far as I see those 
things too, they remain abodes open to my gaze, and, being potentially lodged in 
them, I already perceive from various angles the central object of my present 
vision. Thus every object is the mirror of all others.15 
 
This notion “to look at an object is to inhabit it” is like an embodiment of the middle voice. One 
is seen in the things that one sees. In fact, one is already seen before s/he begins to see. “I am 
being potentially lodged in them” in my seeing. I see things from being in relation to them, 
which are in relation to other things; a relation that connects and separates me from them. In the 
end, I see things from being among things. As I adjust my “body schema” to see, I see them with 
my body being in touch with other bodies in the world. Our seeing thus includes seeing and not 
seeing. What stands out to us is not simply the things themselves but the things in the middle of 
many other things. What we do not see “here and now” is also a part of the seeing. Merleau-
Ponty writes, “Any seeing of an object by me is instantaneously reiterated among all those 
objects in the world which are apprehended as co-existent, because each of them is all that the 
13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 403. 
14 Ibid., 81. 
15 Ibid., 79. He continues, “When I look at the lamp on my table, I attribute to it not only the qualities visible from 
where I am, but also those which the chimney, the walls, the table can ‘see’; but back of my lamp is nothing but the 
face which it ‘shows’ to the chimney. I can therefor see an object in so far as objects form a system of a world, and 
in so far as each one treats the others round it as spectators of its hidden aspects and as guarantee of the permanence 
of those aspects.” Idem. 
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others ‘see’ of it.”16 Luce Irigaray further points out the obvious in our seeing: the air. She writes, 
“Is not air the whole of our habitation as mortals? Is there a dwelling more vast, more spacious, 
or even more generally peaceful than that of air? Can man live elsewhere than in air? Neither in 
earth, nor in fire, nor in water is any habitation possible for him.”17 
 Quietly the air nourishes. It does not shout out its presence nor demand recognition and 
respect. Simply there … and here, it allows us to live, see, think, act, etc. The air is anywhere and 
everywhere. Between the self and the others is not an empty space, but a space full of air. We 
never see the others without any medium. The air connects and separates the self from the others. 
This embodied and relational perception is close to the correlational thinking in Chinese 
worldview, where everything, material or immaterial, is made of qi (meaning: air, breath, energy, 
etc.). The proprioceptive or felt aspect of our perception is well captured in these words of 
Merleau-Ponty:  
The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I 
have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is 
inexhaustible.18 
 
In a group-oriented culture, we will further say that “the world is what we live through together” 
as world, nature and people characterize each individual. Likewise, our seeing is a communal 
seeing; a seeing that is possible when I also am seen, as Paul would say. In saying that “the 
world is not what I think,” Merleau-Ponty finds that “the world is not an object such that I have 
in my possession the law of its making; it is the natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts 
and all my explicit perceptions … [I am] a subject destined to the world.”19 If the world is the 
16 Idem. Emphasis added. 
17 Luce Irigaray, The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger. Translated by Mary Beth Mader (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1999), 8. 
18 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 403, xix. 
19 Ibid., xi-xii. At the same time, we cannot help but to get a sense of individualism in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis. 
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natural field for “all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions,” we are then in a heteronomous 
relationship with the world and others.  
In engaging the Christian Scripture as believers, to what extent are we of and in the text? 
Even if we can objectify the text since the text is out “there” and we are “here,” what happens 
when the “here” meets the “there”? If both the text and we are of and in the world, then how 
much can the text as a medium capture in words the world and the writer? Merleau-Ponty writes: 
When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience; 
moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event, and so it appears 
to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of consciousness, 
and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own operations, the world 
which is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself. The real has 
to be described, not constructed or formed.20 
 
Here, the inter-twining of the subject and the world in her/his reflection of her/his reflection is 
noteworthy. The reflection is in the mode of the middle voice. It is an event in which “the world 
is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself.” It is in this middle voice that the 
“truly creative act” and “changed structure of consciousness” take place. Hence “the real” is not 
“constructed or formed.” To describe “the real” is, however, difficult because we are already 
embedded in it. When we speak of our perception, we often focus on the mental and intellectual 
aspects. We seldom examine our mood and bodily aspect, let alone the different kinds of bodies 
of different social locations. This notion of the body as “our anchorage in a world”21 and “our 
general medium for having a world”22 is not lost to Frantz Fanon. It is manifested on his face and 
his very skin. “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!”23 
20 Ibid., xi. Also, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. II: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 151-80. 
21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 167. 
22 Ibid., 169. Merleau-Ponty writes, “Just as nature finds its way to the core of my personal life and becomes 
inextricably linked with it, so behavior patterns settle into that nature, being deposited in the form of a cultural 
world.” Ibid., 405. This notion of inter-corporeality is further illustrated in the phenomenon of chiasm of our hands 
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No longer just another human being, but “a Negro;” a labelled human being; an out-of-
place human being; a “Negro.” In the language of Julia Kristeva: an abject; fascinating yet 
repulsive to the system (see below). Here, a face-to-face regard for the others obviously does not 
work. Paul thus also has to say that our seeing is out of a part. A partial regard is not a regard. A 
partial respect is not a respect. Remember: “I will know fully insofar as I will be fully known.” 
This poignant experience of Fanon on the train in Paris shows how our skin color does matter in 
the formation of our social identification and consciousness. The “epidermalization” that Fanon 
mentions inscribes the gaze of others into our very being. Not only are we alienated from 
ourselves because of the gaze of the others, we also see ourselves through the gaze of the other. 
As a result, we police ourselves with the gaze of the others. The gaze becomes a “panopticon” 
and we become the product and production of the gaze. In the Althusserian language, we are thus 
“interpellated.” Our body of perception lies elsewhere, at the mercy of others. Yet, this elsewhere 
is interwoven into our very own body and psyche. We may still feel our sentiment, sensations, 
etc. But, the felt aspect is replaced by the claimed and paid aspects (see section 3 in chapter 1). It 
is hard to even think of one’s own identity and agency. What identity? Where to begin? There is 
no “anchorage.” Our skin, comportment, and accent betray us. It is elsewhere. Herein lies the 
danger of an objectifying seeing; a seeing that is not willing to be seen in its seeing. Such a 
seeing that is not addressed in return could become an ideological or an idolatrous seeing. 
This kind of feeling undergirds my experience growing up in Kuala Lumpur in the 1980s-
90s. While the Chinese culture is group-oriented, it is not monolithic. Most Chinese fled to 
touching and sensing each other as Merleau-Ponty speaks of the flesh in terms of the body of the mind and the mind 
of the body in a chiasm. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining – The Chiasm,” in The Visible and the 
Invisible, Followed by Working Notes. Edited by Claude Lefort. Translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 130-55 (141). 
23 See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 
1967). Also, see Kelly Oliver, “Pathology of Recognition,” in Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 23-49. 
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Malaysia during the European imperialism, Japanese invasion and massacre, and the Communist 
vs. Nationalist Chinese struggles in early-mid twentieth century. Because of the need for cheap 
labor for plantation and mining works in Malaysia, the British also brought many Chinese and 
Indians to Malaysia. Consequently, we have numerous dialects and sub-cultures in the Chinese 
community. For various reasons, these dialect groups do not always get along with each another. 
To make the situation more complex, the British adopted the “divide and rule” strategy along 
racial lines. Very soon, these racial lines become socio-cultural, political, economic, religious, 
territorial lines of demarcation.24 The Malays must be Muslims by birth; and because of their 
longer history in Malaysia and the British support, they hold the political power. Indeed, as the 
Malays are the predominant force in the government, they are favored for business opportunities, 
educational scholarships, etc. at the expense of other “races.” A recent article in The Wall Street 
Journal even points out that the “Transparency International said Malaysia scored worst in the 
2012 Bribe Payers Survey.”25 The Chinese, known for their business skill, play a more dominant 
role in the financial areas. The Indians, while many are in the plantation work, many are also in 
the legal and medical professions. With these three major “races” dominate their respective fields, 
some sort of “unity” is thus maintained, tenuously, as they need each other to survive and 
24 In his research, Fenton notes the ideological constructs of different Malay words such as “bangsa,” “kaum,” and 
“orang” to denote the concept of “race” in Malaysia. See Steve Fenton, Ethnicity (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, 2003), 25-50. Also, see Sumit K. Mandal, “Boundaries and Beyond: Whither the Cultural Bases of 
Political Community in Malaysia,” in The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 141-64. 
25 http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2012/12/11/malaysia-tops-bribery-table (accessed January 10, 2013). 
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thrive.26 The fragility of harmony, however, surfaces during the general election when politicians 
gerrymander and play with racial, religious, etc. fears to get the votes.27 
As a result of this discriminatory policy, many Chinese with financial means would enroll 
their children in the private English education system, as the teachers seem more trained than 
those in the public schools. Since the public school is free, most Chinese would go there, in spite 
of the reported discrimination against non-Malays. Those who want to retain their Chinese 
heritage would send their children to a few Chinese secondary schools. This decision is risky. 
The government does not recognize the credential, despite the fact that many students do far 
better in the national examinations than their peers in other education systems. Another challenge 
faced by these students is that they must learn most of the subjects in the school curriculum in 
three languages: Chinese, Malay, and English. Inherent in these languages are the competing 
socio-cultural values that the students need to come to terms with, whether they are aware of 
such implications or not. The situation becomes worse when Malay is the official language, 
whereas English is the language that shows that one is well educated. Being caught in between 
Malay and English, the value of the Chinese language is questionable. Yet the students must 
learn it well. Like their counterparts in Mainland China, they must study Chinese history, 
literature, and geography. 
Given this complex education system, one can imagine its impact on one’s consciousness 
and un/sub-consciousness.28 Growing up in this situation, I was overloaded with mixed feeling 
26 For example, see Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1996); Meredith L. Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). In recent years we see more and more ordinary Malaysians, 
despite their “races,” cultures, and “religions,” work together very closely at different levels for social justice against 
the government’s corruption and power abuse. 
27 For example, see http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577390-after-tainted-election-victory-najib-razak-
needs-show-his-reformist-mettle-dangerous?fsrc=scn%2Ftw_ec%2Fa_dangerous_result (accessed May 10, 2013). 
28 The ripple effect of education on one’s socio-cultural consciousness and identity is well documented. See Louis 
Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in Essays on Ideology 
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and information. I could not articulate who I was, other than the fact that I am an (overseas) 
Chinese Malaysian. There are too many competing values. Kristeva describes these mixed 
feelings and the issues of identity in terms of the maternal body and abjection, a state of very 
intense feeling that fascinates and yet repulses us.29 By the end of this section, it will become 
clear that these ideas of Kristeva are also readily seen in the conflicts in 1 Corinthians. 
(ii) Julia Kristeva: The Notion of “Abject” 
The abject is seen as a threat to one’s identity and the social order. Kristeva writes: “The 
abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I.”30 The abject is an excess 
that cannot be regulated, incorporated, or erased to maintain the integrity of the system. But, why 
is someone or something abject? Is the quality “of being opposed to I” necessarily hostile? Are 
the cause and the result of abjection necessarily bad? As Kristeva speaks of the excess as “the 
semiotic” and the rules as “the symbolic,” the semiotic is often treated as the abject. Yet, 
Kristeva argues, “Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, 
in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order to 
be – maintaining that night in which the outline of the signified thing vanishes and where only 
(London: Verso, 1984), 1-60; Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and 
Culture. Translated by Richard Nice (London; California; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1990). 
29 Kristeva describes abjections as “an extremely strong feeling which is at once somatic and symbolic, and which is 
above all a revolt of the person against an external menace from which one wants to keep oneself at a distance, but 
of which one has the impression that it is not only an external menace but that it may menace us from the inside. So 
it is a desire for separation, for becoming autonomous and also the feeling of an impossibility of doing so…” See 
Women Analyze Women: In France, England, and United States. Edited by Elaine Hoffman Baruch and Lucieenne J. 
Serrano (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 135-36. 
30 See Julia Kristeva, Power of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 1. While Kristeva also illustrates abjection through food/dietary laws, 
death/corpse, etc., she underscores that the border between the subject “I” and the other is tenuous, constituted by 
rejecting what is foreign to “I.” This otherness, however, was a part of the “I” that I need to reject so that I can be 
constituted. As such, the abject is the remainder that does not disappear entirely from one’s subjectivity. Kristeva 
writes: “all abjection is in fact recognition of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is founded” 
(ibid., 5). Noting this “want” in the constitution of the subject, McAfee highlights, through the Freudian das 
Unheimliche (the uncanny), the haunting of abjection. See Noëlle McAfee, Julia Kristeva (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 48-50. 
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the imponderable affect is carried out.”31 In other words, the abject that is jettisoned outside of 
the identity, order, or system is not only marked by an intense violence. It is also marked by “the 
imponderable affect” of the abject “signified thing.” 
For Kristeva, the “semiotic” is the preverbal and pre-Oedipal drives “anterior to sign and 
syntax”32 (cf. Greimas’s Fundamental and Narrative Semantics). It is rhythmic, position-less, 
and is always in process. The “symbolic,” on the other hand, is that which regulates social 
identity and positions (cf. Greimas’s Discursive Semantics/Figurative and Syntax). While the 
“semiotic” and the “symbolic” are different from each other, they “are inseparable within the 
signifying process that constitutes language...” 33  Moreover, as “the subject is always both 
semiotic and symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be either ‘exclusively’ semiotic or 
‘exclusively’ symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by and indebted to both.”34  
Given this notion of the “semiotic,” the “mother’s body becomes the focus of the 
semiotic as the ‘pre-symbolic’ – a manifestation – especially in art, of what could be called the 
‘materiality’ of the symbolic: the voice as rhythm and timbre, the body as movement, gesture, 
and rhythm.”35 For Kristeva, the mother’s love for her child illustrates the inter-twining of the 
31 Ibid., 10. 
32 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language. Introduction by Leon S. Roudiez. Translated by Margaret Waller 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 29. 
33 Ibid., 24. 
34 Idem. 
35 John Lechte, Julia Kristeva (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 129. 
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“semiotic” and the “symbolic,”36 as it embodies the tension between “the semiotic” and “the 
symbolic,” “nature” and “culture,” as well as the “self” and the other.37 
This tactic of Kristeva to “reinscribe language in the body” and “the body in language” at 
the same time, in particular with the body as “the maternal body” that “prefigures the law of the 
father and the onset of the symbolic,”38 aims to show that the symbolic itself is heterogeneous. 
Unlike the “mirror stage” in Jacques Lacan’s theory, 39 in which a baby between six and eighteen 
months old comes to recognize her/his body through her/his image from the mirror,40 the mirror 
stage according to Kristeva is already symbolic.41 Because to identify and differentiate oneself as 
a subject from her/his mirror image implies a symbolic function in which the subject can form a 
36 See Julia Kristeva, “Stabat Mater,” in Tales of Love. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 234-63. She writes: “Silence weighs heavily nonetheless on the corporeal and psychological 
suffering of childbirth and especially the self-sacrifice involved in becoming anonymous in order to pass on the 
social norm, which one might repudiate for one’s own sake but within which one must include the child in order to 
educate it along the chain of generations. A suffering lined with jubilation – ambivalence of masochism – on 
account of which a woman, rather refractory to perversion, in fact allows herself a coded, fundamental, perverse 
behavior, ultimate guarantee of society, without which society will not reproduce and will not maintain a constancy 
of standardized household.” Ibid., 260. 
37 “The experience of love indissolubly ties together the symbolic (what is forbidden, distinguishable, thinkable), the 
imaginary (what the Self imagines in order to sustain and expand itself), and the real (that impossible domain where 
affects aspire to everything and where there is no one to take into account the fact that I am only a part). Strangled 
within this tight knot, reality vanishes: I do not take it into account, and I refer it, if I think of it, to one of the three 
other realms. That means that in love I never cease to be mistaken as to reality.” See Julia Kristeva, “In Praise of 
Love,” in Tales of Love, 7. 
38 Kelly Oliver, Subjectivity without Subjects: From Abject Fathers to Desiring Mothers (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 55. 
39 See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” 
in Ecrits: A Selection. Translated by Bruce Fink (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2002), 3-9. For an 
illustration on the notions of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, see Alain Vanier, Lacan. Translated by Susan 
Fairfield (New York: Other Press, 2000). It is noteworthy to see Lacanian tripartite relations in Althusser’s 
definition of ideology as “a ‘representation’ of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence.” See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” 
36ff. Sean Homer also points this out in Jacques Lacan (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 112. While 
Kristeva finds it “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to translate one theory into another theory, because if one 
does, one ends in confusion and loses the specificity of each author and each approach” (22-23), she thinks that the 
semiotic could correspond to “phenomena that for Lacan are in both the real and the imaginary” (23). As of the 
symbolic, it could be Lacan’s symbolic order, but it also refers to the symbolic element in the symbolic order. See 
Ross Mitchell Guberman, ed., Julia Kristeva Interviews (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
40 This perception is, of course, a misrecognition because the image of the baby is not the baby. For Lacan, the 
symbolic is created from a correspondence between the baby and the image of the baby in the mirror. The symbolic 
as such polices the gap between the signified and the signifier. As a result of internalizing the imaginary “ideal-I” 
from the mirror image, the baby is thus alienated from her/himself. The subject is thus never at home. 
41 Kelly Oliver, Subjectivity without Subjects, 56. 
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judgment. If “in the course of language acquisition, signified negation … appears around the age 
of fifteen months, coinciding with the peak of the ‘mirror stage’ and with holophrastic language 
acquisition,” 42  then it suggests that “the formation of the symbol of negation precedes this 
[symbolic] function or coincides with its development.”43 For Kristeva, as Oliver points out, this 
negativity not only “operates first in the semiotic [maternal] body,” it is also “founded on 
excess.”44 It is not the “castration threat or sense of lack” but the “excess and pleasure that move 
the child [from the presymbolic] into the realm of the symbolic.”45 It would be tragic if the child 
has to move into the symbolic because of threat. Kristeva suggests that it is because of the love 
of the mother and the imaginary father (which is the mother’s love), that the child moves into the 
symbolic or society.46 
As the maternal body juggles multiple roles, the mother becomes a “bridge between 
nature and culture, the drives and the Symbolic order.”47 Kristeva writes: “The mother’s body 
is … what mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the ordering 
principle of the semiotic chora.”48 With the baby coming into being from the flesh and love of 
42 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 122. 
43 Idem. 
44 Kelly Oliver, Subjectivity without Subjects, 56. 
45 Ibid., 57.  
46 Ibid., 65-72. Oliver clarifies that for Kristeva, the signification system (i.e., the symbolic order or the Symbolic) 
“is composed of both semiotic and symbolic elements. So the semiotic is not strictly opposed to the Symbolic. 
Rather, the semiotic is part of the Symbolic. Which is not to say that it is confined within the Symbolic ... The 
semiotic moves both inside and outside the Symbolic. The semiotic … does not move within the symbolic. Within 
signification, the symbolic is heterogeneous to the semiotic. The symbolic is the element within the Symbolic 
against which the semiotic works to produce the dialectical tension that keeps society going.” See Kelly Oliver, 
Reading Kristeva: Unraveling the Double-Bind (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 10. 
Emphasis added. 
47 Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 66. 
48 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 27. “We borrow the chora from Plato’s Timaeus to denote an 
essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their ephemeral stases. We 
differentiate this uncertain and indeterminate articulation from a disposition that already depends on 
representation … Although our theoretical description of the chora is itself part of the discourse of representation 
that offers it as evidence, the chora, as rupture and articulations (rhythm), precedes evidence, verisimilitude, 
spatiality, and temporality. Our discourse – all discourse – moves with and against the chora in the sense that it 
simultaneously depends upon and refuses it. Although the chora can be designated and regulated, it can never be 
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the mother and the father, s/he experiences the “semiotic” and the “symbolic” inside the mother, 
as the mother experiences “the other as the self and the other in the self.”49 This other is not just 
the baby. It is also the mother’s desire and love and the flesh and love of the father. The self 
(mother) is not disintegrated by the other (baby) even though she is changed by the baby. 
Just as the baby needs to separate her/himself from the mother in order to be born, s/he 
also needs to leave the mother in order to become a subject. For this reason the maternal body 
becomes abject.50 This abjection could be bleak for both the child and the mother, if there is no 
love for them. But there is a connection in this division between the mother and her child;51 a 
connection that comes from the mother’s love. It is not a self-centered love, but a love for the 
self and the other (the child). It is because of such a love that the mother gives birth and weans 
the baby so that s/he can become a subject. It is because of this love that the mother turns into an 
abjection what is so dear to her. Oliver writes: “The child must separate from its mother in order 
to be an autonomous being. It cannot remain dependent on her. It is the mother’s love and her 
love for her own mother, a narcissistic love from generation to generation, that supports the 
move into the Symbolic. It is this love that fills language with meaning.”52 It is a love that 
affirms and sustains the self and the other; a love that embodies the “semiotic” and the 
definitively posited: as a result, one can situate the chora and, if necessary, lend it a topology, but one can never give 
it axiomatic form.” Ibid., 25-26. 
49 See Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 162. 
50 “A mother is a continuous separation, a division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of language – and 
it has always been so.” See Julia Kristeva, “Stabat Mater,” 254. 
51 Kristeva writes: “motherhood destines us to a demented jouissance that is answered, by chance, by the nursling’s 
laughter in the sunny waters of the ocean. What connection is there between it [my child] and myself? No 
connection, except for that overflowing laughter where one senses the collapse of some ringing, subtle, fluid identity 
or other, softly buoyed by the waves.” Ibid., 255-56. Speaking of her own motherhood, Kristeva writes: “Recovered 
childhood, dreamed peace restored, in sparks, flash of cells, instants of laughter, smiles in the blackness of dreams, 
at night, opaque joy that roots me in her bed, my mother’s, and projects him, a son, a butterfly soaking up dew from 
her hand, there, nearby, in the night. Alone: she, I, and he.” Ibid., 247. 
52 Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 68. Emphasis added. 
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“symbolic.”53 Recently, Cristina Grenholm also speaks of the vulnerability in the heteronomous 
love relationship between the pregnant woman and her baby, where “[o]ne person is part of 
another person, yet they are separate beings.”54 This loss of autonomy of the pregnant woman is 
not an invitation to abuse, but a transformation of the women into a mother who is caring for a 
new, foreign life inside her that paradoxically troubles and enriches her life at the same time. 
When we turn to 1 Corinthians, it appears that the believers in Corinth were caught up in 
the “symbolic.” They split the “semiotic” from the cross, treat it as a “symbolic” gesture, and 
thus objectify the cross. They want to be in control and reject the element of vulnerability of the 
“semiotic” in their new life in Christ. But, as our discussion on motherhood and embodied love 
show us, the cross is not an exposure to abuse and exploitation but a transformation of life. 
Wonhee Anne Joh argues, “The cross, read through the semiotic maternal lens, is not only the 
horror of abjection but also the power of love. It is love that also is inclusive of abjection. The 
cross is both the power of the symbolic at work in the execution while it is also the irruption of 
the semiotic as the power of jeong [‘a sticky love’].”55 
As an abjection of the Roman Empire, the cross signifies violence and conquest. But, it 
also signifies the dignity of life and the power of love confronting the threat of death. What is at 
stake is not the cross itself, but the figure of the cross (that embodies both the “semiotic” and the 
“symbolic” of the cross).56 Paul makes it clear that the cross was not predestined. Unlike the 
53 Again, it is important to note: “Neither the semiotic nor the symbolic is original. Each is dependent on the other. 
Neither completely destroys the other. Kristeva’s writings can themselves be read as an oscillation between the 
semiotic and symbolic, between rejection and identification.” See Kelly Oliver, Reading Kristeva, 11. 
54 See Cristina Grenholm, Motherhood and Love: Beyond the Gendered Stereotype of Theology. Translated by Marie 
Tåqvist (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 164. 
55 See Wonhee Anne Joh, Heart of the Cross: A Postcolonial Christology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2006), 113. For the notion of jeong, see the sub-section under relationality in chapter 1. 
56 For example, Pickett rightly points out that “the symbol of the cross has no intrinsic meaning, rather what it 
connotes is defined by what ideas and experiences it references in a given context.” See Raymond Pickett, The 
Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the Death of Jesus. JSNT Supplement Series 143 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997), 30. 
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glorious cross that we find in so many Christian hymns, the cross of Christ was anything but 
glorious. Does Paul not say, “Had the rulers of this age known the wisdom of God, they would 
not have crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:8)? The cross must not be fetishized; after all, the 
cross and the resurrection are intertwined for Paul (15:36; cf. Phil. 3:10-11; Gal. 2:20; Rom. 6:1-
14). The cross cannot be sublimated. No signifying trick can signify over this void, this cross. In 
fact, it was for this very quality of crucifixion that the Roman Empire uses it to terrorize any 
rebellions against the Empire. 
The cross was an abjection that distinguishes the loyal Roman citizens from the others. It 
stigmatizes the crucified and those associated with him. But, the cross, shockingly, also marks 
believers from non-believers (1 Cor. 1:18). It marks the God of Christ from the gods and 
goddesses of the Roman Empire.57 The importance of the cross may not be evident in early 
Christian art, as the crucifixion images are scarce compared to the abundant documents on the 
significance of the cross. 58  But as Robin Jensen points out, such a scarcity is a matter of 
categorization.59 The crucifixion images were not uncommon in people’s everyday life.60 
57 Fay finds that the concept of deity in Greco-Roman society “is a loose term, allowing much flexibility while 
stressing power and accomplishment. Being a god did not denote responsibility, instead it conferred on the person a 
special status and the responsibility was imported to the worshippers” See Ron C. Fay, “Greco-Roman Concept of 
Deity,” in Paul’s Word. Edited by Stanley E. Porter. Pauline Studies 4 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 79. 
58 Jensen writes: “Apart from two intaglio gems, probably dating from the fourth century, and a controversial 
second-century graffito found in Rome, the earliest known representations of Jesus crucified date to the early fifth 
century, and are extremely rare until the seventh. Moreover, the earliest certain examples of an image of Christ 
crucified seem almost incidental – not at all monumental, either in size or scope.” See Robin Margaret Jensen, 
Understanding Early Christian Art (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 131. For various theories proposed to 
account for such a paucity of images, see pages 133-35. 
59 “The advent of Christian art is set in the time of the Severan emperors, and its first phase generally coincides with 
the last century of pagan rule, up to the elevation and conversion of the Emperor Constantine. As stated above, that 
few clearly recognizable examples of Christian art pre-date this period probably ensues from the evidence itself, 
rather than results from the vagaries of historical preservation. In other words, the art works were not lost or 
destroyed, they simply have not been recognized as specifically Christian. The fact that little or no evidence of 
recognizable or distinct Christian material culture of any kind can be dated to the first two centuries CE suggests that 
Christians either had selectively adapted the symbols of their pagan neighbors or had acquired very little in the way 
of distinctive material possessions or art works…” Ibid., 16. 
60 “Possible indirect references to the passion include such signs and symbols as simple crosses, ‘crypto-crosses’ 
(anchors, ships’ masts, trees, plows, axes), and tau-crosses, More complex figures that may refer symbolically or 
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Thus in his response to the factions in the church, Paul rhetorically asks believers 
whether he was crucified for them (1:13). For Paul, the cross is integral to their identity (1:17). 
But, the believers in Corinth pay a lip service to it. The cross becomes an abjection to them as 
well. Paul writes: “As you were already filled, you were already made rich, without us you were 
ruling; and would that you were indeed ruling, so that we may be ruling together with you” (4:8). 
The Corinthian believers may have “an overrealized eschatology.”61 But as Paul lists his cross-
like experience, including being treated as the scum of the world and the waste of all things 
(4:13), it appears that the problem is not that believers were already ruling, but that they were 
ruling without the cross. Their ruling imitates the very ruling that crucifies the Christ. 
(iii) Giorgio Agamben: The Notion of “Example” 
The cross was abject to the Roman Empire. It goes against their very sense and sensibility. 
As Martin Hengel points out, “the Roman world was largely unanimous that crucifixion was a 
horrific, disgusting business.”62 In using it against criminals and traitors, the Empire seeks to 
rein-force peace and unity.63 Using Giorgio Agamben’s language, we take the crucifixion as an 
“inclusive exclusion” used by the Roman Empire to consolidate its fides and sovereignty.64 This 
“inclusive exclusion” was, however, turned into an “exclusive inclusion” by Paul as he 
highlights it as a return of the repressed that haunts the Empire. What is excluded (i.e., the cross) 
typologically to the crucifixion include the image of the Lamb (agnus Dei) or a type taken from the Hebrew 
scriptures – Abraham offering his son Isaac as sacrifice.” Ibid., 137.  
61 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 357-59. 
62 See Martin Hengel, Crucifixion: In the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross. Translated by 
John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 37. Hengel notes, “Crucifixion was widespread and frequent, 
above all in Roman times, but the cultured literary world wanted to have nothing to do with it, and as a rule kept 
quiet about it.” Ibid., 38. 
63 “It is usually assumed that there was no question of Roman citizens being executed on the cross, and that the 
punishment was limited to slaves and peregrini. This is only partly correct. There was an archaic, ancient Roman 
punishment, hanging on the ‘barren tree’ (arbor infelix), which could be imposed even on Romans in cases of 
serious crime and high treason (perduellio). Originally this was probably a way of sacrificing the criminal to the 
gods of the underworld…” Ibid., 39. 
64  See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 21-27. 
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by the Empire to consolidate its power is now used by Paul in such a way that it cannot be 
objectified by anyone. Agamben explains, “Exception and example constitute the two modes by 
which a set tries to found and maintain its own coherence. But while the exception is, as we saw, 
an inclusive exclusion (which thus serves to include what is excluded), the example instead 
functions as an exclusive inclusion.”65 As the alterity that is within the self cannot be cast out 
from the self, it destabilizes the self. So by making the cross an “example,” Paul renders it 
unsayable. Believers cannot speak of the cross without un-speaking it.66 Words cannot capture 
the intense feeling and imagery evoked by the cross. As an “example” to imitate, the cross 
cannot be objectified and monopolized. It can only be experienced and witnessed. 
To speak of the cross as “a singular object that presents itself as such”67 – that is, as an 
example – Paul tells us his own cross-like experiences (4:9-13). But, Paul cannot objectify it as if 
everyone else should undergo what he went through in order to embody the cross. No. Note how 
he qualifies it before he lists his cross-like experiences. “Who distinguishes (διακρίνει) you? 
What are you having that did not receive? If you have indeed received (it), why do you boast as 
if you did not receive it?” (4:7). For Paul, if everything comes from God (cf. 8:6), then we cannot 
65 Ibid., 21. For Agamben, “What the example shows is its belonging to a class, but for this very reason the example 
steps out of its class in the very moment in which it exhibits and delimits it … The example is thus excluded from 
the normal case not because it does not belong to it but, on the contrary, because it exhibits its own belonging to 
it … The mechanism of the exception is different. While the example is excluded from the set insofar as it belongs 
to it, the exception is included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to it. And just as belonging to 
a class can be shown only by an example – that is, outside of the class itself – so non-belonging can be shown only 
at the center of the class, by an exception … exception and example are correlative concepts that are ultimately 
indistinguishable and that come into play every time the very sense of the belonging and commonality of individuals 
is to be defined.” Ibid., 22. 
66 Compare the trace of the Dire (“Saying”) in the Dit (“Said”) in Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 3-14, 153-62. 
67 Agamben writes, “On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it 
remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is a singular 
object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity … Exemplary is what is not defined by any property, 
except by being-called. Not being-red, but being-called-red; not being-Jakob, but being-called-Jakob defines the 
example.” See Giorgio Agamben, “Example,” in The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt. Theory Out 
of Bounds, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 10. 
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boast about our cross-like experiences (cf. 2 Cor. 1:3-22; 11:16 – 12:10). To do so is to objectify 
the cross. We should, instead, pay attention and learn from how God works through everyone. 
In the Introduction chapter, we noted that the body of Christ is not only “parts beyond a 
part” (1 Cor. 12:27b). It is also a body broken for everyone (11:24). That is to say, the body of 
Christ does not reside at a fixed center. It cannot be objectified. It can only be discerned. Paul 
makes this point in his biography (9:1-27). The problem of the divisions in the church of Corinth 
is not in the division itself per se. What comes to the fore in the so-called “Cephas’s group,” 
“Apollo’s group,” “Paul’s group,” and even “Christ’s group” in the church (1:12) is the problem 
of objectifying the self and others, which can lead to dangerous ideology and idolatry. 
As a vehement ex-persecutor of the church (15:9; Gal. 1:13-14; cf. Rom. 10:2-4), Paul is 
well aware of the danger of such objectifying mentality and behaviors. This is why Paul learns to 
be critical of his own perspective, lest he be caught up in his own horizon of vision. This is why 
to the Jews Paul became as (ὡς) a Jew, not that he is not a Jew (1 Cor. 9:20). In fact, he is proud 
to be a Jew (Gal. 2:15; Phil. 3:5-6). Paul wants to see how Christ works among the Jews, those 
under the law, those without the law, the weak, etc. (1 Cor. 9:20-22).68 In the words of Daniel 
Patte, “by becoming weak with them and ‘recognizing them as better than oneself,’ that is, 
recognizing what they have received from God and helping them to discover it for what it truly 
is,”69 Paul works as a co-worker of God (3:9), lest his perspective limits his vision of Christ. 
The metaphoric quality of the conjunction ὡς (“as”) is significant. It extends, retracts, and 
creates meanings. This is why Paul pleases everyone in every manner (10:33) because he does 
not know how Christ will work through different people (cf. Matt. 25:31-46). This is why he is 
68 See Daniel Patte, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 347-50. One will note that my next paragraph echoes Patte’s interpretation of 
Pauline letters. 
69 Ibid., 344. 
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indebted to both the Greeks and the non-Greeks (the barbarians) (Rom. 1:14). Because it is 
through them that he comes to see, learn, and work with Christ. Without learning from them, he 
will be entangled in his own perspective. At the same time, however, Paul’s vision is not limited 
to their perspectives either; otherwise he cannot bring the gospel to them. Paul is aware that by 
doing so, he will probably become an abjection for both non-believers and believers. Such is the 
price to pay for being called into the interstitial space of the cross. Note how Paul clarifies his 
language. “To those under the law I become as one under the law, yet not as one under the 
law … To those without the law I become as one without the law, yet not as one without the law 
of God but in the law of Christ (1 Cor. 9:20-21).70 This clarification is crucial. Without it, Paul 
will objectify them. Paul is against an essentialization of one’s cultures and traditions. Now, 
what is this law of Christ? What is the criterion of discernment? It is the logos of the cross (1:17). 
This is why when Paul was with the Corinthians, he decided to know nothing but Jesus Christ 
and him crucified (2:2). Paul is looking for cross-like examples among the Corinthians. 
 
III. An Embodied and Correlative Worldview 
And a concrete situation is what is concresced, a grown-together of whatever 
there are. The concrete situation is what the Taoist called hun tun, a natural con-
fusion, a primal abundance-together.71 – Kuang-Ming Wu 
 
 In highlighting the semantic features of the cross, Paul struggles with the problems in the 
church of Corinth that tends to objectify the cross into a mere slogan. For Paul, the cross must be 
embodied and lived out in the believers’ everyday life. The cross cannot be theologized: it is 
always a scandal (to the Jews) and a foolishness (to the Gentiles) (1:23). It is only within a call 
70 For an interpretation of this law as the Jewish dietary law, see David J. Rudolph, A Jew to the Jews: Jewish 
Contours of Pauline Flexibility in 1 Corinthians 9:19-23 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011). 




                                                          
and response relationship between God and believers that the Christ crucified can be perceived 
as the power and wisdom of God (1:24). Once the cross is rationalized/theologized, it can be 
explained away, with the flesh-and-blood crucified Christ relegated to the background. This 
temptation to theologize the cross – that is, making the cross presentable to both believers and 
non-believers – is understandable in a non-dualistic worldview in the Greco-Roman cultures.72 
Indeed, from our discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s embodied perception of the world and 
Kristeva’s proprioceptive notion of “abject,” it is not a surprise that the cross could become 
abject to the Corinthian believers. The imagery of the crucified Christ was just too traumatic and 
shameful for believers to embrace. It has to be repackaged. But, the problem is that once the 
cross is detached from its “felt” aspect and then represented only in its “claimed” and “paid” 
aspects (see section 3 in chapter 1), the crucified Christ becomes objectified into a system of 
knowing that the believers in Corinth can manipulate. Given this syntactic operation on the cross, 
Paul thus wants to highlight the semantic features of the cross, lest the cross of Christ be emptied 
of its (felt) power (1:17). In our discussion of A. J. Greimas’s “Generative Trajectory” (see 
section 3.3 in the Methodological Appendix), we show that the “semantics” and the “syntax” are 
closely intertwined, but they should not be confused. The crucial difference between the 
“semantics” and “syntax” comes to the fore in our notions of metaphor and typology below, 
where the works of Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell and Wu are semantics-oriented, and the 
works of Pierre Bourdieu and Paul Ricoeur are more syntax-oriented. 
 
 
72 See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 3-37. Martin comments that 
“[i]n the absence of such an ontological dualism, for most people of Greco-Roman culture the human body was of a 
piece with its environment [where] [t]he self was a precarious, temporary state of affairs, constituted by forces 
surrounding and pervading the body.” Ibid., 25. 
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(i) A Semantic Notion of Metaphor 
 To show why we prioritize a semantic notion of metaphor, let us refer briefly to the 
correlative worldview in Chinese cultures. As Wu points out, “every Chinese ‘concept’ can be 
said to be a scene, a pictograph, a compressed story.”73 This pictograph-like “concept” comes 
from a Chinese worldview that sees everything, whether material and immaterial, as made of qi 
(breath or energy). The visible and invisible worlds are thus a continuum where (1) yin-yang (a 
dynamic complementary system), (2) heaven-earth-humanity (a triadic verticality), (3) five 
phases (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water), and (4) nine fields or palaces (a horizontal division 
system) are essential components of a correlative thinking.74 So in her reading of Leviticus, in 
light of the studies of ancient Chinese literature, Mary Douglas highlights the correlative 
thinking in the literary style of Leviticus that “works through analogies.”75 That is to say, “as A 
is to B, so is X to Y” (A:B ≈ X:Y). Given this logic, “everything symbolizes the body … [and] 
the body symbolizes everything else.” 76  As a result, “[a]ny culture is a series of related 
73 Kuang-Ming Wu, On Chinese Body Thinking: A Cultural Hermeneutic (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1997), 30. 
Wu writes: “My sense-organs sense; my inner sense (my heartmind, hsin) senses that I sense. Thanks to my eyes I 
see; thanks to my heartmind I am aware that I see. Being aware, my heartmind senses my senses, thereby integrates 
my sense experience, what is experienced (as) out there. Sense-organs perceive actuals; mindheart-organ 
apperceives perceptions. Apperceiving with the mindheart, the self af-firms, that is, integrates perceived actuals into 
a scene, con-firming a cohesion of actual scene of the world.” Idem. 
74 For various views of the correlative thinking, see Yiu-ming Fung, “On the Very Idea of Correlative Thinking.” 
Philosophy Compass 5/4 (2010): 296-306. 
75 Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18. Referring to the works by 
Graham, and Hall and Ames, she writes: “Their thesis is so important for reading Leviticus that it is worth saying 
more about it. Our logic is based on part-whole relations, the theory of types, causal implications and logical 
entailments. It organizes experience in theoretical terms. Rational construction based upon it always goes in a 
direction away from the concrete particular towards the universal: ‘Persons in society are construed rationally to the 
extent that their idiosyncrasies are abstracted and their general or universal characteristics are made relevant.’” Ibid., 
15. The quote comes from David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius. SUNY Series in 
Systematic Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), 137. For details on the correlative 
thinking, see Angus C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open 
Court, 1989), 319-82; idem., Reason and Spontaneity (London and Dublin: Curzon Press; Totowa, New Jersey: 
Barnes & Noble Books, 1985). 
76 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution and Taboo. With a new preface by the 
author (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), 151. 
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structured structures which comprise social forms, values, cosmology, the whole of knowledge 
and through which all [bodily] experience is mediated.”77 
 In his studies of the notions of the body in Greco-Roman cultures, Dale Martin agrees 
with Douglas that “[t]he body is a model which can stand for any bounded system … The body 
is a complex structure. The functions of its different parts and their relation afford a source of 
symbols for other complex structures.”78 Martin argues that “in the ancient world, the human 
body was not like a microcosm; it was a microcosm – a small version of the universe at large.”79 
As such, the “construing [of] the body as really (not just figuratively) a microcosm blurs any 
boundary between the inner body and the outer body.”80 It is thus not a surprise that “[t]he body-
as-microcosm was not a mere philosophical or literary topos; it ruled the care and economy of 
the self in everyday situations – in medical treatment, for example.” 81  For Chinese, this 
worldview is rather commonplace. The yin-yang principle, heaven-earth-humanity triadic 
verticality, five phases, and nine fields or palaces form the correlative thinking in social relations, 
sexuality, language, rituals, medicine, dietary, exercise, home landscaping and interior design, 
etc. Everything is interrelated. 
77 Ibid., 158. 
78 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger, 142. Commenting on Douglas’s argument, Martin writes: “Furthermore, as 
Mary Douglas says, ‘The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived’ – and no location of ancient 
ideology illustrates her point more clearly than Greco-Roman society’s hierarchical construction of the body. See 
Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 30. I cannot find the 
citation that Martin refers to in Douglas’s Rules and Meanings. But an identical citation can be found in Mary 
Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 69. 
79 See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body, 16. Martin further points out that “[t]he most famous account of the 
microcosmic body in the ancient world is found in Plato’s Timaeus, which portrays not only the human body as a 
cosmos but, conversely, the cosmos as a body … Plato followed pre-Socratic philosophers and Hippocratic medical 
theory in assuming that the human self (body and soul) was composed of the same elements as the universe: air 
(pneuma), earth, water, and fire. Thus the dynamics that one saw at work in the external cosmos could be read onto 
and into the human body, the inner body being buffeted by the same weather as the outer body.” Idem. 
80 Ibid., 17. He continues, “The works of the internal body are not just an imitation of the mechanics of the universe; 
rather, they are part of it, constantly influenced by it.” Idem. 
81 Ibid., 16. 
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 Now, in pointing out the retro-prospective quality in the etymology of the word “ana-
logy” in Greek, Wu further speaks of “analogy as [a] metaphor.”82 From the perspective of a 
correlative thinking, analogy and metaphor are more or less the same in meaning. But, Gerhart 
and Russell want to clarify the difference between the two. For them, an analogy is a relation 
found existing between two terms that are of resemblance. So while we may have a new 
knowledge created as a result of this relation, “the form that this knowledge takes is not very 
different (in size, scale, general shape, etc.) from that which was known already.”83 A metaphor, 
on the other hand, is created when one “insists on making an analogical relationship between 
two understandings that are already formed.”84 Through this insistence, “an analogy where none 
existed [is forced], with the result that our world of meanings has been bent out of shape.”85 
 Note the emphasis on “insistence” that creates the metaphor. A metaphor is created out of 
juxtaposing two terms that do not seem to be of any resemblance but are somehow intuitively or 
felt to be related. This unexplainable intuition is what makes the creation of metaphor semantic, 
instead of syntactic. However, if the relation between the two terms in a metaphor can be 
logically deduced, then it is a syntactic metaphor. Unlike an analogy that syntactically (or 
logically) creates new meanings from an existing relation of resemblance without changing the 
“world of meanings,” a semantic metaphor, according to Gerhart and Russell, can “warp, distort, 
82 See Kuang-Ming Wu, On Metaphoring: A Cultural Hermeneutic (Leiden; Boston; Köln: Brill, 2001), 53. Wu 
writes: “Metaphor sees that ‘as this A, so that B,’ so A and B are similar, to be gathered in and counted together. 
The analogic formula, ‘As [A is to B], so [X is to Y]’ is an elaborated form of the metaphoric formula, ‘As C, so Z.’ 
Analogy is a forwarding metaphor, gathering future unknowns into past known, then, the old known, now warmed 
up, is logically housecleaned. ‘As known C, so unknown Z; as Z, so C renewed.” Ibid., 55-56. 
83 See Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious 
Understanding (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1984), 111. They continue: “Analogies occur in many 
modes among which are included models such as a scale model (a ship or a building), a representation that purports 
to be an identity (a model home in a real estate development), or a map which is developed on the basis of a high 
level of abstraction. A photograph can be thought of as an analogue of that which it pictures. A table of organization 
can be thought of as an analogue of an administration.” Idem. 
84 Ibid., 112. Emphasis added. 
85 Ibid., 113. 
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fold, spindle, and perhaps mutilate our world of meanings”86 as it intuitively – that is, cannot be 
explained logically – puts the two terms of different semantic universe into a metaphorical 
relation.87 A saying like “God is love” is thus a metaphor, not an analogy. It juxtaposes two 
different semantic universes together that do not appear to share any commonality. This is why 
the “is” in a semantic metaphor is not a predicate but a metaphorical relation. One may already 
have some idea about God and love, but as we, in a concrete context, juxtapose these two terms 
together, we change and even create a new “world of meanings” not only of this metaphor but of 
these two terms as well. The Special Theory of Relativity of Albert Einstein is a case in point 
when Einstein juxtaposes two incompatible fields together: Newtonian mechanics with 
Maxwellian electromagnetism.88 
 This description of a metaphor is not unlike Wu’s depiction of an ana-logy, albeit Wu 
does not make explicit the semantic feature in his notion of analogy-metaphor. He writes: “The 
analogic formula, ‘As [A is to B], so [X is to Y]’ is an elaborated form of the metaphoric formula, 
‘As C, so Z.’”89 For Wu, as the word “logos” is related to “legein,” which means “to tell, “to ac-
count,” or “to gather,” it implies “a mental gathering of things seen as similar. The counting, 
collecting and cataloguing led to taking account of things collected, then to account for, to reflect 
on, to reason.”90 Now in order to count and catalogue, one needs to examine how to gather and 
link things together. This examination of the “how” entails both a retrospective and prospective 
86 Ibid., 114. 
87 Gerhart and Russell summarize: “The distortion of the fields of meanings by means of the metaphoric process is a 
structural change which demands that other meanings and understandings have to be changed in the wake of the 
metaphor. This is what is so different about the metaphoric process. Analogy, on the other hand, is an extension of 
meaning (as distinct from the creation of new meaning). The increased knowledge from analogy is primarily in 
terms of the original understandings.” Ibid., 119. 
88 Ibid., 134-40. 
89 See Kuang-Ming Wu, On Metaphoring, 56. 
90 Ibid., 54. 
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reasoning, even though the word logos later on refers to an ac-counting of what has happened.91 
But, as the preposition “ana” indicates, it speaks of a “going ‘up’ to where we have not been 
before.”92 This retrospective and prospective quality of an analogy thus takes account of the 
known logos of the terms and transforms its “world of meanings.” Wu’s illustration of the 
analogy can perhaps help us understand better how the correlative thinking work.  
Metaphor-analogy has four terms, not three where the second term in the middle 
repeats itself to mediate the first term to the third; we must instead logically jump 
from one middle term B in A/B = C/D, to another different middle term D to get 
to the fourth, C. Metaphor’s proportional equality (‘=’) is to be achieved; it is not 
there ready to be calculated and inspected … it is precisely its incomplete 
equation that tips us forward to an adventure for novelty.93 
  
Here, there is a resemblance between Wu’s delineation and the multiple relations in Greimas’s 
semiotic square. As the “metaphor’s proportional equality is to be achieved,” Douglas is right to 
point out the ambiguity and ambivalence in the correlative thinking. Instead of a direct and 
discrete articulation of a logical argument, we are presented in an argument by analogy a series 
of analogies that consolidate, expand, and even challenge each other in their meaning 
production.94 Angus C. Graham further reminds us:   
91 Tracing the usage and meaning of logos, Wu finds the word was used for both backward and forward reasoning 
before the latter was dropped out of use. He writes: “Later two interesting lines of development further exhibited this 
unity of opposites: logos as horos, limit-horizon or definition, and logos as spermatikos, the seed-power of creation. 
First, logos as (ac)counting requires identification of each things counted, and de-fines a thing as a thing. Secondly, 
retrospective de-finition is part of Logos' prospective seeding of creation, the cosmic ratio, rationale. Thus 
retrospective logos is the momentum in ordering and rendering future creation intelligible. The Stoics, Philo, and 
Plotinus used logos in this twofold manner.” Ibid., 56. 
92 Ibid., 59. 
93 Ibid., 59-60. 
94 Douglas writes: “Instead of explaining why an instruction has been given, or even what it means, it adds another 
similar instruction, and another and another, thus producing its highly schematized effect. The series of analogies 
locate a particular instance in a context. They expand the meaning. Sometimes the analogies are hierarchized, one 
within another making inclusive sets, or sometimes they stand in opposed pairs or contrast sets. They serve in a 
place of causal explanations. If one asks, Why this rule? the answer is that it conforms to that other rule. If, Why 
both rules? the answer is a larger category of rules in which they are embedded as subsets or from some of which 
they are distinguished as exceptions … In Leviticus the patterning of oppositions and inclusions is generally all the 




                                                          
It is not that on the borders of logic there is a loose form called argument from 
analogy, but that all thinking starts from a spontaneous discrimination of the like 
and the unlike, and tendency to group the similar in categories and expect similar 
consequences from similar conditions.95 
 
The web of connections of one thing with another and another cannot be avoided. Everything is 
embodied and, hence, cannot be disconnected. Bourdieu’s notion of the “body as a living 
memory” provides a good illustration.96 However, as Bourdieu emphasizes the social aspects of 
the body, his notion of habitus is syntactic, instead of semantic. He writes: 
When the properties and movements of the body are socially qualified, the most 
fundamental social choices are naturalized and the body, with its properties and 
its movements, is constituted as an analogical operator establishing all kinds of 
practical equivalences among the different divisions of the social world … or 
more precisely, among the meanings and values associated with the individuals 
occupying practically equivalent positions in the spaces defined by these divisions. 
In particular, there is every reason to think that the social determinations attached 
to a determinate position in the social space tend, through the relationship to one’s 
own body, to shape the dispositions constituting social identity…97 
 
We have noted this proprioceptive perception in the works of Merleau-Ponty (cf. the 
“semantics”), but Bourdieu puts the body at the very center of the social field (cf. the 
“syntax”).98 With our body being “constituted as an analogical operator establishing all kinds of 
practical equivalences among the different divisions of the social world,” our bodily 
comportments and dispositions are then inscribed by the plays of economic, social, cultural, and 
symbolic capitals. For Bourdieu, these social positions mark our body are tremendous. They 
shape our bodily hexis or dispositions and mold our perception. Bourdieu calls this bodily site of 
95 See Angus C. Graham, Reason and Spontaneity, 52. 
96 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 68. 
97 Ibid., 71. 
98 For different notions of habitus, see A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu. Edited by Tom Sparro and 
Adam Hutchinson (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013). 
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“internalization of externality” and “externalization of internality” habitus.99 He defines it as 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as 
structuring structures.”100  
 The systems are “predisposed to function as structuring structures” because they are so 
bodily based that we act and think without thinking why we act and think in this way instead of 
that way. Once the ways we think and act become our second nature, they become durable and 
transposable. Bourdieu also speaks of the habitus as “a metaphor of the world of objects, which 
is itself an endless circle of metaphors that mirror each other ad infinitum.” 101  Here, the 
description of habitus as “a metaphor of the world of objects” points to a syntactic notion of 
habitus. Consequently, the homologation effects of habitus are also syntactic (cf. a series of 
interlinked actantial models in Narrative Syntax).102 In his words, one’s habitus “structures new 
experiences in accordance with the structures produced by past experiences … brings about a 
99 See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 45. 
100 Ibid., 53. 
101 Ibid., 77. 
102 Bourdieu writes: “The genesis of a system of works or practices generated by the same habitus (or homologous 
habitus, such as those that underlie the unity of the life-style of a group or a class) cannot be described either as the 
autonomous development of a unique and always self-identical essence, or as a continuous creation of novelty, 
because it arises from the necessary yet unpredictable confrontation between the habitus and an event that can 
exercise a pertinent incitement on the habitus only if the latter snatches it from the contingency of the accidental and 
constitutes it as a problem by applying to it the very principles of its solution; and also because the habitus, like the 
‘art of inventing,’ is what makes it possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are relatively 
unpredictable (like the corresponding situations) but also limited in their diversity.” Ibid., 55. Let us look at an 
example that Bourdieu gives. “Because the principle opposing the terms that have been related (for example, the sun 
and the moon) is not defined and usually comes down to a simple contrariety, analogy … establishes a relation of 
homology between relations of opposition (man : woman :: sun : moon), which are themselves indeterminate and 
overdetermined (hot : cold :: male : female :: day : night :: etc.), applying generative schemes different from those 
that can be used to generate other homologies into which one or another of the terms in question might enter (man : 
woman :: east : west, or sun : moon :: dry : wet). This uncertain abstraction is also a false abstraction … This mode 
of apprehension never explicitly limits itself to any one aspect of the terms it links, but takes each one, each time, as 
a whole, exploiting to the full the fact that two ‘realities’ are never entirely alike in all respects but are always alike 
in some respect, at least indirectly (that is, through the mediation of some common term). This explains, first, why 
among the different aspects of the indeterminate yet overdetermined symbols it manipulates, ritual practice never 
clearly opposes aspects symbolizing something to aspects symbolizing nothing, which might therefore be 
disregarded …” Ibid., 88-89. Notice the play of “indeterminate yet overdetermined” and the role of ritual in 
maintaining the tension between the two. For Bourdieu, however, the overdetermined element seems to overpower 
the indeterminate elements in an analogy or the homologous structure. However, if the relation in analogy is not just 
that of contrariety, but also of contradiction and implication (as we see in a semiotic square), then the indeterminate 
element will not be so easily dominated by the overdetermined element. 
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unique integration, dominated by the earliest experiences…” 103  Secondly, while Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus leaves room for contingency and disruption, the description of habitus as “an 
endless circle of metaphors that mirror each other ad infinitum” reduces the metaphor into a 
notion of analogy that Gerhart and Russell mention. 
 The tension between the semantic and syntactic notions of metaphor can, at times, be 
seen in David Tracy’s notion of “analogical imagination” – “a language of ordered relationships 
articulating similarity-in-differences.”104 For example, Tracy writes: 
Any analogical concepts that emerge from that constantly expanding, never-
ending dialectical relationship between authentically critical reflection and real 
participation in the negating, defamiliarizing, disclosing event will be concepts 
that never lose the tensive power of the negative. If that power is lost, analogical 
concepts become mere categories of easy likenesses slipping quietly from their 
status as similarities-in-difference to mere likenesses, falling finally into the 
sterility of a relaxed univocity and a facilely affirmative harmony.105 
 
Given what Gerhart and Russell say about metaphor and analogy, there are two ways to read the 
“constantly expanding, never-ending dialectical relationship between authentically critical 
reflection and real participation in the negating, defamiliarizing, disclosing event.” We can either 
understand it in terms of a semantic metaphor or a syntactic analogy. If we understand it as a 
metaphor, then what the dynamic dialectics highlights is not a representation, but an emergent 
pattern. The pattern is not an existing pattern waiting to be excavated because as flesh-and-blood 
human beings who feel, think, and form the pattern, as long as we breathe, the pattern that we 
formulate also breathes. However, if we understand it as an analogy, then we are treating the 
103 Ibid. 60. Again, we see the overdetermined element dominating the indeterminate element in analogy. 
104 See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 408. 
105 Ibid., 410. 
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pattern as a representation (of the pattern). This representation is a result of thought upon the 
pattern. Indeed, as Tracy follows Ricoeur’s “the symbol gives rise to thought,”106 he also writes: 
The analogies-in-difference will express a whole series of somehow ordered 
relationships (the relationships within the self, the relationships of the self to other 
selves, to society, history, the cosmos) all established in and through reflection 
upon the self’s primordial experience of its similarity-in-difference to the 
event.107 
 
Note that the dialectic between one’s “primordial experience” of the event (cf. Fundamental and 
Narrative Semantics) and one’s critical reflection of it (cf. Fundamental and Narrative Syntax) in 
the analogy ends up being “all established in and through reflection.” The symbol (i.e., 
“primordial experience”) that is semantic-oriented is now at the service of the “syntax” (i.e. 
“reflection”). The principle of negation in analogy that Tracy underscores is now deprived of its 
dialectic power.108 
(ii) The Semantic Metaphor as A “Togetherness” in the Middle Voice 
 If the Jewish culture in the biblical world is proprioceptive or thymic, as Timothy Cargal 
foregrounds, in which “different realms of human experience” are “perceived in terms of the 
106 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. Translated by Emerson Buchanan (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), 
347-57. Tracy follows Ricoeur’s notion of “the symbol gives rise to thought” faithfully: “The symbol has given rise 
to thought but thought now returns reflectively to the symbol expressing the event. But the reflective journey of a 
theological analogical imagination has not been in vain. For the theologian returns to the symbol bearing the fruits of 
that reflection: a now-ordered series of analogical relationships among God-self-world ordered to and by some focal 
meaning for the event (e.g., Jesus Christ as Logos), a focal meaning which has proved itself a relatively adequate 
reflective analogue for understanding the originating religious event and the similarities-indifference that event 
discloses.” See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 411. 
107See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 410. 
108  He writes, “Negations of any claims to full adequacy (for example, any attempts at exhaustive, univocal 
meanings in any analogue) are negations to assure that the similarities remain similarities-in-difference, to assure 
that the analogous relationships of proportion are related to the uncontrollable event, negations to keep the principles 
of order and harmony from becoming merely affirmative. The negations function as principles of intensification 
constituted by the tensive event-character of the focal meaning to negate any slackening of the sense of radical 
mystery, any grasp at control of the event and the similarities-in-difference of the realities (God, self, world) focused 
upon and interpreted by that event. The negations with their disclosure of radical dissimilarity in similarity by their 
concentration upon the tensive event-character in the focal meaning will also manifest the genuine similarities 
disclosed by means of the defamiliarizing difference exposed in the event.” Ibid., 409. 
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value (such as ‘holiness” or ‘uncleanness’) with which they are associated,”109 then what is at 
stake is not an ontological issue (i.e., the realness and trueness of “being”). In a thymic culture, 
that which “is” real and true is what felt to have a good value. This “felt” quality is not unlike the 
correlative feeling/perception in a dynamic yin-yang holistic worldview, where within yin is 
yang, and within yang, yin. What counts as yin is in relation to yang in the overall context, and 
vice versa.110 Given this correlative perception of the world, Wu claims that one’s “[e]xistence is 
a metaphorical project making sense of percepts, going from the subject to the object.”111 From 
the Chinese perspective, both the subject and the object are interrelated in a metaphorical 
relationship. Elsewhere Wu calls this existential and metaphorical project a part-whole thinking, 
where “the whole and its parts mutually indwell and infuse … while keeping intact their 
respective integrities.”112 Likewise, Douglas links the correlative thinking with the logic of the 
part-whole relation.113 Here, the whole is a natural, concrete, bodily whole. Pointing out the 
etymology of the word “concrete” in Latin “concrescere” (“to grow together”), Wu writes: 
“Togetherness is a mutuality which by nature is something interactive, an active co-partaking in 
ontological co-resonance.”114 As such, our existence, according to the Chinese worldview, is “a 
109 See Timothy B. Cargal, Restoring the Diaspora: Discursive Structure and Purpose in the Epistle of James. SBL 
Dissertation Series 144 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993), 44. 
110 Hall and Ames write: “Polarity …has been a major principle of explanation in the initial formulation and 
evolution of classical Chinese metaphysics. By ‘polarity,’ we wish to indicate a relationship of two events each of 
which requires the other as a necessary condition for being what it is. Each existent is ‘so of itself’ and does not 
derive its meaning and order from any transcendent source. The notion of ‘self’ in the locution ‘so of itself’ has a 
polar relationship with ‘other.’ Each particular is a consequence of every other. And there is no contradiction in 
saying that each particular is both self-determinate and determined by every other particular, since each of the 
existing particulars is constitutive of every other as well … Dualistic explanations of relationships encourage an 
essentialistic interpretation in which the elements of the world are characterized by discreteness and independence. 
By contrast, a polar explanation of relationships requires a contextualist interpretation of the world in which events 
are strictly interdependent.” See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 67-68. 
111 Kuang-Ming Wu, On Chinese Body Thinking, 44. 
112 Kuang-Ming Wu, On The “Logic” Of Togetherness, 12. This part-whole relation “describes (one in the other) 
being one (one in the other), yet remaining two.” Idem. 
113 See Mary Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 15. 
114 Kuang-Ming Wu, On The “Logic” Of Togetherness, 5. Wu emphasizes that “a togetherness-thinking [is] a 
thinking that begins at things’ natural wholeness, pristine togetherness, and concrete nexus of things, then proceeds 
to individual units or elements, which we understand in terms of their communal wholes, inclusive inter-involved 
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metaphorical project” and an ontological “togetherness” that is not essentialist.115 It is a dynamic 
togetherness that is yet to be formed together in the togetherness. The togetherness is not an 
essence or a common property. It is a coming together, a relation. It is in a face to face meeting 
that the otherness of the self and the other take place in the event.116 It is in light of this notion of 
togetherness that the part-whole thinking is perceived.117  
 The part-whole relationship does not begin by analyzing the whole into parts and then re-
assemble them into a whole.118 The part-whole thinking starts at the together-whole because we 
are always already together with others in the world. Wu’s notion of the “part-whole” thinking, 
as such, has the character of relationality within heteronomy. The togetherness is an otherness 
that cannot be objectified. We thus have reservation about Kei Eun Chang’s connective ethic of 
τὸ συμφέρον that reflects a political and soteriological notion of a part-whole relation (see the 
conclusion section in the Introduction chapter). While Chang stresses that “the whole does not 
ignore the interests of the individual,”119 and that “for Paul, ἐκκλησία is a part-whole communal 
context (‘the body of Christ’) in which τὸ συμφέρον must operate as the standard for proper 
togetherness. Mind you, we must distinguish natural whole and communal togetherness from artificial synthetic 
totality, totalism, or totalization, whether technological or political. This sort of holistic thinking (not a totalistic one) 
is based on concrete observation of what actually is (and should be) the case: Actuality is first organic togetherness 
(not totalism) before being analyzed into units and individuals.” Ibid., 11. 
115 It is important to note that the notion of togetherness “is not here yet, but is to be constructed by a joint 
undertaking. The ‘logic’ of togetherness must itself be produced together.” Ibid., 3. 
116 Just as the other is an other to me, I am also an other to the other. This otherness of the other and of I comes to 
fore when we come together. The otherness arises in our coming together. I do not possess the otherness of the other. 
Neither does the other possess mine. It is in the coming together that we receive our and each other’s otherness. 
117 Wu writes: “we tend to think the whole-togetherness mutuality in terms of the part-whole relationship. And 
totalization results; politico-ecological disasters ensue.” See Kuang-Ming Wu, On The “Logic” Of Togetherness, 20. 
118 “Analysis produces singularities of ‘individuals,’ units which cannot (‘in-’) be ‘divided’ further. We christen 
them ‘individual integrities,’ implicating ‘autonomy,’ ‘independence,’ even ‘interdependence.’ All this describes 
how analysis reduces the world of natural togetherness into a chaotic situation. We now have to produce the One 
(the principle of preestablished harmony?) up there to oversee the intelligibility, and manage orderliness, of random 
monadic things of the world down here (as seen in structuralist modernism). But then this One overarching principle 
is now exposed as a sham by deconstructionism. The result is quite confusing; this is the ‘postmodernity’ 
predicament.” Ibid., 21. 
119 See Kei Eun Chang, The Community, The Individual And The Common Good: Τὸ Ἴδιον and Τὸ Συμφέρον in the 
Greco-Roman World and Paul (New York and London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), 4. 
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behavior, individualistically and communally,”120 he does not clarify how he conceptualizes the 
part and the whole. As long as the categorization of the whole and the part is not clarified, the 
part can be easily assimilated into the whole. 
 The hospitality to the “unknown” in the correlative thinking and the part-whole relation is 
crucial to our notion of typology. Without this hospitality, there is no correlative thinking. The 
pattern in the correlative thinking is not static, as if one size fits all. As we have noted in the 
conclusion section of the Introduction chapter, this part-whole dynamic is what characterizes the 
body of Christ as “parts beyond a part.” Not unlike the Derridean “undecidability,” where every 
decision is singular, the responsibility that comes with discerning the body of Christ is also 
singular, 121 because the body of Christ is not an objectified body. No wonder Paul went to 
Corinth with fear and trembling. Just as the more that we learn, the more that we realize we are 
indeed ignorant, so with Paul too, the more that he responds to his calling, the more he realizes 
that he needs to be trained even more. Paul thus speaks of seeing and knowing in the context of 
love in the middle voice.  
(iii) “Gospelizing” in the Mode of Middle Voice 
 When Paul says that he must preach the gospel (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) – or better, gospelize – 
and woe is to him if he does not, notice the middle voice in the verb “preaching the gospel” and 
the imperative of ἀνάγκη γάρ μοι ἐπίκειται (9:16). Here, we prefer to use the verb “to gospelize” 
to highlight its middle voice because in the translation of εὐαγγελίζεσθαι the verb “to preach the 
gospel” not only indicates that one is in charge of (the preaching of) the gospel, it also suggests 
120 Ibid., 5. 
121 Derrida writes: “The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable 
– this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the true, 
must nonetheless – it is of duty that one must speak – deliver itself over to the impossible decision while taking 
account of law and rules. A decision that could not go through the test and ordeal of the undecidable would not be a 
free decision; it would only be the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of calculable process.” See 
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in Acts of Religion. Edited and with an 
introduction by Gil Anidjar (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 252. 
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that one possesses the gospel. But, in his letters, Paul never uses the active voice of “preaching;” 
he only uses the middle voice. So when Paul writes that he has to gospelize (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) and 
woe to him if he does not, he is simply saying that (the preaching of) the gospel takes places as 
he is himself gospelized in the gospelizing process. Paul is not the owner of the (preaching of the) 
gospel. He learns from the (preaching of the) gospel. This is why Paul speaks of the reward of 
the (preaching of the) gospel in the (preaching of the) gospel itself. “Now what is my payment 
(μισθός)? So that in the (preaching of the) gospel (εὐαγγελιζόμενος) I may make the gospel free 
of charge (ἀδάπανον) so that with regard to my right I do not make use of it (εἰς τὸ μὴ 
καταχρήσασθαι) in the gospel (ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ)” (9:18). 
 Note that the middle voice of “in the (preaching of the) gospel” shows that the gospel is 
not owned by anyone. There is no benefactor. The middle voice in “not make use of” the gospel 
is a case in point. The syntax of εἰς τὸ + infinitive of καταχρήσασθαι reinforces the result or 
purpose of the middle voice. The clause “in the gospel,” likewise, underscores the quality of the 
middle voice. In short, as the (preaching of the) gospel happens in the (preaching of the) gospel 
in the sphere of the gospel, one cannot speak of payment, benefactor system, and use. Paul thus 
says that he does everything for the sake of the gospel so that he may become a co-partner of it 
(συγκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι) (9:23) (cf. the notion of “togetherness”). This is why Paul would 
harshly discipline his body and enslave it, lest in his gospelizing he is somehow disqualified 
(9:27). Hence, after alluding to the story of Israel in the wilderness, he admonishes and 
encourages believers to be vigilant in their semantic habitus (10:12-13) in the sense that they 
manifest the gospel in discerning and embodying the pattern of the gospel. 
Paul is aware that the body of Christ is “parts beyond a part” (12:27) (see the conclusion 
in the Introduction chapter). Everyone has her/his gift and role. He writes: “I planted, Apollos 
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watered, but God made it grow so that neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters but 
God is the one who makes it grow” (3:6-7). For Paul, believers are God’s co–workers working 
with the Lord (3:9). This “togetherness” is seen in subjective genitive in the “church of God.”122 
The church is always the church of God; a church called to be sanctified in Christ Jesus (1:1-2). 
The leaders must readily admit that the church is not their church, but God’s church (ek-klēsia). 
It is God who calls. It is not anyone’s flock, but God’s flock. This acknowledgement is 
extremely critical. Too often it is not the leaders, but the followers who suffer the most from 
their wrong decisions. Instead of the leaders taking up the cross, the people bear the brunt of the 
cross. The leaders stay behind the frontlines. But, the Lord of Paul is not such a leader. 
This subjective genitive is of utmost importance to Paul. If Paul really sees believers as 
God’s co-workers, then everyone is in communion with God and others at the same time. This is 
why a cross-like semantic habitus is indispensable to both the leaders and the ordinary believers. 
The cross cannot be objectified. It cannot be systematized into a neat representation. It can only 
be witnessed and lived. To highlight the cross as an “example” for believers is to underscore the 
concrete and apophatic character of the cross. It stresses that the believer’s relationship with God 
and the others must be living and interactive. It cannot be objectified, just as the foundation that 
is Jesus Christ cannot be objectified (3:11). The security that we seek is only experienced in a 
cross-like relationship with God and the others. Such a dynamic relationship may sound tiring, 
but it is tiring if we are not in a love relationship. A genuine relationship is not a calculation. It is 
a love that cares for the self and the others at the same time.123 The power of love is felt in the 
122 For example, Prime and Begg write, “Churches do not exist for our benefit or for our livelihood … Our goal is 
not to be well known and respected … Our goal is not to draw people around us so that they are loyal to us … Our 
goal is not to make ourselves indispensable. Such are goals of ownership, whereas ours are goals of stewardship.” 
See Derek Prime and Alistair Begg, On Being a Pastor: Understanding Our Calling and Work (Chicago: Moody 
Publishers, 2004), 49-50. 
123 bell hooks strongly emphasizes the communal and mutual edification in love in All About Love: New Visions 
(New York: HaperCollins, 2000). 
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loving. A cross-like semantic habitus can thus help the leaders and the ordinary believers to 
continue to grow and mature. It helps them transform their heart and mind and expand their 
horizon of semantic vision. Paul thus speaks of the trials and tribulations that he undergoes (4:9-
13; 9:1-27; 2 Cor. 1:3-11; 4:7-12; 12:10; etc.). Paul’s exhortation to believers to imitate him is 
always qualified by how he imitates Christ. Believers imitate Paul insofar as (καθὼς κἀγὼ) Paul 
imitates Christ (1 Cor. 11:1). It is not Paul, but Christ, whom believers should imitate. How? 
Through a cross-like semantic habitus. It is not a predestined cross or an exploited cross. It is a 
cross that embodies a love for the self and the others; a maternal love, Kristeva and Grenholm 
would say. 
Paul was thus upset that the leaders treated believers as if they owned them. Such an 
objectification betrays the cross. It ossifies one’s relationship with God and others. The outcome 
is dire because believers are future leaders. The problem will be perpetuated and exacerbated. As 
we find Paul’s worldview other-oriented (see chapters 3 and 4), we thus foreground heteronomy 
and the mutuality it encompasses in our biblical interpretation. We agree with James Aageson 
that “the process of biblical interpretation … should be understood as an interaction, similar to a 
dialogue, between text and interpreter.” 124  In this interaction, the interpreters necessarily 
approach the texts “with their own views of what constitutes reality, knowledge, and truth.”125 
However, our “views of what constitutes reality, knowledge, and truth” are discursively 
contextual. Aageson contends that the problem in biblical interpretation is “not really a matter of 
124 James W. Aageson, Written Also for Our Sake: Paul and the Art of Biblical Interpretation (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 8. He further argues, “Regardless of one’s level of training, however, biblical 
interpretation requires more than sincerity. It demands disciplined dialogue. It also demands a willingness to be a 
part of the ongoing corporate enterprise of biblical hermeneutics” (ibid., 15). Indeed, “the biblical text is as much a 
‘subject’ engaged in the dialogue as is the interpreter. When the biblical interpreter … sees the text of the Bible as 
an inanimate object or as merely a specimen to be analyzed, the interpreter quite naturally diminishes the 
‘subjectivity’ (life) of the text…” Ibid., 13. 
125 Ibid., 6. 
148 
 
                                                          
a lack of information”126 but how our “views of what constitutes reality, knowledge, and truth” 
process and interpret the information. For the Eastern Orthodox, this “how” is integral to our 
biblical interpretation.127 More than a matter of perspective, it is a matter of ethics, as we are not 
alone by ourselves.128 Here, Tracy’s emphasis on the “publicness” of the field of theology in 
society, academy, and church is applicable to critical biblical studies.129 
It is this “togetherness” in the proprioceptive and correlative thinking, which displays the 
quality of the middle voice, that we see manifested in Paul’s notion of typology. As we will 
show in chapters 3, 4, and 6, this notion of typology comes from our structural semiotic analysis 
of 1 Corinthians in our examination of how the figures are conceptualized inter(con)textually.130 
The allusion to a same figure, which can be anything, in different texts, does not necessarily 
mean that it is thematized or conceptualized in the same way. One will need to examine the 
semantic universe or the symbolic world of each text that uses the same figure. 
 
IV. A Proprioceptive and Correlative Thinking in Typology 
What matters to us here is not the fact that each event of the past – once it 
becomes a figure – announces a future event and is fulfilled in it, but is the 
transformation of time implied by this typological relation. The problem here does 
not simply concern the biunivocal correspondence that binds typos and antitypos 
together in an exclusively hermeneutic relationship … rather, it concerns a tension 
that claps together and transforms past and future, typos and antitypos, in an 
126 Idem. 
127 Vasile Mihoc, “Greek Church Fathers and Orthodox Biblical Hermeneutics,” in Greek Patristic and Eastern 
Orthodox Interpretations of Romans. Romans Through History and Cultures Series 9. Edited by Daniel Patte and 
Vasile Mihoc (London and New York: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013), 1-40. 
128 In the words of Tracy, “the self is never an isolated, private, worldless phenomenon. Rather the self at every 
moment is never substance but subject, affected by and affecting both God and world. Self and world are coexistents 
which can be distinguished, never separated. Both self and world are co-posited by God. They are always-already 
affected by that God who is Love and, as Love, is, in turn, always-already affected by both self and world.” See 
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 436. 
129 Ibid., 3-46. 
130 A great example is Mieke Bal, Loving Yusuf: Conceptual Travels from Present to Past (Chicago; London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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inseparable constellation. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this 
typological relation, it is the relation itself.131 – Giorgio Agamben 
 
The Greek word “typos” is significant to our interpretation of Paul’s notion of love in 1 
Corinthians as a heteronomous and a “here and now but not yet” love. The word appears in 1 Cor. 
10: 6 and 11 (cf. 1 Thess. 1:7; Phil. 3:17; Rom. 5:14 and 6:17). Most English translations render 
it as an “example” (CEB; ESV; NAB; NIV; NJB; NKJ; NRS) and not a “prefiguration.”132 The 
Vulgate translates it as a “figura.” The Chinese Bible translates it as a “warning.” Some 
commentators interpret it as a “formative model,”133 or an “archetype” or a “prefiguration.”134 
Here we must be careful not to objectify the terms juxtaposed in a typology. Richard 
Hays rightly argues, “Typology is before all else a trope, an act of imaginative correlation. If one 
pole of the typological correlation annihilates the other, the metaphorical tension disappears, and 
the trope collapses.”135 This “metaphorical tension” of “imaginative correlation” between the 
two poles is extremely crucial to maintain; otherwise a typology can become a one-on-one 
correspondence. The result of such a reduction not only destroys the discursive function of the 
“figure,”136 it also leads to a supersessionist hermeneutic.137 As such, Hays stresses that “First 
131 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary of the Letter to the Romans. Translated by 
Patricia Dailey. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 74. 
132 Also, see David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 447; Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First letter to the 
Corinthians, 445; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 167; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, 363. Garland 
argues that typos “reveals a pattern or correspondence, observed after the fact, that contains a teaching (cf. Rom. 
6:17). The word clearly means ‘example’ in Phil. 3:17; 1 Thess. 1:7; 2 Thess. 3:9; 1 Tim. 4:12; Titus 2:7.” See 
David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 459. Ciampa and Rosner find that “[t]he word Paul uses for examples (or warnings, 
or patterns; possibly ‘types’) provides the background for the concept of typology, the understanding that patterns 
found in persons, actions, events, and institutions can be expected to find correspondence (with some eschatological 
‘heightening’) in God’s future redemptive works.” See Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First letter to the 
Corinthians, 453. Here, we see that the authors refer to Goppelt in speaking of an “eschatological heightening in 
God’s future redemptive works.” 
133 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 719. 
134 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 376-77. 
135 See Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1989), 100. 
136 Ibid., 101. 
137  Ibid., 97-99. While Hays repeatedly stresses that the Israelite story alluded by Paul should must not be 
understood as being superseded by the events in Pauline communities, it is not clear how is it not a supersession 
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Corinthians 10 should not be read as unqualified deprecation of the historical Israel.”138 Rather, a 
typology is “a framework of literary-historical sensibility that creates the hermeneutical 
conditions necessary for the metaphorical linkage of scriptural text and contemporary 
situation.”139 Hays, however, does not say whether the “contemporary situation” is limited to the 
Pauline eschatological community. 
By contrast, for Patte, if the “metaphorical linkage” (of a scriptural text and 
contemporary situation) is metaphorical in nature, then the linkage cannot be foreclosed to any 
space and time. A typological relation, as such, is always partial and always revealing, 
challenging one to continually look for similar patterns (or manifestations of a similar theme) in 
different people, cultures, religions, etc.140 This is how Scripture can be taken as written also for 
our sake (cf. 9:10; 10:11). Thus, in 10:1–13, we should not expect the “correlation of events” to 
be an exact match between the Hebrew Bible citations and the believers’ situations. Instead, we 
should examine the theme and its conceptualization that Paul tries to transform and convey 
when  he says that the former is fulfilled or understood in light of the latter. For example, Hays writes, “Moses and 
the Law of Sinai are assigned a temporary supporting role, not the lead, in the drama of God’s redemptive purpose. 
Thus, the Torah is neither superseded nor nullified but transformed into a witness of the gospel.” Ibid., 157. Another 
example: “The text was written by some human author long ago, written to and for an ancient community of people 
in Israel, but original writer and readers have become types whose meaning emerges with full clarity only in the 
church – that is, only in the empirical eschatological community that Paul is engaged in building.” Ibid., 167. 
Another example: “All that God has ever done in the past converges toward the eschatological community, and all 
past words of Scripture find their sense rooted in the present graced time. Consequently, Paul can read Moses’ 
turning to behold the glory of the Lord in Exodus 34 as a parable figuring the experience of the church; the hidden 
eschatological meaning of the text is disclosed in the eschatological community, for whom the veil is taken away.” 
Ibid., 170. Many more examples in the work of Hays can be cited, but our question is: is it not a form of 
supersessionism to argue that the meaning of the Hebrew Scripture “emerges with full clarity only in the church”? 
On the other hand, it is no less problematic to say that Pauline eschatological community discloses the meaning of 
the typos in the Hebrew Scripture. For example, Hays writes, “The casual imperfect tense of his description (ēte) [in 
1 Cor. 12:1-2] indicates that Paul thinks of the Corinthian Christians as Gentiles no longer; they have been 
incorporated into Israel.” Ibid., 96. In such an incorporation, differences are thus erased, where both the Jews and 
the Gentiles lose their otherness. 
138 Ibid., 96. Hays argue that “the point of Paul’s metaphor depends on seeing Israel and church as pilgrim people 
who stand in different times, different chapters of the same story, but in identical relation to the same gracious and 
righteous God.” Ibid., 99. 
139 Ibid., 161. 
140 Daniel Patte, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 134-39, 320-23. 
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through the use of “figures” in the typology. For example, it may be strange for Paul to say that 
“the spiritual rock following” the Israelites in the wilderness was the Christ (10:5),141 but this 
usage of figure makes sense when we take note of the theme that the figures of the “rock” and 
“Christ” try to embody. For example, in Greimas’s notions of “thematization” and 
“figurativization” (see section 3.3.d in the Methodological Appendix), a figure is (semantically) 
metaphorical, and as such, we need to see how the “rock” is and, vice versa, is not like the 
“Christ.” This metaphorical quality of a figure is prominent in a proprioceptive and correlative-
thinking worldview. The predicate “was” in ἡ πέτρα δὲ ἦν ὁ Χριστός (“the rock was the Christ”) 
in 10:4 need not be veridictory (or metaphysical). It can be thymic (or proprioceptive or bodily 
felt). In fact, if the “rock” was the “Christ” veridictorily, one could say there is no need for 
“Christ,” since the “rock” was the “Christ.” On the other hand, one can also find Paul, being 
anachronistic and supersessionist, to say that the “rock” was “Christ.” However, in juxtaposing 
these two figures as figures,142 Paul seeks to transform their meaning effects without erasing 
their individual characteristics. So when Paul writes that “all our fathers” drank from “the same 
spiritual drink;” “for they drank from the spiritual accompanying rock, and the rock was the 
Christ” (10:4), commentators tell us that Paul alludes to the stories in Exodus 17:6 or Numbers 
20:7-11. But, these stories do not mention about “all” and “the same” rock. These are added by 
141 Thus it is strange for Hays who writes, “The Hebrew text of Deuteronomy 32 repeatedly ascribes to God the title 
the Rock’ (vv. 4, 15, 18, 30, 31). Though the LXX – regrettably for Paul’s purposes – eliminates the metaphor, 
translating each of these references with the generic theos, Paul surely knows the tradition. However, since he is 
writing to Greek readers who would not know the Hebrew text, he cannot quote Deuteronomy 32 to support his 
assertion. To explain to the Corinthians the difference between their Greek Bible and its Hebrew Vorlage would 
interrupt Paul’s argument. In any case, the identification of the rock with Christ is a parenthetical remark, an 
embellishment of the Israel/church trope. Consequently, rather than digressing to explain the grounds for his 
imaginative leap, he just leaps … In this case, it is doubtful that Paul’s readers could have traced the image back to 
its source in Deuteronomy 32. The Rock echo lies entombed in a Hebrew subtext.” See Richard B. Hays, Echoes of 
Scripture in the Letters of Paul, 94. 
142 That is to say, a figure is only a figure insofar as we have more than one narrative that uses the same figure. As a 
result, all the narratives, where the figure appears, are indispensable to the understanding of the figure. The figure, as 




                                                          
Paul to show how all believers also have received from the one bread (οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς 
ἅρτου μετέχομεν) (10:17). As a result, both the figures of the “rock” and the “Christ” embody a 
similar theme: be always God-oriented.143 Indeed, if God is pistos (10:13; cf. 1:9) in helping the 
people of God, then what cause believers to be so conceited afterward? They have taken God for 
granted. This is why in 1 Cor. 9, in invoking the figure of the “ox” from Deuteronomy 25 and the 
figure of the “race” in the Roman Empire,144 Paul shows how he still responds to the calling of 
God with fear and trembling. We cannot focus on the figure without examining the theme that it 
seeks to embody. 
In light of this illustration of Paul’s usage of typos in 1 Cor. 10:6 and 11, it should be 
clear the typological relation is a relation of “togetherness” where the past, present, and future 
construct and deconstruct one another simultaneously and discursively (see the “narrative 
semantics” in section 3.3.a in the Methodological Appendix). Why? Because time is not static. 
As every present (today) is the future (tomorrow) of the past (yesterday) and the past of the 
future, every representation of time is a betrayal of time. It objectifies time. But, time keeps 
ticking away. The past, present, and future are interwoven into one another. The “transformation 
of time” is a middle-voice transformation that takes place in time itself. Agamben thus argues 
that this “transformation of time” in typology is a “messianic time [that] is neither the complete 
143 From the beginning of 1 Corinthians, Paul stresses the centrality of God. It was in God that believers were 
enriched in every way with every logos and every knowledge (1:5). It was God who chose and made the fool in the 
world wise, the weak strong, etc. (1:27-28). People could do great things in preaching the gospel, but it was God 
who made them grow (3:5). People should realize that everything belongs to God (1:30; cf. 3:21-23; 4:7) and thus 
do everything on the foundation of Christ (3:11). In an honor-and-shame cultural value, this relationship of God and 
Christ with believers is significant. Whatever believers do, they will affect the honor of God and Christ. So, when 
Paul heard that believers form their own groups in the ekklēsia, he was devastated (1:13). Not only did they shame 
each other, they also dishonored God and Christ. 
144 Concerning Roman athletic imagery, where the “cult of beauty dominated athletics in antiquity,” argues that Paul 
“undermines the aesthetic and social canons of athleticism in antiquity: the strong, the beautiful, and the honorable” 
by honoring the crucified body of Christ. See James R. Harrison, “Paul and the Athletic Ideal in Antiquity: A Case 
Study in Wrestling with Word and Image,” in Paul’s World. Pauline Studies 4. Edited by Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: 
Brill, 2008), 103. While people would not care for the weak body members, Paul, in imitating God and Christ, cares 
for them (12:22ff). This self-sacrificial lifestyle of Paul is noteworthy, if Paul indeed came from an aristocratic 
background. See Ronald F. Hock, “The Problem of Paul’s Social Class: Further Reflections,” in Paul’s World, 7-18. 
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nor the incomplete, neither the past nor the future, but the inversion of both.”145 Agamben further 
contends that faith, hope, and love in 1 Cor. 13:13 “are not states of mind, but three arches that 
bend to sustain and fulfill the messianic experience of time.”146 It appears that faith, hope, and 
love embody an inter-twining of the past, present, and future. Time does not tick tock away 
without a trace. It leaves its marks on our flesh-and-blood body. Our experience tells us that time 
does not just travel linearly according to our measurement. The past is not a bygone past. It 
marks the present as well as the future. 
For the lover, moreover, the past, present, and future cannot be counted quantitatively. 
Marion writes, “Erotic time does not pass as long as I wait, for a very clear reason: while I am 
waiting [for the beloved], still nothing happens; I am waiting precisely because still nothing 
happens, and, precisely, I am waiting for something to happen. The time of expectation does not 
pass … Only my expectation lasts: it suspends the flux of time…”147 Marion continues, “When I 
am expecting, I inhabit that which can come upon me from elsewhere [“of which no one knows 
the day nor the hour”] and without which no present or past would matter to me.”148 Now if love 
marks believers and if typology interweaves the past, present, and future, then we cannot ignore 
the middle-voice and inter-twining character of time in typology. This event mode of time can be 
occasionally found in Leonhard Goppelt’s notion of typology, even though Goppelt treats the 
typology as a linear prefiguration and fulfillment.  
145 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 75. 
146 Ibid., 77. 
147 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon. Translated by Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 
2007), 33. In a love relationship, “the future is defined as the time of the expectation of an elsewhere, in which 
nothing happens; the present, as the time in which elsewhere comes to pass and makes the present of its passage; the 
past, as the time in which elsewhere has passed beyond the moment of its present and abandons our time to the side 
of the road, where it withdraws. In every case, time essentially unfolds itself according to the mode of the event, like 
the unpredictable arrival of an elsewhere, of which no one knows the day nor the hour, and of which the present can 
only be given as an unexpected and unmerited gift. According to its character as advent, elsewhere is never 
constituted as a common phenomenon, arranged according to the supposedly dominant point of view of a 
transcendental ego, but instead gives itself by anamorphosis ...” Ibid., 37. 
148 Ibid., 37. 
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[Paul’s] typology is not a hermeneutical method to be used in a technical way to 
interpret the OT. It is a spiritual approach that reveals the connection ordained in 
God’s redemptive plan between the relationship of God and man in the OT and 
that relationship in the NT. The focus oscillates between the present divine-human 
encounter and the one in the past that is recorded in Scripture. Each points to the 
other and is interpreted by it … This description cannot be achieved by 
philosophy or by mythology or even by apocalypticisrn. The result is not a 
typological system but is clearly an insight into the important features of God’s 
redemptive act and of God’s redemptive plan.149 
 
We refer to the work of Goppelt because his notion of typology marks a turning point in 
the study of typology in biblical studies.150 In his “Preface” to the reprint of his work in 1965, 
which was a doctoral dissertation submitted “in the winter semester of 1938-39,” Goppelt tells us 
that chapter 10 “Apocalypticism and Typology in Paul,” which is where we get this block 
citation, is an addition to “show how the discussion of this topic [typology] has been carried 
forward by scholars since this book was written.”151 What Goppelt writes in this citation is 
noteworthy. From what we have learnt about the modes of existence in chapter 1 and the 
difference between the “semantics” and “syntax” (see section 3.2 in the Methodological 
Appendix), it is obvious that Goppelt’s notion of typology is self-contradictory. We first note 
that typology “is a spiritual approach.” Secondly, the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament 
point to each other and are interpreted by each other. Thirdly, typology is neither a system nor a 
technical method; it is “an insight into the important features of God’s redemptive act and of 
149 Leonhard Goppelt, Typos: The Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New. Translated by Donald 
H. Madvig (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1982), 223. Also, see page 237. This viewpoint of typology closely 
resembles that of Gerhard von Rad, as Goppelt and von Rad cite each other for support. See Richard M. Davidson, 
Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical ΤΥΠΟΣ Structures. Andrews University Seminary Doctoral 
Dissertation Series 2 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981), 59-65. 
150 See Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture, 1-14. For an overview of the literature on typology, see pages 
15-114. Likewise, in his “Foreword” to Goppelt’s early work on typology in Typos, Ellis finds the book “most 
clearly demonstrates a typological understanding of Scripture governed the interpretation of NT writers and 
continued to be followed, more or less closely, by Ireneus of Lyon (ca. A.D. 125-195) and by the patristic school of 
Antioch.” See E. Earle Ellis, “Foreword,” in Leonhard Goppelt, Typos, ix. 
151 Leonhard Goppelt, Typos, xxi. For a short summary on the similarities and differences between typology and 
apocalypticism, see pages 234-37. 
155 
 
                                                          
God’s redemptive plan.”152 However, Goppelt does not consistently adhere to these features.153 
Even when he speaks of typology as metaphorical, his view of the metaphor is not dynamic.154 
Indeed, his argument for the nature of the revelation of God’s redemptive acts and plan does not 
render his notion of typology dynamic and heteronomous. Rather, it serves to linearly and 
syntactically bridge the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament as well as of history and faith, 
which Goppelt finds can be achieved by a notion of typology that “is not dependent on a greater 
amount of historicity” and “cannot be restricted to an existential understanding.”155 This tension 
between the “existential understanding” and the “amount of historicity” reveals the ambivalent 
meanings of typos, which Richard Davidson points out is implied in Goppelt’s article in the 
TDNT.156 Davidson writes: 
The listing in the lexicon of Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott seems to imply a 
further ambivalence in the word τύπος. The meaning “hollow mold” or “matrix” 
is categorized under the main heading, “the effect of a blow or of pressure.” The 
matrix which “leaves its impress” is itself already formed by the effect of an 
152 Speaking of the use of typos in 1 Cor. 10:1-11, he argues that “the type does not enable Paul to predict some 
particular divine intervention that could be expected to happen in Corinth; it merely indicates the characteristics of 
the divine action which the church of the last days could anticipate.” Ibid., 220. In fact, “for Paul the OT type is not 
interpreted history nor is it historical analogy. It is God’s self-manifestation express in historical events that are 
communicated by the revelatory word and are preserved in the confession. By its nature, this revelation of God is 
inseparable from the historical events and is not valid as timeless truth. It is valid only in the framework of those 
events. For this reason, it can be used in other situations only if these historical events are included.” Ibid., 232. 
153 The tension is, in fact, rather ambiguous. Consider Goppelt’s approving allusion to Von Rad’s argument: “The 
more emphasis prophecy places on the radical breakdown, the more important it is that the older experiences of 
salvation arc not obliterated but are ‘present in the new in the mysterious dialectic between what is valid and what is 
obsolete. The prophets set great store by this typological correspondence because they work it out in their 
prophecies and, in so doing they are very careful to show how the new overtakes and surpasses the old. The new 
covenant will be better…’” Ibid., 227. The citation comes from Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology. 2 Vols. 
Vol. 2: The Theology of Israel’s Prophetic Traditions. Translated by D. M. G. Stalker (Edinburgh and London: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1965), 272. 
154 Goppelt does not explain his notion of the metaphor. At times, he views it as part of the allegorical approach that 
does not pay attention to the literal and historical notion of the text. At other times, he sees it as part of the 
typological approach. See Leonhard Goppelt, Typos, 18, 147-49, 218, 225, etc. 
155 Ibid., 233. 
156 Davidson writes, “Goppelt [in] TDNT 8:246, appears to imply this when he gives as one of the “basic senses” the 
meaning “form-giving form.” This would seem to indicate that what does the forming is at the same time a product 
of forming. But Goppelt fails to make this possible dual signification clear when he categorizes what for him 
constitute the three classifications of meaning (p. 247): (1) “‘what is stamped,’ ‘mark;’ (2) “‘mould,’ ‘hollow form’ 
which leaves an impress;” and (3) “stamp or impress seen in and for itself as a form.” The duality of Vorbild and 
Nachbild may be implied in the second category, in that the hollow form is itself a Nachbild which serves as a 
Vorbild, but Goppelt does not make this explicit.” See Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture, 129 n. 4. 
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impress. The Vorbild is also a Nachbild. It appears that sometimes both of these 
aspects are simultaneously in view.157 
 
In saying that the “Vorbild is also a Nachbild,” Davidson highlights the interstitial quality 
of a typos in the personal, temporal, and spatial relations of “before” and “after.” These features 
of a typos, which probably comes from τύπτω (“to strike”),158 underscore that the typos (or the 
“mold,” “form,” “impression,” “model,” or “pattern”) struck by the blow is both a “pattern” of 
someone (or something) and for someone (or something). That is to say, a typos is a “pattern” for 
someone insofar as it is a “pattern” of someone. From his exegetical analysis of the usage of 
typos in Pauline letters, Davidson finds that both Paul and believers are the typoi for others 
insofar as they are the typoi of Christ.159 Typology, in other words, is Christocentric. Davidson 
argues that the critique of Paul’s language of imitation cannot neglect this “dual signification” of 
typos.160 Given that Paul is sent by Christ to preach the message of the cross (1 Cor. 1:17), we 
would even say that typology is cross-oriented. Indeed, as the cross cannot be objectified, it 
makes typos rather dynamic and heteronomous. 
In light of this Christocentric orientation of typology that Davidson highlights, we cannot 
agree with his conclusion that echoes Goppelt’s notion of typology as a “linear dynamics” and an 
“advance-presentation” or a “prefiguration” of specific and historical event in the Hebrew Bible 
fulfilled in the eschatological age of the New Testament. He writes: 
This description of a “hollow mold,” a τύπος, amazingly encompasses the various 
linear dynamics of Paul’s hermeneutical approach in 1 Cor. 10. The τύποι (OT 
historical events) are “shaped” from a “prototype” (the divine intent) in the mind 
of the Designer. At the same time these τύποι in their function as a hollow mold 
shape the end (eschatological!) product (the NT events) which ineluctably 
157 Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture, 129. 
158 Leonhard Goppelt, “τύπος, ἀντίτυπος, τυπικός, ὑποτύπωσις,” in TDNT 8:246. For three major meanings that 
Goppelt gives to typos in “non-biblical use,” see n. 156. 
159 See Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture, 147-80. See the diagram on page 180. 
160 Ibid., 153. 
157 
 
                                                          
(devoir-être) corresponds to the (historical) contours of the τύποι (the OT events) 
but transcends them by virtue of the (eschatological) fulfillment of the ultimate 
(Christological/soteriological/ecclesiological) purpose for which the τύποι were 
intended. Thus the OT events are a Nachbild (of the divine design) which serves 
as a dynamic, shaping, determinative Vorbild (of the NT eschatological 
realities).161 
  
Note that Davidson shifts his focus from the semantic nature to the syntactic function of the 
typos. The fulfillment of a typos may certainly correspond and even transcend the “historical 
contours” of the events in the Hebrew Bible, but from whose perspective are the correspondence 
and fulfillment determined? The “divine intent” cannot be objectified. A retrospective approach 
may help us see how a historical event in the Hebrew Bible may correspond to its fulfillment in 
the New Testament – this approach is not without problems – but note what Davidson writes. 
Although the precise nature of the fulfillment is further clarified in the light of the 
Christ-event, yet Paul insists that the movement with reference to the τύποι is 
basically prospective and not retrospective. It does not merely involve the 
retrospective recognition of an historical correspondence but consists of an OT 
prospective/predictive prefiguration of a specific NT fulfillment.162 
  
However, if a typos has the character of a Nachbild and a Vorbild, then we cannot separate the 
prospective from the retrospective features of a typos. Rather, in the words of Agamben, there is 
“a zone of undecidablity” in typology, “in which the past is dislocated into the present and the 
present is extended into the past.”163 The past, present, and future are interwoven. This quality is 
shown in places where Paul uses the word typos. Let us use Goppelt’s example. In the Adam-
Christ typology, he writes: “The relationship of Christ to the first Adam [in Rom. 5:12-21] 
becomes typological only when Christ as the firstfruit of the new creation, steps into the center 
161 Ibid., 289. 
162 Ibid., 285. 
163 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains, 74. 
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and forms new creatures.”164 Here, the retrospective aspect of typos is apparent. It is only in light 
of Christ that the “relationship of Christ to the first Adam becomes typological.” The prospective 
quality of a typos, likewise, comes to the fore when Goppelt argues that Christ is also “the basis 
for the shaping of life and the basis of hope for the future.” 165 Goppelt further argues that 
everything is interpreted through “the witness of the Spirit,” “of the Scripture,” and of 
“Christ.”166 Here, again, the hermeneutical question cannot be avoided. 
Paul’s saying in 1 Cor. 2:9 comes to mind: “No eyes has seen, no ear has heard, and no 
heart has understood what God has prepared for those who love him.” Indeed, if no one knows 
the things of God except the spirit of God (2:11) – hence God has to reveal them to us through 
God’s spirit (2:10) – then the determination, correspondence, and fulfillment of a typos cannot be 
foreclosed but must remain open and dynamic. The two-fold meanings of typos that Goppelt 
highlights – (1) “‘example,’ ‘model,’ which expresses a rule” and (2) “‘advance presentation’ 
intimating eschatological event” – are intertwined, even though Goppelt rules out the first and 
privileges the second meaning.167 
Let us recall Agamben’s notion of an “exclusive inclusion” of an “example” that is “a 
singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity.” 168  This singularity 
highlights the tension between a Vorbild and a Nachbild in the typos. If a typos is both a Vorbild 
and a Nachbild, it is also neither a (pure) Vorbild nor a (pure) Nachbild. In the language of the 
middle voice, the return of the typos from the New Testament to the Hebrew Bible is an eternal 
recurrence that annuls itself in its fulfillment, again and again, discursively.169 The antitypos in 
164 Leonhard Goppelt, Typos, 131. 
165 Ibid., 133. 
166 Idem. 
167 Leonhard Goppelt, “τύπος, ἀντίτυπος, τυπικός, ὑποτύπωσις,” in TDNT 8:251-52. 
168 Giorgio Agamben, “Example,” in The Coming Community, 10. 
169 For this reading of Nietzsche’s “eternal recurrence,” see Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics, 13-52. 
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the New Testament does not merely return and fulfill the typos in the Hebrew Bible. The return 
transforms both the typos and the antitypos. This is how the “Vorbild is also a Nachbild.”170 
In pointing out that “Irenaeus’ use of τύπος and his ‘typology’ develop independently of 
any Pauline hermeneutical sense of the term,”171 Steven DiMattei argues that “Paul’s approach to 
biblical narrative was guided by the same hermeneutical assumptions that governed Qumran 
pesharim.” 172  They have the character of “contemporizing eschatological interpretation of 
prophetic texts” for their community.173 The biblical texts were not only “written for our sake” 
but also “ultimately about ‘us.’”174 Seen from this hermeneutic framework, “Israel’s historical 
past is to be interpreted in light of the contemporary circumstances … with the added belief that 
the community is currently living in the end times.”175 Both the texts and the interpreters engage 
170 Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture, 129. Thus we cannot agree with Ellis that “the OT type not only 
corresponds to the NT antitype but also is complemented and transcended by it.” See E. Earle Ellis, “Foreword,” in 
Typos, x. This notion of typology is a supersessionist hermeneutic that turns the Hebrew Bible into a referencing 
appendix for the New Testament. Ellis’s criticisms of scholarship that “tended to give the OT a secondary role and 
to depreciate its significance for understanding the origin of NT teachings” are puzzling (ibid., xi). In criticizing 
contemporary Marcionite scholarship that rejects the validity of the Hebrew Bible to the Christian faith, Ellis 
actually embodies a different kind of Marcionite thinking that rejects the value of the Hebrew Bible itself. 
171 Steven DiMattei, “Adam, an Image of the Future Economy: Romans 5:14 and Irenaeus’ Christological Exegesis 
of Genesis 1:26,” in Greek Patristic and Eastern Orthodox Interpretations of Romans, 136. DiMattei argues that, 
contra Goppelt’s assertion, Irenaeus’s uses of typos are “dependent on and influenced by: 1) Gnostic uses of τύπος 
to express cosmological and exegetical relationships between earthly happenings and events in the Pleroma; and 2) 
Irenaeus’ particular exegetical project, namely to demonstrate against the Gnostic economy that there is but one 
unified history of salvation, linking events of the Old Testament with those of the New.” Ibid., 136-37. DiMattei 
concludes that “Paul did not equip the early church with either a hermeneutical sense of the term τύπος or a form of 
typological exegesis. Instead, both the meaning and the use of τύπος in the scriptural exegesis of the early church 
developed within, and as a result of, unique socioreligious contexts wherein potentially harmful or ‘heretical’ 
scriptural hermeneutics prompted an ‘orthodox’ response. It is thus unlikely that Paul had already coined a 
hermeneutical sense of the term τύπος or that he interpreted Scripture typologically, even though, it must be granted, 
Paul is apologetically invoked as the founder of this approach.” Idem., “Biblical Narratives,” in As It is Written: 
Studying Paul’s Use of Scripture. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Stanley. Symposium Series 50 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 73-74. 
172 Steven DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” in As It is Written, 77. He continues to argue that “it is this hermeneutic 
that best explains Paul’s approach to biblical narrative.” Idem. 
173 Idem. Another prominent hermeneutic approach that DiMattei finds at work in Pauline writing is “haftarah, by 
which Torah passages were read through the interpretive lens of prophetic passages,” in which thematic and verbal 
analogies are linked together to interpret the biblical texts. Ibid., 83. For details on Jewish hermeneutics, see Back To 
The Sources: Reading the Classic Jewish Texts. Edited by Barry W. Holtz (New York: Touchstone, 1984). 
174 Steven DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” in As It is Written, 87. 
175 Ibid., 78. 
160 
 
                                                          
each other dynamically and contextually.176 God did not just speak and act once upon a time, 
God still speaks and acts today in the world of the interpreters. 
Highlighting the beginning of 1 Cor. 10, the only place where the words typos appear in 1 
Corinthians, DiMattei argues that “Paul’s opening rhetorical formula – I do not want you to be 
ignorant, brethren, that all our fathers” (10:1) – also mimics Hellenistic conventions for opening 
a deliberative speech by employing historical exemplae for pedagogical aims. Thus there can be 
little doubt that Paul understands τύποι in 10:6 as synonymous with Hellenistic uses of the term 
παραδείγματα.”177 However, following Agamben, we note that the preposition “para” (“beside” 
or “beyond”) of paradeigmata (“example”), “the proper place of the example is always beside 
itself, in the empty space in which its undefinable and unforgettable life unfolds.”178 Why “the 
proper place of the example is always beside itself”? Because the example cannot be objectified. 
It is valid for a specific situation for a particular group of people.  
As everything and everyone are metaphorically interrelated, the pattern in correlation can 
only be dynamic and emergent. In the words of DiMattei, “Past and present, the text and its re-
presentation (not to mention its interpretation) seem to coalesce into a single narrative fabric.”179 
This “single narrative fabric” does not mean that the Scripture is closed. DiMattei writes: 
The narrative that Paul read[s] in Scripture appears to have been an ongoing 
narrative, contemporized and historically extended beyond the “biblical” story—a 
narrative that is not only “written for our sake” but one that is also ultimately 
about “us.”180 
 
176 “In other words, the text bears witness to what is currently happening in Paul’s historical present. Thus for Paul, 
the appropriate and perhaps the only context within which to read and understand the prophetic text is the 
contemporized eschatological context. It is in this sense that the question of context remains pertinent to 
understanding Paul’s approach to biblical narrative.” Ibid., 79. 
177 Ibid., 80. 
178 Giorgio Agamben, “Example,” in The Coming Community, 10. 
179 Steven DiMattei, “Biblical Narratives,” in As It is Written, 82. 
180 Ibid., 87. 
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DiMattei stresses that the “ongoing narrative” that contemporizes the Scripture does not “negate 
the existence of the biblical context, Israel’s historical past.”181 Rather, we need to examine the 
theme that “the biblical context” seeks to express. The same figure may be used, but it does not 
mean that the theme is the same. In fact, even if the same theme is found in both the narratives in 
the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, it does not mean that the conceptualization of the 
theme is the same. This is why in 1 Cor. 10:1-13, we should not be surprised that “Paul’s 
renarration of the wilderness narrative, the ‘biblical’ details that Paul puts forth are often 
reshaped to suit the story’s new context and might not be biblical details at all.”182 Such figures 
as “baptism,” “food,” “drink,” “rock,” etc. should not be simply treated as typoi in the Hebrew 
Bible that match and get fulfilled by the antitypoi in the New Testament. 
 One thing that stands out in Paul’s allusion to the wilderness story is that believers should 
not objectify what they have received from God. Paul thus trains himself harshly, lest he be 
disqualified in his gospelizing (9:24-27). He labors harder than all the apostles (περισσότερον 
αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα); the grace of God towards him must not be emptied of its power (κενὴ 
ἐγενήθη) (15:10). If he partakes of the bread that is broken which is the body of Christ (10:16), 
he must also embody such a body that is broken for everyone (cf. 11:24). One becomes what one 
eats and drinks. This is how a semantic habitus is formed gradually. Paul cannot manifest the 
cross without embody the cross. This is why we said that the gospelizing happens in the 
gospelizing, in the middle voice of the embodiment of the gospelizing. Believers should see and 
know that their labor is not emptied of its power in the Lord (οὐκ ἔστιν κενὸς ἐν κυρίῳ) (15:58). 
In fact, they should do everything in love (16:14). For Paul, love is the “most excellent way” 
(12:31b). It broadens one’s heart and expands one’s vision; in love, the self is drawn out of the 
181 Ibid., 86. 
182 Ibid., 91. 
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self towards the beloved. Paul thus says that it is when one loves [God] that s/he is known by 
[God] (8:3). It is when one loves that s/he is open towards the other/Other. It is in love that one 
can feel the love and be inspired by love. To love is to be in love, to be loved in the first place. 
This love of God is stressed in 10:1-4 when Paul uses pantes (“all”) five times to show 
“the generosity of God’s grace that all … participate in the privileges and blessings of the 
redeemed covenant people of God.”183 He also says that all ate the same spiritual food and all 
drank the same spiritual drink (10:3-4). However, only some of “our fathers” pleased God. Why 
did many not please God? Did not all “participate in the privileges and blessings” of God? Paul 
warns believers not to take the grace of God lightly (10:22; cf. 11:22; 2 Cor. 6:1-2). “The one 
who thinks that s/he can stand, watch out, lest s/he falls” (1 Cor. 10:12). 
In a group-oriented culture in which everyone is interrelated, one’s words and deeds 
affect the entire group. One must be responsible for others too. This worldview may sound odd 
to an individual-centered culture. But, as one receives one’s body and flesh from her/his parents, 
one’s body and flesh do not just belong to her/him. They are also her/his parents’. In fact, they 
are the community’s. In such a culture, an individual is always a self-others-God. The hyphens 
are broken when one objectifies any part of this hyphenated link. This objectification is obvious 
when we consider 10:1-13 within its “complete discourse unit” of 8:1–11:1 that deals with the 
issue of the “idol food” (see chapter 6). It is clear that some believers objectify what they know 
of God into a system that makes them disregard other believers. But, if all believers partake of 
the one loaf of bread (10:17), no one can boast about what s/he has received (4:7). Instead, they 
should learn from each other; after all, it is God who assigns the gifts and the missions (12:7-11). 
Here, the notion of “all” has the character of a “being singular plural” in the sense that it 
speaks of a universal-singular relation (see Introduction chapter). If everyone receives from God, 
183 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 725. 
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then everyone is singular in her/his own way. This singularity is in relation to other singularities. 
Hence right in the beginning of 1 Corinthians, Paul makes it clear that the Lord is the one whom 
everyone from everywhere calls upon (1:2). The Lord is not just someone’s Lord, but the Lord of 
everyone. Everyone is interrelated in the fellowship, in the body of Christ that is “parts beyond a 
part” (12:27). Given this exhortation of Paul, it will be ironic if Paul objectifies the wilderness 
story into a rigid and one-way prefiguration for his situation. Rather, Paul realizes that the story 
is written as a warning “for us” (ἐγράφη δὲ πρὸς νουθεσίαν ἡμῶν) (10:11; cf. 9:8-10). The story 
was not just a story of the past, irrelevant to us. The past is the present as well. God who spoke in 
the past to “our fathers” still speaks to us today. Goppelt actually hints at the importance of the 
story that undergirds the typos when he points out that “typology is not prominent in his [Paul’s] 
epistles because they contain the doctrine of redemption primarily and include little redemptive 
history” that we see in the Gospels.184 But, this “little redemptive history” does not mean that the 
typos is stripped of its story. As we will see in chapters 3 and 4, there are at least two major 
textual levels in Paul’s letter: the narrative or warranting level (“redemptive history”) and the 
dialogic level (“doctrine of redemption”). These two levels are interwoven to support one 
another; just as the “semantics” and “syntax” work together in the signifying process. 
 
V. Conclusion 
As our perception of the world is bodily-oriented, the proprioceptive and relational 
quality of love is not unlike the middle voice that takes places in loving itself. Because of its 
metaphorical character, love can be expressed and represented in many ways. Yet, no 
representation can ever exhaust its meaning potential. As an intense feeling, love cannot be 
objectified. A relationship that is marked by love, likewise, cannot be objectified. It is not a 
184 See Leonhard Goppelt, Typos, 128. 
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surprise that Paul speaks of typology in the context of the issue of “idol food” in 8:1–11:1 by 
addressing love in the beginning of the discourse and the language of imitation in the end (see 
chapter 6). Idolatry takes place when objectification takes place. Paul’s typology echoes his 
notion of love that is heteronomous and eschatological (“here and now but not yet”) in the sense 
that it is continuously expanded, realized, deconstructed, and transformed in the body of Christ 




















Chapter 3 – A Structural Semiotic Exegesis of 1 Corinthians:  
The Warranting and Dialogic Levels 
 
To make a declaration of love is to move on from the event encounter to embark 
on a construction of truth.1 – Alain Badiou 
 
[I]f one grants … that one can speak of a love, of Love, one must also grant 
that … love never dwells in us without burning us. To speak about it, even after 
the fact, is probably possible only on the basis of that burning.2 – Julia Kristeva 
 
I. Introduction 
Thus far in our previous chapters, we have shown that meaning is always a meaning 
effect in the sense that it is always relational and multidimensional. We further noted that if we 
are always already “thrown” into the world with others, not only do we think with our body, our 
body also thinks. As our perceptions of the world are always embodied, an embodiment that 
includes making them correlative and metaphorical, our social locations and mood and feeling 
are also indispensable to meaning production in the process of interpretation. We have also 
shown that our analysis of the three interpretive poles (e.g., contextual, textual, and hermeneutic) 
are always primarily framed by one of three modes of existence (i.e., autonomy, relationality, 
and heteronomy) that we privilege. Depending on the mode of existence that we culturally 
prioritize, our perception of the world varies. Accordingly our understanding of the theme of 
love in 1 Corinthians also varies. 
For example, in an interpretive framework that privileges the mode of autonomy, love is 
perceived as self-sacrifice, whether from God or from people, for others (who are in some kind 
of needy situation) and is often called “charity.” This autonomy-centered view of love, which is 
1 Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love. Translated by Peter Bush (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2012), 42. 
2 Julia Kristeva, “In Praise of Love,” in Tales of Love. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 4. 
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indeed a part of the love experience, is certainly expressed by Paul in his text, and can be 
elucidated through a study of 1 Corinthians focused on Paul’s (autonomous) theological 
argument, as commonly found in commentaries that use philological methodological 
approaches.3 We do not focus on this autonomy-centered view of love, because this approach 
commonly excludes the other perspectives on love and especially the heteronomy-centered view 
of love, which for us is essential. The limitations of an autonomy-centered view appear when we 
know that, in this perspective, love is dangerous because it might disrupt reason and self-control 
and therefore can be viewed as weak and pathological. In this individual-centered orientation that 
seeks to minimize risk and vulnerability, love can become non-relational and even indifferent. In 
guarding against being affected emotionally, the lover may appear to be pitying the beloved. In 
the case of a charity or almsgiving, such a love can be negatively perceived as if the receiver is at 
the mercy of the giver. It is not hard to see that this mode of autonomy can make one suspicious 
of love, as it can be condescending and scheming. While this individual-centered love can be 
crucial in a situation where an individual’s identity needs to be asserted, a vision of love in the 
mode of relationality or heteronomy may be more ethical and valuable in some other contexts. 
By contrast, in an interpretive framework that privileges the mode of relationality, love is 
perceived as being faithful, loyal, and obedient to the others in a system of reciprocity. This 
relationality-centered view of love, which is indeed another part of the love experience certainly 
expressed by Paul in his text, as commonly found in studies that use methodologies concerned 
with relationality, such as rhetoric, political and ideological analysis.4 We do not focus on this 
relationality-centered view of love, because this approach commonly excludes the other 
3 For example, see Ceslaus Spicq, Agape in the New Testament. Vol. 2: Agape in the Epistles of St. Paul, the Acts of 
the Apostles, and the Epistles of St. James, St. Peter, and St. Jude. Translated by Marie Aquinsa McNamara and 
Mary Honoria Richter (St. Louis, MO; London: B. Herder Book, 1965), 15-341. 
4 For example, see Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the 
Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991). 
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perspectives on love and especially the heteronomy-centered view of love, which for us is 
essential. The limitations of a relationality-centered view appear when love becomes a means of 
command, exchange, and calculation that seeks benefits. While mutuality is certainly 
indispensable to a healthy love relationship, it is often conceptualized from the perspective of the 
self (in a competitive relation with others), as if the self must never lose out in such a love 
relationship. These autonomy-centered and relationality-centered views are to be contrasted with 
an interpretive framework that privileges the heteronomy-centered perspective, according to 
which being “thrown” into the world with others is perceived from the perspective of a 
heteronomous and thymic notion of a dative “I” that marks the flesh-and-blood interpret. A study 
of Paul’s heteronomy-centered view of love in 1 Corinthians requires a very different kind of 
critical exegesis aimed at elucidating Paul’s convictional vision which is characterized by its 
structure, so the need for structural semiotic exegetical method. 
Such a study of Paul’s heteronomy-centered view of love in 1 Corinthians requires from 
us to perform a series of analytical and interpretive tasks to prepare us for a semantic analysis of 
Paul’s vision of love in 1 Corinthians (a didactic discourse) in chapter 4. In focusing on a 
syntactic analysis of 1 Corinthians – such as differentiating the warranting level from the 
dialogic level (see Appendix 1), finding pairs of opposed actions (see Appendix 2), and 
constructing the story progression in both warranting and dialogic levels (see Appendix 3) – this 
chapter explains how we come to form our semiotic squares for our semantic analysis. 
In the previous chapters, we have emphasized that the independence of the text cannot be 
sidelined. The text is not at the mercy of the interpreter.5 The object of our analysis must not be 
5 Derrida’s notion of the “double commentary” is noteworthy here because as the text must be rigorously studied in 
itself, it must also be interpreted, and hence transgressed, for understanding. He writes, “To recognize and respect all 
its [one’s critical reading] classical exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. 
Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and 
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objectified. In light of the ethical implications of the hermeneutical and semiotic phenomenon of 
“textualization,” biblical scholars should be alert to the fact that our interpretations can minister 
to the life and death of our audience in real life situations.6 As scriptural criticism highlights, as 
long as we are making (1) contextual, (2) textual, and (3) hermeneutical choices in our 
interpretations of the Scripture, which we cannot help but to do, we are responsible for the 
choices that we make. I repeatedly mentioned the contextual character of my study. My 
hermeneutical choices have been mentioned above; I chose to privilege the heteronomy-centered 
view of Paul’s teaching (especially regarding love), rather than the autonomy-centered and the 
relationality-centered ones. But here we need to emphasize that, as we interpret, we are also 
making textual choices, that is, we are choosing certain features of the text as more significant 
than others; for biblical scholars such textual choices are methodological choices. Many critical 
studies privilege “behind the text” approaches concerned with the theological argument of the 
autonomous author, commonly using philological methods to discern “what the author meant to 
say.” Other critical studies privilege “in front of the text” approaches concerned with the 
relationality that the text establishes between author and readers/hearers through the use of 
“rhetorical criticism” or “ideological criticism” and the like. In our own study we privilege 
“within the text” approaches concerned with the heteronomous dimensions of the text expressed 
by its figures and the specific ways. In foregrounding certain textual elements and interpretive 
process, we inevitably relegate to the background those which we do not highlight, but do not 
deny their existence (see Methodological Appendix). 
authorize itself to say almost anything.” See Jacques Derrida, “… That Dangerous Supplement …,” in Of 
Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1976), 158; idem, “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion” (translated by Samuel Weber), in Limited Inc. 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 111-60. 
6 See James Chukwuma Okoye, “Power and Worship: Revelation in African Perspective,” in From Every People 
and Nation: The Book of Revelation in Intercultural Perspective. Edited by David Rhoads (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2005), 110-26. 
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This is why scriptural criticism is very helpful as a dynamic hermeneutical and analytical 
framework that examines the contexts of both the interpreters and the text. It shows that all 
biblical interpretations – whether by scholars, preachers, or ordinary readers – are contextual and 
that they are contextual all the way down. Daniel Patte’s recent argument that, when we 
recognize the contextual character of own interpretation, we must acknowledge most, if not all, 
biblical interpretations are hermeneutically plausible and textually legitimate, further invites 
various voices to engage one another critically and hospitably.7 The main issue is not whether a 
hermeneutic (or theology or worldview) is plausible – it necessarily is from the perspective of 
the interpreter. Neither is it about whether an interpretation is textually legitimate – one can 
agree that biblical scholars carefully choose and apply critical methods, even though we might 
prefer to use another method. What is at stake is the validity or the value of the interpretation in a 
specific context. An interpretation may be textually legitimate and hermeneutically plausible as 
well as valid in one context, but it is not necessarily valid in another context. In fact, it is not 
always valid even in the same context, because this context is always in process of 
transformation. The value of an interpretation must be examined and determined each time, 
again and again. The context must not be objectified. Similar to the Derridean notion of 
“undecidabilty,” 8  this validity consideration can help prevent an interpretation from being 
7 See Daniel Patte, “Ethics of Biblical Interpretation,” in Oxford Encyclopedia of Bible and Ethics (forthcoming); 
idem, “A Response to Robert Jewett’s Hermeneia Commentary on Romans,” in From Rome to Beijing: Symposia on 
Robert Jewett’s Commentary on Romans. Edited by K. K. Yeo (Lincoln, NE: Kairos Studies, 2012), 153-67. This 
acknowledgement may sound radical but it cautions us not to reject any interpretation entirely, by recognizing the 
role of another type of interpretive choices – namely contextual and ethical interpretive choices. It also creates space 
for ordinary readings of the Scripture, lest we reify a dichotomy between scholarly and popular readings. 
8 “Undecidabilty is taken, or mistaken, to mean a pathetic state of apathy, the inability to act, paralyzed by the play 
of signifiers that dance before our eyes … But rather than an inability to act, undecidability is the condition of 
possibility of acting and deciding. For whenever a decision is really a decision, whenever it is more than a 
programmable, deducible, calculable, computable result of a logarithm, that is because it has passed through ‘the 
ordeal of undecidability.’” See John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 137. 
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idolized.9 Thus ultimately we will need to assess the value of our interpretation for specific 
contexts. But prior to this we need not only to acknowledge the hermeneutical choices we made 
– thus I decided to focus on the theme of love from the perspective of the heteronomous mode of 
existence – but also the analytical/textual choices we may through our choice of a particular 
critical approach, namely structural semiotic exegesis, and how they are related. This exegetical 
method is chosen precisely because it makes it possible to elucidate Paul’s vision of love as 
related to this convictional experience, and therefore to clarify Paul’s specific vision of the 
heteronomous experience of (being in) love as expressed in 1 Corinthians. 
 
II. An Overview of  Analytical Steps in Structural Semiotic Exegesis 
Most generally, structural semiotic exegesis focuses on “within-the-text” meaning-
producing dimensions by contrast with “behind-the-text” and “in-front-of-the-text” meaning 
producing dimensions. For this purpose, structural semiotic exegesis first requires identifying the 
complete discourse unit that will be analyzed. The most effective way to proceed is to treat 1 
Corinthians in its entirety as a complete discourse unit. This initial identification of the discourse 
is crucial to trace and map out the (paradigmatic) pattern of the text. In this way there is no 
hesitation regarding the identification of the beginning and the end of the discourse, otherwise 
we might unduly include or exclude relations of signs that would affect our configuration of the 
semantic universe (i.e., the symbolic world or system of convictions) of the discourse. The 
present chapter will be devoted to an overall structural exegesis of 1 Corinthians. Yet since the 
analysis of the whole letter as a discourse unit is complex, following its preliminary analysis in 
9 Derrida clarifies, “I never said that there is indeterminacy of meaning. I think there are interpretations which 
determine the meaning, and there are some undecidabilities, but undecidability is not indeterminacy. Undecidability 
is the competition between two determined possibilities or options, two determined duties. See “Hospitality, Justice 
and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” in Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. 
Edited by Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 79.  
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this chapter, we will subdivide the letter into a series of smaller but complete discourse units. 
Indeed, the semantic universe of the complete discourse units should echo that of the entire letter. 
As we shall see, our analyses of smaller complete discourse units such as 11:17-34 (chapter 5), 
8:1–11:1 (chapter 6), and 12:1–14:40 (chapter 7) will confirm our analysis of the entire letter, 1 
Corinthians, even as they sharpen our understanding of Paul’s vision of love as related to his 
convictional experience. But before proceeding with the structural exegesis of the letter as a 
whole and then of its subdivisions, we need to review the main steps that we shall follow in our 
structural semiotic exegesis. 
(i) Identifying the Complete Discourse Unit 
Even in the case of 1 Corinthians as a whole, we must verify that it is a complete 
discourse unit (and therefore that, for instance, concluding paragraphs have not been added or 
removed from it). One way to locate a complete discourse unit is to examine how a theme is 
introduced and concluded in the text. As a “discourse aims at transforming the views (or old 
knowledge) of readers,”10 we should see an inverted parallelism between the beginning and the 
end of the discourse. This inversion is expected because the enunciator attempts to transform the 
understanding and conceptualization of the theme by the enunciatee – otherwise the discourse is 
pointless.11 Furthermore an obvious change of the theme or topic in the text may indicate a new 
discourse sub-unit, or it could point to a sub-theme under an overarching theme in the discourse. 
This determination of the main theme and the sub-themes of the discourse can also be confirmed 
in our analysis of the explicit pairs of opposition of actions in the discourse. 
10 See Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics. Guides to Biblical Scholarship (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1990), 13. “This process of communication should not merely be conceived as the transmission 
of something (a message) to somebody, but rather as producing an effect – a meaning-effect-upon the readers (the 
implied reader).” Idem. 
11  “There is parallelism because both [the introduction and the conclusion] deal with the same theme; this 
parallelism is inverted because the introduction presents this theme as problematic, while the conclusion presents it 
as a resolved theme.” Ibid., 14. 
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(ii) Identifying the Pairs of Opposition of Actions 
We have noted that the pairs of opposition of actions can help highlight the convictions 
of the enunciator (see section 3.3.c in the Methodological Appendix). By focusing mainly on the 
explicit pairs of opposition, we look for obvious actions that are in opposition to other actions: an 
action being technically defined as the transmission (or not transmission) of an object to a 
receiver that can be formulated as e.g. (Object  Receiver) and an opposition of action as e.g. 
(Object  Receiver) versus (Object / Receiver), (Object  non-Receiver), and (non-Object 
 Receiver). There is no need to focus on obscure pairs of opposed actions. If the opposition is 
not clear, it may actually crowd and cloud our analysis. Even if they are indeed a pair of opposed 
actions, these less explicit oppositions of actions usually do not affect our analysis. Note that this 
identification of pairs of opposed actions is a syntactic analysis; after all, it is a logical operation 
that opposes on action to another. Such a logical operation resembles the “contradiction” (or the 
diagonal) relation in the semiotic square. To turn this syntactic analysis into a semantic analysis, 
which resembles the “contrary” relation in the semiotic square (as the “contrary” relation is a 
semantic relation), we simply need to adjust this series of pairs of opposition of actions, so that 
instead of interpreting them as “contradiction” relations we interpret them as “contrary” relations. 
Now imagine we have a series of pairs of opposition of actions: A1 versus A2, B1 versus 
B2, C1 versus C2, D1 versus D2, etc., (Figure 1) where actions-1 (A1, B1, C1, D1, etc.) are positive 
actions (the “principal axis”) and actions-2 (A2, B2, C2, D2, etc.) are negative actions (the 
“polemical axis”). We can arrange them into a series of squares of syntactic oppositions of action 
(Figure 2). Then by focusing on the qualifications of the subjects/agents of each action, we can 
read these as a series of squares of semantic oppositions – actual semiotic squares – where the 
syntactic oppositions are in semantic contradiction with each other (A1 versus A2) and semantic 
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contrarieties oppose the qualifications of the subjects/agents in successive oppositions B1 versus 
A2).  
   D1             D2 
              D2 
   C1            C2     D1            D2          D1       C2 
   C1             C2         
               C1  C2           C1        B2      
   B1             B2     B1  B2            B1        A2     
   B1  B2 
      A1            A2             A1 
   A1             A2 
         Figure 1            Figure 2              Figure 3 
 
(iii) From A Syntactic Analysis to A Semantic Analysis 
What we see from these three Figures is how the pairs of syntactic opposition identified 
in an analysis of the syntactic unfolding of the discourse are transformed into pairs of semantic 
oppositions that reflect Paul’s conviction, including his vision of love – a semantic analysis so 
that we can eventually flesh out with the qualifications of the values at the four corners of each 
semiotic square (as represented in Figure 3). As we examine how these values are interlinked in 
a semiotic square, we can then tease out the themes emphasized by the text and how each is 
semantically constructed as part of Paul’s system of convictions.12 It is also important to note the 
relations of implications (A1-B1-C1-D1 and A2-B2-C2-D2 in Figure 3) that represent on the 
semiotic squares metaphorical or typological relations. Our notion of metaphor or typology, in 
12 See the demonstration in Daniel Patte, What is Structural Exegesis. Guides to Biblical Scholarship (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1979), 53-83. 
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other words, is marked by a relation that transforms our conceptualization of a certain theme or 
topic.  
(iv) Identifying the Warranting and Dialogic Levels in a Didactic Discourse 
When it comes to such a didactic discourse such as 1 Corinthians that aims to persuade, 
consolidate, or transform the vision of the enunciatee, several more steps to get to the semantic 
analysis of the semiotic squares are needed. First, we need to recognize that a didactic discourse 
is, by definition, twice told; it includes an argument, the dialogic level, and its justification, the 
warranting level (which often has a narrative form) that implicitly or explicitly supports the 
argument in the dialogic level.13 But in this project, we will only focus on the warranting and the 
dialogic levels as we find the secondary level unsubstantial (see Appendix 1). In the language of 
J. Christiaan Beker, the warranting level expresses the coherence of the gospel that cannot be 
compromised, whereas the dialogic level emphasizes the contingency of the gospel that re-
presents the coherence in an effective way for a particular situation.14 Just as the warranting and 
the dialogic levels are intertwined, Beker also emphasizes the dialectic relation between 
coherence and contingency in Paul’s letters.15 From our discussions in the previous chapters, we 
can say that while the “semiotic” and the “symbolic,” the “semantics” and the “syntax,” or the 
“symbol” and the “thought” are intertwined, we should not collapse them together. 
13 In both the dialogic and warranting levels, we may find secondary levels that further undergird them. But in this 
project, we will only focus on the warranting and the dialogic levels as we find the secondary level unsubstantial 
(see Appendix 1). For details, see Daniel Patte, “Method for a Structural Exegesis of Didactic Discourses: Analyses 
of 1 Thessalonians,” Semeia 26 (1983): 85-129. 
14 See J. Chritiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1980). For a summarized version, see idem, The Triumph of God: The Essence of Paul’s Thought. Translated 
by Loren T. Stuckenbruck (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990). 
15 “Is it not the danger of conservative scholarship to absorb contingency into coherence, as if all of Scripture 
embodies the authoritative, coherent content of the gospel? And is it not the danger of liberal scholarship to 
transpose coherence into contingency, as if all of Scripture is a contingent structure and determined in its authority 
by the preference of the times?” See J. Chritiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle, xiii-xiv. 
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As the word “dialogic” indicates, the dialogic level indicates a current conversation that 
the enunciator has with the enunciatee. The warranting level, on the other hand, is what warrants 
or undergirds the validity or the persuasiveness of the dialogic level. For example, in 1 Cor. 1:1-
2,16 the clause “called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God” justifies and 
warrants Paul’s writing to the Corinthian believers; similarly “to those who have been sanctified 
in Christ Jesus, those called saints” warrants the status of the enunciatees, reminding those who 
are in the ekklēsia of God in Corinth of their calling. By contrast, “Paul … and Sosthenes our 
adelphos,” “to the ekklēsia of God in Corinth,” and “with everyone calling upon the name of our 
Lord Jesus Christ in every place, both their Lord and ours” form the dialogic level, identifying 
the addressers and the addressees. Other obvious indicators that signal the dialogic level are “I 
give thanks to my God always concerning you” (1:4a), “I give thanks to God that” (1:14a), “For 
watch out for your calling, adelphoi,” (1:26a), “Do you not know that” (3:16a), etc. (see 
Appendix 1). It is apparent that the dialogic level is about Paul addressing the Corinthians (as if 
he is in a “face to face” conversation with them) as he wants them to know, believe, or do certain 
things. The supports or warrants for such an exhortation comes from some past shared stories or 
experiences that the enunciatee shares with the enunciator; these shared experiences can then 
serve as a warrant for the enunciator’s appeal, encouragement, warning, and even rebuke. The 
allusions to the future goals or promise and even some axiomatic or proverbial statements can 
also be used as warrants. 
As the word “didactic” indicates, a didactic discourse follows the flow and the reasoning 
of the dialogic level. As the discourse aims to transform the old knowledge of the enunciatee, the 
enunciator – if s/he is a good communicator – needs to structure and organize her/his 
16 “Paul, called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus through the will of God, and Sothenes our adelphos, to the ekklēsia 
of God in Corinth, to those who have been sanctified in Christ Jesus, with everyone calling upon the name of our 
Lord Jesus Christ in every place, both their Lord and ours.” 
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presentation in an order that the enunciatee can easily follow and understand. If we overlook the 
context-specific factors of the didactic discourse, as Beker warns, we might mistake the context-
specific argument in the dialogic level as manifesting the convictions in the warranting level (the 
coherence of Paul’s vision). While both the dialogic and warranting levels embody the system of 
convictions, we will focus on the pattern of convictions in the dialogic level, as it is more 
discursivized than that of the warranting level. 
Without distinguishing the dialogic level from the warranting level in the discourse, we 
may think that Paul’s arguments are at times contradictory or opportunistic (e.g., 9:20-22). Paul 
certainly tailors his message according to the particular enunciatee, but it does not mean that he 
changes his convictions. To argue that Paul made such a change, we will need to show that he 
changes the basic pattern that undergirds his system of convictions. But, if the conceptualization 
and the configuration of the theme still embody the fundamental pattern of his system of 
convictions, in spite of various re-presentations of the convictions, we cannot conclude that Paul 
is opportunistic. We see a similar argument presented by Ernst Käsemann and Günther 
Bornkamm when they speak of being faithful to the tradition by being “unfaithful” to it (see 
section 2 in the Methodological Appendix). 
Another feature of Paul’s didactic discourse that we need to take into account is Paul’s 
use of “I” (the enunciator) and “you” (the enunciatee) are not static. It is not necessarily a 
rhetorical irony or a ploy for “I” to praise “you” at one place and then to rebuke “you” at another 
place. To come to this conclusion, we will need to verify it with a synchronic analysis to see how 
the “I” and the “you” interact with each other in a complete discourse unit. 
Once the warranting level and the dialogic level of 1 Corinthians are distinguished, we 
need to arrange the pairs of opposed actions that we identify in the dialogic and warranting levels 
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to show how the story progresses. For organizing these pairs of opposed actions (especially in 
the warranting level which, by definition, is not sequential), we decided to take into account what 
Paul explicitly underscores as most fundamental, namely love, the most excellent way (12:31b) 
and to cover sufficient text (and thus several semiotic squares) until we get a general picture of 
the fundamental pattern that undergirds Paul’s system of convictions. Then, since the pattern 
repeats itself again and again, after a detailed analysis of certain passages, we will analyze other 
passages more quickly, yet enough to show that the pattern actually repeats itself. Yet, even with 
such short-cuts, our analysis of the place of love in Paul’s system of convictions as expressed in 
1 Corinthians requires a close reading of the letter that will expend from this chapter into the 
next four chapters (chapters 4-7) (see Methodological Appendix).  
 
III. A Structural Semiotic Exegesis of 1 Corinthians   
To simplify the presentation of this structural semiotic exegesis, I present the technical 
aspects of the exegesis in Appendices to this chapter. They provide an overall view of the 
analysis that can be consulted while reading the presentation of the analysis focused on specific 
aspects of Paul’s text. Thus Appendix 1 summarizes our identification of the warranting and the 
dialogic levels in 1 Corinthians. 
Of course, the table in Appendix 1 is the result of an interpretive process during which 
we had to make judgment calls in cases where it was not obvious whether a part of the text 
belonged to the warranting or the dialogic levels. We noted ambivalent cases, when they seem to 
function on both levels at the same time. For instance, we have included 8:4b-5 at both levels. 
This passage can be interpreted as an accepted understanding among believers concerning the 
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idol, and thus as belonging to the warranting level.17 However, the tension between 8:4b and 8:5 
seems to require that we read 8:4b-5 as parts of the dialogic level as Paul tries, through his 
argument, to complicate such an understanding. For example, in light of 8:5, Paul does not really 
argue that an idol does not exist.18 Then we should refrain from positing a dichotomy of body vs. 
mind to our reading of 8:4b. It is likely that οὐδὲν shows that the idol is insignificant instead of 
nonexistent.19 But, on the other hand, if, for Paul, the idol is not significant, in particular given 
the believers’ new orientation of life (8:6), then he might refer to their common understanding – 
as part of his argument and line of reasoning at the dialogic level. After all Paul does not want 
believers to objectify their knowledge concerning the idol, since the idol still has impact upon 
people. Hence, 8:4b-5 can be in both the warranting and the dialogic levels. But this is a rare 
case.  As Appendix 1 shows, one can readily distinguish the line of reasoning of Paul’s argument, 
the dialogic level, from the series of warrants (the warranting level) he uses to justify his points. 
17 8:4b: “An idol is nothing in the cosmos (οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ) and that nobody is God but the one God.” 8:5: 
“For even if there are so-called gods, whether in heaven or on earth, as there are many gods and many lords.” 
18 As many Western commentators take οὐδὲν to mean. See Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First letter to 
the Corinthians. The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2010), 
380; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2003), 371; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville, MN: The 
Liturgical Press, 1999), 319. For a discussion on different interpretations of οὐδὲν εἴδωλον, see Anthony C. 
Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, 
UK: Eerdmans, 2000), 629-31. 
19 This is an interpretation called for if our perception of the world is always already embodied (which the notion of 
habitus further illustrates) and if the material and the immaterial worlds are not dualistic in the Greco-Roman 
cultures as argued by Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 
3-37; Kabiro wa Gatumu, The Pauline Concept of Supernatural Powers: A Reading from the African Worldview. 
Foreword by James D. G. Dunn (Milton Keynes; Colorado Springs; India: Paternoster, 2008). One may also point to 
the parallel construction between οὐδὲν εἴδωλον and οὐδεὶς θεὸς in 8:4b to show that, for Paul, as God certainly 
exists, the idol, in contrast, therefore does not exist. But this argument needs to explain 8:5 that speaks of “many 
goods and many lords.” Of course, one can then treat it as Paul is speaking hypothetically here. But, in the 
Methodological Appendix, we have noted the difference between the (Western) veridictory semiotic that is 
metaphysics-centered and the (non-Western) thymic semiotic that is feeling-oriented. That is to say, the former 
primarily focuses on whether an object is real and true, a concern which is secondary to the latter as it focuses on 
whether the object feels to be good or not. Hence, the issue is not so much about the existence of the idol as about 
the influence of the idol. Even if the idol, indeed, does not exist, the power of the idol is still vividly felt. The 
saturated phenomenon of the idol is clearly and publicly felt and experienced in many Asian cultures. One cannot 
tell whether the idol exists or not. A feeling-oriented worldview cannot be explained away with a logical reasoning. 
Such an explanation is not only arrogant, it can also be colonialist. We do not need to rehearse the tragedy and 
history of how Asian religious traditions, beliefs, and practices are treated as primitive, uncivilized, superstitious, etc. 
by many Westerners. 
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(i) Explanation for the Story Progression in the Dialogic Level 
The analysis of the dialogic level of 1 Corinthians amounts to reconstituting the 
progression of the theological story posited by this letter going from Paul’s basic conviction that 
faith, hope, and love remain forever (chapter 13) to his interaction with the Corinthians at the 
time of the writing of the letter (as expressed in chapters 16, 4, and 1, where Paul explains why 
he writes this letter to the Corinthian believers).20 Let us sketch the progression of the story 
posited by 1 Corinthians (a progression which is more technically identified through an analysis 
of the narrative/syntactic oppositions, as presented in Appendices 2 and 3). 
As we just suggested, the story begins with the narrative/syntactic oppositions between (+) 
13:13a – faith, hope, and love will remain [by contrast with  (-) 13:8b-d – prophecy, tongue, 
gnosis will pass away]; (+) 13:1 – those who speak tongues should have love [by contrast with  
(-) 13:1 – those speak tongues without love are roaring brass]; (+) 13:2 – those who prophesy, 
know mysteries, move mountains with love [by contrast with  (-)13:2 – those prophesy … 
without love]; (+) 13:3 – those give away possession and body with love  [by contrast with  (-) 
13:3 – those who give away … without love gain nothing].  
As Paul presents love as the most excellent way (1 Cor. 12:31b) and that in the end, faith, 
hope, and love remain, with love as the greatest among them (13:13), love overwhelms the gaze 
and grasp of anyone. Since love takes place in specific and concrete time and space and yet 
beyond their constraints, it characterizes Paul’s relationship with the other/Other. This intense 
passion of love is vivid in Paul’s confession that no one and nothing can ever separate him from 
20 This progression is conventionally presented in the appendix as going from the bottom up. This representation is 
also convenient analytically to draw the semiotic squares later when we shift the “polemical axis” upward for our 
semantic analysis of the semiotic squares. As the word “progression” indicates, if some of the pairs of oppositions of 
actions do not help the progression of the narrative, we will combine them together as a pair of opposed actions that 
represents a similar action of how an “object” is given to the “receiver.” For details, see Daniel Patte, “Method for a 
Structural Exegesis of Didactic Discourses: Analyses of 1 Thessalonians,” Semeia 26 (1983): 85-129 (113-16). 
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the love of Christ (Rom. 8:35-39). The love he has with Christ is seared in the promise and the 
risk of love. Risk and promise sustain and generate one another in love and passion. So 
regardless of what one does, if one does it without love, this becomes meaning-less (1 Cor. 13:1-
3). Love is performative. It marks and saturates believers, fundamentally. Regardless of how 
gifted, knowledgeable, and capable Paul may be, if he is not marked by love, he is nothing. 
As love cannot be possessed by anyone, since it puts up with all things, trusts in all 
things, hopes for all things, and endures all things (13:7), love cannot be objectified. If love 
cannot be objectified, then it cannot be calculated and manipulated. It is an irony that believers 
can do many incredible “things” (e.g., spiritual gifts), which are beyond one’s comprehension 
and ability, and yet not nurtured and transformed by these “things” that are beyond 
comprehension. By contrast, when believers end up trying to masquerade themselves with these 
incredible “things” (even though they are actually beyond their comprehension and ability), they 
seek to convert these incredible “things” into a capital for their use. However, believers must 
learn to let go of this masquerade and be empowered by the logos of the cross (cf. 1:17-18). But, 
the masquerade cannot be let go if it is not exposed for what it is. 
In the following step in the narrative progression (in 15:42-44) Paul uses the metaphor of 
the sowing to illustrate that one should not be caught up in the present. Sowing is a strenuous 
task. Believers cannot sow without taking care of what they sow. They need to provide constant 
care with patience and hope. Indeed, they should see the present in the light of the future. The 
seed that is sown is to grow into the plant. What believers sow must die in order to come to life 
(15:36). This observation is not only notable in Paul’s own experience (15:8-10), it is also 




The following positive actions in the pairs of narrative oppositions in 15:44b, 15:43d, 
15:43b, 15:42b, do not involve an actual story progression. They refer to the same state of 
change, which shows that Paul and the others did not testify falsely that God had indeed raised 
Christ from the dead (15:12a, 15). Then the narrative progression can resume. The Corinthian 
believers will be saved if they hold fast to the gospel (15:2a-b). It is in being faithful to the 
gospel that believers will, likewise, be changed (15:51c). It is by being in the Holy Spirit that 
people can confess that Jesus is Lord (12:3c). Believers need to get rid of the old yeast in order to 
become the new batch of dough (5:7a-b); that is, they need to celebrate with “the unleavened 
bread of purity of motive and truth” (5:8c). The vessel must be clean in order for the clean item 
put in and through it to remain clean. Believers, in other words, must surrender themselves to 
God and not be mastered by anything (6:12b). This is what it means: there is “one God the father, 
from whom are all things and for whom we are, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all 
things are and through whom we are” (8:6). Hence, even if believers know that “the idol is 
nothing” and that there is one God and one Lord, they should not objectify this knowledge. After 
all, how can anyone objectify God, “from whom are all things and for whom we are”? How can 
anyone grasp “Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things are and through whom we are”? This 
is why in 7:31a, 30c, 30b, 30a, 29d, Paul says that “from now on,” believers must think and act 
in a paradoxical way. Those who use the cosmos as if not using it; those who buy as if not 
possessing it; those who rejoice as if not rejoicing; those who wail as if not wailing; and those 
who have wife as if not having a wife. The “as if not” auto-withdraws and auto-annuls the 
actions. It prevents the objectification from taking place. 
If believers really confess that there is one God and one Lord (8:6), they must have 
experienced and realized that they are in Christ Jesus because of God (1:30a). Indeed, if the 
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logos of the cross was so scandalizing to the people in the Roman Empire, it must be the power 
of God that the Corinthians could still believe in such a message. If all things, as a result, belong 
to believers, Christ, and ultimately God (3:22-23; cf. 4:7), then they should not think that they 
are wiser than God. They should become foolish in the sphere of God so that they could become 
wise (3:18c). Thus Paul does not even judge himself (4:3). Why? Because he does not have the 
ability to do. His judgment of himself will not be accurate. Paul makes it clear that he and the 
other apostles are helpers of Christ (4:1). They are not the owners of the works of God. Rather, 
believers are the field, the building, and the temple of God (3:9b-c, 17c). In a group-oriented 
culture, everyone is interrelated. For those who corrupt the temple of God also corrupt 
themselves in the end. Hence, God will corrupt them, but God will save them too (3:17b). 
Believers should be blessed by the gift of the Lord (16:23). 
In partaking of the Lord’s Supper, believers should embody a pattern for their lives 
similar to the pattern that Jesus exhibited in giving his life for others. This is how believers 
proclaim the Lord’s death and receive the Covenant (11:26). They should examine themselves 
and not be judged in partaking of the Lord’s body and blood (11:31). One can think of the 
Derridean notion of “undecidabilty” in the sense that one must make the decision again each 
time in a new situation. One way to do so is not to become comfortable in one’s situation. It is 
when one is not comfortable that one pays attention and relies on the wisdom of God. Paul thus 
urges believers to receive (food) from one another during the Lord’s Supper (11:33). Indeed, if 
everyone receives from God (4:7), then believers should seek the things of the other (10:24b). 
What they receive from God is only a portion of what God gives to everyone. Believers should 
not totalize and absolutize what they have received from God. They should seek the things of 
others, namely, humbly learn from others. Then they will know that not everything is beneficial 
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and edifying (6:12; 10:23a-b). In fact, what may be edifying in one context is not always 
edifying in the same context, not to mention it may cause problems in other contexts. Believers 
will need to discern the situation to prevent objectifying the other/Other. 
Just as Paul urges believers to seek the things of others, he also argues that it is those who 
love God who are known by God (8:3). Love, as such, builds up, whereas the kind of knowledge 
that objectifies the other/Other makes one puffed up (8:1). Although Paul does not tell us what 
does love build up, we can imagine that love does not just build up oneself but others as well. 
Thus, one should not use food to bring oneself close to God (8:8; 6:13). It is the genuine relation 
that matters. Similar to using knowledge for one’s advantage, food cannot be used as a means to 
an end. One thing is clear, believers must not partake of the Lord’s cup and the Lord’s table with 
the demons’ cup and the demons’ table at the same time (10:21). They should not eat “idol food” 
if their conscience is bothered by it (10:28-29). Even if they may have knowledge and eat in the 
idol’s temple, their action may cause other believers to stumble (8:9b, 10a). The knowledge that 
gives freedom to people should not end up bringing destruction to others. Hence Paul will not eat 
meat if food causes others to stumble (8:13; 10:32). Believers need to become mature in 
prudence (14:20c). Similarly, in the matter of spiritual gifts, Paul highlights the importance of 
other-oriented benefits, instead of a self-centered benefit. This is why Paul highlights the 
importance of the gifts of prophecy, apocalypse, gnosis, and teaching that can benefit more 
people (14:6). As the prophecy addresses the people, it edifies people and the church (14:3, 4b). 
It further causes conviction and worship among unbelievers (14:24-25), as people can understand 
when believers bless in a language that people can understand (14:16). Speaking in tongue, on 
the other hand, is a sign for unbelievers (14:22b). Coupled with the gift of interpretation, it can 
also edify the church (14:5). 
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  Paul is so concerned with the situation of the Corinthian believers because they were his 
beloved children (4:14b; 10:14). He could have ignored them, not to mention that Paul was often 
himself in a dire situation. He did not need extra troubles. But, as he exhorts believers to seek the 
things of the others, he still tries to communicate with them. So even though he is not with them 
physically, he is with them in spirit (5:3b). He is concerned about them. After all, he was the one 
who introduced the gospel to them. He is responsible for them, as he is also their apostle as he 
worked among them (9:2b). The Corinthian believers should notice that what he wrote to them 
regarding spiritual gifts comes from the Lord (14:37). Indeed, anyone who claims to be spiritual 
should realize that it is not her/him who examines all things (2:15). One may speak the gifts that 
are in the teaching of the spirit (2:13b) and the hidden wisdom of God in mystery (2:7a), but this 
ability comes from the God who reveals them to believers (2:10). It is not believers who do these 
things by themselves; it is the spirit of God who does them through believers. Believers should 
therefore glorify God with their body (6:20b); the body is for the Lord (6:13d). They should not 
make the member of Christ a member of the pornēs (6:15c). They should have mourned for the 
porneia among them (5:2b), which did not even happen among the Gentiles (5:1b), and took out 
the wickedness (5:13b). In fact, they should have handed the person who committed the porneia 
with the wife of his father to Satan so that his spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord (5:5). 
They should seek the things of the others by considering both the situations of the perpetrator 
and those who are in the church. 
Concerning the issues related to marriage, Paul tries to avoid any objectification. First of 
all, he readily acknowledges that everyone has his/her own gift from God (7:7b). He may have a 
certain preference, but everyone has her/his gift from God. What matters is that everyone keeps 
the commandment of God (7:19b) so that s/he may be in a devoted relationship with the Lord 
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(7:35c). However, because of this undivided devotion and because of the shortness of time, Paul 
thinks that it is good for the unmarried and the widows to not get married (7:8). The unmarried 
man and woman can then focus on the Lord (7:32, 34b). They could avoid fleshly tribulation 
(7:28d). Likewise, the widow is happier if she does not get remarried (7:40). Here Paul is not 
against marriage. He cautions believers not to push for marriage or abstention from marriage. To 
do so is to objectify the marriage. To be married or not should not be used and turned into a 
capital for anyone’s advantage. So if people cannot control themselves, it is better for them to get 
married (7:9c). In marriage, the wife and the husband have authority over the other’s body (7:4b, 
d). They do not live by themselves. They are held responsible to and for the other spouse. If the 
unbelieving spouse does not want to get a divorce, then the believing spouse should not divorce 
their partner (7:11-13). One should seek the things of the others; and ultimately, one should seek 
the things of God. When it comes the issue of slavery, although Paul says that the slave should 
seek to be freed if possible (7:21b, 23b), he does not say it forcefully against slavery. One may 
argue that, for Paul, if the worldly wisdom is already invalid by crucifying the Lord of glory, it 
should be obvious that the calling of God already recalls all the callings of the world. 
 When it comes to the matter of legal issues, Paul urges believers not to sue against one 
another (6:7). To do so is to insist on one’s right and fail to see that one may be wrong in the 
conflict. Indeed, if believers surrender themselves to God, why can they not submit the matter to 
God in the first place? Why can they, like the crucified Christ, not be robbed and unjustified by 
the others (6:7)? If they want to bring the lawsuit against one another, they should at least 
conduct it before the holy ones (6:1b, 5). While everyone is called to be holy (cf. 1:2), it is clear 
that the holy ones are those baptized in the name of Christ. They are the ones washed, sanctified, 
and justified in the name of Jesus and in the spirit of God (6:11). Given the conflicts in the 
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church, Paul thus says that he wants to find out the power of those who are puffed up (4:19c). 
For Paul, the power of God is the power of the cross, the power of self-emptying, of seeking the 
things of the others. Hence, in urging that no schism should occur among believers (1:10e), Paul, 
“in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,” urges them to say the same thing (1:10d). That is to say, 
to say the same things in light of the message of the cross. Thus, even though Paul may want to 
visit the Corinthians with a rod, he still wants to visit them with love and consideration (4:21c). 
After all, Paul gives birth to them. He feels responsible for them. It is the desire wanting them to 
succeed that Paul writes to them (4:14b). He does not rebuke for the sake of rebuking. He further 
shows his concerns for others when he urges the Corinthians not to make Timothy afraid when 
he visits them (16:10a-c). He hopes that he may spend more time with them, instead of just see 
them in passing (16:7b). Although Apollos will not see him now, Paul mentions that Apollos will 
visit him when he has the time (16:12d). 
 In conclusion. Focusing on this syntactic/narrative dimension of 1 Corinthians, we can 
see how Paul’s view of love can be interpreted as imperative and obligatory, in particular from a 
functionalist perspective (cf. relationality). The authoritative tone of Paul is further heightened 
when he associates his notion of love with the eschaton, which can then make his exhortation 
even more unilaterally imposing. Moreover, as Paul is the one who gives the advice, he can 
appear to be the mouthpiece of God, Holy Spirit, and Jesus. A sense of hierarchy is then strongly 
suggested. As a result, to disagree with Paul can be rendered as rejecting the words of God, Holy 
Spirit, and Jesus, despite the fact that Paul repeatedly speaks of himself, in the notion of 
“togetherness” in a proprioceptive and communal culture, as the helper, co-partner, and co-




(ii) Explanation for the Story Progression in the Warranting Level  
 As the argument in 1 Corinthians follows the line of reasoning of the dialogic level, it is 
not a surprise that it is more difficult to order the story of progression of the warranting level. We 
find that in the warranting level there is a series of stories going all over the place, here and there, 
being alluded and evoked to support the argument flow of the dialogic level. Although in this 
work we mainly focus on Paul’s view of love in his interaction with the Corinthian believers at 
the dialogic level – since this is also what most biblical scholars focus on – we find it important 
to go over the warranting level so that the fundamental stories, in particular the cross of Christ, 
that drive Paul’s enunciation with the Corinthian believers can be more readily seen. Here is how 
the story progression in the warranting level can be constructed, following the results of the 
technical analysis summarized in Appendices 3. 
A dynamic and personal relationship between God and believers is posited at the outset 
and is prominent in Paul’s conviction. In referring to Deuteronomy 25, Paul makes it clear that 
the story “was written for us” (9:10). God is not a God who can be relegated to the past. God is 
the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob. God is the God of the past, present, and future. The 
past, present, and future are inseparably intertwined, where today is the tomorrow of yesterday 
and the yesterday of tomorrow. This concern of God for people is noted in Paul’s use of the 
metaphor of the ox from Deuteronomy 25 to indicate that it is people whom God cares about (1 
Cor. 9:10a). This care for people then and now are also explicit in Paul’s reference to how “our 
fathers” ate and drank the same spiritual food and drink when they were brought out of Egypt to 
the land of Canaan (10:3-4). Thus right in the beginning of 1 Corinthians, Paul not only 
expresses that he holds that believers were enriched in everything in God (1:5). The witness of 
Christ among believers further confirms the believers’ relationship with Christ in God (1:6). 
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Given this concern of God for God’s people, it becomes shocking that Christ was 
crucified for people (1:13b). One may say that God’s concern for people is so tremendous that 
even Christ died for people, but we cannot help but to question how such a tragedy could ever 
take place. It is perplexing that Jesus even gave thanks to God on the night that he was betrayed 
as he broke the bread for the disciples (11:24a). What was there to be thankful for? 
In his correspondence with the Thessalonian and the Philippian believers, Paul also urged 
believers to rejoice, pray, and be thankful (1 Thess. 5:16-18; Phil. 4:4-6), even though he himself 
was in great hardship and danger. In his letters to the Corinthian believers, Paul finds himself 
empowered through his weakness and tribulations (2 Cor. 1:3-11; 12:7-10; etc.). In 1 Corinthians, 
Paul tells believers that “we are in danger every hour” (15:30) to the point that Paul even dies 
every day (15:31a). Paul, obviously, comes to life everyday too. Death and life are intertwined, 
giving birth to each other. As Paul writes, “in Christ all will be made alive” (15:22b). What 
matters to Paul is that one is faithful to God, just as God is faithful. If it is God who calls 
believers into the fellowship of Jesus Christ (1:9b), then the call and response relationship 
defines the believers’ relationship with God. For Paul, if one relies on God, then “the test or 
temptation (πειρασμός) that overtakes believers is nothing but human. God is faithful, he will not 
allow you to be tested or tempted beyond what you are capable of…” (10:13). Here, the tension 
between life and death cannot be reduced and theologized into any system. Faith is a trial. It is a 
process. 
This conviction and experience of Paul is not theoretical and idealistic. To say so would 
be to disregard his relationship with the other/Other. In light of love, Paul speaks of the end (τὸ 
τέλειον) and the beginning together; just as the end of winter points to the beginning of spring. 
As the end implies a delimitation, it also suggests an opening. Indeed, as τὸ τέλειον can also 
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mean “perfection,” “maturity,” “fulfillment,” and “being in effect,” the end folds itself by 
unfolding itself to what is yet to come. It marks the dialectic of the end and beginning. Paul thus 
says that when the end comes, the partial thing will pass away (13:10a). In light of that which is 
to come, we cannot objectify anything. In the face of the other/Other, the other/Other speaks and 
disrupts our objectifying gaze (13:12b). The other/Other is the other/Other in our face. Thus Paul 
makes it clear that it is only when one is fully known that s/he be known (13:12d). If one is not 
open to the other/Other, one cannot fully know. 
Hence, as Paul writes that God prepares for those who love God (2:9d, 10a, 12c), he also 
says that what God has prepared cannot be seen, heard, and understood, as it is beyond the order 
of logic and reasoning. But, it is precisely because of this impossibility (according to the order of 
logic) that Paul testifies that he is who he is because of the grace of God (15:10). In 2:12b, he 
clarifies that the spirit that believers receive is not the spirit of the cosmos but the spirit from God. 
Without receiving this spirit from God, believers cannot know the gifts given by God for their 
benefits. Just as no one can know the things of human without the human’s spirit (2:11b), no one 
can know the things of God without the spirit of God (2:11d). To know the other/Other, the 
other/Other, at least, has to be able to speak in her/his/its own voice. We need to be addressed by 
the other/Other. In fact, as the self is othered/Othered by her/his own spirit, the self is the 
other/Other. In the words of Julia Kristeva, we are “strangers to ourselves.”21 
Violence and tragedy grasp and overtake the other/Other when the other/Other is silenced, 
marginalized, and erased. So, even though the wisdom of God glorifies the Lord (2:8c), the Lord 
of glory is crucified by the rulers of this age. If the rulers had received the hidden wisdom of God, 
they would not have crucified Jesus (2:8). The cross is utterly scandalizing and traumatizing. Yet, 




                                                          
the Lord of glory, because of his love for people, undertakes it. This is why only Jesus can be the 
foundation of the building, a metaphor for believers. That which is despised and silenced is no 
longer silent. The abject of the cross, neither a subject nor an object, marks believers, loud and 
clear. In the language of Giorgio Agamben, what is excluded from the system is highlighted as 
an “example” that exposes and destabilizes the system that relies on what is excluded from the 
system.22 Believers, however, want to objectify the abject and shuffle it out of sight. But Paul 
insists that the kingdom of God is not in the order of logos but in the power. It is a power of 
potentiality and possibility; a power that comes from being open to the other/Other. 
The pistis of believers has to be in the sphere of the power of God (2:5b);23 after all, 
believers are baptized into the name of Christ (1:13c). If it is because of the paschal lamb that 
believers are unleavened bread (5:7c-d), then believers should not add and decide anything on 
their own. They are bought with a heavy price (6:20a); a price that is beyond the economy of 
exchange. As believers are washed, sanctified, and justified “in the name of our Lord Jesus 
Christ and in the spirit of our God” (6:11), they are born again. They are in one body and one 
spirit with the Lord (6:17). In sending Paul as an apostle to the Gentiles, Christ does not send 
Paul to baptize. He sends him to gospelize (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) (1:17b). 
22  See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 21-22; idem., “Example,” in The Coming Community. Translated 
by Michael Hardt. Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 10. 
23 We leave the word pistis untranslated because of its polyphonous meanings. It can mean: (1) “that which evokes 
trust and faith,” (2) “state of believing on the basis of the reliability of the one trusted, trust, confidence, faith,” and 
(3) “that which is believed, body of faith/belief/teaching,” (BDAG, 818-20). As these definitions reveal, pistis is 
related to the notions of “trust,” “faith,” “believing,” and “reliability” and it can be about something or someone. 
Patte further speaks of “faith” in terms of (1) “faithfulness,” (2) “trust,” (3) “believing a speaker’s words (“believing 
that”), (4) “faith, knowledge, understanding, and reason,” (5) “movement toward, and experience of, God,” and (6) 
“gift.” See Daniel Patte, “Faith,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity. Edited by Daniel Patte (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 406-07. Patte also demonstrates that faith can be defined in terms of (1) 
“believing self-evident truths and fundamental narrative semantics,” (2) “believing a truth on authority: the 
‘discoursive semantic’ dimension of believing,” (3) ‘believing as thinking that something is true: the ‘syntactic’ 
dimension of believing.” See Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural 
Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990), 105-215. 
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Paul thus decided to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified in his evangelizing 
(2:2b). This is why he went to the Corinthians in weakness, fear, and much trembling (2:3). The 
mission is impossible. How can Paul gospelize? He is not the Christ. He is not the owner of the 
gospel. He is only sent by Christ. Paul is aware that as he represents Christ, such a representation 
cannot be objectified. The representation is inevitable but it must not be idolized. Herein lies the 
paradox and the dilemma. Paul must not rely on the persuasion of the logos of wisdom. He must 
rely on “a demonstration of spirit and power” (2:4b). The gospelization must be an embodied 
performative that breathes in and out of the logos of the cross. The ethos and pathos of the 
messenger are integral to the logos of the gospel. 
The gospelization, as such, is a “necessity” for Paul (9:16b). It is an embodiment of a 
Christ-like life; a stewardship that has been entrusted to Paul (9:17b). There is nothing to boast 
about. Paul makes it clear that he and Apollos are the diakonoi of God (3:5d). They are here to 
serve not to be served. God will provide what they need (9:9, 10b). For Paul, there is no need to 
make use of his exousia among the Corinthian believers (9:12b, 15a). The gospel is free of 
charge (9:18b). As believers are in a context for an imperishable wreath (9:25c), Paul trains his 
body so that he may not be disqualified from his mission. Given his clear goal (9:26a), he will 
only rely on God and boast in God’s provision (9:15c). For him, believers will receive their 
wages if their work can withstand the test (3:14). 
It is also important for Paul that God is the God of peace in all the churches (14:33b). 
The logos of God does not just go to certain believers (14:36b). A sense of interdependence is at 
work here. While Paul follows the tradition of the Hebrew Scripture that the man is not created 
from the woman (11:8a, 9a), he holds that neither the man nor the woman is independent of each 
other in the Lord (11:11). In fact, he even writes that haireseis are necessary to manifest those 
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who are approved (11:19). If we are not take this verse literally, it can mean that haireseis are not 
a negative social phenomenon. 24  Division can be good or bad, depending on how we 
conceptualize it. If we conceive of division in a positive sense, then it makes sense that Paul 
seeks to please everyone in everything (10:33a). If everyone has received something from God, 
then s/he has something to offer that others cannot. Here, Paul also refers to the social 
convention about woman not having her hair shaved (11:6c) and the man not covering his head. 
While we may be tempted to critique Paul for essentializing the man and the woman, we need to 
remember that having long hair does not necessarily denigrate the woman. The important point is 
not to objectify and essentialize any situation and any group of people. 
For Paul, an adult should get rid of the babbling infant thinking (13:11b). That is to say, 
the mature believers should be able to form their own thinking instead of simply following what 
others say and form their own groups against one another in the church. Paul wishes to address 
the Corinthian believers as spiritual (3:1a), as people who have received the spirit of God in 
discerning the works of God. Paul wants to give them solid food, but they must be able to receive 
and digest a variety of food of thoughts (3:2b). In wishing to rule together with the Corinthians 
24 In fact, the word haireseis was not used negatively as a “heresy” or a “division” before the second century CE. 
The only other place that the term appears in Pauline writings is Galatians 5:20, which includes a series of works of 
the flesh. The negative usage of haireseis in Galatians is not sufficient to show that Paul views haireseis negatively 
in 1 Cor. 11:19. The LSJ Supplement (page 41) lists three overarching meanings: (1) choice; (2) purpose, course of 
action or thought; and (3) proposed condition, proposal. Under (1) choice, it can mean (i) election of magistrates and 
(ii) inclination. Under (2) purpose, course of action or thought, it can mean (i) system of philosophic principles or 
those who profess such principles, sect, school; (ii) corps of epheboi; and (iii) condition in terms of astrology. Under 
(3) proposed condition, proposal, it carries the meaning of (i) commission; (ii) freewill offering or vow; and (iii) bid 
at auction. Overall, the term hairesis does not have negative connotation. When it comes to the BDAG (pages 23-34), 
it lists two major meanings: (1) sect, party, or school and (2) opinion or dogma. Here, the meanings in the LSJ 
Supplement have become more specific and narrowed down to the school of thoughts and opinions. For example, 
under (1), it can refer to (i) the hairesis of Sadducees or Pharisees or even the hairesis of the Nazarenes; or (ii) our 
today’s negative meaning of hairesis in terms of a heretical sect is a much later usage, which The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Christianity points out was clearly thus employed by Justin Martyr and Irenaeus in the second century 
CE (page 507); or (iii) dissension or a faction, which BDAG lists 1 Cor. 11:19 and Gal. 5:20 as examples. Under (2), 
it can refer to a way of thinking of an inclination. Now, if we can exclude the later usage of hairesis, hairesis is not 
used negatively per se. To say that hairesis is a negative term, one will need to make a case for it instead of just 
assuming it. One should not confuse and equate haireseis with schismata or erides (see chapter 5). 
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(4:8d), Paul further highlights the monopoly engaged and employed by some believers to 
marginalize other believers in the church. Paul wants to remind them that as everyone has 
received from God, everyone is interconnected together in the sense that one’s individuality is an 
individuality-with-other-individualities. 
In conclusion. Compared with the story progression in the dialogic level, the story 
progression in the warranting level brings to the fore the importance of cross-like lifestyle in the 
believers’ everyday life.25 In addressing schisms among the Corinthian believers, Paul has to 
clearly – note the interrogative μή –  remind them that it was not him, but Christ who was 
crucified for/concerning (ὑπέρ) them (1:13b). The crucifixion of Christ is so vital to Paul that he 
stresses that Christ did not send him to baptize but to gospelize (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) (1:17). As we 
have noted about the middle voice “to gospelize” – that is, gospelizing takes place in believers 
being gospelized when gospelizing (see section 3.3 in chapter 2) – the gospel is not an object that 
can be possessed by anyone. Neither is it an object that believers can theologize, and hence, 
reason and manipulate. Rather, the gospel is a cross-like lifestyle that believers must continue to 
embody, after they have, amazingly, responded to the call of God to participate in the fellowship 
of Jesus Christ. Hence, Paul says that gospelizing does not take place in the wisdom of logos. If 
it does, the cross of Christ would be emptied (of its power) (1:7). 
25 For example, it is clear in Appendix 2 that, out of fifty-eight pairs of opposed actions, we have ten pairs of 
opposed actions that are related to the cross of Christ: (1) (+) 1:13b – Christ was crucified for you vs. (-) 1:13b – 
Paul was not crucified for you [ellipsis], (2) (+) 1:13c – the Corinthians were baptized into the name of Jesus vs. (-) 
1:13c – the Corinthians were not baptized into the name of Paul [ellipsis], (3) (+) 1:17b – Christ sent Paul to 
evangelize not with wisdom of logos vs. (-) 1:17a – Christ did not send Paul to baptize, (4) (+) 2:3 – Paul came in 
weakness, fear, and trembling vs. (-) 2:1 – Paul did not come with superiority of logos and wisdom, (5) (+) 2:2b – 
Paul wants to know Jesus and him crucified among Corinthians vs. (-) 2:2a – Paul does not want to know any other 
thing among Corinthians, (6) (+) 2:4b – Paul’s logos and kerygma in demonstration of the spirit and power Paul vs. 
(-) 2:4a – Paul’s logos and kerygma not in persuasion of wisdom, (7) (+) 2:5b – pistis in the power of God vs. (-) 
2:5a – pistis not in the wisdom of humans, (8) (+) 2:8 – no crucifixion, if the rulers of this age had received the 
hidden wisdom vs. (-) 2:8 – crucifixion because the rulers of this age received the hidden wisdom, (9) (+) 2:8c – 
[implied] wisdom of God glorifies the Lord [v. 8 – “lord of glory”] vs. (-) 2:8c – wisdom of the rulers of this age 
crucified the lord of glory, and (1) (+) 2:9d, 10a, 12c – God prepared and revealed to those who love him vs. (-) 2:9 
– those who do not love God receives not what God prepared.  
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Note that Paul does not say that Christ is predestined to be crucified. To say so is, 
likewise, to objectify the cross of Christ, as if it is something pre-programmed. By contrast, for 
Paul, “the rulers of this age” would not have crucified “the Lord of glory” if they had known the 
wisdom of God that has been hidden (2:7-8). Indeed, it is only shocking that while God gives 
glory to the Lord, the rulers of this age give crucifixion to him. It is even more shocking that 
while Christ was crucified, he was crucified for/concerning believers. The implication of active 
voice in the passive voice (“was crucified”) is noteworthy. Christ was not merely a victim. 
Rather, Christ entrusts himself to God, as it is God who gives glory to him. Hence, Paul tells the 
Corinthian believers that he was in weakness, fear, and much trembling when he proclaimed to 
them “the mystery of God” (2:1-13). But, as we noted, how can “the mystery of God” be 
proclaimed without being objectified – not to mention that mystery, by definition, is apophatic? 
Thus, Paul discerns and decides to know nothing among them “except Jesus Christ and him 
crucified” so that “what” he proclaims is in a demonstration of the spirit and power of God, lest 
the believers’ pistis is not in the power of God (2:4-5). 
Now, why did the rulers of this age not know the hidden wisdom? Did God not give it to 
them? Or God gave it to them but they could not receive it? In the next two verses (2:9-10), Paul 
makes it clear that the gift of God takes place in love, as God has prepared for those who love 
God. While God may have prepared for those who love God, it does not mean that those who 
love God will then recognize and receive it. They still need to receive the spirit from God to 
know the gifts given by God (2:12). In other words, the love relationship between believers and 
God must be ongoing and cannot be objectified; after all, how can the spirit be objectified? This 
is why Paul too has to only rely on God in his proclamation of “the mystery of God.” Just as the 
mystery cannot be objectified, the demonstration of the spirit and power of God also cannot be 
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objectified. This is why it is in weakness, fear, and much trembling that Paul gospelizes, since 
gospelizing in the persuasive logos of wisdom would only objectify the gospel and render the 
cross of Christ emptied (of its power). The cross of Christ, in short, is a middle voice that cannot 
be objectified. It can only be lived out in love, as it is in love that believers may be empowered to 
discern the mystery and works of God among them. 
From our story progression in the warranting level, we noted that this intense emphasis 
on the non-objectification of the cross of Christ is scattered throughout the warranting level. This 
scattering does not mean that the cross of Christ is not vital to Paul. On the contrary, it is because 
it is so important to Paul that it is disseminated throughout his letter. Likewise, even though the 
cross of Christ is not explicitly apparent in the dialogic level, it actually undergirds many of 
Paul’s (dialogic) exhortations to the Corinthian believers. Indeed, in chapter 4, our semantic 
analysis of Paul’s vision of love in the dialogic level will reflect this fundamental role of the 
cross of Christ in Paul’s heteronomous view of love. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have focused on the syntactic/narrative dimension of 1 Corinthians as 
we explained our story progression in both the warranting and dialogic levels in Paul’s didactic 
discourse. As we noted about A. J. Greimas’s “actantial model” in the Methodological Appendix, 
how the “subject” gives (or does not give) an “object” to the “receiver” and how the “receiver” 
receives (or does not receive) the “object” from the “subject” are not solely syntactic. The 
“subject” is not only helped (or opposed) by her/his knowledge, ability, and will in giving the 
“object” to the “receiver,” s/he is also affected by the (often unmentioned) “sender” that makes 
her/him to do such a giving action. Same thing can be said about the “receiver.” And, when the 
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“object” is “something” that cannot be objectified and quantified, the relationship and identity of 
the “giver,” “receiver,” and “object” can be unclear. In the case of love, for example, it is not 
easy to determine to whom the “giver” is giving “what” to the “receiver.” Because in being 
attracted to the beloved, the lover (i.e., the “giver”) could actually be the “receiver” who 
responds to such an attraction. Moreover, “what” does the “giver” give to the “receiver”? Love? 
Her/himself? Etc. This is why to flesh out Paul’s vision of love, we will in the next chapter turn 



















Appendix 1: The Textual Levels of 1 Corinthians 
 
Primary Warranting or Narrative Level Interpretative Warranting Level Dialogic Level (address and exhortation) 
  
1:1b – called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus 
through the will of God 
 
1:2b – to those who have been sanctified in 





1:4b-9 – for the grace of God given to you in 
Christ Jesus [1:5] because in everything you 
were enriched in him [God], in every logos 
and every gnosis [1:6] just as the martyrion 
of Christ was confirmed among you [1:7] – 
so that you are not lacking in any gift as you 
wait for the apocalypse of our Lord Jesus 
Christ [1:8] who also will keep you strong to 
the end to be blameless in the day of our 
Lord Jesus Christ [1:9] God is pistos, through 
whom you were called into the koinoia of his 
son Jesus Christ our Lord. 
 
 
1:11 – For it was made known to me about 
you, my adelphoi, by the Chloe’s household 
that there are strife among you. 
 
 
1:13 – Has Christ been divided? Was Paul 
crucified on your behalf? Or into the name of 
Paul were you baptized? 
 
1:14b-17 – I baptized none of you except 
Crispus and Gaius [1:15] so that nobody may 
say that you were baptized into my name 






























1:1-2 – Paul … and Sothenes our adelphos 
 
1:2a – to the ekklēsia of God in Corinth 
 
 
1:2c – with everyone calling upon the name of 
our Lord Jesus Christ in every place, both their 
Lord and ours 
1:3 – Grace to you all and peace from God our 
father and Lord Jesus Christ. 








1:10 – I am calling you to my side, adelphoi, 
through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ that 
you all may say the same thing and that there may 
not be schismata among you, and that you may 
restore each other in the same mind and in the 
same opinion 
 
1:12 – What I am saying is this:  each of you says 
“I belong to nobody but Paul,” and “I belong to 
nobody but Apollos,” and “I belong to nobody 
but Cephas,” and “I belong to nobody but Christ” 
 
 





household, the rest I did not know if I 
baptized anyone else [1:17] for Christ did not 
send me to baptize but to evangelize, not in 
wisdom of logos in order that the cross of 



















1:26b-29 – not many were wise according to 
flesh, not many powerful, not many well born 
[1:27] – but the moron things of the cosmos 
God chose to shame [καταισχύνῃ] the wise, 
and the weak things of the cosmos God chose 
to shame [καταισχύνῃ] the strong things 
[1:28] and the ignoble things of the cosmos 
and the despised things God chose, the things 
that are not [τά μὴ ὄντα] to bring to nothing 
[καταργήσῃ] the things that are [τὰ ὄντα] 
[1:29] so that every flesh may not boast in 
front of God. 
1:30b-31 – who became wisdom for us from 
God, both justice and holiness, and 
redemption [1:31] so that as it was written, 




1:18-21 – For the logos of the 
cross is [ἐστίν] moron to the 
destroyed, but to us who are saved 
it is [ἐστίν] the power of God 
[1:19] for it was written: I will 
destroy the wisdom of the wise and 
the understanding of the 
understanding ones I will set 
against [1:20] where is the wise? 
Where is the scribe? Where is the 
debater of this age? Did God not 
moronize the wisdom of the 
cosmos? [1:21] for since in the 
wisdom of God the cosmos did not 
know God through its wisdom, 
God was pleased, through the 
moron of the kerygma, to save 




1:25 – because [ὅτι] the moron of 
God is wiser than that of humans 
and the weakness of God is 


























1:22-24 – whereas the Jews ask for signs and the 
Greeks seek wisdom [1:23] we proclaim Christ 
the crucified, to the Jews a scandal, to the gentiles 
a moron [1:24] but to us who are called, both to 
the Jews and the Greek, Christ is the power of 
God and the wisdom of God  
 
 















2:1b–5 – I came proclaiming to you the 
mystery thing of God not with the superiority 
of logos or wisdom [2:2] for I decided 
[ἔκρινα] to know nothing among you except 
Jesus Christ and him crucified [2:3] and in 
weakness and in fear and in much trembling I 
was with you [2:4] also my logos and my 
kerygma was not in persuasive logos of 
wisdom but in demonstration of the spirit and 
power [2:5] so that your pistis was not in the 
wisdom of humans but in the power of God. 
  
2:7b-12 – which God predestined before the 
ages for our glory [2:8] which none of the 
rulers of this age knew, for if they had 
known, they would not have crucified the 
lord of glory [2:9] – but as it was written: 
what the eye did not see and ear did not hear 
and upon the heart of human did not 
understand, what God prepared for those who 
loved him [2:10] – to us/for our benefit God 
revealed through his spirit, for the spirit 
searches all things, even the depths of God 
[2:11] – for who among humans knew [οἶδεν] 
the things of human except the spirit of 
human that is in him? So also nobody knew 
[ἔγνωκεν] the things of God except the spirit 
of God [2:12] – we received not the spirit of 
the cosmos but the spirit from God so that we 
might know the gifts given by God to us/for 






2:16a – for who knew [ἔγνω] the mind of the 











































2:6-7a – But we speak [λαλοῦμεν] wisdom 
among the mature [τοῖς τελείοις], wisdom not of 
this age nor of the rulers of this age who are 
coming to nothing [καταργουμένων] [2:7a] but 










2:13-15 – which [= the gifts] we also speak, not 
in teaching logos of human wisdom but in 
teaching of the spirit, because to the spiritual 
people [πνευματικοῖς] we interpret the spiritual 
things [2:14] and the physical [ψυχικὸς] human 
does not receive the things of the spirit of God for 
to him they are moron and he is not able to know 
because spiritually the things are examined 
[ἀνακρίνεται] [2:15] but the spiritual 
[πνευματικὸς] person examines [ἀνακρίνει] all 
things, and he is not examined [ἀνακρίνεται] by 
anyone  
 




3:1-2c – And I, adelphoi, I was not able to 
speak to you as to the spiritual people 
[πνευματικοῖς] but as to the fleshly people 
[σαρκίνοις], as babbling infants in Christ. 
[3:2] I gave you milk, not food, for you were 






3:5c-8 – as the Lord assigned to each person 
[3:6] I planted, Apollos watered it, but God 
made it grow [3:7] so neither the planter is 
anything nor the waterer but the grower is 
God [3:8] the planter and the waterer are one, 
each will receive his own wage according to 
his own labor 
 
3:10a-b– According to the grace of God that 
was given to me as a wise architect I set up 
foundation  and other builds upon it 
 
3:11 – For nobody is able to set up other 
foundation besides what is laid, who is Jesus 
Christ 
 
3:13b-15 – for the day will make it manifest 
because in fire it will be revealed and what 
sort of work of each person is the fire will 
test it [3:14] If the work which anyone built 
upon remains, s/he will receive her/his wage 
[3:15] if the work of anyone is burnt down, 
s/he will be punished, but s/he will be saved, 
as if through fire. 
 
3:16b – the temple [ναός] of God you [ἐστε] 
are and the spirit of God dwells among you 
[ὑμῖν]? 
 



































3:2d-5b – and even now you are still not able 
[3:3] For you are still fleshly [σαρκικοί], for 
insofar as there are factionalism [ζῆλος] and strife 
among you, are you not fleshly [σαρκικοί] and 
behaving according to human ways [κατὰ 
ἄνθρωπον] [3:4] for whenever someone says: I 
belong to nobody but Paul, but another: I belong 
to nobody but Apollos, are you not humans 
[ἄνθρωποι]? [3:5a-b] But who is Apollos? And 





3:9 – for we are the co-workers [συνεργοί] of 




3:10c – Let each person watch out how he builds 
upon it  
 
3:12-13a – And if anyone builds upon the 
foundation with gold, silver, worthy stones, 
wood, hay, straw [3:13a] the work of each person 




3:16a – Do you not know [oἴδατε] that 
 
 
3:17a-b – If anyone corrupts [φθείρει] the temple 






3:19-20 – for the wisdom of this cosmos is 
moron at the side of God for it was written: 
he seizes the wise in their cunning [3:20] and 
again: the Lord knows the reasoning of the 












4:5b-6 – who will bring to light the hidden 
things of darkness and make visible the plan 
of the hearts. Then the praise will be to each 
person from God [4:6] These things [ταῦτα], 
adelphoi, I applied [μετεσχημάτισα] to 
myself and Apollos for your sake so that by 
us you may learn “not to beyond what is 
written” [τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ ἃ γέγραπται] so that you 
are not puffed up in favor of one against 
another. 
 
4:7b-13 – What do you have that you did not 
receive? If indeed you received it, why do 
you boast as if you did not receive? [4:8] 
Already you have been filled, already you 
became rich, without us you became king; 
and would that you became king so that we 
may become king with you. [4:9] For I think 
that God exhibited us apostles last as the 
condemned to death because [ὅτι] we became 
the play to the cosmos, to angels and to 
































3:17d-18 – you yourselves are [temple][οἵτινές 
ἐστε ὑμεῖς] [3:18] Let nobody deceive himself. If 
anyone thinks that he is wise among you in this 




3:21-23 – so let nobody boast among humans for 
all things belong to nobody but you [πάντα ... 
ὑμῶν ἐστιν] [3:22] whether Paul or Apollos or 
Cephas or cosmos or life or death, or the present 
or the future, all things belong to nobody but you 
[πάντα ὑμῶν] [3:23] and you belong to nobody 
but Christ, and Christ belong to nobody but God. 
 
4:1-5a – In this way let human regard us as 
helpers [ὑπηρέτας] of Christ and stewards 
[οἰκονόμους] of the mysteries of God [4:2] The 
following/the preceding [ὧδε λοιπὸν] is required 
among the stewards so that s/he is found pistos 
[4:3] to me it is a very small thing that I should be 
judged by you [ὑφ’ ὑμῶν] or by human courts, 
but I do not even judge myself. 4:4 – for nothing 
against me that I am aware of but not in this way 
I am justified, and the one who judges me is the 
Lord [4:5a] Therefore do not judge anything 
















Christ, but you are prudent in Christ; we are 
weak, but you are strong; you are in honor, 
but we are in shame [4:11]  until the current 
hour we hunger and thirst and we are poorly 
dressed and roughly treated and unsettled 
[4:12] and we labor as we work with our own 
hands; though reviled we bless, though 
persecuted we endure [4:13] though defamed 
we encourage, as the refuse of the cosmos we 
became, the dirt of all things until now. 
 
4:15 – For you may have numerous 
pedagogues [παιδαγωγούς] in Christ but [you 
have] not many fathers for in Christ Jesus 
through the gospel I gave you birth 
 
4:17 – Because of this reason [διὰ τοῦτο] I 
sent [ἔπεμψα] Timothy to you, who is my 
beloved and faithful teknon in the Lord and 
who will remind [ἀναμνήσει] you my ways 
of life in Christ Jesus, just as I teach 




4:20 – for not in the logos the kingdom of 

















































4:14 – Not because of shaming you I am writing 
these things but because of admonishing [you] as 
my beloved tekna. 
 
 
4:16 – I am therefore calling you to my side, 




4:18-19 – As if I am not coming to you some 
became puffed up [ἐφυσιώθνσάν] [4:19] but I 
will go quickly to you, if the Lord wants, and I 
will come to know not the logos of those who 
puffed up [πεφυσιωμένων] but the power. 
 
4:21 – what do you want: in rod I come to you or 
in love and spirit of gentleness? 
 
5:1-6ab– Actually (Ὅλως) porneia is reported 
among you, and such porneia is not even among 
the gentiles that (ὥστε) a man has the wife of his 
father [5:2] and you are puffed up 
[πεφυσιωμένοι] and not rather mourn so that he 
might be lifted out from the midst of you the one 
who did this deed? [5:3] for though absent in the 
body I am present in the spirit, already I have 
judged as if present the man who did this [5:4 ] in 
the name of the Lord Jesus when you gather 
together and my spirit is with the power of the 
our Lord Jesus [5:5] to hand over such man to 
satan into destruction of his flesh so that his spirit 
may be saved in the day of the Lord [5:6a-b] it is 
not good your boasting [καύχημα]. Do you not 
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 5:6c – a little yeast ferments the entire batch 
of dough. 
 
5:7c-d – just as you are unleavened. For the 
paschal lamb, our Lord, was sacrificed. 
 
 
5:9 – I wrote to you in the letter not to 






5:12b-13a – Are you not judging those 






6:2b-c – the holy ones will judge the cosmos? 
And if the cosmos is judged by you, are you 
unworthy to judge the least matters?                                                      
 
6:3b – we will judge angels, let alone [μήτι 









































5:7a-b – Cleanse out the old yeast so that you 
may be a new batch 
 
5:8 – Therefore let us celebrate not with old yeast 
or with yeast of badness and wickedness but with 
the unleavened bread of “purity of motive” and 
truth.” 
 
5:10-12a – not at all with the pornoi of this 
cosmos or the greedy and the robbers or the 
idolaters since then you ought to go out of this 
cosmos [5:11] But now (νῦν δε) I wrote to you 
not to associate yourselves if anyone is called 
adelphos is a pornos or a greedy person or an 
idolater or reviler or drunkard or robber, with 
such a person do not eat together [5:12a] For 
what is it to me to judge those outside?  
 
5:13b – Take out the wicked from among you. 
 
6:1-2a – When some of you have a lawsuit 
against the other, does he dare to bring the suit to 
the unjust and not to the holy ones? [6:2a] Or do 
you not know that 
 
6:3a – Do you not know that 
 
 
6:4-9a – Accordingly if you have legal suits of 
daily stuffs, do you set them before those who are 
despised in the ekklēsia? [6:5] To your shame I 
am saying to you. In this way is there nobody 
among you wise who will be able to discern 
[διακρῖναι] among his adelphoi? [6:6] but 
adelphos goes to law against adelphos and this 
before the apistoi [6:7] Actually it is already a 
defeat to you that you sue against one another. 








6:11 – But these things some of you were. 
But you were washed, sanctified, and made 
just in the name of Lord Jesus Christ and in 





6:14 – And God raised the Lord and he will 
also raise us through his power. 
 
6:15b – your bodies are the members of 
Christ? 
 
6:16b-17 – the one who joins himself with 
the pornēs is one body? For they will be, it 
says, the two into one flesh [6:17] he who 
joins himself with the Lord is one spirit. 
 
 
6:19b-20a – your [plural] body is a temple of 
the holy spirit among you which you have 
from God, and you are not of your own? 






































robbed [ἀποστερεῖσθε]? [6:8] but you unjustify 
and rob [ἀποστερεῖτε], and especially [καὶ τοῦτο] 
adelphoi  [6:9a] Or do you not know that 
 
6:9c-10 – Do not be led astray; neither pornoi nor 
idolaters nor adulterers nor malakoi nor 
arsenokoitai [6:10] nor thieves nor the greedy nor 
drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers will inherit 
the kingdom of God. 
 
6:12-13 – All things are permitted to me but not 
all things are beneficial. All things are permitted 
to me but I will not be mastered by anything 
[6:13] the food for the stomach and the stomach 
for the food, but God will bring to nothing both 
one and the other [cf. 8:8]. The body is not for the 
benefit of porneia but for the benefit of the Lord, 
and the Lord is for the benefit of the body. 
 
6:15a – Do you not know that 
 
6:15c-16a – Shall I then take up the members of 
Christ and make them members of a pornēs? 
Never! [6:16a] Or do you not know that 
 
 
6:18-19a – Flee from porneia. Every sin that a 
person does is outside his body, but the one who 
commits porneia sins into [εἰς] is own body 
[6:19a] Or do you not know that 
 
 
6:20b – glorify, indeed, God with [ἐν] your body. 
 
7:1-13 – Now concerning what you wrote: it is 
good for a human to not touch a woman [7:2] But 
because of porneiai, let each man have his wife 
and let each woman her own husband [7:3] to the 
wife, the husband should give the [conjugal] 
obligation, likewise the wife to her husband [7:4] 

















7:14 – for the husband who is an apistos was 
sanctified by the wife and the apistos wife 
was sanctified by the adelphos; otherwise 
[ἐπεὶ ἄρα] your children are unclean, but now 
they are holy.               
                                   
7:15d – but in peace God has called us 
 
 
7:17a-b – but [εἰ μὴ] to each person as the 







































but the husband, and likewise the husband does 
not have authority over his body but the wife 
[7:5] do not deprive/rob [ἀποστερεῖτε] each other, 
except by agreement for a time so that you may 
devote yourselves to prayer and again you may be 
together [ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] so that satan may not tempt 
you because of your lack of self-control [7:6] I 
am saying this as a concession not as a command 
[7:7] I want all humans to be like me but each has 
his own gift from God, one of one kind and one 
of another [7:8] Now I am speaking to the 
unmarried and the widows, it is good for them if 
they remain as I do [7:9] if they cannot control 
themselves, let they get married, it is better to get 
married than to be burnt [7:10] And to the already 
married I instruct, not I but the Lord, that the wife 
not to be separated from her husband [7:11] if she 
is separated, let her remain unmarried or let her 
be reconciled to her husband – and the husband 
should not divorce his wife [7:12] And to the rest 
I myself say, not the Lord, if any adelphos has a 
wife who is an apistos and she agrees to live with 
him, let him not divorce her [7:13] and if any 
woman has an apistos husband and he agrees to 
live with her, let her not divorce her husband. 
 
 
7:15a-c – But if the apistos husband separates 
himself, let him separate; the adelphos or the 
adelphē has not been enslaved in such situations. 
 
7:16 – for what do you know, wife, if you will 
save your husband? Or what do you know, 
husband, if you will save your wife? 
 
7:17c-21 – in this way let the person walk. And in 
this way in all the ekklēsiai do I command [7:18] 
someone was called when circumcised, let him 
not conceal the mark of circumcision; in 
uncircumcision someone was called, let him not 
be circumcised [7:19] circumcision is nothing and 
non-circumcision is nothing, but the keeping of 
the commandments of God [7:20] each person in 
the calling in which he was called, let the person 
remain in that [7:21] a slave you were called, may 
it not concern you; but if it happens to be able to 
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 7:22-23a – For the slave called in the Lord is 
a freedman of the Lord, likewise, the 
freedman is the slave of Christ when called. 




7:25d – as a pistos shown mercy by the Lord. 
 












7:31b – for the schema of this cosmos is 









































become free, rather make use [imperative] of it 
 
 
7:23b-25ac – do not become slaves of people 
[7:24] Each in what you were called, adelphoi, let 
her/him remain in that at the side of God [7:25a-
c] Now, concerning the ‘virgins,’ I do not have 
the command of the Lord but I am giving my 
opinion 
 
7:26a – I therefore think that it is good that 
 
7:26c-29a – it is good for a person to be in this 
way [7:27] have you been bound to your wife, do 
not seek release; have you been released from 
your wife, do not seek a wife [7:28] but if you 
marry, you do not sin, and if a ‘virgin’ marries, 
she does not sin. But such people will have 
tribulation with regard to the flesh, and I spare 
you [7:29a] This is what I am saying, adelphoi 
 
7:29c-31a – from now on (τὸ λοιπόν), let the ones 
who have wives as if they do not have [7:30] and 
let those who bewail as if they do not bewail and 
let those who rejoice as if they do not rejoice and 
let those who buy as if they do not possess [7:31] 
and let those who make use of the cosmos as if 
they do not fully make use 
 
7:32-40 – And I want you to be without concerns. 
The unmarried man concerns about the things of 
the Lord, how he may please the Lord [7:33] but 
the married man concerns about the things of the 
cosmos, how he may please his wife [7:34] and 
he has been divided. But the unmarried woman 
and the “virgin” are concern about the things of 
the Lord so that she may be holy both in the body 
and in the spirit. But the married woman concerns 
about the things of the cosmos, how she may 
please her husband [7:35] this for your own 
benefit I am saying so that a noose/restraint to 
you I do not throw over but for a proper 
[εὔσχημον] and devoted thing to the Lord without 
distraction [7:36] and if anyone thinks that he is 

















[8:4b-5 can also be a warrant] 8:4b – “an idol 
is nothing in the cosmos and that nobody is 
God but the one God” [8:5] For even if there 
are so-called gods, whether in heaven or on 













































‘virgin,’ and if his passion is strong and in this 
way it is obligated, what he wants let him do, he 
does not sin, let them marry [7:37] but he who 
stood firm in his very heart, and not having 
necessity, but has power over his own want and 
this he has decided in his own heart, to keep her 
as his ‘virgin,’ he will do well [7:38] so that he 
who marries his own ‘virgin’ does well and he 
who does not will do better [7:39] A wife has 
been bound as long as her husband lives. If the 
husband dies she is a free woman to whom she 
wants to marry, only in the Lord [7:40] she is 
happier if in this way she remains, according to 
my opinion. And I think I have the spirit of God 
 
8:1-11a– Now concerning the food offered to 
idols, we know that “we all have gnosis.” Gnosis 
puffs up, but love builds up [8:2] Ιf anyone thinks 
that he knew something, not yet did he know as 
he ought to know [8:3] but if someone loves God, 
he has been known by God [8:4a] Thus 
concerning eating food offered to idols, we know 
that  
[8:4b] “an idol is nothing in the cosmos and that 
nobody is God but the one God” [8:5] For even if 
there are so-called gods, whether in heaven or on 
earth, as there are many gods and many lords 
[8:6] but for us there is one God the father, from 
whom are all things and for whom we are, and 
one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things 
are and through whom we are  [8:7] – But not in 
everyone is the gnosis. Some are accustomed, 
until now, to the idol eat as if food offered to idol, 
and their conscience being weak is defiled 
[μολύνεται] [8:8] Food will not offer us to God. 
Neither are we lacking if we eat nor are we 
abundant if we eat [8:9] Watch out not somehow 
this exousia of yours becomes a stumbling block 
[πρόσκομμα] to the weak [8:10] for if someone 
sees you, who has gnosis, eating [κατακείμενον] 
in the idol’s temple, his conscience being weak, 
will he not be built up to eat food offered to 
idols? [8:11a] for the weak person is destroyed in 
your gnosis 
 
8:12-13 – in this way sinning against the adelphoi 
and striking their conscience when it is weak you 




9:1 – Am I not free? Am I not an apostle? 
Have I not seen Jesus our Lord? Are you not 
the work of mine in the Lord? 
 
 
9:4-12 – Do we not have exousia to eat and 
to drink? [9:5] do we not have exousia to 
bring along adelphē-wife as also the rest of 
apostles and the adelphoi of the Lord and 
Cephas? [9:6] or only I and Barnabas do not 
have the exousia not to work? [9:7] – Who 
serves as a soldier with his own wages? Who 
plants a vineyard but cannot eat his own 
fruit? Or who tends a flock and cannot eat 
from the milk of the flock? [9:8] Not 
according to human I am saying these things 
or does the law not say these things? [9:9] for 
in the law of Moses has been written: you 
shall not muzzle an ox that is threshing, is 
God concerns about the oxen [9:10] or 
certainly because of us he says? For because 
of us it was written it ought to be in hope that 
the plower plows and the thresher in hope of 
sharing [9:11] if we among you sowed the 
spiritual things, shall we not reap greatly 
your fleshly things? [9:12] if others share 
your exousia, do we not more? But we did 
not make use of this exousia, but we endure 
[στέγομεν] all things lest we may cause 
certain hindrances to the gospel of Christ. 
 
9:13b-23 – those who do the temple works 
eat from the temple and those who serve 
regularly at the altar share the altar offering? 
[9:14] in this way also the Lord commanded 
to those who proclaim the gospel live out of 
the gospel [9:15] But I have not made use of 
any of the things. And I did not write these 
stuffs so that it will be for my advantage in 
this way; for it is better for me to die than 
anyone may empty my boast [9:16] for if I 
evangelize, it is not for me a boasting for the 
necessity presses upon me; for woe to me if I 
do not evangelize [9:17] for if willingly I do 
































scandalizes my adelphos I do not eat meat forever 
so that I do not scandalize my adelphos. 
 
 
9:2-3 – If to others I am not an apostle, but to you 
indeed I am; for you are my seal of apostleship in 
the Lord [9:3] This is my ἀπολογία to those who 




























been entrusted [πεπίστευμαι] the stewardship 
[9:18] what then is my wage? So that when 
evangelize I may make the gospel free of 
charge not to make full use of my exousia in 
the gospel [9:19] For although I am free from 
all to all I made myself a slave so that I may 
gain more. [9:20] And I became to the Jews 
as a Jew so that I might gain Jews; to those 
under law as under law, not that I myself 
under law so that I might gain those under 
law [9:21] to those without law as a person 
without law, not being without law of God 
but in the law of Christ, so that I might gain 
those without law [9:22] I became to those 
who are weak a weak person so that those 
who are weak I might gain; to all people I 
became all so that I might by all means save 
some [9:23] All these things I do for the sake 
of the gospel so that I might become a 
participant [συγκοινωνὸς] of the gospel. 
 
9:24b-27 – while all the runners run in a 
stadium, one actually gets the prize; in this 
way you run to win [9:25] every person who 
engages in contest controls all things, while 
they receive a perishable wreath, we receive 
imperishable wreath [9:26] I therefore in this 
way run as not uncertainly, I box in this way 
as not a person beating air [9:27] but I treat 
my body harshly and I bring it to subjection, 
lest somehow after preaching to others I 
myself may become disqualified. 
 
10:1b-5 – all our fathers were under the cloud 
and all went through the sea [10:2] and all 
were baptized into Moses in the cloud and in 
the sea [10:3] and all ate the same spiritual 
food [10:4] and all drank the same spiritual 
drink; for they drank from the spiritual 
accompanying rock, and the rock was the 
Christ [10:5] But God was not pleased with 
most of them [10:6] Now these things 
became patterns [τύποι] for us that we do not 
desire [ἐπιθυμηντὰς] bad things just as those 
desired [ἐπεθύμησαν]. 
10:7b-c – as some of them were, as it is 
written, ‘the people sat down to eat and drink 


































































 10:8b-c – just as some of them committed 
porneia and in one day twenty-three 
thousands fell. 
 
10:9b-c – just as some of them tested and 
were destroyed by the snakes. 
 
10:10b-c – as some of them grumbled and 
were destroyed by the Destroyer. 
 
 
10:13 – trial/temptation has not grasped you 
except what is common to human 
[ἀνθρώπινος]. God is pistos, he will not 
allow you to be tempted beyond what you are 
able but he will make, with the 
trial/temptation, a way out of it to be able to 
bear 
 
10:16-18 – The cup of blessing which we 
bless, is it not a fellowship [κοινωνία] of the 
blood of Christ? The bread which we break, 
is it not a fellowship [κοινωνία] of the body 
of Christ? [10:17] Because one bread, we 
who are many are one body, for we all share 
from the one bread [10:18] Consider 
[βλέπετε] earthly [κατὰ σάρκα] Israel: are not 
those who eat the sacrifices fellow-partners 









































10:8a – Let us not commit porneia 
 
 
10:9a – Let us not test the Lord 
 
 
10:10a – Do not grumble 
 
10:11-12 – Now these things came about to them 
typologically [τυπικῶς] and it was written as a 
warning for us, for whom the end of the ages has 
come [10:12] Therefore the person who thinks 
that he has stood, let him watch out not to fall 
 
 
10:14-15 – Therefore my beloved [ἀγαπητοί], 
flee from idolatry [10:15] as I am speaking to 







10:19-25 – What then am I saying? That food 
offered to idols is anything or that idol is 
anything? [10:20] but that what they offer, they 
offer to demons and not to God. I do not want 
you to become partners [κοινωνοὺς] of demons. 
[10:21] you are not able to drink the cup of the 
Lord and the cup of demons, you are not able to 
partake of the table of the Lord and the table of 
demons [10:22] or are we provoking the Lord to 
jealousy? Are we stronger than him? [10:23] 
everything is permitted but not everything brings 
benefit; everything is permitted but not 
everything builds up. [10:24] Let nobody seek 
her/his own thing but the thing of other [10:25] 
Eat all sold in the meat market without judging 
[ἀνακρίνοντες] anything because of the 
211 
 
 10:26 – for the earth is of the Lord and the 










10:33 – just as I am pleasing everyone in 
everything not seeking my own benefit but of 
others so that they may be saved. 
 
11:1b – just as I am of Christ 
 
11:2b – just as I have passed down 
 
 
11:3b-c – the head of all men is Christ, and 
the head of woman is the man [ὁ ἀνήρ], and 





11:6c – if it is shameful for the woman to 
have her hair cut off or to have her shaved 
 
 
11:7b-10 – since he is [ὑπάρχων] the image 
and glory of God and woman is the glory of 


































10:27-32 – if someone of the apistos calls you 
and you want to go, eat everything set before you 
without judging [ἀνακρίνοντες] anything because 
of conscience [10:28] if someone says to you that 
this is sacrificed to idols, do not eat for the sake 
of that person who made known [to you] and for 
the sake of conscience [10:29] I am saying not 
your conscience [συνείδησιν δὲ λέγω οὐχὶ τὴν 
ἑαυτοῦ] but of the other person, for why my 
freedom is judged by other’s conscience? [10:30] 
if I am partaking with thanksgiving [χάριτι] why 
am I defamed by what I give thanks [εὐχαριστῶ]? 
[10:31] so whether you eat or drink or do 
something, everything do for the glory of God 
[10:32] become blameless people to the Jews and 
the Greeks and the ekklēsia of God 
 
 
11:1a – Become imitators of me 
 
11:2a – I praise you because you remember me in 
everything 
11:2c – and you hold on to the traditions 
11:3a – Now I want you to know that  
 
11:4-6b – every man when praying or when 
prophesying having the head down [κατὰ 
κεφαλῆς] dishonors [καταισχύνει] his head [11:5] 
every woman when praying or when prophesying 
uncovered [ἀκατακαλύπτῳ] dishonors her head; 
for it is one and the same thing with respect to 
having been shaven [11:6b] for if a woman does 
not cover herself [κατακαλύπτεται], let her cut 
her hair off 
 
11:6d-7a – let her be covered [11:7a] a man, on 





woman from man [11:9] and for man was not 
created [ἐκτίσθη] through the woman but 
woman through the man [τὸν ἄνδρα]  [11:10] 
Because of this reason woman must have 
authority over her head for the sake of the 
angels [διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους] 11:11 – However 
neither woman is apart from the man nor man 
is apart from woman in the Lord 
11:12a – For just as the woman is from [ἐκ] 
the man,  
 
11:14-15 – does not nature itself teach you 
that while a man wearing long hair is a 
dishonor to him [11:15] a woman wearing 
long hair is a glory to her? Because her long 




[11:19 can also be a warrant] [11:19] for it is 
necessary that haireseis are among you so 
that those tested may become visible among 






11:23-25 – For I received from the Lord, 
which I passed to you, that the Lord Jesus on 
the night that he was betrayed he took bread 
[11:24] and after giving thanks he broke it 
and said: this is my body on behalf of you; do 
this for my remembrance [11:25] likewise the 
cup after the dinner he said: this cup the new 
covenant is in my blood; do this as often as 





































[11:11 can also be in the dialogic level] 11:11 – 
However neither woman is apart from the man 
nor man is apart from woman in the Lord 
 
 
11:12b-13 – in this way now the man is through 
[διά] the woman; and everything is from [ἐκ] 
God. [11:13] Among you judge for yourselves; is 
it proper that an uncovered woman pray to God? 
 
11:16-22 – But if anyone thinks that it is 
contentious, we do not have such custom nor do 
the ekklēsiai of God [11:17] In the following 
instructions I do not praise you because you come 
together not for the better but for the worse 
[11:18] for in the first place when you gather 
together in the ekklēsia I hear schismata among 
you and I partly believe it [11:19] for it is 
necessary that haireseis are among you so that 
those tested may become visible among you [cf. 
12:22] [11:20] therefore when you gather at the 
same place [ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό] it is not the Lord’s 
supper that you eat [11:21] for each person takes 
[προλαμβάνει] his own supper as he eats [ἐν τῷ 
φαγεῖν] and while one is hungry the other is 
drunk [11:22] do you not have houses [οἰκίας] to 
eat and to drink? Or the ekklēsiai of God are you 
considering down [καταφρονεῖτε]? Are you also 
shaming [καταισχύνετε] those who do not have? 
What shall I say to you? Shall I praise you? In 





11:26-34 – For as often as you eat this bread and 
drink this cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord 
until he comes [11:27] Therefore whoever eats 
this bread or drink this cup of the Lord 
unworthily, he will be guilty of the body and the 
blood of the Lord  [11:28] Let a person examine 













12:2b – when you were gentiles [ἔθνη] led to 
mute idols because you were led astray 
[ἀπαγὀμενοι] 
 
12:4-6– There are varieties of gifts, but the 
same spirit [12:5] and there are varieties of 
services [διακονιῶν] but the same Lord 
[12:6] and there are varieties of workings, but 








12:12-13 – For just as the body is one and it 
has many members, and all the members of 
the body being many is one body, in this way 
is Christ [12:13] for by one spirit we all were 
baptized into one body, whether Jews or 
Greeks or slaves or free, we all were given 































12:14-26 – For the body is not one 
member but many [12:15] if the 
foot should say that “I am not a 
hand I am not a part of the body” 
not because of this [παρὰ τοῦτο] it 
is not a part of the body? [12:16] 
and from the cup let him drink [11:29] for he who 
eats and he who drinks not discerning 
[διακρίνων] the body eats and drinks judgment 
[κρίμα] upon himself [11:30] This is the reason 
among you many are weak and ill and many are 
dead [11:31] but if we had discerned 
[διεκρίνομεν] ourselves we would not have been 
judged [ἐκρινόμεθα] [11:33] therefore, my 
adelphoi, when you come together to eat, receive 
from [ἐκδέχεσθε] one another [11:34] If anyone 
is hungry, let him eat in the house [οἴκῳ], lest you 
come together into judgment. When I come I will 
instruct the rest of stuffs. 
 
12:1-2a – Now concerning the spiritual matters, 
adelphoi, I do not want you to be ignorant [12:2a] 
You know that 
 
12:3 – Therefore I am making it known to you 
that nobody speaking in the spirit of God says 
“anathema Jesus” and nobody is able to say 
“Jesus is Lord” except in the holy spirit. 
 
 
12:7-11 – to each person has been given the 
manifestation of the spirit for the common good 
[12:8] for while to one through the spirit has been 
given logos of wisdom, to another logos of gnosis 
according to the same spirit [12:9] to another 
pistis by the same spirit, but to other the gifts of 
healing by the one spirit [12:10] to other the 
workings of the powers, but to other prophecy, to 
other the discerning of spirits, to another various 
kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of 
tongues [12:11] All these things the one and the 
same spirit works in when it distributes to each 































12:28-29 – and while some God appointed in 
the ekklēsia first as apostles, second prophets, 
third teachers, and then powers, then gifts of 
healing, helps, administrations, various kinds 
of tongues [12:29] are all apostles? Are all 
prophets? Are all teachers? Are all powers? 
[12:30] are all having gifts of healing? Are 




and if the ear should say that “I am 
not an eye, I am not part of the 
body, not because of this it is not 
part of the body? [12:17] if the 
whole body is eye, where is 
hearing? If the whole is hearing, 
where is sense of smell? [12:18] 
but now God set up the members, 
each one of them in the body as he 
wanted [12:19] if all were one 
member, where is the body? 
[12:20] now many are the 
members, but one body [12:21] the 
eye is not able to say to the hand: I 
have no need for you or again the 
head to the feet: I have no need of 
you [12:22] but much more [πολλῷ 
μᾶλλον] the members of the body 
that seem to be weak are necessary 
[12:23] and what we think are 
dishonorable members of the body 
to them we give more, and our 
unpresentable/private [ἀσχήμονα] 
members have more presentability 
[εὐσχημοσύνην] [12:24] but our 
presentable members do not have 
need but God united the body 
giving more honor to the lacking 
member [12:25] so that there may 
not be schisma in the body but the 
members may care the same for 
each other [12:26] and if one 
member suffers, the whole 
members suffer together; if one 
member is glorified, the whole 
































12:27 – You [plural] are the body of Christ and 





[12:31] Seek the greater gifts and still I will show 



















13:10-12 – But when the fulfillment comes, 
the partial thing will probably pass away 
[future more vivid]. [13:11] When I was a 
babbling infant, I spoke as a babbling infant, 
I thought like a babbling infant, I reasoned 
like a babbling infant [cf. 3:1ff, do not be 
babbling infants] When I have become a man 
[ἀνήρ] I have gotten rid of babbling infant 
stuffs. [13:12] For until now I see through the 
mirror in enigma, but then face to face; until 
now I know partially, but then I shall know 









































13:1-9 – If with the tongues of people and even of 
angels I speak, but love I do not have, I have 
become a roaring brass or a clanging cymbal. 
[13:2] And if I have a prophecy and I know all 
the mysteries and all the gnosis and even have all 
the pistis to remove the mountains, but love I do 
not have, I am nothing. [13:3] Indeed if I give 
away all my possessions  and give my body over 
to boast [καυχήσωμαι vs. καυθήσομαι?], but love 
I do not have, I gain nothing [13:4] Love is 
forbearing, love is merciful, it does not show bad 
zeal, it does not boast [περπερεύεται] nor become 
puffed up [13:5] it does not behave dishonorably 
[ἀσχημονεῖ], it does not seek things for itself, it 
does not get provoked to wrath [παροξύνεται], it 
does not take into account the bad thing [13:6] it 
does not rejoice at the unjust but rejoices in truth 
[13:7] it endures/covers [στέγει] all things, it 
believes/trusts/entrust [πιστεύει] all things, it 
hopes all things, endures all things. [13:8] love 
never falls [πίπτει] but whether prophecy, they 
will pass away [καταργηθήσονται], or tongue, 
they will cease [παύσονται], or gnosis it will pass 
away [καταργηθήσεται]. [13:9] For we know 








13:13 – So now faith, hope, and love remain, 
these three things; and the greater of these is love. 
 
14:1-6 – Pursue love, seek the spiritual matters, 
especially [μᾶλλον δὲ] so that you may 
prophesy.” [14:2] For the one who speaks in 
tongue does not speak to people but to God for 
nobody hears him, but he speaks the mystery in 
spirit. [14:3] and the one who prophesies speaks 
to people for building up and encouragement and 
comfort [14:4] the one speaking in tongue builds 
up himself and the one prophesying builds up 
ekklēsia [14:5] I want you all to speak in tongues, 






14:7-11 – Likewise lifeless stuffs giving 
sound, whether a flute or a harp, if it does not 
give distinction to the tones, how will the 
flute or the harp be made known? [14:8] and 
if trumpet gives indistinct sound, who will be 
prepared for war? [14:9] in this way also you, 
through the tongue, if you give not easily 
recognizable logos, how will what is said be 
made known? For you are speaking into the 
air [14:10] perhaps [εἰ τύχοι] there are many 
kinds of sounds [φωνῶν] in cosmos and 
nothing is silent [ἄφωνον] [14:11] so if I do 
not know the meaning [δύναμιν] of the 
sound, I will be a “barbarian” to the speaker 














14:21– In the law it is written, ‘By the 
foreign tongues and by the lips of others I 
will speak to this people and even in this way 


































prophesy; greater is the one who prophesies than 
the one who speaks in tongues unless [ἐκτὸς εἰ 
μὴ] [someone] interprets so that the ekklēsia may 
receive building up. [14:6] Now then, adelphoi, if 
I come to you speaking in tongue, what will I 
benefit you unless I speak to you apocalypse or in 









14:12-21 – in this way also you, since you are 
zealots of spiritual matters, seek the building up 
of the ekklēsiai so that you may abound [14:13] 
therefore the one speaking tongue let him pray so 
that he may interpret [14:14] for if I pray in 
tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful 
[14:15] what then [τί οὖν ἐστιν]? I shall pray with 
the spirit, and I shall also pray with the mind; I 
shall sing with the spirit, and I shall also sing 
with the mind [14:16] since if you bless in the 
spirit, how will the one with the position of an 
inquirer say “amen” to your thanksgiving since 
he does not know what you say? [14:17] for 
while you give thanks well but the other is not 
built up [14:18] I give thanks to God more than 
all of you I speak in tongues [14:19] but in 
ekklēsia I want to speak five logos with my mind 
so that I may also instruct others than mystery 
logos in a tongue. [14:20] – Adelphoi, do not 
become children [παιδία] in regard to prudence 
(ταῖς φρεσὶν), but in regard to bad thing, be a 
babbling infant and in regard to prudence (ταῖς δὲ 
φρεσὶν) become mature [τέλειοι] [cf. 3:1ff – 
babbling infant] 
 
14:22-32 – Therefore tongues as a sign not for 
those who believe but for those who do not 
believe while prophecy is not for unbelievers but 
for believers [14:23] If now the whole ekklēsia 

















14:33 – for God is not of disorder but of 
peace as in all the ekklēsiai of the holy ones 
 
14:34d – just as the law says 
 
 
14:36 – or the logos of God came from you, 









































speak in tongues, the inquirers or apistoi come in, 
will they not say that you are crazy [μαίνεσθε]? 
[14:24] but if we all prophesy, and some apistos 
or inquirer comes in, he will be convicted 
[ἐλέγχεται] by everyone, he will be judged 
[ἀνακρίνεται] by all [14:25] the hidden things of 
his heart become manifest, and in this way falling 
upon his face he will worship God proclaiming 
that really God is among you [14:26] What is it 
now [τί οὖν ἐστιν], adelphoi? When you come 
together, each has a song of praise, a teaching, an 
apocalypse, a tongue, an interpretation; let all 
become for building up [14:27] whether someone 
speaks in tongues, two or the most, three at a 
time, and each in turn, also let one interpret 
[14:28] if there is no interpreter, let him be silent 
in ekklēsia, let him speak to himself and to God 
[14:29] let two or three prophets speak and let the 
others discern [14:30] if it is revealed to other 
who is sitting, let the first one be silent [14:31] 
for you are all able to prophesy one by one so that 
all may learn and all may be encouraged [14:32] 
and the spirit of prophets are subjected to 
prophets 
 
14:34a-c – the women in the ekklēsiai let them be 
silent, for is it not allowed for them to speak, but 
let them be subjected,  
 
14:35 – and if they want to ask something, in the 
house let them ask their own husbands, for it is 
shameful for a woman to speak in ekklēsia 
 
14:37-40 – if anyone thinks that he is a prophet or 
spiritual, let him acknowledge what I am writing 
to you is a command of the Lord [14:38] if 
someone disregards [ἀγνοεῖ], he is disregarded 
[14:39] Therefore, adelphoi, seek prophecy and 
do not hinder speaking in tongue [14:40] but let 
everything become properly and according to 
order. 
 
15:1-2 – I am making it known to you, adelphoi, 
the gospel which I proclaimed/ evangelized you, 
and which you received and in which you stood  




15:3-11 – For I passed over to you in the first 
place which I received, that Christ died for 
our sins [ὐπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν] according to 
the writings [15:4] and that he was buried 
and that he was raised on the third day 
according to the writings [15:5] and that he 
appeared to Cephas then to the twelve [15:6] 
then he appeared to more than five hundred 
adelphoi at once, most of them remain until 
now, but some fell asleep [15:7] then he 
appeared to James [Ἰακώβῳ] then to all the 
apostles [15:8] last of everyone, as if were to 
one untimely born/miscarried, he appeared 
also to me [15:9] for I am [Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι] the 
least of the apostles who is not worthy to be 
called [καλεῖσθαι] as apostle, because I 
persecuted the ekklēsia of God [15:10] by the 
gift of God I am who I am, and his gift 
toward me did not become empty but I 
labored more than all of them, and it was not 
I but the gift of God was with me [15:11] 
now whether I or they, in this way we 










15:20b-32 –the first fruits of those who have 
fallen asleep [15:21] for since through human 
is death, also through human resurrection of 
the dead [15:22] for as in Adam all die, in 
this way also in Christ all will be made alive 
[15:23] each in his own group: the first fruits 
Christ, then those belong to nobody but 
Christ in his presence [παρουσίᾳ] [15:24] 
then in the end, when he hands over the 
































certain logos I proclaimed/evangelized you, if 















15:12-20a – Ιf Christ is preached that from the 
dead he was raised, how some among you say 
that there is no resurrection of the dead? [15:13]  
If there is no resurrection of the dead Christ has 
not been raised  [15:14] And if Christ has not 
been raised, empty then is our kerygma, empty 
also is your pistis [15:15]  Then we are found to 
be false-witness of God, because [ὅτι] we 
witnessed against God that he raised Christ, 
whom he did not raise, if indeed the dead are not 
raised [15:16] for if the dead are not raised, Christ 
has not been raised [15:17] if Christ has not been 
raised, futile is your pistis [15:18] then those who 
fell asleep in Christ perished [15:19] if in this life, 
in Christ we are only those who hoped, pitiable 
all humans are [15:20a] Now Christ has been 








abolishes every rule and every authority and 
power [15:25] for it is necessary that he rules 
until ‘he put all his enemies under his feet’ 
[15:26] the last enemy abolished is death 
[15:27] ‘for he [God?]  subjected everything 
under his feet’ and when it says that 
‘everything has been subjected’ it is clear that 
except him who subjected to him everything 
[15:28] when subjected to him is everything, 
then the Son himself will be subjected to him 
who subject everything to him so that God 
may be everything among everyone [15:29] 
for otherwise what will those baptized on 
behalf of the dead do; if actually the dead are 
not raised, why are they baptized on behalf of 
them? [15:30] and why are we in danger 
every hour? [15:31] everyday I die, your 
boasting, adelphoi, which I have in Christ 
Jesus our Lord [15:32] if according to human 
I fought against wild animals in Ephesus, 
what benefit is to me? If dead are not raised, 
let us eat and let us drink, for tomorrow we 
die 
15:33b – ‘bad association corrupt (morally) 
good habits’ 
 
[15:36b-38 can also be a warrant] what you 
sow is not made alive unless it dies [15:37] 
and what you sow, you are not sowing the-
body-to-become but a naked grain perhaps [εἰ 
τύχοι] of wheat or of some others [15:38] and 
God gives to it a body as he wanted, and to 
each of the seeds its own body 
 
15:39-41 – not every flesh is the same flesh 
but other [flesh] of humans, other flesh of 
domesticated animals, other flesh of birds, 
and other [flesh] of fish [15:40] and heavenly 
bodies, also earthly bodies, but on the one 
hand another glory of the heavenly, and on 
the other hand another [glory] of the earthly 
[15:41] another glory of sun, and another 
glory of moon, and another glory of stars, for 















































15:33a – Do not be led astray 
 
15-34-38 – come to your senses [ἐκνήχατε] justly 
and do not sin, for some have ignorance about 
God, to your shame I am saying to you [15:35] 
But some will say, ‘How are the dead raised? 
And to what sort of body do they have? [15:36] 
senseless people [ἄφρων], what you sow is not 
made alive unless it dies [15:37] and what you 
sow, you are not sowing the-body-to-become but 
a naked grain perhaps [εἰ τύχοι] of wheat or of 
some others [15:38] and God gives to it a body as 







15:42-44 – in this way is the resurrection of the 
dead it is sown in corruption, it is raised in un-
corruption [15:43] it is sown in dishonor, it is 
raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised 
in power [15:44] it is sown a psychikon body, it is 
220 
 
 15:45-49 – in this way it has been written, 
‘the first human Adam became a soul that 
lives [ψυχὴν ζῶσαν], the last Adam a spirit 
that makes life [πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν] [15:46] 
but not the first is spiritual but the physical, 
then the spiritual [15:47] the first human 
made out of earth, the second human out of 
heaven [15:48] as the man made of earth, 
such are those made of earth too, and as the 
heavenly man, such are those heavenly men 
also [15:49] and just as we have borne the 
image of the human made of earth, we also 









15:54d-55 – death is swallowed into victory 
[15:55] where, O death, is your victory? 












































raised a pneumatikon body. If there is a psychikon 








15:50-54c – This I am saying, adelphoi, that flesh 
and blood are not able to inherit the kingdom of 
God, nor the corruption inherits the un-corruption 
[15:51] Behold, I am telling you a mystery: we all 
will not fall asleep, we all will be changed 
[15:52] in an indivisible time [ἐν ἀτόμῳ], in the 
blink of an eye, in the last trumpet sound, for it 
will trumpet and the dead will be raised 
uncorrupted and we will be changed [15:53] for 
this corrupted thing to put on un-corruption and 
this mortal thing to put on immortality [15:54c] 
when this corrupted thing put on un-corruption 
and this mortal thing put on immortality, then the 
logos that has been written will come to pass 
 
15:56-58 – the sting of death is sin, and the power 
of sin is the law [15:57] but thanks [χάρις] to God 
who gives you victory through our Lord Jesus 
Christ [15:58] Therefore, my beloved adelphoi, 
become firm, immovable, abound in the work of 
the Lord always, knowing [εἰδότες] that your 
labor is not in vain in the Lord. 
 
16:1a – Now concerning the collections of money 
for the holy ones 
 
16:1-10c – in this way also you will do [16:2] on 
the first Sabbath each of you let him set aside 
himself when storing what he may prosper so that 
when I come collections may not be made [16:3] 
when I arrive, whom you approve, through the 
letters I will send them to bring your gift to 
Jerusalem [16:4] if it is worthwhile for me to go, 













16:10d – for he [Timothy] does the work of 







16:15c-d – the household of Stephanas that it 
is the first fruit of Archaia and into the 
service of the holy ones they devoted 
themselves to  
 
16:17b-18a – because they made complete 
your absence [16:18a] for they refreshed my 




I pass through Macedonia, for I am passing 
through Macedonia [16:6] perhaps I will stay 
with you or even spend the winter so that you 
may help me on my journey wherever I go [16:7] 
for I do not want to see you now in passing, I 
hope to spend some time with you if the Lord 
permits [16:8] I will stay in Ephesus until 
Pentecost [16:9] for a large and effective door has 
opened for me and  there are many opponents 
[16:10a-c] If Timothy comes, watch out, so that 
fearlessly he may be with you 
 
16:11-15b – therefore let no one despise him. 
Help him on his journey in peace so that he may 
come to me. For I am waiting for him with the 
adelphoi [16:12] Now concerning Apollos the 
adelphos, many times I called him to my side so 
that he may come to us with the adelphoi but it 
was certainly was not his will that he comes now; 
he will come when he has opportunity [16:13] 
Watch out, stand firm in faith, be courageous 
[ἀνδρίζεσθε], be strong [16:14] let everything of 
yours become in love [16:15b] I call you to my 
side, adelphoi – you know that 
 
16:16-17a – so that you may be subjected to such 
people and to every co-worker and laborer 
[16:17a] I rejoice at the coming of Stephanas and 
Fortunatus and Achaicus 
 
16:18b-24 – acknowledge therefore such people 
[16:19] the ekklēsiai of Asia greet you. Aquila 
and Prisca with the ekklēsia at their house greet 
you in the Lord a lot [16:20] all the adelphoi 
greet you. Greet each other with a holy kiss 
[16:21] I, Paul, the one greeting with my hand 
[16:22] if anyone does not like [φιλεῖ] the Lord, 
let him be anathema. Maranatha [16:23] the gift 
of the Lord Jesus with you [16:24] my love with 
you all in Christ Jesus. 
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Appendix 2 – Pairs of Opposition of Actions in 1 Corinthians 
I. The Dialogic Level 
(+) 1:10d – Paul urges the Corinthians to say the same thing  Corinthians (same thing  selves) 
(-) 1:12, 3:4b-c – Corinthians say different things   Corinthians (different things  selves) 
 
(+) 1:10e – Paul urges no schismata     Corinthians (no schismata  selves) 
(-) 3:3b – jealousy (ζῆλος) and strife among Corinthians  Corinthians (jealousy and strife  selves) 
(-) 11:18 – schismata among Corinthians when gathering together  Corinthians (schismata  selves) 
 
(+) 1:30a – the Corinthians in Christ belong to God   God (people  Christ) 
(-) 3:4a – “I belong to nobody but Paul”    Paul’s group (people  Paul’s group) 
(-) 3:4b – “I belong to nobody but Apollos”    Apollos’ group (people  Apollos’ group) 
 
(+) 2:7a – “we” speak of hidden wisdom of God in mystery  “we” (hidden wisdom  the mature) 
(-) 2:6 – “we” speak of wisdom not of this age or rulers of this age - “we” (other wisdom  the mature) 
 
(+) 2:13b – “we” speak of gifts in teaching of the spirit  spirit (spiritual words   “we”)  
(-) 2:13a – “we” speak of gifts not in teaching of human wisdom - human (human words   “we”) 
 
(+) 2:15 – the spiritual examines all things    spiritual people (discernment  people) 
(-) 2:14 – the physical cannot know (hence cannot examine)  physical people (no discernment  people) 
 
(+) 3:9 b-c, 3:17d – Corinthians are the field, building, and temple of God Corinthians (selves  God)   
(-) 10:20c – Paul does NOT want Corinthians to become partners of demons  Corinthians (selves  demons) 
 
(+) 3:17b – God corrupts yet saves those who corrupt the temple God (corruption + salvation  people) 
(-) 3:17a – people corrupt the temple of God    People (corruption  God) 
 
(+) 3:18c – people should think that they are moron   people (moron  selves) 
(-) 3:18b – people who think that they are wise in this age  people (wise  selves) 
 
(+) 3:22-23 – all things belong to people, to Christ, and to God  Christ (people  God) 
(-) 3:4a – “I belong to nobody but Paul”    Paul’s group (people  Paul’s group) 
(-) 3:4b – “I belong to nobody but Apollos”    Apollos’ group (people  Apollos’ group) 
 
(+) 4:1 – “we” are helpers of Christ and stewards  (vocation of Christ’s helper  “we”) 
(-) 3:4 – “we” are helpers and stewards of Apollos and Paul (vocation of Apollos & Paul’s helper  “we”) 
 
(+) 4:3 – Paul doesn’t even judge himself   Paul (no judgment  Paul) 
(-) 4:3a-b – a small thing for Paul to be judged by people Corinthians or human courts (judgment  Paul) 
 
(+) 4:5a – the Lord will judge when the time comes   Lord (judgment  people) 
(-) 4:5a – people should not judge before the Lord comes - people (no judgment  people) 
 
(+) 4:14b – Paul wrote to admonish    Paul (admonition  Corinthians) 
(-) 4:14a – Paul did not write to shame   - Paul (shaming  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 4:14b, 10:14 – Paul addresses the Corinthians as beloved children         Paul (beloved tekna  Corinthians) 
(-) 3:2d-3a – [implied] Paul addresses the Corinthians as babbling infants      Paul (babbling infants  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 4:19c – Paul finds out about the power   Corinthians (power  Paul) 





(+) 4:21c – Paul wishes to go with love and spirit of gentleness      Paul (love and spirit of gentleness  Corinthians) 
(-) 4:21b – Paul doesn’t want to go with rod         - Paul (rod  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 5:1b – no such porneia among pagans    pagans (no such porneia  people) 
(-) 5:1a – has such porneia among Corinthians  Corinthians (such porneia  people) 
 
(+) 5:2b – the Corinthians should have mourned  Corinthians (mourning  Corinthians) 
(-) 5:2a – the Corinthians were puffed up   - Corinthians (puff up  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 5:3b – Paul is present in the spirit   spirit (presence  Paul) 
(-) 5:3a – Paul is absent in the body    body (absence  Paul) 
 
(+) 5:5a – hand the person who commits porneia over to satan             Corinthians (the person  satan) 
(-) 5:1-2 – the Corinthians did not take out the person who commits porneia     - Corinthians (the person  ekklesia) 
 
(+) 5:7a-b – get rid of the old yeast to become a new batch   Corinthians (new yeast  selves) 
(-) 5:8a – do not celebrate with old yeast     - Corinthians (old yeast  selves) 
 
(+) 5:8c – celebrate with unleavened bread of purity of motive and truth      Corinthians (unleavened bread  selves) 
(-) 5:8b – do not celebrate with yeast of badness and wickedness Corinthians (bad and wicked yeast  selves) 
 
(+) 5:13b – Paul urged the Corinthians to take out wickedness Paul (concerns about wickedness  Corinthians) 
(-) 5:2 – the Corinthians were puffed up about the deed  Corinthians (proud about wickedness  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 6:1b – should bring the lawsuits before the holy ones Corinthians (lawsuit hearing  the holy ones) 
(-) 6:1a – should not bring the lawsuits to the unjust  Corinthians (lawsuit hearing  the unjust) 
 
(+) 6:5 – should bring the lawsuits before respected adelphoi Corinthians (lawsuits hearing  adelphoi) 
(-) 6:6 – should not bring the lawsuits to the apistoi  Corinthians (lawsuits hearing  apistoi) 
 
(+) 6:7 – should not have lawsuit against each other  (no law suits  adelphoi) 
(-) 6:6 – sue against each other    (law suits  adelphoi) 
 
(+) 6:7 – the Corinthians be unjustified and robbed          Corinthians (being unjustified and robbed  Corinthians) 
(-) 6:8 – the Corinthians unjustify and rob each other         Corinthians (unjustifying and robbing  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 6:12a – [implied] certain things are beneficial to me something (benefit  “I”)  
(-) 6:12a – some things are not beneficial to me  something (no benefit  “I”) 
  
(+) 6:12b – should not be mastered by anything people (self-mastery  selves) 
(-) 6:12a, c – all things are permitted   people (all permission  selves) 
 
(+) 6:13a, 8:8a [implied], 10:31 – food will not offer us to God     “we” (glory  God) 
(-) 6:13b, 8:8a – food will offer us to God        “we” (food  God), (food  “stomach” = “we”) 
 
(+) 6:13d – the body is for the Lord   Corinthians (body  Lord) 
(-) 6:13c – the body is not for porneia  Corinthians (body  porneia) 
 
(+) 6:15c – should not make the members of Christ members of a pornes Corinthians (members  Christ) 
(-) 6:15c – [implied] make the members of Christ members of a pornes  Corinthians (members  pornes) 
 
(+) 6:18b – every sin is outside the body  body (outside  sin) [relatively “+”] 
(-) 6:18c – porneia sins into the body  body (inside  sin) 
 
(+) 6:20b – glorify God with body     body (glory  God) 
(-) 6:13c – [implied] the body is not for porneia   body (porneia  God) 
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(+) 7:4b - the husband has authority over his wife’s body  wife (body  husband) 
(-) 7:4a – the wife does not have authority over her own body  - wife (body  self) 
 
(+) 7:4d – the wife has authority over her husband’s body  husband (body  wife) 
(-) 7:4c – the husband does not have authority over his body  - husband (body  self) 
 
(+) 7:7b – God gives each his/her own gift    God (individual gift  each person) 
(-) 7:7a – [implied] God does not give everyone same gift, as Paul’s - God (same gift  each person) 
 
(+) 7:8 – it’s good for the unmarried and widows to stay so  unmarried and widows (no marriage  self) 
(-) 7:9 – let the unmarried and widows marry if they cannot control  unmarried and widows (marriage  self) 
 
(+) 7:9c – it’s better to get married   unmarried and widows (married result  selves) 
(-) 7:9d – it’s better not to get burnt   - unmarried and widows (burnt result  selves) 
 
(+) 7:11, 27a – the adelphoi should not seek release from [pistoi?] wives adelphos (no divorce  pistos wife) 
(-) 7:27b – the adelphos released from his [pistos?] wife   adelphos (divorce  pistos wife) 
 
(+) 7:12 – the pistos husband should not divorce his apistos wife    pistos husband (no divorce  apistos wife) 
(-) 7:15c – [implied] the pistos husband let his apistos wife separated  pistos husband (divorce  apistos wife) 
 
(+) 7:13 – the pistos wife should not divorce her apistos husband pistos wife (no divorce  apistos husband)   
(-) 7:15a-b – the pistos wife can let her apistos husband separated pistos wife (divorce  apistos husband) 
 
(+) 7:19b – keeping God’s commandment is meaningful            (observance of God’s commandment  selves) 
(-) 7:19a – circumcision and non-circumcision are not meaningful    - (circumcision and non-circumcision  selves) 
 
(+) 7:21b, 23b – if possible, become a freed person  receive freedom  selves) 
(-) 7:23b – [implied] do not become slaves of people  (receive slavery  selves) 
 
(+) 7:28d – people who don’t get married will avoid fleshly tribulation people (no fleshly tribulation  selves) 
(-) 7:28a-c – people who get married will have flesh tribulation  people (fleshly tribulation  selves) 
 
(+) 7:29d – from “now on” people who have wives won’t have wives husbands (no wives  selves) 
(-) 7:29c – before “now” people who have wives have wives  husbands (wives  selves) 
 
(+) 7:30a – those who bewail as if not wailing  wailers (no wailing  selves) 
(-) 7:30a – [implied] those who bewail are bewailing  wailers (wailing  selves) 
 
(+) 7:30b – those who rejoice as if not rejoicing  those who rejoice (no joy  selves) 
(-) 7:30b – [implied] those who rejoice are rejoicing  those who rejoice (joy  selves) 
 
(+) 7:30c – those who buy as if not possessing  buyers (no possession  selves) 
(-) 7:30c – [implied] those who buy are possessing  buyers (possession  selves) 
 
(+) 7:31a – those who use cosmos as if not using  users (no cosmos usage  selves) 
(-) 7:31a – [implied] those who use cosmos are using  users (cosmos usage  selves) 
 
(+) 7:32 – unmarried man concerns about the Lord’s and pleasing Lord     unmarried man (please  Lord) 
(-) 7:33 – married man concerns about the cosmos and pleasing wife     married man (please  wife) 
 
(+) 7:34b – unmarried woman concerns about the Lord’s to be holy      unmarried woman (concern  Lord) 
(-) 7:34c – the married woman concerns about the cosmos and husband      married woman (concern  husband) 
 
(+) 7:35c – Paul gives a proper matter to the Lord to Corinthians       Paul (proper and devoted matter  Corinthians) 
(-) 7:35b – Paul does not want to throw a restraint to Corinthians       Paul (noose/restraint  Corinthians) 
225 
 
(+) 7:38b – a man who does not marry his virgin do better man (virgin  self) 
(-) 7:38a – a man who marries his virgin does well  - man (virgin  self) 
 
(+) 7:40 – a wife is happier if not remarried after her husband died wife (no remarrying  self) 
(-) 7:38 – a wife is free to remarry in the Lord after her husband died - wife (remarrying  self) 
 
(+) 8:1e – love builds up    love (building up  people) 
(-) 8:1d – gnosis puffs up    gnosis (puff up  people) 
 
(+) 8:3 – those who love God are known by God         God (knowledge  self = God)  
(-) 8:2 – people who think they know actually do not yet know        - people (claimed knowledge  selves = people) 
 
(+)  8:4-6 – We know that the “idol is nothing” and that “there is no God but one;” that there is one God, the Father 
… and one Lord, Jesus Christ …        We (all this knowledge self) 
(-)  8:7 – Others do not have this knowledge  others (not all this knowledge  self) 
 
(+) 8:6 – for “us” there is one God the father and one Lord Jesus Christ      (one God and one Lord  “us” = people)  
(-) 8:5 – there are many gods and many lords  (many gods and many lords  “other” = people) 
 
(+) 8:9b, 10a – gnosis gives exousia to eat in idol’s temple  gnosis (freedom/right  people) 
(-) 8:9c, 11a – gnosis and exousia cause stumbling and destruction gnosis (destruction  people) 
 
(+) 8:13, 10:32 – not eating idol-food to not scandalize people  Paul (no scandal  people) 
(-) 8:9-11a – eating becomes a stumbling block to people  “strong” people (stumbling block people) 
 
(+) 9:2b – Paul is an apostle to the Corinthians   Corinthians (recognition  Paul) 
(-) 9:2a – Paul may not be an apostle to other people  others (no recognition  Paul) 
 
(+) 10:20b – earthly Israel offered sacrifice to God  earthly Israel (sacrifice  God) 
(-) 10:20a – earthly Israel offered sacrifice to demons  earthly Israel (sacrifice  demons) 
 
(+) 10:21a – “you are not able to drink the Lord’s cup and the demons’ cup”  Corinthians (the Lord’s cup  selves) 
(-) 10:21a – “you are not able to drink the Lord’s cup and the demons’ cup”  Corinthians (the demons’ cup  selves) 
 
(+) 10:21b – “not to share the Lord’s table and the demons’ table” Corinthians (the Lord’s table  selves) 
(-) 10:21b – “not to share the Lord’s table and the demons’ table” Corinthians (the demons’ table  selves) 
 
(+) 10:23a – [implied] not everything brings benefit  (benefit  people) 
(-) 10:23a – not everything brings benefit   (no benefit  people) 
 
(+) 10:23b – [implied] not everything builds up  (edification  people) 
(-) 10:23b – not everything builds up   (no edification  people) 
 
(+) 10:24b – people seek the thing of other   Corinthians (thing of other  selves) 
(-) 10:24a – people seek their own thing   Corinthians (own thing  selves) 
 
(+) 10:28-29 – do not eat for the sake of other’s conscience  (not eating  selves) 
(-) 10:25, 27 – eat without judging anything for the sake of conscience (eating  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 11:4, 7a – [implied] when prophesying, no head covering honors the “head”   man (no head covering  self) 
(-) 11:4 – when prophesying, head covering is a dishonor     - man (head covering  self) 
 
(+) 11:5-6b, 6d – [implied] when prophesying, head covering honors the “head”  woman (head covering  self) 




(+) 11:26 – proclaim the Lord’s death, remember it, receive the Covenant … those corrected in the Lord’s Supper   
      (union of Lord’s death and covenantal vocation  selves) 
(-) 11:30 – those did not pass the test become weak, ill, and dead (weakness, ill, death  selves) 
 
(+) 11:31 – not judged if discerning at the Lord’s Supper discerning people (no judgment  selves)  
(-) 11:29 – judged if did not discern at the Lord’s Supper  non-discerning people (judgment  selves) 
 
(+) 11:33 – receive from one another in coming together      those receive from one another (Lord’s Supper  selves) 
(-) 11:20-21 – individually eating own supper       those do not receive from one another (individual supper  selves) 
 
(+) 12:3c – people in the holy spirit say Jesus is Lord   people in the holy spirit (Lordship  Jesus) 
(-) 12:3b – people saying anathema     people not in the spirit of God (anathema  Jesus) 
 
(+) 13:1 – [implied] I should have love when speaking in tongues       (love  self) 
(-) 13:1 – I become a roaring brass when speaking in tongues without love (roaring brass, clanging cymbal  self) 
 
(+) 13:2 – [implied] I prophesy, know all mysteries, and move mountains with love  (love  self) 
(-) 13:2 – I prophesy, know all mysteries, and move mountains without love      (nothing  self) 
 
(+) 13: 3 – [implied] I give away all possession and body with love   (love  self) 
(-) 13:3 – I give away all possession and body without love gain nothing  (nothing  self) 
 
(+) 13:4a-b, 6b-8a – (endurance, mercy, rejoicing in truth, enduring all things, faithful/trusting all things, hoping all  
     things, enduring all things, never falling love) 
(-) 13:4c-6a – (jealousy, boasting, puff up, shaming, self-seeking, anger, calculating bad thing, rejoicing in injustice  
                        love) 
 
(+) 13:13a – faith, hope, and love remain   (eternity  love) 
(-) 13:8b-d – prophecy, tongue, gnosis will pass away  (impermanence  prophecy, tongue, gnosis) 
 
(+) 14:3 – s/he who prophesies speaks to people   prophet (understanding  people)   
(-) 14:2 – s/he who speaks in tongue does not speak to people   tongue speaker (no understanding  people) 
 
(+) 14:3, 4b – the person prophesying builds up ekklesia prophet (building up  ekklesia) 
(-) 14:4a – the person speaking in tongue builds up himself tongue speaker (building up  self) 
 
(+) 14:5 – tongues and interpretation will build up ekklesia  (building up  ekklesia) 
(-) 14:5 – [implied] tongue [alone] will not build up  (no building up  ekklesia) 
 
(+) 14:6b – prophecy, teaching, gnosis, apocalypse will benefit   (benefit  ekklesia) 
(-) 14:6a – speaking in tongues will not benefit      (no benefit  ekklesia) 
 
(+) 14:16 – [implied] people will understand if blessing in mind     blessing in the mind (understanding  people) 
(-) 14:16 – people will not understand if blessing spirit        blessing in spirit (no understanding  people) 
 
(+) 14:20c – become mature in prudence  Corinthians (maturity  selves) 
(-) 14:20a – do not become children in prudence Corinthians (childishness  selves) 
 
(+) 14:20b – be babbling infants in bad things (babbling infant in bad things  selves) 
(-)  3:3 – [implied] do not be babbling infants (babbling infant in good things  selves)  
 
(+) 14:22b – tongues are a sign for unbelievers people who speak tongues (sign  people) 
(-) 14:22a – tongues are not a sign for believers people who speak tongues (no sign  people) 
 
(+) 14:24-25 – prophecy causes conviction, judgment and worship      (conviction, judgment, worship  unbelievers) 
(-) 14:23 – tongues cause unbelievers to think believers are mad          (misunderstanding  unbelievers) 
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(+) 14:37 – prophet or spiritual should acknowledge Paul’s command  (acknowledgement  Paul) 
(-) 14:38 – people should not disregard Paul’s command as from the Lord (disregard  Paul) 
 
(+) 15:2a-b – Corinthians are saved by the gospel when they hold it fast  gospel (salvation  Corinthians) 
(-) 15:2c – the Corinthians believed in vain if they don’t the gospel fast  Corinthians (vanity  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 15:12a – Christ is preached as raised from the dead God (resurrection of the Christ  people) 
(-) 15:12b – Corinthians deny resurrection of the dead     Corinthians (no resurrection of the dead  people) 
 
(+) 15:15 – [implied] we did not testify falsely that God raised Christ We (true testimony  God) 
(-) 15:15a-b – we testified falsely that God raised Christ  We (false testimony  God) 
 
(+) 15:36 – “what you sow is not made alive unless it dies”  death (life  what sown) 
(-) 15:36 – [implied] what you sow is not made alive unless it dies” no death (death  what sown) 
 
(+) 15:42b – raised in un-corruption the state of raised (un-corruption  people) 
(-) 15:42a – sown in corruption  the state of not raised (corruption  people) 
 
(+) 15:43b – raised in glory  the state of raised (glory  people) 
(-) 15:43a – sown in dishonor  the state of not raised (dishonor  people) 
 
(+) 15:43d – raised in power  the state of raised (power  people) 
(-) 15:43c – sown in weakness  the state of not raised (weakness  people) 
 
(+) 15:44b – raised a spiritual body  the state of raised (spiritual body  people) 
(-) 15:44a – sown a physical body   the state of not raised (physical body  people) 
 
(+) 15:51c – we will all be changed   time (change  “we”) 
(-) 15:51b – we will all not fall asleep  time (sleep  “we”) 
 
(+) 15:57 – God gives victory through Lord Jesus Christ God (victory  people) 
(-) 15:56 – the sting of death is sin    sin (death  people) 
 
(+) 16:7b – Paul wants to spend some time   Paul (longer visit  Corinthians) 
(-) 16:7a – Paul does not want to visit in passing  - Paul (short visit  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 16:10a-c – Corinthians should not let Timothy fearful Corinthians (respect  Timothy) 
(-) 16:11- Corinthians should not despise Timothy  Corinthians (despise  Timothy) 
 
(+) 16:12d – Apollos will go to Paul when he has the opportunity Apollos (accompaniment  Paul) 
(-) 16:12c – Apollos is not willing to go to Paul now Apollos  Apollos (no accompaniment  Paul) 
 
(+) 16:23 – people receiving the gift of the Lord Jesus (gift of the Lord Jesus  people) 
(-) 16:22a – people receiving the anathema   (anathema  people) 
 
II. The Warranting Level 
 
(+) 1:5 – Corinthians were enriched in everything in God   God (gifts  Corinthians) 
(+) 4:7b – whatever Corinthians possess comes not from themselves      God (gifts  Corinthians)  
(-) 4:7c – Corinthians acted as if possession is not the result of receiving       - (self-generated possessionsselves) 
  
(+) 1:6 – testimony of Christ was confirmed among Corinthians for Paul     (testimony of Christ  Paul) 




(+) 1:9b – God called the Corinthians into the fellowship of Jesus Christ    God (fellowship  Corinthians) 
(-) 1:12b-e – different groups grouped themselves        different groups (groups  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 1:13b – Christ was crucified for you   Christ (crucifixion  Corinthians) 
(-) 1:13b – Paul was not crucified for you [ellipsis]  Paul (no crucifixion  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 1:13c – the Corinthians were baptized into the name of Jesus  Jesus (baptism  Corinthians) 
(-) 1:13c – the Corinthians were not baptized into the name of Paul [ellipsis]  Paul (no baptism  Corinthians) 
   
(+) 1:17b – Christ sent Paul to evangelize not with wisdom of logos  Christ (mission of evangelism  Paul) 
(-) 1:17a – Christ did not send Paul to baptize   Christ (mission of baptism  Paul) 
  
(+) 2:3 – Paul came in weakness, fear, and trembling        Paul (weakness, fear, trembling  Corinthians) 
(-) 2:1 – Paul did not come with superiority of logos and wisdom  Paul (eloquence and wisdom  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 2:2b – Paul wants to know Jesus and him crucified among Corinthians Paul (Christ and crucified  self) 
(-) 2:2a – Paul does not want to know any other thing among Corinthians - Paul (something else  self) 
 
(+) 2:4b – Paul’s logos and kerygma in demonstration of the spirit and power Paul (demonstration  Corinthians) 
(-) 2:4a – Paul’s logos and kerygma not in persuasion of wisdom  - Paul (persuasive logos of wisdom  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 2:5b – pistis in the power of God   Paul (God’s power  Corinthians) 
(-) 2:5a – pistis not in the wisdom of humans  Paul (human’s wisdom  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 2:8 – no crucifixion, if the rulers of this age had received the hidden wisdom  (no crucifixion  Jesus) 
(-) 2:8 – crucifixion because the rulers of this age received the hidden wisdom  (crucifixion  Jesus) 
 
(+) 2:8c – [implied] wisdom of God glorifies the Lord [v. 8 – “lord of glory”] God (glory  Lord) 
(-) 2:8c – wisdom of the rulers of this age crucified the lord of glory            rulers of this age (crucifixion  Lord) 
 
(+) 2:9d, 10a, 12c – God prepared and revealed to those who love him  (revelation  those who love God) 
(-) 2:9 – those who do not love God receives not what God prepared (no revelation  those who do not love God) 
 
(+) 2:11b – the human’s spirit within her/him knows the things of her/him   spirit of human (human things  human)  
(-) 2:11a – nobody knows the things of human          human (no human things   human) 
 
(+) 2:11d – the spirit of God knows the things of God  spirit of God (divine things  human) 
(-) 2:11c – nobody knows the things of God   human (no divine things  human) 
 
(+) 2:12b – “we” received the spirit from God   God (spirit from God  “we”) 
(-) 2:12a – “we” did not receive the spirit of the cosmos - cosmos (spirit of the cosmos  “we”) 
 
(+) 2:12b – “we” received the spirit from God    God (spirit from God  people) 
(-) 2:14 – the physical cannot receive the things of the spirit of God   the physical (not the spirit of God  people) 
 
(+) 3:1a – Paul could not address the Corinthians as spiritual people        Paul (teaching  spiritual Corinthians)  
(-) 3:1b – Paul addressed the Corinthians as fleshly people, babbling infants      - Paul (teaching fleshy Corinthians) 
 
(+) 3:2b – Paul could not give solid food to the Corinthians Paul (solid food  Corinthians) 
(-) 3:2a – Paul gave milk to Corinthians   Paul (milk  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 3:5d – Paul and Apollos are diakonoi    Lord (diakonoi  Apollos and Paul) 
(-) 3:5a-b – [implied] the Corinthians misrecognize Paul and Apollos (someone important  Apollos and Paul) 
  
(+) 3:11b – only Jesus can set up foundation    Jesus (foundation  people) 
(-) 3:11a – nobody can set up other foundation besides what is laid  people (no foundation  people) 
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(+) 3:14 – if anyone’s work remains, s/he will receive wage           God (wage & salvation people) 
(-) 3:15 – if anyone’s work burnt down, s/he will be punished, though saved  God (punishment & salvation people) 
 
(+) 4:8d – “we” and Corinthians became king Corinthians (kingship  Corinthians and “we”) 
(-) 4:8c – Corinthians alone became king  Corinthians (kingship  selves) 
 
(+) 4:20b – the kingdom of God is in power  (power  kingdom of God) 
(-)  4:20a – the kingdom of God is not in the logos (logos  kingdom of God) 
 
(+) 5:7c-d – Corinthians are unleavened    paschal lamb (unleavened bread  people) 
(-) 5:6c – a little yeast ferments the entire batch of dough yeast (leavened bread  people) 
 
(+) 6:11b-d – Corinthians washed and justified in the Lord and God Lord and God (washing  Corinthians) 
(-) 6:11a – Corinthians not washed and were wicked   (no washing  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 6:17 – the person who joined with the Lord is one spirit  Corinthians (selves  Christ) 
(-) 6:16b – the person who joined with the pornes is one body  Corinthians (selves  pornes) 
 
(+) 6:17 - Corinthians become one spirit with the Lord Lord (spirit  Corinthians) 
(-) 6:16c – Corinthians become one flesh with the pornes pornes (flesh  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 6:20a – the Corinthians were bought with a price  Corinthians (ownership  God) 
(-) 6:19 – the Corinthians do not belong to themselves Corinthians (ownership  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 9:9, 10b – thresher threshes in hope to share  people (food  ox) 
(-) 9:9 – you shall not muzzle an ox that is threshing  people (muzzle  ox) 
 
(+) 9:10a – God is concerned about us   God (concern  “we”) 
(-) 9:9 – God is not concern about the oxen   God (no concern  oxen) 
 
(+) 9:12b, 15a – we did not make use of our authority/right among you   “we” (no authority/right  selves) 
(-) 9:12a, 10b, 14 – others made use of their authority/right among you  others (authority/right  selves) 
 
(+) 9:15c – Paul would rather die than to lose his boast  (death  Paul) 
(-) 9:15d – Paul does not want anyone to empty him of his boast - other (empty of boast  Paul) 
 
(+) 9:16b - it is because of necessity that Paul evangelizes   gospel (necessity  Paul) 
(-) 9:16a – it is not because of boasting that Paul evangelizes   - gospel (boasting  Paul) 
(-) 9:16c – it is because of woe that Paul evangelizes   - gospel (woe  Paul) 
 
(+) 9:17b – evangelism is a stewardship, unwillingly speaking  + gospel (stewardship responsibility  Paul) 
(-) 9:17a – Paul would receive a wage if he evangelizes willingly -   gospel (wage  Paul) 
  
(+) 9:18b – Paul wants to make the gospel free of charge to people Paul (gospel free of charge  people) 
(-) 9:18c – Paul does not want to make use of his evangelism wage - Paul (gospel not free for people  people) 
 
(+) 9:25c – we are in contest for an imperishable wreath  (imperishable wreath  “we”) 
(-) 9:25b – the runners in contest for a perishable wreath  - (perishable wreath  “we”) 
 
(+) 9:26a – Paul does not run without an aim (goal  Paul) 
(-) 9:26b – Paul is beating the air   - (air  Paul) 
 
(+) 9:27a – Paul brings his body to subjection so that he is not disqualified Paul (qualification  self) 





(+) 10:13a – no trial has grasped you, except the common one  (common trial/temptation  Corinthians) 
(-) 10:13a – uncommon trial has grasped you   - (uncommon trial/temptation  Corinthians) 
 
(+) 10:3-4 – “our fathers” ate and drank the spiritual food and drink  Christ (spiritual food and drink  “our fathers”) 
(-) 10:8b-c – some of “our fathers” committed porneia and died        porneia (death  “our fathers”) 
(-) 10:9b-c – some of “our fathers” tested God and destroyed by snakes        testing (destruction  “our fathers”) 
(-) 10:10b-c – some of “our fathers” grumbled and destroyed          grumbling (destruction  “our fathers”) 
 
(+) 10:33a – Paul pleases everyone in everything   Paul (please  everyone) 
(-) 10:33b – Paul does not seek his own benefit   - Paul (please  self) 
(-) 10:5, 7b-c – some of “our fathers” ate and drank and danced - “our fathers” (please  selves) 
 
(+) 11:6c – [implied] woman should not have hair cut off or shaven  hair (honor  woman) 
(+) 11:15 – long hair gives woman glory because it covers   long hair (glory  woman) 
(-) 11:6c – it is shameful for woman to have her hair cut off or shaven  no hair (shame  woman) 
(+) 11:8a, 9a – in the beginning, the man is not created through the woman man (origin  woman) 
(-) 11:8b, 9b – [implied] in the beginning, woman is created through the man  -woman (no origin  woman) 
  
(+) 11:11 – in the Lord   man does not exist independently of woman  woman (origin/authority  man) 
(+) 11:11 – in the Lord, woman does not exist independently of man   man (origin/authority  woman) 
(-implied) 11:11 – NOT in the Lord, man exists independently of woman  -woman (origin/authority –/ man) 
(-implied) 11:11 – NOT in the Lord, woman exists independently of man  -man (origin/authority –/ woman) 
Note: These pairs of opposed actions can also be in the dialogic level 
 
(+) 11:14 – [implied] short hair, not covering the head [cf. 11:7a], is an honor to man     short hair (honor  man) 
(-) 11:14 – natures shows that man with long hair is a dishonor because it covers            long hair (dishonor  man) 
 
(+) 11:19 – haireseis is a necessity among Corinthians to reveal the approved ones (existence  haireseis) 
(-) 1:11 – strife among Corinthians       (existence  strife) 
 
(+) 11:24a – Jesus gave thanks   Jesus (thanksgiving  God) 
(-) 11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God  people (betrayal  God) 
 
(+) 13:10a – when the fulfillment comes, the partial will pass away future (fulfillment  “we”) 
(-) 13:10b – when the fulfillment comes, the partial will pass away  present (partial fulfillment  “we”) 
 
(+) 13:11b – adult get rid of babbling infant stuffs       adult (grown-up speech, thought, reasoning  self) 
(-) 13:11a – babbling infant act and think like a babbling infant   infant (infant speech, thought, reasoning  self) 
 
(+) 13:12b – will see face to face   future (face to face vision  self) 
(-) 13:12a – now see through the mirror in enigma present (mirror vision  self) 
 
(+) 13:12d – will know fully  future (full knowledge  self) 
(-) 13:12c – now know partially  present (partial knowledge  self) 
 
(+) 14:33b – God is of peace in all the ekklesiai God (peace  ekklesiai of the holy ones) 
(-) 14:33a – God is not of disorder    God (disorder  ekklesiai of the holy ones) 
 
(+) 14:36b – the logos of God did not go to Corinthians only  God (the logos of God  people) 
(-) 14:36a – the logos of God did not come from Corinthians  Corinthians (the logos of God  people) 
 
(+) 15:10 – “by the gift of God I am who I am” – an apostle gift of God (Paul the apostle  ekklesia of God) 





(+) 15:22b – in Christ all will be made alive  Jesus (life  all people) 
(-) 15:22a – in Adam all die [present tense]  Adam (death  all people) 
 
(+) 15:30 – we are in danger every hour  (danger  “we”) 
(-) 15:32d – let us eat and drink   (food and drink  “we”) 
 
(+) 15:31a – I die every day (= I am raised everyday)  (resurrection  people) 
























Appendix 3 – The Story Progression in 1 Corinthians 
I. The Dialogic Level (Paul’s interaction with the Corinthians) 
(+) 16:12d – Apollos goes to Paul when he has the opportunity  (-) 16:12c – Apollos is not willing to go to Paul now  
(+) 16:7b – Paul wants to spend some time with the Corinthians (-) 16:7a – Paul does not want to visit in passing 
(+) 16:10a-c – should not let Timothy be afraid       (-) 16:11- Corinthians should not despise Timothy  
(+) 4:14b – Paul wrote these things to admonish    (-) 4:14a – Paul did not write to shame 
(+) 4:21c – Paul wants to visit with love and consideration    (-) 4:21b – Paul did not want to visit with a rod  
(+) 1:10d – Paul urges Corinthians to say the same thing   (-) 3:4b-c – the Corinthians say different things 
(+) 1:10e – Paul urges no schismata      (-) 3:3b, 11:18 – jealousy/strife among Corinthians  
(+) 4:19c – Paul wants to find out about/to receive the power   (-) 4:19b – Paul does not want talk 
(+) 6:1b, 5 – bring the lawsuits before the holy ones (-) 6:1a, 6 – bring the lawsuits to the unjust and the apistoi 
(+) 6:7 – should rather be unjustified and robbed (-) 6:8 – the Corinthians unjustify and rob each other 
(+) 6:7 – should not have lawsuit against each other (-) 6:6 – sue against each other  
(+) 7:21b, 23b – if possible, become a freed person (-) 7:23b – [implied] do not become slaves of people 
(+) 7:13 – the wife should not divorce her apistos husband      (-) 7:15a-b – the wife divorces her apistos husband  
(+) 7:12 – the pistos husband should not divorce his apistos wife (-) 7:15c – the husband divorces his apistos wife 
(+) 7:11, 27a – should not seek release from [pistoi?] wives       (-) 7:27b – adelphos released from his [pistos?] wife 
(+) 7:4b – the husband has authority over his wife’s body          (-) 7:4a – the wife has authority over her own body 
(+) 7:4d – the wife has authority over her husband’s body          (-) 7:4c – the husband has authority over his body 
(+) 7:9c – it is relatively better to get married   (-) 7:9d – it is better not to get burnt 
(+) 7:38b – a man who does not marry his virgin do better  (-) 7:38a – a man who marries his virgin does well 
(+) 7:40 – the widow is happier if not remarried                         (-) 7:38 – the widow is free to remarry in the Lord 
(+) 7:28d – the unmarried will avoid fleshly tribulation    (-) 7:28a-c – the married people will have flesh tribulation 
(+) 7:34b – the unmarried woman focuses on the Lord      (-) 7:34c – the married woman focuses on her husband  
(+) 7:32 – the unmarried man pleases the Lord             (-) 7:33 – the married man pleases the wife  
(+) 7:8 – it’s good for the unmarried and widows to remain so  (-) 7:9 – let the unmarried and widows marry if they... 
(+) 7:35c – Paul presents the Corinthians properly to the Lord   (-) 7:35b – Paul does not want to restrain Corinthians 
(+) 7:19b – keeping the commandment is meaningful  (-) 7:19a – circumcision and non-circumcision not meaningful 
(+) 7:7b – God gives each his/her own gift    (-) 7:7a – [implied] God gives everyone the same gift 
(+) 5:5a – hand over the person who did porneia to satan     (-) 5:1-2 – not taking out the person committing  porneia 
(+) 5:13b – should take out wickedness            (-) 5:2 – the Corinthians were puffed up about the deed 
(+) 5:1b – no such porneia among the Gentiles           (-) 5:1a – has such porneia among Corinthians 
(+) 5:2b – should have mourned for such porneia (-) 5:2a – the Corinthians were puffed up 
(+) 6:15c – do not become a member of a pornēs    (-) 6:15c – [implied] becoming a member of a pornēs 
(+) 6:13d – the body is for the Lord   (-) 6:13c – the body is not for porneia 
(+) 6:20b – should glorify God with body (plural) (-) 6:13c – [implied?] the body is not for porneia 
(+) 2:7a – “we” speak of hidden wisdom of God in mystery (-) 2:6 – “we” speak of wisdom not of this age 
(+) 2:13b – “we” speak of gifts in the teaching of the spirit   (-) 2:13a – “we” speak of gifts not in the human wisdom  
(+) 2:15 – the spiritual examines all things            (-) 2:14 – the physical cannot know and examine 
(+) 14:37 – should acknowledge Paul’s command…           (-) 14:38 – should not disregard Paul’s command … 
(+) 9:2b – Paul is an apostle to the Corinthians             (-) 9:2a – Paul may not be an apostle to other people  
(+) 5:3b – Paul is present in the spirit            (-) 5:3a – Paul is absent in the body 
(+) 4:14b, 10:14 – the Corinthians are Paul’s beloved children    (-) 3:2d-3a – Paul calls Corinthians babbling infants 
(+) 14:5 – tongues and interpretation build up the ekklesia  (-) 14:5 – [implied] tongue [alone] will not build up 
(+) 14:22b – tongues are a sign for unbelievers (status?)     (-) 14:22a – tongues are not a sign for believers 
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(+) 14:16 – people understand if blessing with the mind  (-) 14:16 – people will not understand if blessing in spirit 
(+) 14:24-25 – prophecy causes conviction and worship  (-) 14:23 – speaking in tongues causes confusion 
(+) 14:3, 4b – the one prophesies builds up ekklesia         (-) 14:4a – the one speaks in tongue builds up her/himself  
(+) 14:3 – the one prophesies speaks to people      (-) 14:2 – the one speaks in tongue does not speak to people 
(+) 14:6b – prophecy… gnosis, apocalypse benefit Corinthians  (-) 14:6a – speaking in tongues not beneficial 
(+) 14:20c – should become mature in prudence    (-) 14:20a – do not become children in prudence  
(+) 8:13, 10:32 – should not scandalize people when eating idol-food (-) 8:9-11a – eating scandalize people 
(+) 8:9b, 10a – those with gnosis eat in idol’s temple (-) 8:9c, 11a – gnosis and exousia cause stumbling-destruction 
(+) 10:28-29 – should not eat idol-food because of conscience      (-) 10:25, 27 – conscience judged when eating 
(+) 10:21 – should not drink the Lord’s cup and the demons’ cup (-) 10:21 – [implied] drink the Lord’s and demons’  
(+) 8:8; 6:13 – food will not offer us to God        (-) 8:8 [implied] – food will offer us to God 
(+) 8:1e – love builds up    (-) 8:1d – gnosis puffs up 
(+) 8:3 – those who love God are known by God (-) 8:2 – people who think they know actually do not yet know  
(+) 6:12, 10:23a, 10:23b – not everything is beneficial and edifying  (-) 6:12ac, 10:23 – everything is permitted 
(+) 10:24b – should seek the thing of other            (-) 10:24a – people seek their own thing 
(+) 11:33 – should receive from one another    (-) 11:20-21 – individually eating own supper 
(+) 11:31 – not judged if discern the Lord’s body   (-) 11:29 – judged if do not discern the Lord’s body  
(+) 11:26 – should proclaim the Lord’s death … the Covenant  (-) 11:30 – those fail the test become weak, ill, dead 
(+) 16:23 – should receive the gift of the Lord       (-) 16:22a – people receive anathema  
(+) 3:17b – God corrupts yet saves those who corrupt the temple   (-) 3:17a – people corrupt the temple of God 
(+) 3:9 b-c, 3:17c – Corinthians are God’s building/temple      (-) 10:20c – Corinthians should not be demon-partners 
(+) 4:1 – Paul and other apostles are helpers of Christ              (-) 3:4 – Corinthians are helpers of Apollos, or Paul 
(+) 4:3 – Paul does not even judge himself               (-) 4:3a-b – it’s a small thing for Paul to be judged  
(+) 3:18c – the Corinthians should think that they are fools in God    (-) 3:18b – people think that they are wise 
(+) 3:22-23 – all things belong to the Corinthians, Christ, and God (-) 3:4a-b – I belong to Paul, or Apollos 
(+) 1:30a – the Corinthians are in Christ because of God (-) 1:12 – I belong to Paul, Apollos, Cephas, or Christ    
  (+) 7:29d – from “now on” those having wives as if not having wives  (-) 7:29d – those having wives have wives 
  (+) 7:30a – from “now on” those wailing as if not wailing         (-) 7:30a – those wailing are bewailing 
  (+) 7:30b – from “now on” those rejoicing as if not rejoicing  (-) 7:30b – those rejoicing rejoice 
  (+) 7:30c – from “now on” those buying as if not possessing             (-) 7:30c – those possessing what they buy 
(+) 7:31a – from “now on” those using the cosmos as if not using        (-) 7:31a – those using the cosmos are using 
(+) 8:4-6 – We know that the “idol is nothing,” that “there is no God     (-) 8:7 – Others do not have this knowledge  
but one,” and that there is one God, the Father … and one Lord, Jesus Christ… 
(+) 8:6 – for “us” there is one God…and one Lord Jesus Christ       (-) 8:5 – there are many gods and many lords 
(+) 6:12b – should not be mastered by anything         (-) 6:12a, c – all things are permitted 
(+) 5:8c – celebrate with unleavened bread of purity….  (-) 5:8b – do not celebrate with yeast of wickedness 
(+) 5:7a-b – get rid of the old yeast to become a new batch (-) 5:8a – do not celebrate with old yeast 
(+) 12:3c – people in the Holy Spirit say Jesus is Lord (-) 12:3b – people say anathema concerning the Lord 
(+) 15:51c – “we” will all be changed   (-) 15:51b – we will all not fall asleep 
(+) 15:2a-b – the Corinthians are saved if hold fast to the gospel (-) 15:2c – the Corinthians believe in vain otherwise 
(+) 15:15 – [implied] we did not testify falsely that God raised Christ (-) 15:15a-b – we testified falsely 
(+) 15:12a – Christ is preached as raised from the dead (-) 15:12b – Corinthians say there is no resurrection 
  (+) 15:42b – raised in un-corruption (-) 15:42a – sown in corruption 
  (+) 15:43b – raised in glory  (-) 15:43a – sown in dishonor 
  (+) 15:43d – raised in power  (-) 15:43c – sown in weakness 
(+) 15:44b – raised a spiritual body  (-) 15:44a – sown a physical body  
(+) 15:57 – God gives victory through Lord Jesus Christ        (-) 15:56 – the sting of death is sin 
(+) 15:36 – “what you sow is not made alive unless it dies”   (-) 15:36 – what you sow is dead if it does not die 
(+) 13:3 – I give away possession and body with love            (-) 13:3 – I give away … without love gain nothing  
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(+) 13:2 – I prophesy, know mysteries, move mountains with love (-) 13:2 – I prophesy … without love  
(+) 13:1 – I speak in tongues with love        (-) 13:1 – I become a roaring brass when I speak in tongues without love 
(+) 13:13a – faith, hope, and love will remain    (-) 13:8b-d – prophecy, tongue, gnosis will pass away 
 
II. The Warranting Level (The Past and Future Stories) 
(+) 4:8d – Paul wished to be king with the Corinthians             (-) 4:8c – the Corinthians became king by themselves 
(+) 3:2b – Paul wished to give solid food to the Corinthians (-) 3:2a – Paul gave milk to Corinthians  
(+) 3:1a – Paul wished to address the Corinthians as spiritual   (-) 3:1b – Paul addressed Corinthians as fleshly 
(+) 13:11b – an adult should get rid of the infant thinking    (-) 13:11a – a babbling infant act and think like an infant    
(+) 11:14 – [implied] short hair, not covering the head, is an honor to man (-) 11:14 – man with long hair is a shame 
(+) 11:6c – [implied] woman not to have the hair cut off  (-) 11:6c – it is shameful for woman to have the hair cut off 
(+) 10:33a – Paul seeks to please everyone in everything (-) 10:33b – Paul does not seek his own benefit  
(+) 11:19 – haireseis are necessary to reveal the approved (-) 1:11 – strife among the Corinthians 
(+) 11:11 – in the Lord, woman not independent of man (-) 11:11 – [implied] woman independent of man 
(+) 11:11 – in the Lord, man not independent of woman (-) 11:11 – [implied] man independent of woman   
(+) 11:8a, 9a – man is not from the woman          (-) 11:8b, 9b – [implied] woman created through the man  
(+) 14:36b – the logos of God did not go to some believers only  (-) 14:36a – the logos of God is not from believers  
(+) 14:33b – God is the God of peace in all the ekklesiai     (-) 14:33a – God is not of disorder   
(+) 3:14 – if one’s work remains, one receives the wage     (-) 3:15 – if one’s work burnt down, one suffers but saved 
(+) 9:15c – Paul would rather die than to lose his boast       (-) 9:15d – Paul does not want his boast be emptied  
(+) 9:26a – Paul does not want to run without an aim         (-) 9:26b – Paul is beating the air  
(+) 9:27a – Paul trains his body to be qualified         (-) 9:27b – Paul does not want to be disqualified 
(+) 9:25c – “we” compete for an imperishable wreath         (-) 9:25b – the runners run for a perishable wreath 
(+) 9:18b – Paul makes the gospel free of charge                (-) 9:18c – Paul does not want to make use of his exousia 
(+) 9:12b, 15a – “we” did not use our exousia among you  (-) 9:12a, 10b, 14 – others made use of their exousia 
(+) 9:9, 10b – thresher threshes in the hope to share         (-) 9:9 – you shall not muzzle an ox that is threshing  
(+) 3:5d – Paul and Apollos are [only] diakonoi of God      (-) 3:5a-b – believers misrecognize Paul and Apollos  
(+) 9:17b – evangelism is a stewardship…               (-) 9:17a – Paul receiving a wage if he evangelizes willingly 
(+) 9:16b – Paul evangelizes because of “necessity” (-) 9:16a – Paul does not evangelize because of boasting 
(-) 9:16c – woe is to Paul if he does not evangelize 
(+) 2:4b – Paul’s logos… in the spirit and power         (-) 2:4a – Paul’s logos… not in persuasion of wisdom   
(+) 2:3 – Paul went to the Corinthians in weakness…         (-) 2:1 – Paul did not go with the superiority of logos…  
(+) 2:2b – Paul decided to know nothing but Jesus Christ   (-) 2:2a – Paul does not want to know any other thing 
(+) 1:17b – Christ sent Paul to evangelize…                      (-) 1:17a – Christ did not send Paul to baptize 
(+) 6:17 – believers become one spirit with the Lord           (-) 6:16b – believers become one body with the pornēs  
(+) 6:17 – believers should be joined with the Lord             (-) 6:16c – believers become one flesh with the pornēs 
(+) 6:11b-d – believers were washed… in the Lord and God        (-) 6:11a – [implied] believers were not washed… 
(+) 6:20a – believers were bought with a price                     (-) 6:19 – believers do not belong to themselves 
(+) 5:7c-d – believers are unleavened because of the paschal lamb    (-) 5:6c – a little yeast ferments the entire dough 
(+) 1:13c – believers baptized into the name of Jesus              (-) 1:13c – believers not baptized into the name of Paul  
(+) 2:5b – the pistis should be in the power of God                (-) 2:5a –the pistis not in the wisdom of humans 
(+) 4:20b – the kingdom of God is in the power             (-) 4:20a – the kingdom of God is not in the logos  
(+) 3:11b – only Jesus can set up the foundation                   (-) 3:11a – nobody can set up the foundation   
(+) 2:8 – no crucifixion, if received the hidden wisdom    (-) 2:8 – crucifixion when not receiving the hidden wisdom 
(+) 2:8c – [implied] the wisdom of God glorifies the Lord  (-) 2:8c – the wisdom of the rulers crucified the Lord 
(+) 2:11d – the spirit of God knows the things of God   (-) 2:11c – nobody knows the things of God 
(+) 2:11b – only the human’s spirit knows her/his own things    (-) 2:11a – nobody knows the things of human 
235 
 
(+) 2:12b – receiving the spirit of God to recognize God’s gifts (-) 2:12a – not receiving the spirit of the cosmos 
(+) 2:12b – “we” received the spirit from God     (-) 2:14 – the physical cannot receive the things of the spirit of God  
(+) 15:10 – “by the gift of God I am who I am” – an apostle (-) 15:9c – Paul persecuted the ekklesia of God 
(+) 2:9d, 10a, 12c – God prepared for those who love God (-) 2:9 – those who do not love God do not receive 
  (+) 13:12d – when the end comes, I will know fully  (-) 13:12c – now I know partially 
  (+) 13:12b – when the end comes, I will see face to face    (-) 13:12a – now I see through the mirror in enigma 
(+) 13:10a – when the end comes, the partial will pass away   (-) 13:10b – when the end comes, the partial is gone 
(+) 10:13a – no trial has grasped you, except the common one (-) 10:13a – uncommon trial has grasped you 
(+) 1:9b – God called believers into the fellowship of Jesus      (-) 1:12b-e – different groups grouped themselves  
(+) 15:22b – in Christ all will be made alive                (-) 15:22a – in Adam all die [present tense]  
(+) 15:31a – Paul dies every day (= Paul is raised everyday)  (-) 15:29b – the dead are not raised [present tense]  
(+) 15:30 – “we” are in danger every hour   (-) 15:32d – let us eat and drink   
(+) 11:24a – Jesus thanked God when breaking the bread         (-) 11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God 
(+) 1:13b – Christ was crucified for people   (-) 1:13b – Paul was not crucified for people 
(+) 1:6 – Christ’s testimony was confirmed among believers    (-) 1:11 – strife was reported by Chloe’s household 
(+) 1:5 – believers were enriched in everything in God      (-) 4:7c – believers acted as if receiving nothing from God 
(+) 10:3-4 – “our fathers” ate the same spiritual food  (-) 10:8b-c – some of “our fathers” committed porneia and die 
(-) 10:9b-c – some of “our fathers” tested God and destroyed by snakes         
(-) 10:10b-c – some of “our fathers” grumbled and destroyed  
















Chapter 4 – A Semantic Analysis of Paul’s Vision of Love in 1 Corinthians 
Heteronomy, Vigilance, and Fidelity 
 
This is the paradox of love: where there is much love there is much pain; where 
there is little love there is little pain … In love heaven and earth coexist. In it good 
and evil struggle for domination. And in love the divine purges and redeems the 
love that is self-serving and abusive.1 – C. S. Song 
 
I. Introduction 
This chapter presents a semantic analysis of Paul’s notion of love in 1 Corinthians that 
seeks to elucidate Paul’s vision of love as related to his convictional experience. On the basis of 
such a textual analysis and interpretation of its results, we will argue that Paul’s experience and 
vision of love are non-objectifying: charismatic, messianic, performative, and typological. This 
heteronomous view of love is expressed in Paul’s text by the fact that love is always presented in 
the middle-voice mode of a “present progressive tense,” as Franz Rosenzweig points out in his 
remarkable description of love as “being in love” – a common description of the heteronomous 
experience love. 2 Rosenzweig continues: “Love balks at making a portrait of the lover; the 
1 C. S. Song, The Believing Heart: An Invitation to Story Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 267. 
2 As Rosenzweig points out this middle-voice mode is a characteristic of discourse about everyday experience of 
love: “the love of the lover is implanted in the moment of its origin, and because it is so, it must deny all other 
moments, it must deny all of life; in its essence, it is unfaithful, for its essence is in the moment; and so, in order to 
be faithful, it must renew itself every moment, and every moment must become the first glance of love. Only 
through this totality in every present moment can it grasp the whole of created life, but through this, it really can do 
it; it can do it by traversing this whole with ever new meaning and by shining its rays and its life upon now this and 
now that single thing – a progress that begins anew every day, and never needs to come to its end; at every moment, 
because it is wholly present, it thinks it has reached the height beyond which there is none higher – and yet, each 
new day it learns again that it has never loved as much as today the part of life which it loves; every day love loves a 
little more that which it loves. This constant increase is the form of permanence in love, in that and because it is the 
most extreme non-permanence and its fidelity is devoted solely to the present, singular moment: from the deepest 
infidelity, and from this alone, it can thus become permanent fidelity; for only the non-permanence of the moment 
renders it capable of living every moment as new and thus of carrying the flame of love through the vast nocturnal- 
and twilight-kingdom of created life. It increases because it does not want to cease being new; it wants always to be 
new in order to be able to be permanent; it can only be permanent by living entirely in the non-permanent, in the 
moment, and it must be permanent so that the lover may be not merely the empty bearer of an ephemeral emotion, 
but living soul. This, too, is the way God loves.” See Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption. Translated by 
Barbara E. Galli (London and Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 176. 
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portrait would harden the living face into a dead one.”3 This hardening of “the living face into a 
dead one” also applies to the portrait making of the beloved. Love as “being in love” is an 
ongoing, living, and dynamic relationship that embodies an intertwining of the past, present, and 
the future.4 Such a love transforms the past into the present with hope and faith for what is yet to 
come. This quality of love echoes the notion of typology as presented in chapter 2 and its 
manifestation, as part of the Narrative Semantics (see section 3.3.a in the Methodological 
Appendix) 
 
II. A Semantic Analysis of Paul’s Vision of Love in 1 Corinthians 
When the story progression is established as we did in chapter 3 for the dialogic level and 
when the narrative/syntactic significance of each key theme (understood in a functionalist way, 
since it makes the story progress) is made clear, we need to recognize the semantic value of each 
key theme as represented by the qualifications that enable the subjects to perform their actions as 
compared with the qualifications of comparable (in relation of implication) or contrary or 
contradictory subjects. In this chapter, since we want to flesh out Paul’s interaction with the 
Corinthian believers in his notion of love, we will focus on the semiotic squares formed by the 
qualifications of the subjects that make the story progress, analyzing them to flesh out the 
fundamental pattern that undergirds Paul’s system of convictions. But the analysis of these 
squares is not mechanical; it is an exploration of the figurative dimensions of 1 Corinthians, 
3 Ibid., 177. 
4 Every saying of “I love You” is already doubly late as an expression of love. Yet it redresses the lateness. The 
saying of “I love You” expresses one’s feeling toward the beloved. The mediation of language, however, cannot 
capture the time and the immediate feeling of “I love You.” Hence, the saying of “I love You” is doubly late. Yet, 
the saying of “I love You” remedies the lack of love of the lover towards the beloved. As such, the saying restores 
the past. It promises that “I will love You more than I did in the past.” 
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which demands much literary sensitivity. In the following semiotic squares, we will mainly focus 
on the ones that mention love. 
(i) Semiotic Square 1: Performative-Love 
In chapter 3, we have noted that we begin our story progression with Paul saying that 
love is “the most excellent way” (καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν) (12:31b; cf. 14:1; Rom. 8:35-39). The 
first two pairs of opposed actions – pairs of syntactic oppositions – are (from the bottom up): (+) 
1 Cor. 13:13a (faith, hope, and love will remain) vs. (-) 13:8b-d (prophecy, tongue, gnosis will 
pass away) and (+) 13:1 (I speak in tongues with love) vs. (-) 13:1 (I become a roaring gong or a 
clanging cymbal when I do not speak in tongues with love). Organized as semantic oppositions,5 
these produce the following semiotic square. 
13:2 – (implied) I should have love when I                    13:1 – I become a roaring gong or a 
have prophecies, know all mysteries and        clanging cymbal when I do not speak in 




13:1 – (implied) I should have love when         13:8b-d – prophecy, tongue, and 
I speak in tongues (non-S2)                 gnosis will pass away (non-S1) 
 
 
 The above semiotic square might appear for many readers as difficult to interpret. But a 
few explanations are enough to show how useful this conceptualization of semantic relations is, 
in the same way that the logical square has been in philosophy/metaphysics for centuries. It is a 
matter of analyzing the values at the corners of semiotic square. For this purpose, I use the 
“actantial model” to see how an action is (or is not) performed (see section 3.3.c in the 
Methodological Appendix).6 If the “subject” is to give an “object” to the receiver, then we 
5 To use syntactic oppositions for our semantic analysis, we shift the “polemical axis” upward (as we explained in 
note 20 in chapter 3). 
6 This syntactic analysis, manifested by the actantial model, has the character of semantics, since the “sender” is 
often assumed and not mentioned and the “opponent” and “helper” can be mood, bodily drive, and feeling that 
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should examine who are the “helper” and the “opponent” that affect the execution of an action, 
which include such factors as having or not having appropriate knowledge and ability of 
different kinds; we should as well examine who are the “sender” and the “receiver” that affect 
having or not having an appropriate “vision” (conveyed by the “sender”) and “will” established 
by the “subject’s” relationship to the “receiver” (often defined by the “sender”). 




   Helper                           Subject       Opponent 
 
In 13:2, as one’s knowledge, ability, will, and vision (as related to prophecy, mysteries, 
gnosis, and pistis) are qualified by love, they should embody and express love. Without love as 
the “helper,” the “subject” cannot give the “gifts of prophecy, knowing all mysteries and all 
gnosis, and having all the pistis to remove the mountains with love”7 to the “receiver.” So, even 
if the “subject” may “have” the gifts, as long as s/he does “not have” love, the gifts lose their 
significance and signification. 
The contrast between “having” and “not having” is ironic. If it is the same spirit who 
gives the gifts (12:4), if God gives to those who love God (2:9), and if it is by the spirit from God 
that believers perceive the gifts of God (2:12), then it does not make sense for believers to 
perform the gifts without “having” love. When the gifts are severed from their source, they 
become superficial and distorted. The performance of the gifts, as a result, renders the “subject” 
cannot be articulated, which then can also be the “sender” that cause the “subject” to give an “object” to the 
“receiver.” 
7 It is important to note that pistis can be defined in terms of (1) “believing self-evident truths and fundamental 
narrative semantics,” (2) “believing a truth on authority: the ‘discoursive semantic’ dimension of believing,” (3) 
‘believing as thinking that something is true: the ‘syntactic’ dimension of believing.” See Daniel Patte, The 
Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1990), 105-215. 
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meaning-less. Paul writes: ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐδέν εἰμι (“but if I do not have love, I am 
nothing”). The “subject” ends up as a “nothing,” when s/he “has” the gifts but not the love. 
The gifts are not the “root problem” – that which causes the problems. The root problem 
is the lack of love. We are not told what cause the lack of love. But, if God gives to those who 
love God, then the relationship between believers and God and Christ have probably deteriorated. 
In exhorting believers to “have” love, Paul wants them to return to the fundamental that marks 
their relationship with God and Christ. He does not want them to focus on the manifestations of 
the spirit (i.e., the gifts) at the expense of the spirit that gives the gifts (12:7). The gifts that are 
supposed to express love to the “receiver” should not end up replacing love. 
The intertwining of love and the gifts of prophesying, knowing, and having all pistis to 
remove the mountains delineates a love that is performative, charismatic, and messianic. Paul not 
only makes it clear that the love is beyond the order of logic (cf. 2:9; 8:3).8 He also ties it to a 
God who gives to those who love God. This gift, moreover, is messianic or Christ-oriented (2:7-
12). Without receiving the spirit from God, believers cannot see and receive the gifts of God. 
Through love, believers will not mistake the wisdom and power of God for the weakness and 
foolishness of God, and crucify the Lord of glory. 
This charismatic and messianic character of love comes to the fore in the gifts mentioned 
in 13:2. Prophesy, all the knowledge of mystery,9 and all the pistis to remove the mountains are 
8 As Paul cites Isaiah 64:4 in 1 Cor. 2:9 (in the warranting level) to say that what God has prepared for those who 
love God cannot be seen by the eyes, heard by the ears, and understood by the heart. In other words, the gifts of God 
for those who love God cannot be received in the order of logic and reasoning. Thus, it is crucial that “we received 
not the spirit of the cosmos but the spirit from God so that we might know the gifts given by God to us” (2:12). 
9 The relationality of “knowing” is significant because in 13:2 Paul talks about “knowing” all mysteries. Two words 
capture our attention. First, the word “knowing” (οἶδα) that underscores a sense of intimacy. BDAG shows that the 
word can mean (1) “to have information about,” (2) “be intimately acquainted with or stand in a close relation to,” 
(3) “to know/understand how,” (4) “to grasp the meaning of something,” (5) “to remember, recollect, recall, be 
aware of,” and (6) “to recognize merit, respect, honor” (BDAG, 693-94). As Seesemann points out, it is hard to 
establish a substantial distinction between γινώσκω and οἶδα. See Heinrich Seesemann, “οἶδα,” in TDNT 5: 116-19. 
Secondly, the word “mysteries.” If “mystery” (μυστήριον) means (1) “the unmanifested or private counsel of God” 
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not only beyond human ability and grasp, but are also gifts impossible to have without God, as 
the modifier “all” highlights. Actually when the gifts are performed without love, the giver 
becomes meaningless. 
The gifts point to the spirit and one’s relationship with God and Christ. The gifts are not 
owned by believers, who cannot use and manipulate them for their own gains. The gifts are given 
by the same spirit for the common good (12:4, 7). Since each receives her/his gift from the same 
spirit who assigns the gifts accordingly (12:11), believers must not rank and divide the gifts as 
they did by dividing the church into factions (1:12).10 When believers only focus on the gifts, 
they miss out the spirit who gives the gifts. As they rank the gifts, they discriminate against other 
gifts. Consequently, not only do they objectify the gifts, they also objectify others who receive 
different gifts as well as the spirit who gives the gifts. Here, we can see why Paul stresses the 
temporality of the gifts as he foregrounds love as the fundamental ingredient that characterizes 
them. Indeed, if it is in love that God prepares for those who love God, then love is that which 
makes believers meaning-full. 
In light of this intertwining relation of love, spirit, and gift, it is odd that one could have 
received gifts without love. Either one has never loved God, which then renders the gifts from 
God suspicious, or one loses love after receiving the gifts. Whatever the scenario might be, love 
undergirds the gifts and is their foundation. Without love, the gifts are empty and superficial. 
When the love (of God) does not undergird the gift, the gift of God becomes incomprehensible. 
What God gives to those who love God can only be received in love and the spirit from God. 
and (2) “that which transcends normal understanding” (BDAG, 662) – the relationality and heteronomy of 
μυστήριον are apparent in verses where the word appears (1 Cor. 2:1, 7; 4:1; 13:2; 14:2; and 15:51) – then how can 
we speak of knowing something that is unknowable, let alone knowing all the mysteries? Such a “knowing” is only 
possible in an intimate relationship with God (2:10-13). Indeed, if Paul thinks that whatever believers have come 
from God (4:7; cf. 1:5-7, 8:6; 2 Cor. 5:18; Rom. 11:36), then the relationality and heteronomy of speaking in 
tongues, prophecy, “knowing,” and pistis in 1 Cor. 13:2 come to fore. 
10 Concerning this factionalism, Paul uses a similar language. He argues that it is the Lord who assigns to each 
person her/his mission (3:4-8). 
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This is why those who speak in tongues without love become a roaring gong or a clanging 
cymbal.11 Their speaking in tongues becomes a noise. In not communicating clearly, believers 
leave a bad impression about the gift of speaking in tongues. It causes people to misunderstand 
the church of God and God (14:23); after all, it is the spirit who bestows the gifts to believers 
(12:10-11). It is noteworthy that Paul is not against speaking in tongues (14:39); he himself 
speaks in tongues (14:18-19). Rather, if to speak in tongues is to speak to God (14:2, 28), then 
believers should not speak in tongues to each other. It can mislead unbelievers who visit the 
church to think that believers are out of their mind (μαίνεσθε) (14:23). In fact, if to speak in 
tongues is to speak mysteries by the spirit (14:2), then those who speak in tongues are not totally 
in control of their gift. If no one can know the things of human except the spirit of human that is 
in her/him (2:11), then the gift of speaking in tongues actually de-subjectifies those who speak in 
tongues. The one who speaks in tongues is both the “subject” and the “receiver” of the gift, as 
her/his spirit speaks through her/his body. 
The gift of speaking in tongues is a sign for unbelievers (14:22), but it is a sign of 
communicating with God. As a sign of communicating with God, the confusion caused by the 
speaking in tongues in public can be misunderstood as attributed to the doing of God. Paul thus 
11 While Conzelmann suggests that they could be instruments used in the ecstatic cults – see Hans Conzelmann, 1 
Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Translated by James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1975), 221 – Harris argues that the chalkos is not a musical instrument or device but an acoustical 
device used in the theater for echoing and resonating purposes. As such, the use of chalkos aims to show the 
emptiness and meaninglessness of the speaking in tongues. Harris writes, “Theaters throughout Italy were originally 
largely constructed of wood, and hence had reverberative properties suitable for sound propagation. In case of need 
the actor could turn to the large hung double doors and project his voice back to the audience. But as wood gave way 
in the first century B.C. to stone construction, the theaters became acoustically dead and better ways were needed to 
project voices and music over the theater. About this time most of the cities of Italy, as well as Greece proper, 
adopted resonating jars, which were large containers cast of bronze or, in the case of poorer communities fired 
earthen ware, which were located in niches around the periphery of the back of the theater.” See William Harris, 
“Echoing Bronze,” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 70 (1981): 1184; idem., “‘Sounding Brass’ and 
Hellenistic Technology: Ancient Acoustical Device Clarifies Paul’s Well-Known Metaphor,” Biblical Archaeology 
Society Review 8/1 (1982) 38–41; William W. Klein, “Noisy Gong or Acoustic Vase? A Note on 1 Corinthians 
13.1,” New Testament Studies 32 (1986) 286–89. Contra Harris and Klein, see Anathea Portier-Young, “Tongues 
and Cymbals: Contextualizing 1 Corinthians 13:1,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 35 (2005) 99–105. 
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has to clarify that God is not a God of disorder but of peace (14:33). Such a sign, moreover, 
could carry certain social and symbolic capitals, as it can imply that God acknowledges believers 
by giving them such gifts. 12  Therefore, in order to make public this private and personal 
conversation with God, believers should at least get God’s approval. They need to interpret it 
properly. This basic courtesy is missing among believers. Thus for Paul, even if the gift of 
prophecy is greater than the gift of speaking in tongues, since is it can edify the church (14:3-5), 
the one who prophecies still needs to assume responsibility for what s/he says (14:32). 
Each gift is a communal gift; it is not a self-centered gift used for one’s own agenda. 
Each gift is the fruit of the believers’ love-relationship with God as God gives to those who love 
God (cf. Gal. 5:22). Love, as such, marks and sustains the relationship between those believers 
and God. Because of love, believers are always already in relations with the others as they are 
called by God into the fellowship of Jesus (1 Cor. 1:9). Without being concerned for the others, 
the one who speaks in tongues becomes a roaring gong or a clanging cymbal. The gift of God 
cannot be possessed and manipulated; it is a double-edged sword, depending on how believers 
use it. In emphasizing that one must speak in tongues with love, Paul suggests that love can 
prevent the misuse of the gift. It appears that love is other-oriented in the sense that it makes one 
concerned with the situation of her/his speaking in tongues. The gift of speaking in tongues, as 
such, is context sensitive; it is not appropriate for all situations. 
Let us move to the next value of the semiotic square, the implied non-S2 (13:1, those who 
speak in tongues should have love), which is in a contradictory relation with S2 (13:1, those who 
12 For different critical interpretations that seek to address the contradiction in 14:22-23, see Anthony C. Thiselton, 
The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 1122-127. 
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speak in tongues without love are a roaring gong or a clanging cymbal).13 As non-S2 is in a 
relation of implication with S1 (those with gifts should have love), we can see that for Paul, love 
indeed helps believers not to objectify and use the gifts of God for their own gains and purposes. 
The gifts of prophecy, of knowing all mysteries and gnosis, and of having all pistis to move 
mountains are not an end in themselves. They point to a relation between God and believers. The 
gift is a relation. It is a transformative relation between God and believers as well as among 
believers. The gifts, as such, signify a responsibility; more specifically a responsibility to 
respond to God and others as well as the responsibility to enable others to respond to the gifts. 
Here, a sense of other-orientation that marks the gifts becomes prominent. The gifts transform 
both the self and the others in their relationship with each other and with God. 
This notion that the gifts are not an end in themselves comes to the fore in our last value 
of the semiotic square, non-S1 (13:8b-d – prophecy, tongue, and gnosis will pass away). The 
middle voice in 13:8 that highlights a sense of neither an active nor a passive voice further 
modifies this notion of the gift. Paul writes, “Love never falls (πίπτει) but whether prophecy, 
they will pass away (καταργηθήσονται), or tongue, they will cease (παύσονται), or gnosis it will 
pass away (καταργηθήσεται).” In other words, there is a sense of auto-deconstruction inherent in 
the gifts. The gifts will annul themselves in due time. This self-annulment of the gifts is in a 
sharp contrast with the believers’ overemphasis of the gifts. Note that Paul does not say that love 
abolishes prophecy, tongue, or gnosis. By juxtaposing love with these gifts, Paul suggests that 
the gifts cannot be objectified. The gifts are not an end in themselves. They always point to 
something else. This is why the gifts are auto-deconstructive. 
13 In this particular case, both the position formulation (Ss) and the negative formulation (non-Ss) are expressed by 
the same verse, 13:1. 
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In summary. In light of the qualities that we see embodied in these four values of the 
semiotic squares, what hold them together? Because Paul stresses a dynamic “having” of love in 
performing the gifts, we propose a notion of “performative-love.” That is to say, the otherness of 
the gifts can remain other (as given by God and received through the spirit from God) if it is 
marked by a love that is other/Other-oriented. It is this heteronomous character of love that 
prevents the gifts from being objectified. For example, when one is in love, one does not think 
that “since I have already said that ‘I love you’ yesterday, I do not need to say it again today and 
tomorrow.” No. The saying of “I love you” is elicited and responded repeatedly, as if it is never 
sufficient; as if love can never be assured. In short, the language of love is a “present 
progressive.” The promise that “I will love you, tomorrow” is a promise with responsibility: the 
promise that I will be able to respond to love, and thus to respond to the other/Other. 
Performative-love, in short, is an expression of a sense of heteronomy. It is a love that is 
a “concern for other/Other.” If believers have love, they will be concerned for others. They do 
not just perform the gifts. They will be mindful of the dynamic situations of the others. They will 
not just speak in tongues. They will speak in tongues wanting others to understand what they try 
to convey. It is in this sense of “concern for other/Other” that the gifts are open to the unknown 
which then render them auto-deconstructive in the passing of time and space. For Paul, this 
concern for the context can create a sense of order and peace among believers. This “concern for 
other/Other” is not a self-sacrifice. It is a form of self-care, as it saturates one with meanings. 
Here, we can distill the above semiotic square to the following semiotic square that highlights a 





Performative-Love: discursive,       Self-Centered: superficial, noisy, not  
other-oriented, and meaningful (13:2)       context sensitive, and not communicative 
           (13:1) 
                        
 
 
Non-Self-Centered: communicative and           Non-Performative-Love: temporary and  
discursive (13:1)              delimited (13:8b-d) 
     
(ii) Semiotic Square 2: “Letting Go” 
From our analysis of the first semiotic square, we note that the juxtaposition of various 
values in the relations of contrary, contradiction, and implication help us slow down and read the 
Scripture from different angles. As it makes us examine how an action is (and is not) carried out, 
it also helps us think of different ways to link the values together. And, as the contrary values of 
the first semiotic square become the sub-contrary values of the second semiotic square (and vice 
versa), they are re-viewed in light of other values in the second semiotic square. 
13:3 – (implied) I should have love in giving      13:2 – I do not have love when I prophecy,  
away all possessions and body (S1): Letting Go     know all mysteries and all gnosis, and  




13:2 – (implied) I should have love when                   13:1 – I become a roaring gong or a  
I prophecy, know all mysteries and all          clanging cymbal when I speak in tongues  
gnosis, and have all pistis to remove                   without love (non-S1): Non-Letting-Go: 
mountains (non-S2): Non-Controlling:      Representing God 
Collaborating  
 
The debates on the textual variants of καυχήσωμαι (“to boast”) and καυθήσωμαι (“to be 
burnt”) in 1 Cor. 13:3 do not affect our analysis of this second semiotic square,14 since we focus 
14 For an overview of the debate, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1042-043. In listing 
seven possible readings: (1) καυχήσωμαι, (2) καυθήσομαι, (3) καυθήσωμαι, (4) καυθῇ, (5) καθήσωμαι, (6) 
καυθήσεται, and (7) καυθήσηται, Caragounis finds that since the main difference is between καυχῶμαι and καίομαι, 
where καυθήσωμαι is a form of καυθήσομαι because of the “evolution of the morphology, syntax, and especially the 
phonology (i.e. the pronunciation) of the Greek language …” (563), he argues for a reading of καυθήσωμαι in 1 Cor. 
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on the qualification of the subject of the act of the giving itself. Like what we see in 13:1-2, Paul 
in 13:3 uses an “I” as the “subject” who does the extreme giving. He does not indicate the 
“sender” and the “receiver.” The focus is on how the “subject” gives the “object,” and how this 
giving is further modified by love. 
Let us first note that 13:1-2 are about what believers “have,” whereas 13:3 is about giving 
away or letting go of what they “have.” For Paul, whether in “having” or “giving away,” love 
must characterize the actions. So unless the “subject” can be “in control of” love, the actions of 
“having” and “giving away” are not in the control of the “subject.” When love is missing in the 
“giving away,” then the giving can become problematic, as it will result in οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι (see 
the discussion below). 
This lack of control – and hence, the “subject” cannot speak of possessing what s/he has 
– is further highlighted by the fact that the objects of “having” (or the gifts) are beyond human 
ability and grasp. Paul makes it clear that whatever the Corinthian believers have actually come 
from God; there is nothing for them to boast about (4:7). Indeed, if believers are bought at a price 
(6:20; 7:23), then their body and their possessions are not theirs to give away, as if they own 
them.15 This is why when Paul was commissioned to gospelize, he says that there is nothing for 
him to boast about (9:16-17). 
13:3 as he shows that the “grammatical monstrosity” of a future subjunctive is actually grammatically explainable. 
See Chrys C. Caragounis, The Development of Greek and the New Testament: Morphology, Syntax, Phonology, and 
Textual Transmission (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 547-64. 
15 Martin writes, “Agorazein refers not to the sale of a slave to a god by which the slave is actually freed, but to the 
ordinary sale of a slave by one owner to another owner. Therefore, when Christ buys a person, the salvific element 
of the metaphor is not in the movement from slavery to freedom but in the movement from a lower level of slavery 
(as the slave of just anybody or the slave of sin) to a higher level of slavery (as the slave of Christ).” See Dale B. 
Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1990), 63. This socio-economic relation between Christ and believers can also be conceived of in 
terms of the call, as the context of 7:23 makes clear. In fact, in his analysis of Romans 1:1a, Patte illustrates how 
Paul as a “slave of Christ Jesus” can be conceptualized in at least three major ways, depending on the referential 
framework that the interpreter privileges. See Daniel Patte, “Three Types of Identity Formation For Paul As Servant 
of Christ Jesus in Romans,” in Reading Paul in Context: Explorations in Identity Formation: Essays in Honour of 
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This emphasis on “letting go” continues the sense of performative-love and heteronomy 
in the first semiotic square. The notion of performative challenges one to be sensitive to the 
situation of the “receiver.” That is to say, the “subject” must be critical of her/his presuppositions 
so that s/he can avoid insisting on her/his way of “giving.” This explains why even if the acts of 
giving away one’s possessions and body are an extreme form of self-sacrifice, the outcome is 
οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι if it is performed without love. 
Concerning the phrase οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι in 13:3, most translations render it as the giver 
gaining or receiving no benefit (CEB, ESV, NIV, NKJV, and NRSV). Anthony Thiselton, on the 
other hand, proposes that ὠφελοῦμαι is “the passive of ὀφείλω, I owe, I ought, with an 
accusative.”16 So instead of “advantage” or “benefit” from ὠφελέω as most commentators find,17 
we can render οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι as “I am obligated to nobody” or “I owe nobody anything.” 
While Thiselton does not show grammatically how ὠφελοῦμαι comes from ὀφείλω (cf. BDF 
§67.2, §359.1), the idea of an indebted love is prominent in Romans 13:8.18  
Here, we do not privilege ὠφελέω (“I help,” “I benefit,” or “I am of use to”) over ὀφείλω 
(“I owe”). We want to highlight the middle voice of ὠφελοῦμαι. Recall that the middle voice 
signifies a sense of “intransitive nonreflexivity.”19 So here we can render οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι as 
William S. Campbell. Edited by Kathy Ehrensperger and J. Brian Tucker (London and New York: T&T Clark 
International, 2010), 209-28. 
16 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1045. The word ὀφείλω has three major meanings: (1) 
“to be indebted to someone in a financial sense,” (2) “to be under obligation to meet certain social or moral 
expectations,” and (3) “to be constrained by circumstance” (BDAG, 742). 
17 For example, see Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina 7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 
1999), 477; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The 
Anchor Yale Bible (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), 494. 
18 Paul writes: “Do not be indebted to anyone of anything (μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε) except to love one another 
because the one who loves the other has fulfilled the law.” For an illustration, see Monya A. Stubbs, “Subjection, 
Reflection, Resistance: An African American Reading of the Three-Dimensional Process of Empowerment in 
Romans 13 and the Free-Market Economy,” in Navigating Romans through Cultures: Challenging Readings by 
Charting a New Course. Edited by Yeo Khiok-khng (K.K.) (London and New York: T &T Clark International, 
2004), 171-97. 
19  “The middle voice suggests something that goes beyond subject-object formations. It is able to articulate 
nonreflexive enactments that are not for themselves or for something else. As a formation, it does not need to 
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the benefit that takes place in the benefiting itself, or the obligation that takes places in the 
obliging itself, which means that the relationship between the giver and the receiver happens in 
the “benefiting” or the “obliging” itself. In emphasizing love as undergirding this form of an 
extreme giving, Paul seems to suggest a love that is middle-voice oriented. So when the giving is 
performed without love, the middle voice of ὠφελοῦμαι cannot take place. The result becomes 
οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι. It is difficult to articulate this middle voice in our translation of οὐδὲν 
ὠφελοῦμαι. Perhaps we can render it as my giving “causes me to be of no value to anyone (or to 
anything).” The point is that the act of “letting go” is not a calculation or an exchange; otherwise 
it is not a genuine “letting go.” 
Therefore, in this analysis of the semantic connotations expressed figuratively in this 
passage, it is problematic to say that if the giving is done without love, then the giver does not 
gain or benefit anything, or the giving is of no advantage to the giver, as many translations and 
commentators do. For Paul’s vision, one’s giving is not an egoistic giving; after all, believers are 
bought at a price and everything that they have is from God. The middle voice of ὠφελοῦμαι 
transforms both the giver and the receiver. The giving is not to be objectified into a strategy (by 
contrast with the functionalism of the interpretation focused on the narrative/syntactic dimension 
of the text). Neither does it objectify the giver nor the receiver. As a result, it prevents the giving 
from being objectified into a calculation that can bring benefits to the giver.20 It prevents the 
suggest intention outside of its movement or a movement toward an other. It does not oppose active and passive 
formations, but it is other than they are. It is the voice of something’s taking place through its own enactment…” 
See Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1990), 24. 
20 For various notions of the gift, see The Gift: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Edited by Aafke E. Komter 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996); The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity. Edited by 
Alan D. Schrift (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). In this volume, Schrift does not include the works of 
Marion who has a sustained debate with Derrida. See “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Luc Marion: Moderated by Richard Kearney,” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism. Edited by John D. Caputo and 
Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 54-78; John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the 
Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion,” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, 185-222. For 
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giving from becoming a form of a strategic gaining, as is the case in particular if we translate 
οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι as “I gain nothing” (NAB, NIV, NIB, RSV, NRSV) or “it profits me nothing” 
(KJV, NKJV, NAS). Such a giving turns the giving with love into an economy of exchange. Love 
becomes a part of the transaction, which contradicts Paul’s vision of love that portrays love as 
not seeking things for oneself and not taking into account of the bad things (13:5-6). Rather, one 
lets go and gives away her/his possessions and body because what one has received empowers 
her/his to give everything, including one’s very own body.21 
Contrary to this value of “letting go” in 13:3 (S1), the negative value of 13:2 (S2) signals a 
control of believers in prophesying, knowing all mysteries and all gnosis, and having all pistis to 
remove the mountains. As these gifts and activities are only possible with the gift/grace of God, 
believers need to work with God when performing these activities (cf. 3:9). They are not the 
owners of the gifts. They are the channels through which the gifts are manifested and become 
beneficial to believers.  
(iii) Semiotic Square 3: Risk and Promise 
Continuing with the values of the previous semiotic square, we find that “letting go” does 
not condone abuse or invite exploitation. Note that Paul does not say how “what you sow” dies. 
Paul simply says “what you sow (σὺ δε σπείρεις) is not made alive unless it dies” (15:36). Paul 
does not indicate the “subject” that gives “death” (the “object”) to “what you sow” (the 
“receiver”). Alternatively, the “object” can be “what you sow” that needs to receive death, and as 
such cannot be objectified. One cannot objectify what one sows. The emphasis on “you” seems 
to highlight a self-criticism of one’s investment. Moreover, in using a series of metaphors, Paul 
various notions of the gift in antiquity, see The Gift in Antiquity. Edited by Michael L. Satlow (UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013). 
21 The “ἵνα-clause [in 13:3] constitutes the complement of the verb παραδῶ, i.e. its purpose, not its motive.” See 
Chrys C. Caragounis, The Development of Greek and the New Testament, 561-62. 
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tries to give believers a vision of what is beyond what one has sown. If whatever has been given 
away is given away, then one should move on. This letting go, however, is not an act that 
believers can do on their own. It must take place in Christ. The verb παραδῶ (“hand over” or 
“give away”) appears fifteen times in Pauline letters.22 In 1 Corinthians, whether it is about 
handing over the man who has the wife of his father to satan (5:5), Paul handing over the 
teaching to believers (11:2, 23; 15:3), Jesus being handed over (11:23), or Jesus handing over the 
kingdom to God the father (15:24), the handing over conveys a sense of trust in God. 
15:36 – (implied) what you sow is made              13:3 – I give away all possessions and 
alive if it dies (S1): Risky but promising                          body without love (S2): Calculative 




13:3 – (implied) I should have love in giving          13:2 – I do not have love when I have 
away all possessions and body = letting go              prophecy, know all mysteries and all  
(non-S2): Non-Calculative       gnosis, and have all pistis to remove         
         mountains (non-S1): Non-Risky 
 
It is certainly risky to “let go” and be exposed to foreign elements in a new situation. But, 
without “letting go” of one’s “comfort zone,” one cannot see beyond one’s vision horizon. Of 
course, there is no guarantee that the “letting go” is beneficial. It can exacerbate the current 
situation. The “letting go,” as such, is an act of faith; a faith that the end is not the end itself but a 
threshold to a new beginning. Indeed, it is a faith that “what you sow is not made alive unless it 
dies” (15:36). We need to take Paul’s saying that “I die every day” (καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀποθνῄσκω) 
22 Rom 1:24, 26, 28; 4:25; 6:17; and 8:32; 1 Cor. 5:5; 11:2, 23 (x2); 13:3; 15:3, 24; 2 Cor. 4:11; and Gal. 2:20. Rom 
1:24, 26, 28 are about God handing over those who knew God but dishonored God. Rom. 4:25, 8:32; 1 Cor. 11:23, 2 
Cor. 4:11; and Gal. 2:20 are about Jesus being handed over for our trespasses. Rom. 6:17; 1 Cor. 11:2, 23, 15:3 are 
about the teaching handed over by Paul to believers. 1 Cor. 5:5 is about handing over the wrongdoer to satan for the 
destruction of his flesh so that his spirit may be saved on the day of the Lord. Lastly, 1 Cor. 15:24 is about Jesus 
handing over the kingdom to God in the end. 
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(15:31) seriously. 23 If Paul dies every day, then he also comes to life every day.24 Death is not 
the end. 25  Paul is not advocating a stance of terminating one’s life. It is life that Paul is 
23 Whether Paul is speaking of “dying” symbolically or not is not our concern here. We can certainly link the 
language of dying in 15:30 with Paul fighting against the wild beasts in Ephesus in 15:32. Concerning this fight 
against the wild beasts, Malherbe takes it symbolically as a part of a Hellenistic moralist discourse that speaks of 
fighting against one’s passion. See Abraham J. Malherbe, “The Beasts at Ephesus,” in Paul and the Popular 
Philosophers (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1989), 79-89. 
24 We are not getting into the theme of resurrection, but it is important to note that in the biblical worldview the 
visible and invisible worlds are a continuum in which the spirit (whether the deceased or spiritual being) and living 
human beings interact with each other. This should be clear in 1 Cor. 15:3-8 because the resurrected Christ appeared 
(ὤφθη) and interacted with Cephas, the twelve, some five hundred adelphoi, James, all the apostles, and Paul (15:5-
8; cf. the transfigured body of Jesus in Mark 9:2-8). The appearance was a public and communal event; it was not an 
individualistic and private event. We may want to interrogate the notion of “appearance,” but it is clear that the 
visible and the invisible worlds are not disjointed. For many Chinese in Malaysia, this phenomenon of the deceased 
and the spirit interacting with the living people is not uncommon (cf. 1 Sam. 28:1-28). That is to say, the community 
is not just a community of the living. It is a community of both the living and the deceased. While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to examine the notion and mode of resurrection of “the dead” (e.g., ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν and ἐκ 
νεκρῶν in 15:12), or the notion of sōma (“body”) of the resurrection, we agree with Martin that “the ancients [in the 
Greco-Roman cultures] by and large view the self as a continuum of substances” with its own hierarchy. See Dale B. 
Martin, The Corinthian Body, 21. Many, in fact, see the body as the microcosm, where even the inner body 
corresponds to the outer body (e.g., the body reflects the soul or one’s physiognomy reflects one’s character) (ibid., 
15-21). Given this worldview, it is not surprising, as Martin thinks, that while the philosophers and the educated in 
Greco-Roman cultures despise the resurrection of the body/corpse, as opposed to the “superstition” (i.e., 
deisidaimonia or “fear of the gods”) held by ordinary people, they still speak of “heavenly entities as bodies 
(sōmata)” (ibid., 108-20). Because, if Plato’s Timaeus portrays the body as the cosmos and the cosmos as the body 
(ibid., 16), then the earthly body and the heavenly body are in a dynamic yin-yang relationship, in particular if 
“human beings, or perhaps only their souls, become stars or some similar heavenly bodies after death” (ibid., 117). 
Indeed, if nature comprises corporeality and noncorporeality as well as “things that exist (sunt) and things that do 
not exist (non sunt)” according to the Stoics (ibid., 9), then Paul’s illustration of the resurrected body through 
“agricultural” (1 Cor. 15:36-38), “zoological” (15:39), and “astronomical” (15:40-44) imageries are not just 
analogies. See Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians 477; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 586. The 
imageries speak “literally” of the characteristics of the resurrected body. A good illustration is 15:36-37, where the 
wheat plant (if the seed is a wheat), though no longer a wheat seed, is still the wheat. Here, in explaining his notion 
of “The Semitic Totality Concept,” where individuality and totality/solidarity echo one another as “[a]ll reality is 
organized in a series of totalities within totalities. The final totality that unifies and comprehends the rest is God 
himself” (61), Dahl writes: “But if I say, This is the same man I met in London seven years ago, I mean he is the 
same person (in Pauline terms the same ‘body’), knowing that the particular cells of his ‘body’ (in the modern sense) 
have completely changed since then” (94). See M. E. Dahl, The Resurrection of the Body: A Study of 1 Corinthians 
15 (London: SCM Press, 1962). For Dahl, this “somatic identity” is prominent in the Hebrew Bible. He writes: 
“When it comes to human personality, we should not be surprised to find that man [sic], too, is a totality, which 
embraces all that a man is an ever shall be. It is not so much that man is made of ‘dust of the earth’; he is dust, which 
presumably means that, in man, matter has, by the in-breathing of God, acquired the characteristics of self-conscious 
being. The Old Testament has no word for ‘body’ because this totality concept makes it unnecessary. The Hebrew 
mind never produces anything quite like an abstraction; ‘soul’ and ‘heart’ and ‘flesh’ each mean the totality of man 
considered from different aspects, and they comprehend concepts like mouth, eyes, lips, hands, feet, reins, belly, 
bones and so on, in such a way that each of these tends to refer, not to a physical organ or limb so much as to the 
whole man acting in a certain way.” Ibid., 71-72. 
25 In light of the “culture of death” in imperial Rome, Harrison writes, “In consigning humanity to the slavery of sin, 
the apostle strips the Roman ruler of the virtus that made him god-like, while simultaneously denying the ruler’s 
critics the satisfaction that the fear of death at Rome could be explained solely by reference to the Julio-Claudian 
house, or that freedom from a ruler’s tyranny could be achieved by suicide, or by achieving fame fighting in the 
arena. Rather, death, the sting of sin (1 Cor 15:55–56), had entered the world, corrupting the pristine glory of God’s 
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emphasizing here. Dying and coming to life are intertwined (cf. Phil. 3:10-11; Gal. 2:19-20; Rom. 
6:1-14). This sense of death and rebirth in every day is stressed in the present indicative of 
“dying” (ἀποθνῄσκω) and the adverbial phrase “day by day” (καθ’ ἡμέραν).  
The rupture between the end and the beginning is not an abrupt discontinuation from one 
stage to another. In using the metaphor of a seed, Paul suggests a form of continuity in terms of a 
discontinuity. The words of Käsemann are pertinent here, as he argues that the “continuity with 
the past is preserved by shattering the received terminology, the received imagery, the received 
theology – in short, by shattering the tradition.” 26  The shattering of the tradition is not a 
disregard or a dismissal of the tradition. It is to prevent the tradition from being objectified, so 
much so that it cannot be engaged. In being passed down from one generation to another, the 
tradition is already dynamic and discursive. To shatter the tradition is to prevent it from being 
forgotten and left behind as a relic collecting dust. In the words of Jacques Derrida, to be faithful 
to one’s heritage is to be unfaithful to it by “relaunching it otherwise and keeping it alive.”27 The 
shattering of the tradition delineates a transforming relation of the past to the present and the 
future.28 Paul does not focus on the seed or the plant that the seed will yield. He is concerned 
with the process. It is the sowing, dying, and coming to life that concern Paul. 
creation (Rom 5:12; cf. 1:20, 23a; Gen 3:17–19) and frustrating its original purpose (Rom 8:20; Gen 1:31; Ps 19:1–
4).” See James R. Harrison, “Paul and the ‘Social Relations’ of Death at Rome (Romans 5:14, 17, 21),” in Paul and 
His Social Relations. Pauline Studies 7. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Land (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 
2013), 119. 
26 See Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” in Essays on New Testament Themes. Studies in 
Biblical Theology 41. Translated by W. J. Montague (London: SCM Press, 1971), 21. 
27 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Choosing One’s Heritage,” in For What Tomorrow … : A Dialogue. 
Translated by Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 4. 
28 Commenting on Paul’s notion of the typology, Agamben writes: “What matters to us here is not the fact that each 
event of the past – once it becomes a figure – announces a future event and is fulfilled in it, but is the transformation 
of time implied by this typological relation. The problem here does not simply concern the biunivocal 
correspondence that binds typos and antitypos together in an exclusively hermeneutic relationship … rather, it 
concerns a tension that claps together and transforms past and future, typos and antitypos, in an inseparable 
constellation. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this typological relation, it is the relation itself.” See 
Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary of the Letter to the Romans. Translated by Patricia 
Dailey. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005), 74. 
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On the other hand, there is a discontinuity between the seed and the plant, but the plant is 
the transformation of the seed. The transformation is, in fact, inherent in the seed. The death of 
the seed is not the end; it is the beginning of the plant. The present is a type of the future and the 
future is a type of the present. Consequently, one needs to be careful with the kind of seed that 
one sows (cf. Gal. 6:7-8; cf. 2 Cor. 9:6), as we see in the language of sanctification in 1 
Corinthians (e.g., 1:2, 30; 5:6-8; 6:11; etc.). In addition, regardless of whether the seed is good or 
bad, one still needs to let go of it. One should not cling on to the seed as if it is everything that 
there is. There is always something more, but opportunity presents itself through letting go and 
being open toward what is yet to come. While every seed has its own kind of body given by God, 
it is God who decides what kind of body that God wants to give (1 Cor. 15:37-38). In other 
words, as the potentiality is inherent in the present, it is also beyond our grasp. If it was within 
our grasp, the potentiality would no longer be a potentiality but an actualization, a realization, 
and a discursivized manifestation in a concrete context. 
For Paul, the present (i.e., the seed) is full of potentialities.29 This potentiality of the seed 
prevents us from saying that the seed must die.30 Paul does not say that the crucifixion must take 
29 Ibid., 37-42. Speaking of a potentiality in terms of an impotentiality, Agamben concludes: “Contrary to the 
traditional idea of potentiality that is annulled in actuality, here we are confronted with a potentiality that conserves 
itself and saves itself in actuality. Here potentiality, so to speak, survives actuality and, in this way, gives itself to 
itself.” See idem, “On Potentiality,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Edited and translated with an 
Introduction by Daniel Heller-Rozaen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 184. Also, see idem, “Bartleby,” 
in The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt. Theory Out of Bounds, Vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 35-37. 
30 “The same model is used by Jesus in the Fourth Gospel (John 12:24) to denote the contrast between ‘letting go of 
self in death’ … and a new, glorified state … Here in 15:36, however, Paul is not emphasizing the necessity of death, 
but ‘the fact of transformation through death and revivification.’” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, 1263-264. The quote that Thiselton cites comes from C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle 
to the Corinthians. 2nd ed. (London: Black, 1971), 370. Fee also makes a similar argument: “The first clause is 
reminiscent of John 12:24, but the point is different here. There the emphasis is on the necessity of death for fruit. 
Despite several contemporary scholars who would see the necessity of death as the point here too, that concern is 
not picked up anywhere in the succeeding argument, and vv. 50-53 stand quite against it. Paul’s concern is with 
death as the precondition of life, not in the sense that all must die but in the sense that the seed itself demonstrates 
that out of death a new expression of life springs forth. God's purposes are not thwarted by death; as with the seed, 
what is sown in death is brought forth into life. His point, therefore, in response to their scepticism as to the 
resurrection is that it is possible for the dead to rise again, as their own experience of sowing grain gives evidence.” 
255 
 
                                                          
place. He actually argues against it (2:8). It is crucial to note that the end is not death but life. 
What matters to Paul is the relationship of believers with God and with each other. There is no 
need to be so concerned with the details of what the seed will become. That which is yet to come 
is implicated in the present, just as today is the tomorrow of yesterday and the yesterday of 
tomorrow. For Paul, the present is a dynamic present. The present is the present insofar as it is 
viewed in light of the past and of what is yet to come.  
With this orientation towards life, the giving of one’s possessions and body cannot be 
viewed as a part of an economy of exchange. The extreme acts of giving have the character of 
risk that prevents the calculation and objectification of death and life. No one knows whether 
s/he will come to life. The present middle-passive indicative of “being made alive” (ζῳοποιεῖται) 
in the general condition of 15:36 – “it will not be made alive unless it dies” (οὐ ζῳοποιεῖται ἐὰν 
μὴ ἀποθάνῃ) – further highlights the uncertainty of “being made alive.” However, as the threat of 
death does not overpower love (cf. 15:55-57), the extreme giving can only take place in love, as 
love is not limited by the outcome of such a giving. 
(iv) Semiotic Square 4: A Christ-oriented Relation 
As 15:57 and 15:36 imply each other in this new semiotic square, the victory (the 
“object”) that God (the “sender” and “subject”) gives us (the “receiver”) through Jesus (the 
“subject”) is made alive when it dies. That is to say, the victory must not be objectified. It is not 
a victory that is done for us once upon a time. It is still taking place today. Notice how Paul 
qualifies God in 15:57: “τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ διδόντι ἡμῖν τὸ νῖκος διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ.” For Paul, God is the God who gives us victory. The present active participle of giving 
(διδόντι) shows that God still gives us victory “through our Lord Jesus Christ.” Paul thus 
See Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians. The New International Commentary on the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 781. 
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concludes with 15:58, “Therefore (Ὥστε), my beloved adelphoi, become firm, immovable, 
abound in the work of the Lord always, knowing (εἰδότες) that the labor of yours is not empty 
(κενὸς) in the Lord.” 
15:57 – God gives us victory through our       15:36 – (implied) what you sow is not 
Lord Jesus Christ (S1): Christ-oriented       made alive (S2): A Self-centered  




15:36 – what you sow is made alive when       13:3 – I give away all possessions and 
it dies (non-S2): A Non-Self-Centered             body without love (non-S1):Non-Christ- 
reasoning                            oriented 
 
Here, one’s thanksgiving to God is not simply an acknowledgement of the grace of God 
upon believers. In arguing that “[i]n the body of Paul’s letters, the centrality of God is precisely 
the basis underlying his frequent calls to thanksgiving,”31 David Pao finds that to give thanks is 
not only to “remember a past act of kindness,” but that it “is also offered for the future acts of 
God.”32 Thiselton further points out that “the basis of victory is a present gift, providing grounds 
for present exultation and thanksgiving.” 33  The act of thanksgiving, as such, is not only a 
recognition of the works of God among believers until now. It is also a confession and a trust 
that God is faithful to God’s promise to deliver believers from trial and tribulation (cf. 1:9; 
10:13). Giving thanks is an act of worship, remembrance, trust, and submission. 34 As it is 
31 See David W. Pao, “Gospel Within the Constraints of An Epistolary Form: Pauline Introductory Thanksgiving 
And Paul’s Theology of Thanksgiving,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Sean 
A. Adams. Pauline Studies Series 6 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010), 102. 
32 Ibid.,124. 
33 He continues, “It is not a mere present of future certainty about resurrection; it also expresses the present gift of 
grace to believers for whom the destructive potential of sin, the law, and death as a terrifying prospect has been 
broken. The present reality is that the sting of death had been drawn out by Christ’s victory. Believers already in 
some measure share in this victory, even though the final appropriation of all that this entails has yet to be 
appropriated and experienced fully at the last day.” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 
1304. 
34 See David W. Pao, Thanksgiving: An Investigation of a Pauline Theme. New Studies in Biblical Theology 13 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002). 
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through Jesus that God gives victory to believers, the believers’ relationship with God and Christ 
is indispensable to their recognition and receiving of the gift of God. This is why Paul exhorts 
believers to always “abound in the work of the Lord.” 
Now, if victory is given by God through Jesus Christ, then Jesus must address the issues 
of the law and sin (15:56); otherwise there is no victory over death. For Paul, Jesus “died for” 
our sins “according to the Scripture” (15:3; cf. Gal. 1:4; Rom 5:6, 8) and was raised on the third 
day “according to the Scripture” (1 Cor. 15:4). In addition to theological explanations, the 
various meanings of the preposition “hyper” (ὑπέρ) also give rise to numerous interpretations of 
the phrase “died for” (ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ). While we will limit our brief discussion to the footnote, 
we want to highlight Derrida’s comment: “No one can die for me if ‘for me’ means instead of me, 
in my place.”35 That is to say, if each person is singular, then s/he is irreplaceable, and hence, no 
one can die “in my place” for me, depriving me of my singularity, responsibility, and response-
ability as a singular individual. It is in this sense that we find Daniel Patte’s interpretation of 
ὑπέρ as “concerning” makes more sense, 36  as it not only exposes and conscientizes the 
35 See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), 41. 
36 For anyone to insist that Jesus must die in order for our sins to be forgiven, s/he will need to explain the Gospel 
stories that speak of Jesus forgiving sins without having his blood shed (e.g., Mark 2:5). For a discussion on the idea 
of atonement implied in how we translate ὑπέρ, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 475-
49, 1191-92. TeSelle and Patte highlight that we have at least three major notions of atonement in Christian theology 
and traditions. (1) “Ransom and redemption from bondage or healing,” (2) “Honor and juridical satisfaction,” and (3) 
“Moral transformation.” For details, see Eugene TeSelle and Daniel Patte, “Atonement,” in Cambridge Dictionary 
of Christianity, 81-82. The preposition ὑπέρ is usually translated as “for the sake of,” and when it is used with the 
case of genitive, it functions as (1) “a marker indicating that an activity or event is in some entity’s interest, for, in 
behalf of, for the sake of someone/something,” (2) a “marker of the moving cause or reason, because of, for the sake 
of,” and (3) a “marker of general content, whether of a discourse or mental activity, about, concerning” (BDAG, 
1030-031). Most English translations (ASV, ESV, KJV, NKJV, NAB, NAS, NIB, NIV, NIRV, NJB, NLT, RSV, NRSV) 
render ὑπέρ in terms of the meanings that we see in (1) and (2).  
Patte, however, renders ὑπέρ as “concerning.” As such, Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν κατὰ 
τὰς γραφὰς in 1 Cor. 15:3 means that Christ died (in that particular circumstance) concerning our sins according to 
the Scripture. In other words, the cross and the resurrection of Jesus as well as the Scripture expose and defeat the 
power and the law of sin (cf. Rom. 8:2); otherwise we will still be in the power of sins (15:17). The Scripture not 
only points to God’s faithfulness to God’s promise, it also highlights the role of Scripture in the believer’s 
relationship with God. Hence, the celebration of Lord’s Supper in every gathering is indispensable as the partaking 
of the bread and the cup is an embodiment and proclamation of the death of Jesus until he comes again (11:26). See 
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enunciatee to the contradiction entailed in the system that crucified, it also empowers them to 
respond to the crucifixion executed by the Roman Empire. 
On the other hand, the phrase “according to the Scripture” (κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς) points to 
the Scripture as a promise, just as the seed has the character of a promise. This promise is not 
necessarily a form of predestination (cf. 2:8), as our third semiotic square highlights the value of 
risk. This value of risk is not simply about taking risk. Our fourth semiotic square shows that, for 
Paul, the risk taking is God-oriented and community-oriented. It is not about demanding success 
in taking risk. Rather, it is about entrusting oneself to the guidance of Christ and God. Paul 
makes this clear in 15:57. What undergirds the sowing, dying, and coming to life of the seed into 
a plant is one’s relationship with God and Christ. One does not simply sow; one sows in Christ. 
Likewise, the seed does not just die; it dies in Christ; so on and so forth. 
Daniel Patte, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the Gospel: A Structural Introduction to the Pauline Letters 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1983), 222-31, 277-87. Also, see Ciliers Breytenbach, “The ‘For Us’ Phrases in 
Pauline Soteriology,” in Salvation in the New Testament: Perspectives on Soteriology. Supplements to Novum 
Testamentum 121. Edited by Jan G. van der Watt (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), 175. 
In a language similar to Nancy’s notion of “implosion” from within the structure – see Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity. Translated by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant, and Michael B. 
Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) – Patte further shows how the law revealed by God was 
absolutized by people into an idol as if the law was the complete revelation of God. As this idol is built upon God’s 
revelation, it appears to be credible; it is not simply a false illusion. To destroy an idolatrous system that orients our 
value system, one can do it “from the outside” or “from the inside.” To do it “from the outside” will, however, 
destroy everything in the system. It will, moreover, be like throwing the baby out with the bathwater as one 
discounts the revelation of God that has been distorted. A more constructive but risky approach is a “from the 
inside” tactic. Thus when Paul writes that “Christ bought us out of the curse of the law by becoming a curse for 
us …” (Gal. 3:13; cf. 2 Cor. 5:21) or “God sent his own son in the likeness of the sinful flesh and concerning sins he 
condemns the sin in the flesh” (Rom. 8:3), he stresses the sacrifices that Jesus undertook in imploding the idolatrous 
system from within. That is to say, Jesus became the curse according to the law so that we may see that the law was 
actually distorted. If the law was not distorted and Jesus was indeed cursed, then he would not have been raised from 
the dead by God. But, the fact that Jesus was cursed by the law and yet raised by God shows the law itself is 
incoherent. Without this contradiction, people will not realize that the revelation of God through the law is distorted. 
This is what it means that “God sent his own son in the likeness of the sinful flesh” so that we may see the 
contradiction in our notion of sin and so that God may judge it. This exposure and victory over sin, however, must 
be done through a Christ-like manner, as one needs to trust God and be sent “in the likeness of the sinful flesh.” 
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Such a death, moreover, is not a “half-way” death. It is a death in which one surrenders 
oneself wholeheartedly to God and Christ.37 Paul thus exhorts believers to come to their senses 
and not to sin (15:34). So the challenge is not with dying, but with dying whole-heartedly. It is 
not a “half-way” dying that is a calculative move trying to test the water to see whether one 
should “die” or not. This calculation is understandable; after all, the stake is high. The issue, 
however, is not about whether believers die or not or give away all their possessions and body. 
The issue is about whether they do so with love. Love should be the motivating force. The issue 
is about whether they are God-centered in Christ. 
(v) Semiotic Square 5: Non-Objectifiable 
15:44b – a pneumatikon body is raised (S1):              15:56a – the sting of death is sin (S2): 





15:57 – God gives victory through Lord       15:36 – (implied) what you sow is not 
Jesus Christ (non-S2): Non-Imprisoning       made alive (non-S1): Objectifiable (not 
(Liberating)           transformed) 
 
In writing: “It is sown a psychikon (NRSV: physical; NIV: natural) body, it is raised a 
pneumatikon (NRSV; NIV: spiritual) body. If there is a psychikon body, there is also a 
pneumatikon [body]” (15:44),38 Paul seems to suggest a bodily entity of the spirit, not unlike our 
physical body. It is important to note that in Greco-Roman cultures, the material and immaterial 
worlds are a continuum. The dichotomy between body and mind and between material and 
immaterial world is a (Western) Cartesian construction. Another observation that we can make 
37 For example, Paul writes: “We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; 
persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed; always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that 
the life of Jesus may also be made visible in our bodies. For while we live, we are always being given up to death 
for Jesus' sake, so that the life of Jesus may be made visible in our mortal flesh” (2 Cor. 4:8-11; NRSV). 
38 The word “body” (σῶμα) is a neuter noun and it can mean (1) the “body of a human being or animal,” which can 
be a dead or living body, (2) “slaves” (the plural of σῶμα: σώματα), (3) “plant and seed structure,” (4) the 
“substantive reality, the thing itself,” and (5) “a unified group of people” (BDAG, 983-84). 
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about this verse is that Paul does not make a rigid opposition between the psychikon body and 
the pneumatikon body.39 If it is God who gives to each a body as God desires (15:38), we cannot 
conclude that the psychikon body is bad, unless we want to argue that God creates the bad body. 
Paul, however, does speak negatively of the psychikos person who does not receive the spirit of 
God (2:14). Rather, it is under certain circumstances that the psychikon body is described 
negatively. What is clear in 15:42-44 is that the psychikon body is associated with what is sown 
in corruption (ἐν φθορᾷ), dishonor (ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ), and weakness (ἐν ἀσθενεία), whereas the 
pneumatikon body is with what is raised in incorruption (ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ), glory (ἐν δόξῃ), and 
potentiality (ἐν δυνάμει).40 Instead of saying that the sowing and the raising are oppositional, it is 
more accurate to speak of the sowing and raising as a part of a continuum.41  
In 15:57, God and Jesus are portrayed as the “subjects” and “helpers” who transform the 
psychikon body into a pneumatikon body, whereas sin is the “opponent.” In 15:56, although Paul 
writes that the potentiality of sin is the law (ἡ δὲ δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ νόμος), we should be 
careful not to conclude that the law is therefore sinful. Such a negative view of the law is further 
reinforced if we translate dynamis (δύναμις) as “power” (CEB, ESV, NAB, NIV, NJB, and NRSV). 
While we should note the various conceptions of “power” (e.g., “power over,” “power with,” and 
“power-less”), we should not forget that the primary meanings of dynamis are “potentiality,” 
“capacity,” or “capability.” So if we translate 15:56b as “the potentiality of sin is the law,” 
39 For a possible Hellenistic Jewish notion of the psychikos person and the pneumatikos person, see Richard A. 
Horsley, 1 Corinthians. Abingdon New Testament Commentaries (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 210-13. 
40 As the word dynamis (δύναμις) can mean (1) “potential for functioning in some way: power, might, strength, 
force, capability,” (2) “ability to carry out something: ability, capability,” (3) “a deed that exhibits ability to function 
powerfully: deed of power, miracle, wonder,” (4) “something that serves as an adjunct of power: resource,” (5) “an 
entity or being, whether human or transcendent, that functions in a remarkable manner,” and (6) “the capacity to 
convey thought” (BDAG, 262-63), it is better to translate it as “capability,” “capacity,” or “potentiality,” which also 
has the meaning of “power” and “resource.” For an implication of this understanding of dynamis, see Richard 
Kearney, The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001).  
41 Paul writes: “The first human was made out of earth, the second human out of heaven. As the human was made of 
earth, such are those made of earth too; and as the heavenly human, such are those heavenly humans too. Just as we 
have borne the image of the human made of earth, we also bear the image of the heavenly human” (15:47-49). 
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instead of “the power of sin is the law,” then the law is not necessarily the dynamis of sin. The 
law is the site where sin works, thus the potentiality of sin. That is to say, when the law is 
distorted by sin and used as what empowers it, it can help sin to become “the sting of death.” 
It is not clear here how the law could be abused. But, from the succession of semiotic 
squares, it appears that the law (“what you sow”) is not made alive unless it dies. In other words, 
when the law is objectified or idolized as if it cannot die, it can become the dynamis of sin. Death 
is important here. In showing the limit of the law, death highlights its temporality and 
contextuality. As such, it can help prevent us from essentializing the law. Thus in saying that if 
there is a psychikon body, there is also a pneumatikon body (15:44), Paul exhorts believers not to 
fixate on any kind of body but to realize that there are many kinds of bodies (15:38-41). 
Likewise, on the issue of death, Paul reminds believers that while death is brought about 
by sin, it does not mean that it is necessarily the outcome of sin. In the case of Jesus, for example, 
death was used to bring about life, not unlike what we see in the case of “what you sow does not 
come to life unless it dies” (15:36). Indeed, by saying that God gives victory to believers through 
Jesus, Paul juxtaposes two kinds of “death.” Not only does Paul challenge believers to re-
examine the kind of “death” that Jesus went through. He also questions the kind of law that 
sentenced Jesus to crucifixion. If God gives victory to believers through Jesus, then does it mean 
that God uses the law to give victory? But, how does God use the law to give victory? Does it 
mean that God approves the law that condemns Jesus? Certainly not! Paul, after all, censures the 
world for rejecting the wisdom of God in its own wisdom (1:21). Paul makes it clear that “if the 
rulers of this age knew (the wisdom of God), they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” 
(2:8). There is something wrong with the social norms and the laws, whether the Roman laws, 
Jewish laws, or the natural laws. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into this complex question, we argue 
that the death of Jesus becomes the death of the law. That is to say, the law that condemns Jesus 
becomes the law that condemns itself in condemning Jesus. (Recall our discussion of the notion 
of “exception” of Giorgio Agamben in section 2.3 in chapter 2).42 Paul highlights this point 
when he writes, “For since in the wisdom of God the cosmos did not know God through its 
wisdom, God was pleased, through the foolishness of the kerygma, to save those who believed” 
(2:21). As “the psychikos does not receive the things of the spirit of God for they are foolish to 
him” (2:14), it is thus vital for the psychikon body to be transformed into a pneumatikon body. 
Without this transformation, believers will not be able to receive the wisdom and power (or 
potentiality) of God to see or recognize that God is actually at work through Jesus. 
Thus by reminding believers of their calling (1:26-29),43 Paul urges them to examine 
their own situation to see whether God indeed calls into question the social norms that have 
marginalized those who are deemed foolish, weak, and ignoble the society. But, just as God 
chose “the things that are not (τά μὴ ὄντα) to bring to nothing the things that are (τὰ ὄντα)” 
(1:28), God raised what is sown in corruption, dishonor, and weakness into incorruption, glory, 
and potentiality, respectively (15:42-43). In light of their own situations, believers should realize 
that the law must not be objectified. For Paul, when something or someone is objectified, 
her/his/its otherness will be reduced. As her/his/its potentiality is constrained, s/he/it cannot 
change and grow anymore. There is no more room for engagement and transformation. 
 
42 For example, see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
43 Paul writes, “For watch out for your calling (Βλέπετε γὰρ τὴν κλῆσιν ὑμῶν), adelphoi, not many were wise 
according to flesh (κατὰ σάρκα), not many were powerful (δυνατοί), not many were well born (εὐγενεῖς), but the 
foolish things of the cosmos God chose to shame the wise, and the weak things of the cosmos God chose to shame 
the strong things, and the ignoble things of the cosmos and the despised things God chose, the things that are not (τὰ 
μὴ ὄντα) to bring to nothing (καταργήσῃ) the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) so that every flesh may not boast in front of 
God” (1 Cor. 1:26-29). 
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(vi) Semiotic Square 6: Up-lifting and Empowering 
15:43d, 43b, 42b – raised in potentiality,        15:43a, 43c, 44a – sown as a psychikon  
glory, and incorruption (S1): Empowering        body, in weakness and dishonor (S2):  





15:44b, 43d, 43b – raised as a pneumatikon        15:56, 44a, 43c – the sting of death is sin,  
body, in potentiality and glory (non-S2):       sown in weakness and dishonor (non-S1): 
Non-Delimiting          Non-Empowering 
 
In this semiotic square, we combine three pairs of opposed actions together because they 
do not contribute to the story progression (see Appendix 3 of chapter 3). Overall, we find that the 
values of the previous semiotic square are more or less repeated in this sixth semiotic square. Yet 
the value of liberation and empowerment is more stressed and that the contrast between the 
psychikon body and the pneumatikon body is further highlighted. The psychikon body that is 
sown (downward) in corruption, weakness, and dishonor is contrasted with the pneumatikon 
body that is raised (upward) in potentiality, glory, and incorruption. 
There is a sense of hope and faith, if not of idealism, in the face of sin, weakness, 
dishonor, and death. In referring to the stories of the first Adam and the last Adam (15:45-49), 
Paul wants believers to see that as they bear the images of both figures, they need to be vigilant 
and hopeful at the same time, lest they cannot inherit the kingdom of God (15:50). Paul tries to 
paint an inviting and encouraging picture for believers so that they will not limit their potentiality 






(vii) Semiotic Square 7: Being Faithful to the Grace of God 
15:12a – Christ is preached as raised from      15:42a – sown in corruption (S2): Static 
the dead (S1): Being faithful to the grace       (remaining in the same condition without 




15:43d- 43b, 42b – raised in potentiality,      15:43a, 43c, 44a – sown as a psychikon 
glory, and incorruption (non-S2): Non-Static      body, in weakness and dishonor (non-S1):  
    Non-Faithful (i.e., waste the grace of God) 
 
For Paul, the resurrection of Christ is of utmost importance to the pistis of believers. For 
him, “if Christ has not been raised (οὐκ ἐγήγερται), then empty (κενὸν) is our kerygma, empty 
(κενὴ) also is your pistis” (15:14; cf. 15:2). Again in 15:17, Paul mentions that “if Christ has not 
been raised, then empty (ματαία) is your pistis.” The perfect passive indicative of “has been 
raised” shows that the resurrection of Jesus continues to have its effect. However, in making his 
case for the resurrection of Christ, Paul begins intriguingly by saying, “If there is no resurrection 
of the dead, Christ has not been raised” (εἰ δὲ ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς 
ἐγήγερται) (15:13). Likewise, in 15:16, Paul writes, “If the dead are not raised, Christ has not 
been raised” (γὰρ νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, οὐδὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται). 
What is intriguing about Paul’s argument is that he says, “If there is no resurrection of the 
dead (ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν), Christ has not been raised” (15:13). Could Paul be arguing that 
“Christ has been raised” is supported by “the resurrection of the dead”?44 We may right away 
reject this possibility because Paul did not mention the dead being resurrected. Implicit but 
integral to this rejection is a deeply ingrained assumption about the corpse of Jesus transformed 
44 Regarding the notion of the dead (νεκρός), Martin argues that Paul’s language of the “resurrection of the dead” 
refers to the resuscitation of the corpse, a popular understanding of the uneducated at the church that is found 
ridiculous by the “strong” in the church. See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body, 107-8. Thiselton, however, 
argues that Martin’s “lexicographical claim about νεκρός [as the corpse] may also be overstated. In the LXX (the 
Bible of the Church at Corinth) the Greek term often means the dead without necessarily alluding to a rotting 
corpse…” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1217. 
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into a divine body. But what does Paul mean by “the dead”? To many Chinese, the “deceased” 
are not necessarily “the dead.” They are “dead” when they are no longer relevant to the family. 
That is to say, the notion of “dead” is conceptualized not in terms of biology, but of relationship. 
So without clarifying how people become “dead,” we cannot speak of how they come to life 
again.45 While these questions are not the primary inquiry of this chapter, they must be clarified 
within the framework of a non-Cartesian worldview of the Greco-Roman cultures. 
Just based on the simple present condition in 15:13 and 15:16, even if the protasis (“if…”) 
indicates nothing about the reality or the probability of the apodosis (“then...”), the verses 
suggest that “the resurrection of the dead” does somehow happen; otherwise the argument would 
lose its force of persuasion.46 Moreover, if Christ is the first-fruits of those who have fallen 
asleep (15:20),47 and if Paul dies every day (15:31), which suggests that he also comes to life 
every day, then is it not possible that “the dead” can also refer to a kind of death that Paul 
experiences?  
This experience of dying and coming to life is crucial to Paul’s preaching of the gospel. 
In light of his radical transformation from a fervent persecutor of the church to an apostle of 
45 Could “the resurrection of the dead” signify the transformation of a psychikon body into a pneumatikon body, in 
particular if Jesus is the life-giving spirit (15:45)? 
46 Many commentators take 15:13 and 16 as parts of Paul’s rhetoric. They begin with the assumption that the 
physical body of Jesus must have been made alive (even though we only have the “appearance” story in the Gospels 
and we are not told about the “resurrected body” of Jesus), and as such, the dead must likewise be raised accordingly. 
Paul, however, does not follow this logic. He reverses the order. Fee writes, “This [verse 13] may possibly mean that 
a general repudiation of the resurrection would thereby render a single instance to be impossible; more likely Paul 
already has in mind the causal connection between Christ's resurrection and that of believers. That is, to deny the 
resurrection of the dead is to deny the resurrection of the one who makes any and all resurrections possible. At this 
point, however, Paul chooses not to refute their position on the basis of vv. 1-11, that is, since Christ has been raised, 
as he preached and they believed, there must be a resurrection of the dead.” See Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to 
the Corinthians, 741. Likewise, Fitzmyer: “Paul’s philosophical argument now begins, as he tries to reduce the 
denial ad absurdum: If there is no ‘resurrection of the dead,’ then Christ’s resurrection is unthinkable, indeed 
impossible!” See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 563.  
47 This notion of Christ as the first-fruits of those raised from the dead seems to contradict what we read in Matthew 
27:53 that says that when Jesus gave up his spirit on the cross, the tombs were opened, and the many bodies of the 
holy ones who had slept were raised (καὶ τὰ μνημεῖα ἀνεῴχθησαν καὶ πολλὰ σώματα τῶν κεκομημένων ἁγίων 
ἡγέρθησαν).” That is to say, before the “official” resurrection of Jesus, which happened three days after his 
crucifixion, the holy ones were already raised. Instead of Jesus, they were the first fruits. Of course, here we come to 
our conceptualization of “resurrection,” which is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Christ Jesus, Paul calls Christ’s appearance to him the grace of God. Calling himself the least of 
the apostles not worthy to be called (καλεῖσθαι) to be an apostle (15:9), Paul labors harder than 
other apostles so that the grace of God for him is not in vain (15:10). This strong sense of fidelity 
to the grace of God marks Paul’s response to God’s calling. Since the Corinthian believers first 
believed in this proclamation of the gospel (15:11) and even experienced the grace of God (1:4-
9), the denial of the resurrection of the dead (15:12) would reject the very fundamental that once 
characterized their relationship with Paul and other apostles through whom God and Christ have 
worked. It is to call into question the very foundation of one’s pistis. 
 As we mentioned, 15:13 and 15:16 could imply that, for Paul, the Corinthian believers 
have somehow been raised. The believers’ rejection of the preaching of the resurrection of Christ 
would then suggest their rejection of Paul’s experience, of the Scripture (15:4), of the witness of 
God and Christ (as Paul preaches and manifests the gospel with the grace of God), as well as 
their earlier experience when receiving the proclamation of the gospel (15:11). As a result, such 
believers remain in corruption, weakness, and dishonor. It is through the fidelity to the 
experience of God in Christ that what is sown as a psychikon body can be raised as a 
pneumatikon body. This is why Paul exhorts believers to “become firm, immovable, abound in 
the work of the Lord always, knowing that your labor is not in vain in the Lord” (15:58). 
(viii) Semiotic Square 8: Contextualizing 
So far, we see that the basic values that undergird Paul’s argument are related to love 
(which he says is the most excellent way in 12:31b) and the resurrection of Christ (without which 
the pistis of believers is vain). We can continue with our analysis of several more semiotic 
squares that are immediately connected to semiotic square 7, but since they are not directly 
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related to Paul’s conception of love, we will limit our presentation to the pairs of opposed actions 
in the dialogic level that address love (see Appendix 3 of chapter 3).  
8:3 – those who love God are known by       6:12a-c; 10:23 – everything is permitted  
God (S1): Contextualizing (risk and promise:          (to me) (S2): Particularizing and 
a renewed understanding)         Universalizing one’s own context and 
            interest 
 
 
6:12a; 10:23a-b – (implied) certain things       10:24a – (implied) people seek their own  
are beneficial (to me) (non-S2): Non-Particularizing-     thing (non-S1): Non-Contextualizing ( 
and-Universalizing one’s own context and interest      Security and self-affirmation and 
     aggrandizement) 
 
In this semiotic square, love and knowing are intimately related and, from the perspective 
of our earlier discussion of 1 Corinthians 13 and 15, love needs to be viewed has having several 
actantial roles. In 8:3, the “subjects” (τις, anyone or “those” – in the plural to use inclusive 
language) may love God in the sense that God is the “receiver” of the “object” love. But this 
should not be understood as meaning that they do objectify God. While the “subjects” may give 
love (the “object”) to God, they are actually helped by “love” in loving God. Love is also a 
“helper.” Furthermore, if love moves the “subjects” to love, then love is also the “sender.” 
Furthermore, if the “subjects” are drawn out by love and by God, then love and God are not 
under their subjection. When the “subjects” are “in love,” not only are they subjected to love, 
they are also the “receivers” of their own love. 
In being drawn out of themselves toward God, the “subjects” are not in control of 
themselves. This love movement toward God further de-subjectifies the “subjects” when Paul 
refrains from saying that they will know God in loving God. On the contrary, they are known by 
God. The “subjects,” as a result, are doubly de-subjectified. As love sends and helps the 
“subjects” to give love and themselves to God, God is also moved by love in knowing the 
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“subjects.” God, however, does not objectify them in knowing them. This non-objectifying 
character of God’s knowing comes to the fore when we consider the textual variants and the 
middle voice of knowing (ἔγνωσται) in 8:3 to be the most authentic text.48  
Following our earlier comments regarding the “intransitive nonreflexivity” of the middle 
voice, we need to argue here that the verb ἔγνωσται is a knowing that takes place in the knowing 
itself, in between the subject of knowing and the object of knowing. The knowing, as such, is a 
process that has its own spirit; a process not unlike the characteristics of a conversation that 
Hans-Georg Gadamer propounds. 49  This quality of the middle voice exemplifies the 
performative and charismatic qualities of love that Paul envisions (see “Semiotic Square 1” 
above). Qualified by love, the knowing is not a grasping or an objectification of the other/Other. 
Paul thus says in 8:2-3, “If anyone thinks that he knew something, he did not yet know as he 
ought to know. But, if someone loves [God], he has been known [by God].” Paul is concerned 
that the knowing be objectified and turned into a system of categorization that orders, 
manipulates, and marginalizes the other/Other, as we see happen in the “idol food” conflict (see 
chapter 6). Because such a knowing is distorted into an abusive power, Paul warns believers, 
48 For example, Thiselton writes, “The verb ἔγνωσται may be constructed either as middle (expressing personal 
interest or the involvement of the subject of the verb in a reflexive sense) or as a passive (known). To retain the 
ambiguity, we may translate the shorter text: But if anyone loves, he or she has experienced true ‘knowing.’ Thus 
א* and 33 also omit ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. Conzelmann describes this shorter reading as ‘a very pregnant text;’ Fee observes 
that ‘this shorter text (i.e., εἰ δὲ τις ἀγαπᾷ, οὗτος ἔγνωσται) brings Paul’s point home so powerfully that it is most 
likely what he originally wrote;’ and Spicq considers it ‘very probably authentic.’ Against p46 and Clement, p15, א2, 
A, B, D, F, the Latin and Syriac VSS, and Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Augustine include τόν θεόν and also (except 
for א* and 33) ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. The UBS 4th ed. accepts the longer reading with ‘A’ grading. Metzger defends this on the 
grounds that ‘the absence of τόν θεόν … was regarded by the Committee to be the result of formal assimilation to 
ver 2.’ …” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 625. We make this citation to show that 
the discussions have yet to consider the “intransitive nonreflexivity” character of the middle voice, which renders 
the verb ἔγνωσται as “knowing that takes place in the knowing itself.” This translation is close to that of Thiselton, 
with the exception that the “true knowing” is not reflexive. This exception stresses that the “knowing” cannot be co-
opted by the “subject” of knowing. Because as the “true knowing” is not reflexive, it does not return to the gaze of 
the “subject.” This “nonreflexivity” of the “true knowing” is further confirmed when we see that the knowing by 
God is not a knowing that grasps the other, but a knowing that takes places in Christ dying for the other. 
49 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method. Second, revised edition. Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 385. 
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“Watch out that this right of yours (ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὕτη) not somehow becomes a stumbling 
block (πρόσκομμα) to the weak” (8:9). 
 This notion of risk and vulnerability in being drawn out of oneself towards the beloved in 
the matter of knowing is further stressed in 13:12.50 As we have noted in chapter 2, the premise 
of knowing fully (note the middle voice) is “I am fully known.” It is insofar as I am fully known 
that I come to know fully. But, to know what? The other/Other? Myself (as a result of becoming 
vulnerable)? Paul does not say. But, it is in being drawn out of myself (i.e., cleared of my own 
perspective that tries to grasp the other/Other), that I can know in a way that the other/Other can 
be the other/Other without being co-opted into my knowing. 
 This quality of risk and vulnerability in knowing echoes our analysis of the second and 
third semiotic squares above regarding 13:3 and 15:36. It is also reflected in 6:12 and 10:23 that 
challenges an egotistic perspective. Paul writes, “All things are permitted to me (μοι ἔξεστιν) but 
not all things are beneficial (οὐ πάντα συμφέρει). All things are permitted to me but I will not be 
mastered (ἐξουσιασθήσομαι) by anything” (6:12).51 While Paul does not mention to whom are 
“not all things beneficial,” his caution that “I will not be mastered by anything” points out the 
problem with saying that “all things are permitted to me.” Because if “all things are permitted to 
me,” then “I” do not need to care about anyone. This carelessness towards the other/Other is fine 
if “I” am self-sufficient and do not need anyone’s help. But, if “I” am always related to someone 
and even indebted to her/him (to whatever degree it may be), then to say that “all things are 
permitted to me” is to treat the other/Other as a means to an end. One’s relationship with the 
50 Paul writes, “For until now I see through the mirror in enigma, but then face to face; until now I know partially, 
but then I shall know fully (ἐπιγνώοσμαι), just as I am fully known (καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην).” 
51 Thiselton points out the “wordplay on the two forms derived from ἐκ + εἰμι. ἔξεστι (indicate) relates to ἐξουσία 
(participle) and hence to the first singular future passive indicative of ἐξουσιασθήσομαι, from ἐξουσιάζω. The noun 
ἐξουσία often [means] authority, but means no less the right to act because the agent possesses ἐξουσία in the sense 
of freedom of choice. In the active voice ἐξουσιάζω means to control someone else’s rights, power, or freedom of 
choice. Hence the passive voice (as used here) can mean I will not be mastered by (NIV), or dominated by (NRSV, 
NJB)…” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 461. 
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other/Other becomes an economy of exchange. This self-centered attitude is at odds with a 
group-oriented culture, where only a very few have the means to do so. Here, it is important to 
note that immediately before 6:12, Paul in 6:11 reminds believers that they were “washed, 
sanctified, and made just in the name of Lord Jesus Christ and in the spirit of our God.” In fact, 
this is how Paul addresses the Corinthian believers: “to the church of God in Corinth, to those 
who have been sanctified in Chris Jesus, those called saints…” (1:2). All things are certainly 
permitted to God and Jesus, yet they focus on the washing, sanctification, and justification of 
people. Indeed, Jesus even died for people (8:11). 
 It may be tempting to overemphasize the value of reason and self-control in the autonomy 
of an individual (see chapter 1). But, for Paul, the sense of self-mastery is oriented toward God 
and Christ (6:13). The saying that “I will not be mastered by anything” is not against heteronomy. 
On the contrary, it highlights one’s reliance upon God and Christ to be not “mastered by 
anything.” Thus when Paul reiterates 6:12 in 10:23, not only does he repeat the phrase “not all 
things are beneficial (συμφέρει),” in particular the word συμφέρει, he also says that “not all 
things build up (οἰκοδομεῖ),” which echoes 8:1, “Gnosis puffs up, but love builds up 
(οἰκοδομεῖ).” Love, in other words, is not only indispensable to “building up” the other/Other 
and brings everyone and everything together (συμ-φέρει), 52 it is also what moves believers 
towards God and God towards believers (2:9; 8:3). 
This imageries of building and bringing everything together are interrelated with love. To 
build something is to bring things together. But, how to bring things together is the challenge. As 
the foundation that provides the support to the building is Christ (3:11), the building must be 
built Christ-like or in the pattern of a cross-like lifestyle, as Paul tells the Corinthian believers 
that when he was with them, he only focused on “Jesus Christ and him crucified” (2:2). 
52 Note that Paul describes the Corinthian believers as “the field of God, the building of God (οἰκοδομή)” in 3:9. 
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Socio-politically and religiously, the cross was a scandal in ancient Mediterranean 
cultures. In the Roman Empire, the cross was certainly the most horrific, despicable, and 
shameful execution that even the Roman “cultured literary world wanted to have nothing to do 
with it, and as a rule kept quiet about it.”53 As that which should not be mentioned, the cross was 
used to maintain the Pax Romana of the Empire. However, the cross was also, shockingly, used 
by Paul to highlight the power and wisdom of God. Who would have known that the wisdom of 
God that the wisdom of the world had rejected (1:21) and that the rulers of this age had crucified 
(2:8) was “Jesus Christ and him crucified”? Here, one should not reason that Jesus was 
predestined to be crucified. To say so is to say that God predestined the world and the rulers of 
this age to reject Jesus. Rather, Jesus was rejected and crucified because of the ignorance of the 
world (2:8) and because of his love for people. In contradiction to those who seek their own 
things (10:24), the preposition “dia” (διά) + accusative in 8:11, meaning “for the sake of,” shows 
that Jesus did not seek his own things but the things of others. The cross, in other words, was the 
embodiment of vulnerability and care for others. It was the risk that Jesus was willing to take for 
the sake of others. This other-orientation of the cross shows that the cross cannot be objectified. 
For Paul, the crucifixion of Jesus was not the killing of the Son by the Father. It was not a child 
abuse. Neither was it sadistic (by the Father) nor masochistic (by the Son). Rather, it was for the 
sake of others that Jesus died (ἀπέθανεν) (notice the active voice in 8:11). If it was because of 
the love of life that Christ took the path of the cross (8:11; cf. 2 Cor. 5:14-15; Rom. 5:6-8), then 
we cannot address συμφέρει (“bringing together”) and οἰκοδομεῖ (“building up”) without 
highlighting this cruciform love. 
53 Martin Hengel, Crucifixion: In the Ancient World and the Folly of the Message of the Cross. Translated by John 
Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 38. 
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 The connection of “love builds up” (1 Cor. 8:1), “not everything builds up” (10:23), 
“believers are the building of God” (3:9), Jesus Christ as the foundation of the building (3:10-11) 
– which shows why Paul decided to know nothing among the Corinthian believers “except Jesus 
Christ and him crucified” (2:2) – reflects the importance of the cross in Paul’s vision of love. 
Paul’s exhortation in 10:24, “Let no one seek her/his own thing but the thing of the other” on the 
issue of the “idol food” conflict, likewise, echoes Paul’s notion of a love that “does not seek 
things for itself” (13:5). As Kei Eun Chang stresses, the common good (τὸ συμφέρον) is vitally 
important to Paul’s ethico-political and soteriological vision of the body of Christ. 54  Our 
discussion of the “togetherness” of sym (συμ) in συμφέρει (see section 3.2 in chapter 2) further 
underscores that it is in the coming together of various groups of people that differences and 
similarities are foregrounded. Differences and similarities are not an essence in themselves. 
As we have repeatedly emphasized, a context is contextual all the way down. A context is 
always other-oriented, fluid, and dynamic. It must not be objectified and ossified. To essentialize 
a context is to de-contextualize it, depriving it of its dynamics and discursiveness. It is in the 
coming together, in a face-to-face encounter that love and knowing take place. Recall Paul’s 
saying in 13:12 that “I will fully know” only insofar as “I am fully known.” Thus Paul urges 
believers not to seek their own things (cf. Phil. 2:3; Rom. 12:3). In seeking their own things, 
believers cannot see beyond their horizons. They will only further reinforce it. But, when one 
seeks the things of the other/Other, in particular as one is in love and is drawn out of oneself 
towards the beloved, one’s perspective can then be broadened and deepened.  
 
 
54 See Kei Eun Chang, The Community, The Individual And The Common Good: Τὸ Ἴδιον and Τὸ Συμφέρον in the 
Greco-Roman World and Paul (New York and London: Bloomsbury T & T Clark, 2013). 
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(ix) Semiotic Square 9: A Response-ability Labor 
Noting that φυσιοῖ (“to be inflated”) “is a Pauline word,”55 Raymond Collins points out 
that the word “was common in Hellenistic rhetoric where it was used to characterize those whose 
self-conceit was such that it led to partisanship.”56 This “airy” and “free-floating” imagery of 
knowledge “puffing up” contrasts sharply with the “down to earth” and painstaking imagery of 
love “building up” (8:1; cf. 4:6, 18, 19; 5:2; and 13:4). 
8:1e – love builds up (S1): A Response-       8:2 – those who think they know actually 
Ability Labor                      do not yet know (S2): A Non-Relational 




8:3 – those who love God are known by        6:12a-c, 10:23 – everything is permitted  
God (non-S2): A Relational Knowing       (to me) (non-S1): A Non-Response- 
     Ability Labor 
 
Building a building is a hard and a dedicated work. A building that is not built well can 
get people hurt and killed. It takes planning, skill, patience, labor, persistency, constant review, 
responsibility, and consideration to build a safe and comfortable place. As the building of God 
(θεοῦ οἰκοδομή) (3:9), believers too must use love to build themselves into a well-rounded 
person. As an entrusted steward (οἰκονόμος) of the mysteries of God (4:2) and a wise architect 
(ἀρχιτέκτων) (3:10), Paul cannot help but to proclaim the gospel with much fear and trembling.57 
Believers, likewise, need to be careful in building themselves (3:9-15). Once the building is built 
wrong, it must be deconstructed and built again. One must start over again. One should thus 
begin well so that one does not need to undo and redo what one has done. 
55 Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, 180. 
56 Ibid., 177. 
57 Because it is impossible to communicate the mysteries of God without somehow reducing it, Paul must rely on 
God to convey them to believers. 
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Similarly, the more massive a building believers want to become, the stronger a 
foundation they must lay. No building can stand on a weak foundation. The foundation must be 
able to support the building. To build themselves into a building of God, believers must use 
Christ as the foundation (3:11). A long-lasting building requires a long-lasting foundation and 
good building materials. This is why the believers’ pistis (i.e., “faith,” “faithfulness,” “trust,” or 
“obedience”) cannot be in human wisdom; it must be in the power of God (2:5), namely, the 
logos of the cross (1:18). Once this foundation is laid, believers must not waste it by using flimsy 
materials to build the building. Whatever they build will be tested to make sure that it can last. 
As the foundation is equipped with the potentiality for believers to build all kinds of buildings, 
they should use valuable materials to make the building impressive and to make their life worthy 
of the grace of God (cf. 15:10; 9:26-27). 
In this building project, Paul cannot simply lay the foundation. First, as the foundation 
can only be Jesus Christ and him crucified (2:2-3), it must be laid with the help of God and 
Christ so that the building can be built by the locals to meet their own needs (cf. 9:19-23; 10:33). 
Secondly, as Paul is one of the co-workers of God (3:9), one of the building-stewards of the 
mysteries of God (οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ) who must be found pistos (4:1-2), as he has 
already been entrusted with the building-stewardship (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι) (9:17), Paul must 
really work hard to rely on God in doing his mission, not to mention the mysteries of God can 
only be conveyed by God. Here, Paul’s language of “laboring” (3:8; 4:12; 15:10, 58; 16:16) is 
prominent. In making himself a slave to all people (9:19) and disciplining himself harshly for his 
mission (9:25-27), Paul continues to show that “the kingdom of God” is not in the sphere of 
logos but in power (οὐ γὰρ λόγῳ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλ’ ἐν δυνάμει) (4:20). The kingdom has 
its own ethos; one cannot do whatever one desires. In saying that believers have already become 
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king by themselves (4:8), Paul suggests that they have even usurped the place of God and Christ. 
But, if the power of God is manifested through the crucified Messiah (1:24, 30), then the 
building that believers are should embody the mark of the crucified Christ (cf. 2 Cor. 4:10), as 
they were called by God to participate in the fellowship of Jesus. Otherwise they would have 
already rejected the logos of the cross as foolishness (1 Cor. 1:18). So not just Paul himself, but 
also believers need to continue to labor in their pistis (15:58; cf. 1 Thess. 1:2-10; Rom. 5:1-5). 
Whatever believers build must be tested by fire (1 Cor. 3:13). Thus in being baptized into the 
name of Christ (1:13), they need to be Christ-like (11:1), put on Christ (Gal. 3:27; Rom. 13:12, 
14; 2 Cor. 5:1-5; cf. 1 Cor. 15:53-54),58 and to be transformed accordingly (cf. 1 Cor. 11:27-32; 
Rom. 12:1-3). 
From these imageries of building a strong and good building, we can see that love, which 
manifests similar qualities (1 Cor. 13:4-8), indeed builds up. One cannot simply build a building 
in any way that one wants, in particular if one is building the building of God. In a group-
oriented culture, one is always already in relations with others. Not only is one the “fruit” of love 
of one’s parents, one also receives her/his flesh and body from them, whether one likes it or not. 
One’s life is not one’s alone; it also belongs to one’s family and friends. Whatever that one does 
affects these people. One must be aware and be responsible for one’s words and deeds, lest they 
disable people from being able to respond to the love of God towards them. 
(x) Semiotic Square 10: No Fixed Representation 
In this semiotic square, since only 8:1e (non-S2) mentions love, a semantic analysis of 
this semiotic square will not offer us much insight about Paul’s view of love. We will thus just 
focus on the relation of contradiction between 8:1d (S2) and 8:1e (non-S2).  
58 See Jung Hoon Kim, The Significance of Clothing Imagery in the Pauline Corpus (London and New York: T&T 
Clark International, 2004). 
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8:8; 6:13 – food will not offer us to God        8:1d – gnosis puffs up (S2): Delimiting: 
(S1): No Representation that can replace              a ki nd of knowledge that contracts one’s 
the real conditions of life          horizon of vision           
 
 
8:1e – love builds up (non-S2): Non         8:2 – those who think they know do not 
delimiting: a kind of love that expands        yet know (non-S1): A representation that 
one’s horizon of vision          replaces the real conditions of life 
 
In this relation, love that builds up has to be practical, substantial, and connective. In fact, 
love cannot be indifferent but must pay attention to various situations. By contrast, gnosis about 
the “idol food” can classify and separate people into different categories, once it shifts its focus 
from people’s situation to the food. So, instead of building people up in their relationship with 
God, it objectifies and alienates people from each other and from God. Instead of going before 
God without any intermediary, believers need to go through the food system. As a result, God is 
also included into this signifying system. Food becomes the currency that defines believers and 
God. For Paul, even if food may define one’s relationship with other/Other, it must not be turned 
into a universal and fixed evaluative system that prevents one from interacting and knowing the 
other/Other in person in her/his/its concrete situation. 
(xi) Semiotic Square 11: Christ-like 
4:21c – Paul wants to visit the Corinthian       3:4b-c – the Corinthian believers say that 
believers in love and a spirit of gentleness       they belong to different groups (S2): Self- 





1:10d – Paul urges the Corinthian believers       3:3b; 11:18 – jealousy and strive are 





In our final two semiotic squares, we come to the end of our story progression. In saying 
that he wants to visit the Corinthian believers in love and a spirit of gentleness (ἐν ἀγάπῃ 
πνεύματί τε πραΰτητος),59 Paul wants them to receive love and a spirit of gentleness from his 
visit. He does not want them to receive a rod from him (4:21) and to seem be imposingly 
authoritative. However, as the kingdom of God is not in logos but in power (4:20), one’s 
relationship with Christ and God should then embody the power of God (2:5), that is, the logos 
of the cross (1:18). Thus, even if Paul wants to visit the believers, he cannot just go. The Lord 
has to approve it first (4:19). As such, it is not entirely up to Paul to discipline or to treat them 
with love and gentleness. 
Indeed, if “Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1:24), and if it is out of 
God that believers are “in Christ Jesus who became wisdom” for their benefit by God (1:30), 
then they are in the power of God when called by God “into the fellowship of God’s Son Jesus 
Chris our Lord” (1:9). Thus when Paul calls believers to his side (παρακάλειν), it is “through the 
name of our Lord Jesus Christ” that he encourages them all to say the same thing (τὸ αὐτὸ 
λέγητε), not to have factions (σχίσματα) among themselves, and be restored in the same mind 
and in the same thought (κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοΐ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ) (1:10).60 
Note that it is “through the name of our Lord Jesus” that Paul urges and persuades 
believers; the very name that “everyone” from “every place” calls upon as her/his Lord (1:2). 
This is the fundamental characteristic of a believer: one who is “sanctified in Christ Jesus” and 
calls upon “the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (1:2). If Paul “decided to know nothing among 
59 The word πραΰτης means “the quality of not being overly impressed by a sense of one’s self-importance, 
gentleness, humility, courtesy, considerateness, meekness” (BDAG, 861). 
60 The word νοῦς can mean: (1) “the faculty of intellectual perception,” (2) “way of thinking,” and (3) “result of 
thinking” (e.g., “thought, opinion, decree” (BDAG, 680). The word γνὠμη can mean: (1) “that which is purposed or 
intended,” (2) “a viewpoint of or way of thinking about a matter” (e.g., “opinion, judgment, way of thinking”), (3)  
“the act of expressing agreement with a body of data” (e.g., “approval”), and (4) “a declaration that expresses formal 
consideration of a matter” (e.g., “declaration, decision, resolution”) (BDAG, 202-3). 
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you [i.e., the Corinthians] except Jesus Christ and him crucified” (2:2), then it is through 
acknowledging the lordship of Jesus and his crucifixion that Paul asks the Corinthian believers to 
“say the same thing” and to be restored “in the same mind and in the same thought.” This 
exhortation is not too demanding; after all, believers already did the impossible. As they were 
empowered by the Holy Spirit to confess that Jesus is Lord (12:3) and received the spirit from 
God (2:12), they did not reject the scandal and the logos of the cross as foolishness but received 
it as the power of God (1:18). If they have already accepted Christ as the power of God and the 
wisdom of God (1:24) and were even enriched in God in everything, “in every logos and every 
gnosis” (1:5), then it should not be impossible for them to “say the same thing.” As Paul makes it 
clear in 12:4-6, there are many gifts but the same spirit, many services (διακονιῶν) but the same 
Lord, and many workings (ἐνεργημάτων) but the same God, to “say the same thing” does not 
mean to erase differences. The body of Christ is one, but it is “parts beyond a part” (12:27). In 
3:8, for example, Paul writes, “the planter (i.e., Paul) and the waterer (i.e., Apollos) are one 
(ἕν),61 each will receive his own wage according to his own labor.” 
In other words, to say “the same thing” and “be restored in the same mind and in the 
same thought” should be done in a Christ-like way; after all, Christ is the foundation of the 
building of God (i.e., believers) (3:9-11). Thus, Paul “became all kinds of people” as he interacts 
with them in proclaiming the gospel of Christ (9:22). He pleases everyone in everything, not 
seeking his own benefits but of others so that they may be saved (10:33). So, if believers want to 
form their own groups, they should do so in a Christ-like manner. If they want to strive and be 
61 Concerning this notion of “one,” Thiselton writes, “Exegetes and translators show some disagreement, however, 
about whether one (ἕν, neuter form of εἷς, μία, ἕν, adjectival singular numeral, one [person] … one [thing]) signifies 
here one in status (equal, RSV; there is no difference between …, TEV) or one in task and goal (have a common 
purpose, NRSV; work as a team, REB; are working for the same end, Basic English). The AV/KJN and RV simply 
reproduce the Greek, are one, while the NJB has a useful double play in rendering It is all one who does the planting 
and who does the watering. This flows beautifully, has great force, and much to commend it since the Greek leaves 
open whether purpose or status is in view, and probably embraces both.” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, 303. 
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zealous, they should also do so in a Christ-like way. If Christ is the foundation that cannot be 
objectified, as Christ is crucified and the resurrected Messiah, then the “unity” among believers 
must also be Christ-like. 
(xii) Semiotic Square 12: A Christ-oriented Honor 
4:14b – Paul wrote the letter to admonish        4:21b – Paul did not want to visit the 
the Corinthian believers (S1): A Christ-             Corinthian believers with a rod (S2): A 




4:21c – Paul wants to visit believers in        3:4b-c – the Corinthian believers say that 
love and a spirit of gentleness (non-S2):                   they belong to different groups (non-S1): 
A Non-Self-centered Authority         A Non-Christ-oriented Honor 
 
As the person who gives birth to the Corinthian believers in Christ Jesus through the 
gospel (4:15),62 Paul’s reputation and honor are naturally intertwined with that of the group of 
believers. In saying that they are his work in the Lord and the seal of his apostleship in the Lord 
(9:1-2), Paul not only makes himself vulnerable to the charges of others against believers. He 
also implicates the reputation and honor of the Lord, as it is God and Christ who send him and 
entrust him with the responsibility to oversee the believers’ building project (3:10; 4:1-2; 9:17). 
Thus, in saying that it is “in Christ Jesus through the gospel” that he gives birth to believers, Paul 
62 In highlighting five aspects of a father-child relationship in Jewish and non-Jewish ancient texts (e.g., “hierarchy,” 
“authority,” “imitation,” “affection,” and “education”), Burke finds that Paul “employs the father-child metaphor in 
order to unite the Corinthians under himself as their common pater. As the founding-father of the community Paul 
expects his children to heed his position, submit to his authority, follow his example, obey his instructions and be 
aware of his love for them.” See Trevor J. Burke, “Paul’s Role As ‘Father’ To His Corinthian ‘Children’ in Socio-
Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:14-21),” in Paul and the Corinthians: Studies On A Community in Conflict. 
Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall. Edited by Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003), 
113. This might be an appropriate understanding of the father – child relationship in the narrative – dialogic 
dimension of the letter. But from the perspective of the semantic relationships that posit Paul’s convictional vision, 
we envision the “unity” differently. We find that Paul’s usage of a familial metaphor points out that if believers are 
Paul’s beloved children born in Christ Jesus through the gospel, then no individual believers can have privileges 
over the others (cf. 1 Cor. 4:6). In Christ, everyone is interdependent. The body of Christ is “parts beyond a part” 
(12:27) with each individuality in relation to other individualities. While individuality is certainly important in itself, 
we cannot speak of it without other individualities. It is in light of plurality (i.e., many individualities) that we can 
speak of an individuality. By itself, an individuality cannot be identified. It is when individuals come together that 
we can speak of individuality and plurality. 
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shows that believers are not his children alone. As he points out in 3:9, he and the other apostles 
are the co-workers of God. Hence, even if Paul wants to visit believers, he needs to seek the 
Lord’s approval. It is also not up to him alone to decide whether to visit them with a rod or with 
love and a spirit of gentleness.  
In a group-oriented culture where everyone’s honor is tied together, one can see why 
some Corinthian believers do not want to be associated with other believers in the church of God. 
They do not want their reputation and honor be affected by those whom they do not like. They 
want to form their own groups and be separated from them. Here, the use of genitive + εἰμι in 3:4 
(Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, ἕτερος δέ, Ἐγὼ Ἀπολλῶ) and 1:12 (Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, Ἐγὼ δὲ 
Ἀπολλῶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ) is noteworthy.63 For Donald Mastronarde, while the 
use of predicate in dative of possession “emphasizes having vs. not having something,” the use 
of predicate in genitive of possession “emphasizes that something belongs to X and not to 
anybody else.” 64 So as the Corinthian believers assert that “Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου … Ἐγὼ 
Ἀπολλῶ…,” they seem to be stressing that “I belong to nobody but Paul … I belong to nobody 
but Apollos.” The emphatic “I” in one’s association and dissociation with the others is 
remarkable. It simultaneously marks a clear, distinct, and rigid boundary between the self and the 
63 While treating this genitive as a genitive of possession, Wallace in his footnote on 1:12 writes, “Not altogether 
common in this example is the possessive gen. in the predicate, making an assertion about the subject.” See Daniel 
B. Wallace, Greek Grammar: Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1996), 83. In pointing out that no one has yet “produced one example of an ancient political slogan 
which has the same formula (personal pronoun + εἰμι [or ellipsed] + genitive of a proper name),” Mitchell further 
highlights the nuances in interpreting 1:12. In listing Dem. Or. 9.56 (Ἤσαν ... τινὲς μὲν Φιλίππου) and Andoc. 1.53 
(εἶναι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν) to show “a comparable use of the genitive of possession or relation to refer to party 
membership,” Mitchell also refers to BDF 162.7 that “classifies 1 Cor. 1:12 (and 3:4, 21; 6:19; Acts 27:23) as a 
‘genitive of relationship’ meaning ‘I belong to’ (also BAGD, 225).” See Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and Rhetoric of 
Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1991), 84. 
64 Donald J. Mastronarde, Introduction to Attic Greek (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California 
Press, 1993), 73. 
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others. 65  Paul’s admonition to believers thus exposes the power relations among believers. 
Through the language of honor and shame (4:14), the reminder that they were born through the 
gospel in Christ Jesus (4:15), the mention of Timothy as Paul’s beloved and pistos child in the 
Lord (4:17), and the emphasis that the kingdom of God is in the power of God (i.e., the logos of 
the cross) (4:20), Paul wants believers to realize that however much they may want to do to 
separate themselves from others, their honor is always already marked by the cross. As they have 
experienced and received so much grace from God and Jesus (1:4-5), they should be cross-
oriented. To make their own group according to their own wisdom is to reject the cross and to 
cut themselves off from the grace, wisdom, and power of God. It is for this reason that Paul 
wants to visit believers so that they can be reminded that the kingdom of God is not in logos but 
in the power of the cross (4:18-20).              
 
V. Conclusion 
Let us now summarize the values that we have fleshed out through our analyses of the 
semiotic squares. For this we will focus on the relations of “implication” from the first to the last 
semiotic square.66 The values that we find undergird Paul’s love are (in the order of the semiotic 
squares): (1) performative (i.e., other-oriented, messianic, and charismatic) and communicative, 
(2) letting go and collaborative, (3) risky (but promising) and non-calculative, (4) Christ-oriented 
65 In making these claims, believers do not want to be vulnerable to the possibility that their honor being tainted by 
their association with other believers. But, if they were already shamed by the society in being part of the fellowship 
and the body of a crucified Messiah, then why were they still so caught up in the social norms that not only 
marginalized them but also condemned their Lord? This concern for their own interests and honor marks a sharp 
contrast with the other-orientation of God, Christ, Paul and other apostles who risked being exposed to shame and 
violence in bringing them the gospel. If they are even willing to become vulnerable in associating themselves with 
all kinds of people, then how could believers later on turn away from such a habitus? Do they now feel ashamed of 
the other/Other that they want to form their own groups to preserve and enhance their reputation and honor? 
66  The first four semiotic squares are related to the concept of love. Although semiotic squares 5-7 (which 
immediately follow semiotic squares 1-4 in our story progression) are not related to love, we analyzed them to show 
that they display similar characteristics that we see in the concept of love in semiotic squares 1-4. Then, we skipped 
over other semiotic squares in the story progression to focus on those that address love. Here, a similar pattern is 
found related to that of the semiotic squares 1-4. 
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and a non-self-centered reasoning, (5) contextual (risky but promising) and not universalizing a 
particular context, (6) perseverance (in hard work and response-ability) and a relational knowing, 
(7) something that cannot be represented and delimited, (8) Christ-like and non-self-centered, 
and (9) a Christ-oriented honor and a non-self-centered authority. 
In semiotic square 1, the first thing that caught our attention is Paul shows that love is 
performative in the sense that it is other-oriented by highlighting the contrast between those who 
“have” or “have-not” love when performing the spiritual gifts. Love is other-oriented because, 
when the lover is drawn out of her/himself toward the beloved, the beloved becomes the center 
of attention of the lover. While Paul adapts Isaiah 64:3 (LXX) to say that God has prepared for 
those who love God (1 Cor. 2:9) and that believers received “not the spirit of the cosmos but the 
spirit from God so that we might know the gifts given by God for our benefit” (2:12), he notes in 
12:7 that “to each person has been given the manifestation of the spirit for the common good” 
and that despite the varieties of gifts, it is the same spirit who works and distributes gifts to each 
person individually as it wants (12:4, 11). 
The spiritual gifts mentioned in the first semiotic square, in other words, are not only the 
gifts of God to those who love God. They are also to be perceived and received in love. So when 
the gifts are not undergirded by love, not only can they not convey the love of God, they can also 
make the performers of the gifts meaning-less. In the example of the speaking in tongues turned 
into a meaningless noise, we see that love keeps the performers on their toes to be sensitive to 
the works of God and the situation of the audience. 
In case when love is objectified, that is turned into an object that can be possessed and 
used for one’s own agenda, the value of “letting go” comes to the fore in semiotic square 2. This 
“letting go” in love is not an irresponsible “letting go.” Neither is it a calculative “letting go” that 
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serves one’s own interest. The extreme giving away all of one’s possessions and even of one’s 
body shows that such a “letting go” is an act of faith that entrusts oneself into God’s guidance. 
Without an intimate relationship with God that empowers the giver, s/he is not able to discern 
how to collaborate with God. The giver must not be self-centered in the acts; otherwise the 
giving away may cause hurt and abuse. This concern that the “letting go” could become 
dangerous is a major concern to Paul, as we found mentioned again in semiotic squares 3-4. 
In saying that “what you sow is not made alive unless it dies (σὺ δ’ σπείρεις, οὐ 
ζῳοποιεῖται ἐὰν μὴ ἀποθάνη)” (15:36), Paul emphasizes a sense of continuity and discontinuity 
at the same time. That is to say, while one must not insist on one’s plan and calculation (“what 
you sow”), the potentiality of what is yet to come is already inherent in the present (note the 
middle-passive voice in ζῳοποιεῖται). To let go does not mean no planning. On the contrary, one 
needs to plan but the outcome of the plan is beyond one’s control. This is why the notion of risk 
and promise in semiotic square 3 is further qualified by a Christ-oriented framework in semiotic 
square 4. “What you sow is not made alive unless it dies” has to be perceived in the example of 
God giving us victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Paul writes, “τῷ δὲ θεῷ χάρις τῷ διδόντι 
ἡμῖν τὸ νῖκος διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ” (15:57). God may give us victory, but we 
need to be able to recognize and receive it (hence, the thanksgiving). Without receiving the spirit 
from God and living in the power of God that is manifested in the logos of the cross (1:24, 30; 
2:12), we cannot discern and see how God works through “our Lord Jesus Christ.” The victory 
that God gives to us is still happening today (note the present active participle of διδόντι that 
qualifies God). It is not a one-time victory that happened in the past. To receive the victory, 
however, believers must continue to embody the logos of the cross in their daily life. The letting 
go is not a random and an irresponsible letting go. It is a discerning letting go that is cross-
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oriented (15:31, 36). Again, this explanation of letting go shows that love cannot be objectified. 
It is in the mode of a present progressive tense. It is a middle-voice quality. It takes place in a 
concrete situation (“what you sow”) but goes beyond it at the same time (“is not made alive 
unless it dies”). 
Now, let us move to semiotic squares 8-12 that mention love. The textual variants and the 
middle voice in 8:3 are noteworthy: εἰ δέ τις ἀγαπᾷ [τὸν θεόν], οὕτος ἔγνωσται [αὐτοῦ] (“if 
anyone loves God, this person is already known by Him”). While the form of ἔγνωσται can be 
either a passive or a middle voice, the omissions of “God” and “by Him” in some manuscripts 
show that ἔγνωσται can be treated as a middle voice. Indeed, as no one can tell the “object” of 
love (since τὸν θεόν is bracketed) and the “subject” who loves the one who loves (since αὐτοῦ is 
bracketed), verse 8:3 further shows that ἔγνωσται is a knowing that takes place in the knowing 
itself, sustained by love. This is why Paul in 8:2 says that “if anyone thinks that he already 
knows something, he does not yet know as he ought to know.” The knowing cannot be 
objectified. It happens in the happening, not unlike Gadamer’s notion of falling into conversation, 
as people in dialogue are guided by the spirit of conversation.67 
Paul in his vision of love, likewise, says that “I shall know fully insofar as I am known 
fully” (13:12). While the object of my knowing and the subject who knows me are not 
mentioned, the subject “I” is not in control of the knowing. The subject, on the contrary, is “de-
subjectified” into an object in the process of knowing. It is insofar as I am open to being known 
in knowing the other/Other that I will come to know. This de-subjectifying of the “I” contrasts 
sharply with the egotistical claim that “everything is permitted” to me in 6:12 and 10:23. This 
de-subjectifying takes place in love because the lover is not only a subject of giving love, s/he is 
67 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 385. 
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also the object moved by love to give love and her/himself to the beloved. As such, the lover is 
also the receiver of the love that moves her/him toward the beloved. 
Thus in urging believers to seek the things of the other/Other (10:24), Paul is not saying 
that one should not take care of oneself. Neither is Paul prioritizing the other/Other at the 
expense of the self. To do so might objectify the other/Other. In saying that the knowing already 
takes places when one loves, Paul conveys that the self and the other/Other implicate each other 
in the process of knowing one another. In a group-oriented culture, this simultaneous focus on 
the self and the other/Other can challenge social norms. Because the identity of the self is usually 
embedded in the collective identity of the group that s/he is associated with,68 the self can be 
marginalized and erased in the name of the group interest. The middle-voice of knowing in love, 
however, problematizes such a mode of thinking. So in trying to find a value that can connect all 
the values of semiotic square 8 together, we decided to use “contextualizing” to describe Paul’s 
notion of love, which while foregrounding a particular context of love, does not universalize it, 
because this would essentialize and de-contextualize it. As a dynamic and concrete love that is 
always on the move (with the lover drawn out of her/himself towards the beloved), love is like a 
rhythmic heartbeat (using the language of Jean-Luc Nancy)69 that constructs and deconstructs 
itself in each beating of the heart. 
The constructive and deconstructive qualities of love are prominent in semiotic square 9 
that analyzes how Paul contrasts love with gnosis when he writes that “gnosis puffs up, but love 
builds up” (8:1). The imagery of building a solid and safe building that is comfortable for people 
68 For example, Malina points out that people in a communal society tend to “define themselves rather exclusively in 
terms of the groups in which they [are] embedded; their total self-awareness emphatically depends upon such group 
embeddedness.” See Bruce J. Malina, The Social World of Jesus and the Gospels (New York: Routledge, 1996), 41. 
69 See Jean-Luc Nancy, “Shattered Love,” in The Inoperative Community. Theory and History of Literature 76. 
Edited by Peter Connor. Translated by Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), 82-109. 
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to live in shows that love also requires planning, persistency, responsibility, re-evaluation, and 
hard work. As buildings of God (3:9), believers not only should take advantage of the strong 
foundation that Christ is (3:11), they should also use very good-quality materials to build 
themselves so that their buildings may stand strong even under the test of fire (3:12-15). The 
builder should have a long-term goal and a broad vision when building their building. As the 
foundation offers them an unlimited range of potentiality to build upon it, they should continue 
to expand their horizon of vision. This expansion takes place in love. Because when one is in 
love, one will keep thinking and coming up with creative ideas of how to surprise and please the 
beloved. Just as each beating of the heart is rhythmic, love does not return to itself without being 
changed and transformed. It ex-cites and empowers the lover to see the building as fun, instead 
of just toil and labor. Not only does it make the lover concerned with the beloved (cf. 7:32-35), it 
also makes the lover to be anxious concerning the possible response of the beloved towards what 
s/he does and does not say and do. Herein lies the response-ability of love. 
Thus it is not surprising to find in semiotic square 10 that love can be neither represented 
nor delimited. For Paul, if food can be used to identify and define people, then it can represent, 
replace, and even obscure the believers’ real conditions of life. Indeed, it can even be used to 
discriminate and marginalize people, as it happened to the Corinthian believes in the “idol food” 
conflict (8:9). Once the value and the situation of the people are subjected to the evaluation of a 
classification, God can be portrayed as more concerned about food than about people. As a result, 
food can become a signifying system that not only mediates the relationship between believers 
and God but also identifies and places God in the system. When God is thus defined by the 
system, those responsible for the classification of food become deified. But Paul makes it clear 
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that only love can build us up (8:1). Because love is performative (and hence, context-specific), 
it pushes us to examine each context carefully in our love.70 
In semiotic square 11, Paul debates whether he should visit the Corinthian believers with 
a rod or in love and a spirit of gentleness (ἀγάπῃ πνεύματί τε πραΰτητος) (4:21). It is noteworthy 
that Paul also says that he wants to visit them quickly, if the Lord willing (4:19). This orientation 
toward the Lord comes to the fore when Paul, “through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ,” 
urges believers to say the same thing and be restored in the same mind and the same thought 
(1:10). Love, in other words, is Christ-oriented. As noted, it is not possible for everyone to say 
the same thing. But, if every believer from every place calls upon “the name of our Lord Jesus 
Christ, both their Lord and our Lord” (1:2), then to say the same thing “through the name of our 
Lord Jesus Christ” is to be Christ-like. Indeed, if believers are the building of God (3:9) and the 
temple of God (3:16), where Christ is the foundation (3:11), then they need to embody the logos 
of the cross, which is the power of God (1:18) that characterizes the kingdom of God (4:20). But, 
70 The temptation to classify people and things can lead to the discrimination of people. In reminding the Corinthian 
believers that they are his beloved children to whom he gives birth in Christ through the gospel (4:15; 9:1), Paul 
shows that they are not the children of him alone. It is in Christ Jesus and it is through the gospel that Paul gives 
birth to them. Paul also shows that since they are born through the gospel in Christ Jesus, they should not 
discriminate against anyone. As they are all called by God into the fellowship of Jesus (1:9), they have received the 
spirit from God (2:12) and the gifts of the spirit (12:7). They should learn and receive from one another the gift of 
God (cf. Phil. 2:3; Rom. 12:3). 
For Paul, no individual believer or gift can be privileged at the expense of the others. Like the body of 
Christ that is “parts beyond a part” (12:27), every believer and gift is indispensable. For example, regardless of how 
great and amazing believer-A may be, the love of believer-B can never be given by believer-A. Only believer-B can 
give the kind of love that only believer-B can give. Likewise, regardless of how attractive and brilliant believer-B 
may be, only believer-A can give the kind of love that no one but believer-A can give. At the same time, however, it 
is crucial to note that neither believer-A nor believer-B is by her/himself, as if there are no other believers. A love 
relationship is not just between two individuals; it is also between the friends and families of two individuals. 
Therefore in saying that believers are his beloved children, Paul brings to the fore the individuality-plurality 
character of love. That is to say, an individuality by itself cannot be identified as an individuality. It is only in 
relation to other individualities (i.e., plurality) that we can tell one individuality from another individuality. Here, 
plurality is not an essence either. It is in the coming together of individualities that we have a plurality. The coming 
together, in other words, is what love does as it connects and separates the lover from the beloved. Without the space 
between the lover and the beloved, there is no love since there is no possibility of movement between the two. There 
needs to be a space for the movement of love to take place. 
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the fact that believers form their own groups shows that they are not cross-oriented; they want to 
separate themselves from other believers.  
In a group-oriented culture in which the values of honor and shame have the function of 
today’s “credit rating,” 71  where “life has no value” without honor, 72  it appears that some 
believers are wary that their honor may be affected by the reputation of those they do not like. 
This sensitivity toward honor and shame is explicit in 4:14 as Paul clarifies that he does not write 
to shame them but to warn them as his beloved children. Believers are not children of Paul alone; 
they are also God’s and Christ’s as it is in Christ that they are born through the gospel. Being 
entrusted with the responsibility to oversee how believers build themselves into the building of 
God (3:10; 4:1; 9:17), Paul needs to make sure that the foundation is Christ and that the building 
materials are of good quality so that the building can withstand the test of fire. 
For Paul and the Corinthian believers, if Christ is the everlasting foundation, then they 
should embody the logos of the cross; after all, Paul only focused on “Jesus Christ and him 
crucified” when he was with them (2:2). In fact, this is what believers did when they first 
believed in the gospel; otherwise the witness of Christ would not be confirmed among them (1:6). 
By associating themselves with the most shameful and despicable cross, believers were already 
shamed. Yet, for whatever reason, it appears that some believers later on wanted to salvage their 
honor. In forming their own groups, they steered away from a cross-oriented lifestyle. They 
resumed the kind of honor that not only marginalized them in the first place, but also rejected 
and crucified their Lord of glory. But, for believers, how can the social norm and its honor be 
honorable if it rejects God and Christ? How can the building that they build be strong if they 
71 Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Kentucky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1993), 45. 




                                                          
want to build upon a non-Christ foundation? Or do they still build upon the Christ but want to 
embellish it to be less shameful to the society? Is it a part of an evangelistic tactic to repackage 
the crucified Christ so that it can be less offensive to society? Paul does not give us any clear 
answer. What is of utmost importance to him is that believers must be Christ-oriented. 
With this overview of our semantic analysis of Paul’s vision of love in 1 Corinthians, we 
will in the next three chapters (chapters 5-7) focus on 11:17-34, 8:1–11:1, and 12:1–14:40. In 
these smaller complete discourse units, we will find them manifest similar pattern of Paul’s 


















Chapter 5 – Refiguring Heresy:  
A Semantic Habitus of Receiving from One Another in 1 Corinthians 11:17-34 
 
Eating transforms food so that it becomes a vital part of our bodies, and, 
simultaneously, the embodied individual is also transformed by the act of eating. 
The body can become strong and healthy, weak or ill, by eating or abstaining 
from food. Eating can vitalize the body, but it can also make it sick and even 
bring about death. But eating not only brings about physiological or biological 
change; it is also a means of psychological, affective, and even spiritual 
transformation. Eating and drinking certain products and substances triggers 
particular moods, enkindles various degrees of emotion, and awakens memories.1 
 – Angel F. Méndez Montoya 
 
If love is communal in nature, it must be particular in its orientation. This means 
that theology, which is described as love between God and human being in action, 
must be informed by historical and situational particularity.2 – C. S. Song 
 
I. Introduction 
For many Chinese, the importance of the familial, communal, socio-cultural, and ethico-
political aspects of food and eating together can hardly be overstated.3 The issues of eating (e.g., 
with whom, where, and when does one eat what kind of food) are crucial to the construction and 
maintenance of one’s relationship with the other/Other. Moreover, as the human body, social 
body (including one’s ancestors), natural body, and cosmic body reflect one another in a yin-
yang correlative mode of thinking (see chapter 2), to care for one’s body is to care for the other’s 
body. This analogical relation among the human, social, natural, and cosmic bodies is not 
uncommon in Greco-Roman cultures in politics, social status, sex, dietary, social beliefs and 
1 Angel F. Méndez Montoya, The Theology of Food: Eating And the Eucharist. Illuminations: Theory and Religion 
(Chichester, UK; Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 1-2. 
2 Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings. Rev. ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1991), 108. 
3 See Frederick J. Simoons, Food in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1991). For 
an overview of the function and role of food and religion in the making sense of one’s meaning of life in the world, 
see Corrie E. Norman, “Religion and Food,” in Encyclopedia of Food and Culture. 3 vols. Vol. 3: Obesity to 
Zoroastrianism, Index. Edited by Solomon H. Katz (New York: Scribner/Thompson Gale, 2003), 171-76. Also, see 
Kinship and Food in South East Asia. Edited by Monica Janowski and Fiona Kerlogue. Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies (Copenhagen, Denmark: NIAS Press, 2007). 
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practices. 4 As semioticians, sociologists, and anthropologists have also noted how food as a 
signifying system (which can affect the production, distribution, and consumption of certain kind 
of food, instead of others) can shape the configuration and representation of certain social 
relations in the society, 5  the conflict at the Lord’s meal in 1 Cor. 11:17-34 is not just a 
theological issue. Neither is it a simple matter of “where,” “when,” and “who” get to eat “what” 
when believers gather together at a patron-believer’s house, which can host about thirty to forty 
people.6 Rather, as Dennis Smith points out, how the Lord’s meal is observed can have concrete 
impact on the behaviors of believers.7  
However, we disagree that an exhortation to wait for one another (11:33), as most 
translations claim (e.g., CEB, KJV, NAS, NJB, RSV, etc.),8 can address the schism in the church 
4 See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995). 
5 See the articles by scholars of various disciplines in Food and Culture: A Reader. Edited by Carole Counihan and 
Penny Van Esterik. 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013). Here, the editors agree with M.F.K. Fisher “that food 
touches everything and is the foundation of every economy, marking social differences, boundaries, bonds, and 
contradictions – an endlessly evolving enactment of gender, family, and community relationships.” Ibid, 3.  
6 In his analysis, Murphy-O’Connor finds that for a well-off person’s house in the Roman society, “the average size 
of the atrium is 55 sq. metres and that of the triclinium 36 sq. metres. Not all this area, however, was usable. The 
effective space in the triclinium was limited by the couches around the walls; the rooms surveyed would not have 
accommodated more than nine, and this is the usual number. The impluvium in the centre of the atrium would not 
only have diminished the space by one-ninth, but would also have restricted movement; circulation was possible 
only around the outside of the square. Thus, the maximum number that the atrium could hold was fifty, but this 
assumes that there were no decorative urns, etc. to take up space, and that everyone stayed in one place; the true 
figure would probably be between thirty and forty.” See Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “House Churches and the 
Eucharist,” in Key to First Corinthians: Revisiting the Major Issues (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 183. 
7 “As Paul develops his arguments, he will refer to the power of the meal to create social bonding and define social 
boundaries. His arguments for social ethics within the community will draw on banquet traditions of social 
obligation toward one’s meal companions. He will respond to issues of social stratification at the table but will 
especially develop the theme of social equality.” See Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet 
in the Early Christian World (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2003), 175. 
8 Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Hermeneia – A Critical and 
Historical Commentary on the Bible. Translated by James W. Leitch. Edited by George W. MacRae (Philadelphia, 
PA: Fortress Press, 1975), 193; Charles K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Harper’s 
New Testament Commentaries (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 276; Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the 
Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1992), 265; Marion L. Soards, New International Biblical Commentary: 1 Corinthians (Peabody, 
MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 249-50; Simon J. Kistemaker, New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1993), 405; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. 
Sacra Pagina Series 7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 422; Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The 
First Letter to the Corinthians. The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 558-
59; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Yale 
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of God (11:18) that leads to some getting drunk while others hungry at the Lord’s meal (11:21). 
From our analysis of the semiotic squares in this chapter, as we interpret the words αἱρέσεις 
(haireseis; singular: hairesis) (NRSV: “factions”) (11:19), προλαμβάνει (NRSV: “goes ahead”) 
(11:21), and ἐκδέχεσθε (NRSV: “wait for”) (11:33) differently from most translations, we argue 
that Paul does not just urge believers to wait for one another or to welcome (or receive) one 
another at the Lord’s meal. He also tells them to receive (food) from one another. This act of 
receiving (food) from one another – that is, of eating each other’s food as in the case of a 
potluck9 – not only can challenge and change the semantic habitus of believers at a bodily and 
social level. It can also conscientize and expose believers to their real conditions of life and the 
system of power relations that contributes to the kind of food that they can afford to buy, make, 
and eat. This sharing and eating the food of each other echoes Paul’s vision of love. Among the 
Bible 32 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 448; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text. The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 899; etc. 
9 While Smith points out this feature of the Lord’s meal, he does not pursue this line of argument. He first writes, 
“The community meal was a full-course dinner, as indicated by 1 Corinthians, in which the deipnon, or dinner 
course, is followed by the symposium. The same text also records the problem that some were getting too much to 
eat and drink while others were not getting enough. This tells us that the meal was intended, at least, to provide 
adequate food. We do not know how the meal was arranged, but we can guess at some of its features. The 
householder/patron would presumably be the host. The food, however, may have been provided by everyone 
bringing a portion, somewhat like our potluck dinner today. This is a format used in some Greco-Roman clubs and is 
suggested by the language of 1 Corinthians 14, where everyone is said to have brought as their contribution to the 
occasion not food but an expression of worship. It is also suggested by the phrase ‘one’s own meal,’ which Paul uses 
to refer to the abuses at the banquet. How the meal could have devolved from a community meal to a meal of 
individuals is not dear, but one suggestion is that those who brought food for the community table ate it themselves 
instead of sharing it.” See Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, 178. A few pages later, he writes, “And 
whatever the problem with the ‘individual meal,’ Paul felt it could be resolved by eating together. Consequently, 
while the differentiations in food may have implied a difference in status connected with social class either because 
some were free to start eating earlier than others or because some simply brought more food for themselves, these 
differentiations were not of such gravity to be a concern in themselves. Rather, they were indicative of a more 
serious problem, in which a sense of status as applied especially to spiritual gifts was threatening Paul’s concept of a 
proper meal community, which was characterized by unity.” Ibid., 196. If the Lord’s meal is a potluck, then 
believers will need to eat each other’s food. And, if food is a signifying system contributing to the construction and 
maintenance of power relations in the church, then eating each other’s food can conscientize believers to the real 
conditions of life of each other, which can further expose the system of power relations at work that make some 
more well-off than the others. 
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characteristics of love that we highlighted in chapter 4, 10  it is the values of letting go, 
collaboration, and a Christ-oriented honor that come to the fore in 11:17-34. For Paul, if 
everyone has received the gifts of God (1:4-6; 4:7; 12:7), then no one should discriminate against 
the other (cf. Phil. 2:3-4; Rom. 12:2-3). Believers need to learn and receive from one another, 
lest they get caught up in their own gifts and not be nourished to discern how God works in 
various situations. As Justin Ukpong writes about the theology and practice of many missionaries 
who went to Nigeria: “[D]id Christian missionaries bring Christ to the Gentiles? Was Christ not 
already present among these people even before the arrival of the missionaries?”11 The issue is 
not to bring the gospel, as if one owns it; rather, the issue is to discern the gospel so that one can 
be a co-worker of God. 
 
II. The Issues of Translation  
Therefore, my adelphoi, when you come together to eat, receive (food) from one 
another (1 Cor. 11:33). 
 
We begin this section by first noting that, for many biblical scholars, the translations of 
προλαμβάνει in 1 Cor. 11:21 and of ἐκδέχεσθε in 11:33 are tied together. In the next section, we 
will address the notion of “heresy” which is related to our translation of ἐκδέχεσθε. We argue 
that Paul not only ambiguously uses the term haireseis (NRSV: “factions”) in 11:19 to marks its 
difference from schismata (NRSV: “divisions”) in 11:19, but also try to highlight the dynamics of 
unity and diversity in the church of God, just as he seeks to stress that all believers are the body 
10 From our structural semiotic analysis of love in chapter 4, we find that Paul’s notion of love display the following 
characteristics: “(1) performative (i.e., other-oriented, messianic, and charismatic) and communicative, (2) letting go 
and collaborative, (3) risky (but promising) and non-calculative, (4) Christ-oriented and a non-self-centered 
reasoning, (5) contextual (risky but promising) and not universalizing a particular context, (6) perseverance (in hard 
work and response-ability) and a relational knowing, (7) something that cannot be represented and delimited, (8) 
Christ-like and non-self-centered, and (9) a Christ-oriented honor and a non-self-centered authority.” 
11  Justin Ukpong, “Luke,” in Global Bible Commentary. Edited by Daniel Patte, J. Severino Croatto, Nicole 
Wilkinson Duran, Teresa Okure, and Archie Chi Chung Lee (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2004), 387. 
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of Christ insofar as “parts beyond a part” (12:27). Indeed, just as the notions of singularity and 
plurality come into play with each other in the notion of “togetherness” (see chapter 2) – note the 
repetition of the middle-passive voice of συνέρχομαι (“coming together”) in 11:17, 18, 20, 33, 
and 34 – it is also necessary (δεῖ) that haireseis exist among believers so that the tested (οἱ 
δόκιμοι) may become visible (φανεροὶ γένωνται) among them (11:19). Contrary to most biblical 
scholars, we do not take the word haireseis negatively. We want to highlight its basic and 
primary meaning as “choices,”12 which comes from the verb αἱρέω (“to take” or “to choose” in 
the middle voice). 
Having thus presented our argument, we agree with Gordon Fee that the meaning of 
ἐκδέχεσθε as “to wait for” often assumes that προλαμβάνει means “to eat beforehand.”13 David 
Garland, likewise, argues that to translate “the command ἐκδέχεσθε in 11:33 as ‘wait for one 
another’ provides further support” to translate προλαμβάνει as “to take beforehand.”14 Although 
Gerd Theissen strongly argues for a temporal meaning of the preposition προ in προλαμβάνει 
and calls our attention to the material conditions of the meal gathering,15 where the quality and 
12 For example, Desjardins writes, “The term αἵρεσις, at least before it has been transformed simply into ‘heresies’ 
by Christian and Jewish heresiology, referred to variant perspectives (beliefs, dispositions, scholarly and medical 
points of view) within a recognized unity. Different ways of being Jewish, for instance, were called αἵρεσις (and this 
applied initially to Christians as well as Pharisees); as were different ways of understanding and treating sickness, 
and different ways of understanding truth (at times even within one φιλοσοφία). Belonging to a αἵρεσις did not make 
you ‘sectarian’ in the sense that it separated you from your roots; rather, it distinguished you from others, and all the 
αἱρέσεις were part of a larger matrix.” See Michel Desjardins, “Bauer and Beyond: On Recent Scholarly 
Discussions of Αἵρεσις in the Early Christian Era,” in The Second Century: A Journal of Early Christian Studies 8.2 
(Summer 1991): 80. Patte and TeSelle also point out that the word hairesis was not used negatively before Justin 
Martyr and Irenaeus. See Daniel Patte and Eugene TeSelle, “Heresy,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity. 
Edited by Daniel Patte (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 507-08. 
13 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians. The New International Commentary on the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 567. 
14 David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2003), 540. For this rendering of προλαμβάνει as “to eat beforehand,” see Charles K. Barrett, A 
Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, 262; Marion L. Soards, New International Biblical 
Commentary: 1 Corinthians, 234; Simon J. Kistemaker, New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, 389, 405; and Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 
545. 
15 In light of Plutarch’s Quaestiones Convivales 2.10.1, Pliny the Younger’s Epistulae 2.6, Martial’s Epigrammata 
3.60, Theissen writes, “We notice that 1 Cor. 11:21 is a statement, v. 33 an exhortation. For that reason, in the case 
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quantity of food as well as the order of meal distribution varies according to the social status of 
the guests, 16 προλαμβάνει can also mean to devour” as some have contended. 17  In fact, in 
showing that προλαμβάνει “had lost is temporal force by the first century,” 18 Bruce Winter 
contends that προ can intensify its meaning, as we see in the Koine Greek word προδίδωμι, 
“where δίδωμι can mean ‘give up’ while προδίδωμι means ‘betray.’”19 In his analysis of the 
usage of προλαμβάνει in the context of eating, Winter finds that it does not mean “to take 
before,” “to take,” or “to receive.” It means “to devour.” 20 While Fee also makes a similar 
argument, he cautions that “one cannot rule out a temporal sense” of the word. 21 Garland, 
however, is right to say that “the temporal dimension of the verb [προλαμβάνει] loses all its force 
if the verb ἐκδέχεσθαι in 11:33 does not mean ‘to wait.’”22 
In our analysis of 11:17-34, it is important that our translations of ἐκδέχεσθε and 
προλαμβάνει do not hinge upon one another. If we argue that the meaning of ἐκδέχεσθε depends 
on how we translate προλαμβάνει, then it is circular to claim that ἐκδέχεσθε should mean “to 
wait” simply because προλαμβάνει should mean “to eat beforehand.” Even if ἐκδέχεσθε does 
mean “to wait,” waiting for one another at the meal gathering will not fundamentally address the 
problem of some getting drunk while others hungry at the Lord’s meal (11:21). If Theissen’s 
of a conflict v. 21 gets the nod for reconstructing the situation, especially as v. 33 would then become a meaningful 
warning if addressed to those who went ahead first with their private meal.” See Gerd Theissen, “Social Integration 
and Sacramental Activity: An Analysis of 1 Cor. 11:17-34,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on 
Corinth. Edited and translated and with an introduction by John H. Schütz (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1982), 
151. 
16 Ibid., 153-63. 
17 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids, MI; 
Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2001), 144-48; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 542; Richard B. 
Hays, First Corinthians. Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, KY: John 
Knox Press, 1989), 197; Richard A. Horsley, 1 Corinthians. Abingdon New Testament Commentary Series 
(Abingdon, TN: Nashville, 1998), 159; David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 540-42. 
18 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 146. 
19 Ibid., 148. 
20 Idem. 
21 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 542. 
22 David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 541. 
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sociological analysis is accurate that those who get drunk are the well-to-do believers,23 then 
even if everyone eats at the same time, the well-to-do believers would still eat their quality food, 
while the less well-to-do their own food. There is no genuine exchange and interaction. 
Here, we are not suggesting that waiting for one another is a useless advice. Rather, if the 
issues concern the conflict between the well-to-do and less well-to-do believers, then telling 
believers to wait for one another does not address the system that contributes to the conflict. As 
Smith,24 Hal Taussig,25 and others have underscored the power of ritual at the meal gathering, a 
ritual has tremendous power over people’s behavior and worldview. It should not be viewed as 
primitive, superstitious, and mechanical. With its liminal character, a ritual can transform one’s 
usual ways of thinking and doing things. Indeed, as a rhythmic and performative activity, a 
ritualization can endow an ordinary time and space with special meaning.26 Moreover, if Bruno 
Blumenfeld is correct that by the Hellenistic period, oikos (“house”) “expands its sphere and 
increases in significance”27 and “effectively substitutes for the polis [“city”] in meaning and 
extension,” 28  then the church meeting at the house may become “a household institution, 
find[ing] its meaning as part of the oikos.”29 As a “shriveled polis”30 that is “conjoined to a 
divine basilea,”31 the house that hosts the church may carry certain reputation. 
23 Gerd Theissen, “Social Integration and Sacramental Activity: An Analysis of 1 Cor. 11:17-34,” 151. 
24 Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, 173-217. 
25 “When people gathered for meals in first-century Mediterranean cultures, the event was laden with meaning. 
Meals were highly stylized occasions that carried significant social coding, identity formation, and meaning making. 
Participating in a meal entailed entering into a social dynamic that confirmed, challenged, and negotiated both who 
the group as a whole was and who the individuals within in it were.” See Hal Taussig, In the Beginning was the 
Meal: Social Experimentation and Early Christian Identity (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 22. 
26 In the words of Bell, “Ritualization is fundamentally a way of doing things to trigger the perception that these 
practices are distinct and the associations that they engender are special.” See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual 
Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 220. 
27 Bruno Blumenfeld, The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework (London: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 113. 
28 Ibid., 114. 
29 Idem. 
30 Ibid., 113. 
31 Ibid., 107. 
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Indeed, as male and female believers share the same space of the house,32 where people 
of different social status and ethnic groups gather together,33 how the Lord’s meal is observed 
can shape the formation of the believers’ semantic habitus. Not only does Smith highlight how 
the Lord’s Meal is observed can contribute to the construction and maintenance of the group’s 
“social boundaries,” “social bonding,” “social obligation,” “social stratification,” and “social 
equality,”34 Taussig also shows that the Lord’s meal can provide a safe space for early believers 
to try out their new identities as believers of Christ in the Roman Empire.35 Hence, when Paul 
asks those who get drunk to eat at home before the meal gathering (11:34), his exhortation can 
shame them. For Paul, even if the Lord’s meal takes place at the house, it should not be treated 
lightly.36 Believers should not confuse the ritualized space of church with the everyday space of 
the house. 37  So even if the command “to wait for” one another may not be effective, the 
32 Økland notes that while the “Greek and Roman women were closely associated with domestic space” (64), “it is 
impossible to know if domestic space was established as private and as female through domestic female discourse. 
As far as we can know, domestic space was established as private and female through the same public discourse that 
established the public space as male” (65). See Jorunn Økland, Women in Their Place: Paul and the Corinthian 
Discourse of Gender and Sanctuary Space. JSNT 269 (London: T & T Clark, 2004). Following Wallace-Hadrill, 
Økland stresses that the “private and public should not be seen as dichotomies in a Roman context. Second, greater 
privacy represented an advance towards intimacy with the paterfamilias, not with the matron. Thus ‘privateness’ was 
not necessarily linked to the notion of the house as female space. Third, greater privacy also represented greater 
significance and power. Fourth, confidential business and planning of political strategies also counted as ‘intimacy.’ 
The Roman house was not private by modern standards. Since one man’s private in this way was another man’s 
public space, public or private must be deemed a matter of perspective” (ibid., 65-66). See Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, 
“The Social Structure of the Roman House,” Papers of the British School at Rome 56: 43-97. 
33 In pointing out the similarities between the Lord’s meal and Greco-Roman meal gatherings, Smith argues that 
“when any group of people in the ancient Mediterranean world met for social or religious purposes, their gatherings 
tended to be centered on a common meal or banquet … the banquet was one social institution that cut across ethnic, 
religious, and social lines…” See Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist, 1-2. 
34 Ibid., 9-12, 172-217. 
35 “These meals – because of their already established socially formative place in the Hellenistic world – evoked 
social experimentation. They allowed early Christians to try out new behaviors in dialogue with their vision of the 
realm of God. The meals became a laboratory in which a range of expressive vocabularies explored alternative 
social visions.” See Hal Taussig, In the Beginning was the Meal, 20. 
36 Although Paul uses the term oikia at 11:22 and oikos at 11:34, Økland finds that “[t]he strictly juridical use of 
οἶκος as the term including property and goods, and οἰκία as the term designating the house and the household (i.e. 
the dwellers) seem quite useless when we get down to Paul’s days … It seems then, that there is no distinguishable 
difference in meaning in Paul’s use of οἶκος and οἰκία.” See Jorunn Økland, Women in Their Place, 138. 
37 Ibid., 135-49. 
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instruction still has certain effects. It is, however, problematic to argue that the meaning of 
ἐκδέχεσθε should depend on the temporal aspect of προλαμβάνει. 
At the same time, some scholars also suggest that ἐκδέχεσθε can mean “to receive” or “to 
welcome.” So while Ben Witherington, III argues that it is “perfectly possible” to render 
ἐκδέχεσθε as “to wait for,”38 he points out that the term “often has the sense of ‘welcome’ or 
‘entertain’ when it is used in the context of an act of hospitality (cf. 3 Macc. 5:26; Josephus Ant. 
7.351).”39 Fee makes a similar point that ἐκδέχεσθε “carries its primary meaning of ‘receive,’ 
which it often does in the context of hospitality.”40 Also citing 3 Macc. 5:26 and Josephus Ant. 
7.351, Richard Hays writes, “Paul is telling the Corinthians not just to wait for one another but to 
receive one another as guests (cf. Rom. 15:7) when they come together.”41 Likewise, Richard 
Horsley argues that ἐκδέχεσθε should be rendered as “to receive” instead of “to wait.”42 As 
Garland further finds that “when used of persons, [ἐκδέχεσθε] usually means ‘to take or receive 
from another’ or ‘to entertain’ (MM 192),”43 he argues, following Winter, that it is by receiving 
one another and “sharing their resources will they [i.e., believers] alleviate the acute 
embarrassment of the ‘have-nots’ … and capture the spirit of Jesus’ sacrifice.”44 
While I agree with Winter that Paul urges believers to welcome and receive one another 
“in the sense of sharing food and drink,”45 I want to stress that such a receiving is not one 
directional. Indeed, if ἐκδέχεσθε “in the LXX was used to express the concept of hospitality, not 
38  Ben Witherington III, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 
Corinthians (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1995), 248. 
39 Ibid., 249. Witherington thinks that the term “more likely” means “to welcome” in the sense that “all [believers] 
should partake together, with no distinction in rank or food.” Ibid., 252. 
40 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 567. 
41 Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians, 202. 
42 Richard A. Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 159. 
43 David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 554. MM refers to The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament: Illustrated from the 
Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources. Edited by James Hope Moulton and George Milligan (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1914). 
44 David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 555. 
45 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 151. 
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only in its simple form δέχομαι in most of its composite forms including ἐκδέχομαι (3 Macc. 
5:26),”46 then the preposition ἐκ (“from,” or “out of”) and the reciprocal pronoun ἀλλήλους 
(“each other”) in 1 Cor. 11:33 may accentuate Paul’s exhortation to both the well-to-do and less 
well-to-do believers to receive food from one another. Garland actually briefly points to this 
meaning of ἐκδέχεσθε. Moreover, while older-generation scholars like Thomas Charles Edwards 
and George G. Findlay find that the classical Greek and LXX use ἐκδέχομαι to mean “to 
receive,” they contend that it is only used in the sense of “receiving from another.”47 Even if Roy 
Ciampa and Brian Rosner contend that ἐκδέχομαι “does not seem to be used with the sense of 
receiving another person with hospitality but when it has to do with ‘receiving’ is a matter of 
receiving something from someone,”48 it fits with our suggestion that Paul asks believers to 
receive food (“something”) from one another (“someone”). In other words, it is by receiving and 
eating the food of each other that believers receive and welcome one another. 
Not only should the well-to-do believers receive and welcome the less well-to-do at the 
dining table by sharing resources with them, as Winter suggests,49 they should also receive from 
them. They are not giving charity to others as if they do not need anything from them. Such an 
attitude of giving is arrogant and condescending. Rather, Paul wants believers to interact with 
one another to see that they need each other to be in the body of Christ. Because if every believer 
is integral to the body of Christ and if everyone has something to contribute to the church (cf. 
46 Idem. 
47 Thomas Charles Edwards, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. 2nd ed. (New York: A. C. 
Armstrong, 1886), 303; George G. Findlay, “St Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians,” in The Expositor’s Greek 
Testament. Edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897), 884. 
48 Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 558. 
49 Winter writes, “By receiving one another they share their resources with those who ‘have not’ and thus alleviate 
the acute embarrassment felt by those who came without food to the Lord’s Dinner” (151). As of those who refused 
to receive one another, “their own action invalidated it [the Lord’s Dinner] because they acted towards the needs of 
others in exactly the opposite way Jesus did” (152). See Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth. 
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14:26),50 then believers need to receive from one another the gifts that s/he has received from 
God in Christ (cf. 4:7; 12:7).51 Since no one receives every gift, the gift that one receives from 
God can complement the gift that others receive. It is by such sharing and receiving from one 
another that believers realize that they need one another (cf. 12:21). 
If the suffering of one part of the body affects the entire body (12:26), then all the body 
members should honor each other (12:22-25). This relationship among the parts in the whole is 
expected in a group-oriented honor-and-shame culture. As individuals are defined by the group(s) 
that they are associated with, the reputation of the group and its members are intertwined.52 Paul, 
however, does not say that the weak and the less honorable body members are less honorable in 
relation to what is honorable. Rather, Paul instructs believers to treat the less honorable body 
member with more honor, just as God gives more honor to the body member that lacks it (12:23-
24). This language of honor and shame is also prominent in 11:17-34, as some believers shame 
others and the church of God in relation to their privileged position. This is why Paul writes that 
the haireseis must exist among believers so that the tested (οἱ δόκιμοι) may become visible 
(φανεροὶ γένωνται) among them (11:19). 
 
III. The Notion of “Heresy” 
In 11:8-19, as Paul censures schismata (NRSV: “divisions”) in the church of God (cf. 
1:10-13), he intriguingly writes that haireseis (NRSV: “factions”) are necessary (δεῖ) among 
50 As Paul writes in 1 Cor. 14:26, “What then, adelphoi? Whenever you gather together, each of you has a hymn, a 
teaching, a revelation, an interpretation. Let everything be done for building up,” Paul obviously thinks that every 
believer can contribute to the building up of the church. 
51 For instance, right from the beginning of First Corinthians, Paul makes it clear that believers have been enriched 
in Christ in everything, in every logos and every gnosis (1:5) to a point that they are not lacking in any gift (1:7). 
Likewise, Paul reminds believers that whatever they have, they have received in from God (4:7). 
52 For example, Malina argues that individuals in the ancient Mediterranean world “owe [to their groups] loyalty, 
respect, and obedience of a kind which commits their individual honor without limit and without compromise.” See 
Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Kentucky: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1993), 45. 
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believers so that the approved (οἱ δόκιμοι) might appear. But, if divisions can threaten the group 
unity,53 why must haireseis exist among believers? If haireseis and divisions are destructive54 
and the church and haireseis are incompatible, then how do we understand δεῖ?55 Was Paul being 
pessimistic, realistic, or sarcastic? However, if the notion of haireseis is different from that of 
schismata, could Paul have a positive view of haireseis? This possibility is considerable when 
the usages of haireseis prior to the second century CE are positive or neutral. Even Paul’s notion 
of “community” could be built upon haireseis. We argue that Paul uses the term ambiguously to 
try to transform the power relations in the church by using the “body” figure in both 11:23-26 
and 12:12-27 to foreground a Christ-like way of living. 
Let us first examine δεῖ. Walter Grunmann argues that “the LXX, Josephus, other Jewish 
Hellenistic and even the NT”56 adopted the Greek and Hellenistic sense of necessity, but used it 
to indicate “the will of God declared in the message,” instead of “the neutral necessity of fate.”57 
Given the eschatological notion of δεῖ, Grundmann suggests that it implies a mysterious and 
committed God at work in fulfilling the eschatological event.58 This view of δεῖ indicating a 
personal will of God is common among ancient writers. Whether one stresses the inevitability or 
the purpose of haireseis, it is a part of the divine eschatological event. So for instance, John 
Chrysostom attributes haireseis to the sayings of Jesus and explains that they “did not come 
53 For example, see Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 65-70, 263-66. 
54 Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St. Paul to 
the Corinthians. ICC (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 240. Also, see Charles K. Barrett, A Commentary 
on the First Epistle to the Corinthian, 261; Canon Leon Morris, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An 
Introduction and Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1985), 156; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, 538 n. 34; Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation, 263; and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, 
First Corinthians, 433. 
55 Heinrich Schlier, “αἵρεσις,” in TDNT 1: 180-85. 
56 Walter Grundmann “δεῖ,” in TDNT 2: 22. 
57 Idem (for both citations). Soards also thinks that “in the vast majority of NT occurrences [δεῖ] means ‘it must be’ 
or ‘it is necessary’ because of the presence, action, and will of God.” See Marion L. Soards, New International 
Biblical Commentary: 1 Corinthians, 233. 
58 Walter Grundmann “δεῖ,” in TDNT 2: 23 
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about because Christ foretold them; rather he foretold them because they were inevitable.”59 A 
similar explanation is given in the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies 2.17 and 16.21.60 Ambrosiaster, 
on the other hand, maintains that “Paul did not want heresies or choose them, but he foresaw the 
future and knew that they would come.” 61  In the Dialogue with Trypho 35, Justin Martyr 
clarifies that schismata and haireseis are end-time phenomena foretold by Jesus and argues that 
they can help Christians to be more faithful to Christ.62 Likewise, Clement of Alexandria teaches 
that haireseis can “make us [genuine Christians] get down to the toil of discovering [the 
truth].”63 Augustine, too, propounds that the necessity of haireseis shows a God who “uses even 
evil for good purposes.”64 Regardless of how we understand the relationship between δεῖ and 
haireseis, these after-first-century-CE ancient writers treat haireseis negatively.65 Most modern 
Western biblical scholars follow this line of interpretation. The difference is that while they 
agree that haireseis are bad,66 they differ on how δεῖ and haireseis are related to the approved 
ones (οἱ δόκιμοι) in 11:19. 
Joseph Fitzmyer,67 Hays,68 Fee,69 Canon Morris,70 etc. interpret οἱ δόκιμοι positively as 
the ones who withstood and passed the test. But, Raymond Collins,71 Horsley,72 Ciampa and 
59 John Chrysostom, “Homilies on the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians 27.3,” in A Select Library of the Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 1.12.158. Quoted from Ancient Christian Commentary on 
Scripture: 1-2 Corinthians. Edited by Gerald Bray (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 111. 
60  See “The Clementine Homilies” in Ante-Nicene Fathers 8: 232. Translated by Thomas Smith. Also, “The 
Clementine Homilies” in Ante-Nicene Fathers 8:317. Translated by Donaldson. 
61 Ambrosiaster, “Commentary on Paul’s Epistles,” in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 81.125.  
Quoted from Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, 110. 
62 Justin Martyr, “Dialogue of Justin, Philosopher and Martyr, with Trypho, A Jew,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers 1: 212. 
63 1 Corinthians: Interpreted by Early Christian Commentators. Edited and translated by Judith L. Kovacs (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2005), 186. 
64 1 Corinthians: Interpreted by Early Christian Commentators, 185. 
65 Besides Dialogue with Trypho 35, chapters twenty-three and twenty-four of The Didascalia Apostolorum also link 
divisions and haireseis together. See The Didascalia apostolorum in English. Edited by Margaret Dunlop Gibson 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 102-105, 105-107. 
66 Different from most scholars, Kistemaker argues that haireseis were those approved by God. As such, he takes 
haireseis as what was supposed to happen because the haireseis should not mingle with the disproved ones. See 
Simon J. Kistemaker, New Testament Commentary: Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, 387. 
67 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians, 433. 
68 Richard B. Hays, First Corinthian, 195. 
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Rosner, 73  and Garland 74  argue that Paul was being ironic in his use of οἱ δόκιμοι. While 
Thiselton posits that Paul might be ironic, he thinks that such an interpretation of οἱ δόκιμοι 
“construes Paul’s pastoral response as unusually sharp and sarcastic.”75 So for him, “the second 
part of the verse [11:19] … most probably derives from the sayings of Jesus.”76 Jerome Murphy-
O’Connor agrees that 11:19 (without the phrase “among you”) did not originate with Paul. But, 
he argues that it comes from the Corinthian believers. He suggests that Paul added “among you” 
in the slogan to prevent believers from justifying haireseis as eschatologically inevitable.77 
Whether Paul is genuine or ironic in using οἱ δόκιμοι, this study argues that haireseis 
need not be rendered negatively. In light of the “body” figure in 11:23-26 and 12:12-27, we 
argue that Paul points out that haireseis are social phenomena of choices in the church. For Paul, 
haireseis, that is, different choices, are not necessarily oppositional and divisive. They can be 
iconoclastic in helping believers not to remain static and contented in their faith. As Winter 
argues about the syntax in 11:24, τοῦτο μού ἐστιν τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν (“this is my body that is 
for you”),78 it appears that Paul foregrounds the personal pronoun μού to exhort believers to 
embody the life of Christ, instead of being self-centered. As such, it makes sense that in the end 
of 11:17-34, Paul urges believers to receive from one another (11:33). If they are not Christ-
oriented and do not each other’s gift in Christ, believers will not be able to receive from one 
69 Gordon Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 538. 
70 Canon Morris, The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, 156. 
71 Collins thinks that Paul might speak of hoi dokimoi as “the hybrists … within the community.” See Raymond F. 
Collins, First Corinthians, 422. 
72 Richard A. Horsley, 1 Corinthians, 158. 
73 Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 544. 
74 David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians, 538. Following Campbell’s interpretation of hoi dokimoi as dignitaries, Garland 
thinks that dei and hoi dokimoi are incompatible. See R. Alastair Campbell, “Does Paul Acquiesce in Divisions at 
the Lord’s Table,” Novum Testamentum 33 (1991): 61-70. 
75 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 859. 
76 Idem. 
77 Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Divisions are Necessary (1 Corinthians 11:19),” in Celebrating Paul: Festschrift in 
Honor of Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, O.P., and Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J. Edited by Peter Spitaler (Washington, DC: 
The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2011), 9-14. 
78 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 154. 
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another. By telling them to do so at the meal gathering, Paul hopes that the power of ritual can 
help transform their semantic habitus. 
 Now, let us examine the meaning of haireseis. The only other occurrence of haireseis in 
Pauline letters is Gal. 5:20, where Paul lists haireseis, along with other vices, as one of the works 
of the flesh (τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός) (5:19). Note that haireseis is not a doctrinal vice. Given this 
only other usage in the Pauline corpus, we cannot conclude that Paul uses haireseis negatively in 
1 Cor. 11:19. The difficulty is enhanced when haireseis is used in the New Testament writings 
with positive, negative, and neutral meanings (e.g., Acts 5:17, 15:5, 24:5 and 14, 26:5, 28:22, 
and 2 Peter 2:1).79 This polyvalence of haireseis shows that we need to examine how Paul uses 
haireseis in 1 Cor. 11:17-34. This is why a structural semiotic analysis that fleshes out Paul’s 
conviction in 11:17-34 becomes important to our understanding of haireseis. For a review of the 
great variety of interpretations see Appendix A to this chapter. 
 
IV. A Structural Semiotic Analysis of 1 Cor. 11:17-34 
In chapters 2 and 4, we mentioned that, according to semiotic theories, the semantic 
analysis of the entire 1 Corinthians and of the individual complete discourse units in 1 
Corinthians should display a consistent semantic universe – if Paul is indeed the author of the 
entire 1 Corinthians. Now, to perform a structural semiotic analysis of a chosen passage, we need 
to first examine whether the passage is a complete discourse unit.80 This initial analysis is crucial, 
79 Also, see Titus 3:10, “Reject the hairetikon man after first and second warning,” where the adjective hairetikos is 
related to hairesis. The haireseis in 2 Peter 2:1 refers to wrong opinions or teachings: “But there were also false 
prophets among the people, just as there will be false teachers among you. Some will secretly introduce destructive 
haireseis, even rejecting the sovereign Lord who bought them, bringing swift destruction against themselves.” See 
“αἵρεσις,” in The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament: Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-Literary Sources, 
13. 
80 For an introduction to structural exegesis, see Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990) and Aline Patte and Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to 
Practice: Exegesis of Mark 15 and 16: Hermeneutical Implications (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978). For 
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lest we include or exclude parts of the text that are not pertinent to our identification of the 
semantic universe of the passage. One way to identify the complete discourse unit is to locate the 
inverted parallelism that signifies the beginning and end of the passage. This identification can 
highlight the theme of the passage. Next, our semantic analysis of the semiotic squares of the 
passage, formed by transforming the opposed actions found in the passage, can further tease out 
how the theme is conceptualized and manifested. 
(i) “In Coming Together”: An Inverted Parallelism and Its Theme 
In 11:17-19, Paul broaches a new issue when he writes, “In the following instructions I 
do not praise you because it is not for the better but for the worse when you come together 
(συνέρχεσθε). First of all, when you gather together (συνερχομένων ὑμῶν) in the ekklēsia I heard 
schismata among you and I partly believe it. Because it is necessary that haireseis exist among 
you so that the tested (οἱ δόκιμοι) may become visible (φανεροὶ γένωνται) among you.” 
This conflict in the meal gathering is obviously different from the issue of head covering 
during the worship in 11:2-16. So, we know that 11:17 signals the beginning of a new discussion. 
The end of this discussion is 11:33-34 because beginning with 12:1, Paul introduces the issue of 
spiritual gifts which lasts till the end of chapter 14. Now, if 11:17-34 addresses a new issue, then 
we can expect Paul to provide a solution in the end of the passage. Indeed, this solution comes to 
the fore in 11:33-34: “Therefore (ὥστε), my adelphoi, when you gather together (συνερχόμενοι) 
to eat (εἰς τὸ φαγεῖν), receive (food) from one another (ἀλλήλους ἐκδέχεσθε). If anyone is 
hungry, let him eat at home, lest you gather together (συνέρχησθε) for judgment. The rest I will 
set in order when I come.” Here, the inverted parallelism between 11:17-19 and 11:33-34 
details on semiotic theory that undergirds structural exegesis, see Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical 
Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990). 
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indicates that 11:17-34 is a complete discourse unit because as it poses a problem of “coming 
together” in the beginning of the passage, it provides a solution at the end. 
Given this inverted parallelism, we argue that if this passage is about “how to interact 
with each other in the church” – the word “coming together” (συνέρχομαι), which only appears 
in 1 Corinthians is found five times in 11:17-34, out of seven times altogether in the Pauline 
corpus (the other two times are in 14:23, 26) – then the church of God, for Paul, is characterized 
by a notion of receiving from one another, which implies an acknowledgement and appreciation 
of differences. Hence, it should not surprise us (by contrast with many Patristic Fathers and 
modern biblical scholars), that Paul writes that “it is necessary that haireseis exist among you, so 
that the approved ones may become manifested among you” (11:19). Indeed, if we do not 
assume that haireseis are necessarily bad and are simply a matter of “choices” (the basic 
meaning of hairesis before it becomes primarily pejorative in the second century CE), then the 
feature of the church of God in 11:17-34 will stand out. 
This characteristic of the church is, however, sidelined in most interpretations of 11:17-
34. Besides the typical negative rendition of haireseis, another term that we have discussed is 
ἐκδέχεσθε in 11:33, which Thiselton says is the “most problematic Greek word for translation” 
in this passage.81 We have also noted that, for many scholars, the meaning of ἐκδέχεσθε is tied to 
the meaning of προλαμβάνει in 11:21. As we have shown that the meanings of προλαμβάνει and 
ἐκδέχεσθε need not rely on each other; consequently, the meaning of ἐκδέχεσθε as “to receive 
from” can reflect the tension between schismata in 11:18 and haireseis in 11:19. Given the 
ambiguous meaning of haireseis, Paul as an enunciator, at first, seems to equate schismata and 
haireseis together. This move is important to appeal to the enunciatee so that they will not reject 
Paul’s exhortation outright. It can get their attention. Because while it is clear that Paul is against 
81 Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 898. 
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schismata in 1:10 and 11:18, when he says that haireseis must exist among believers in 11:19, he 
appears to contradict himself. We can take this saying of Paul in 11:19 as a sarcasm, but to do so 
is to portray Paul simply as wanting to rebuke and mock the enunciatee. Such an action is not 
helpful for communication and persuasion. However, if the basic meaning of hairesis is 
“choice,” and if Paul is not against differences but actually promote them in the Lord (12:4-7), 
then Paul tries to show that while haireseis must exist among believers, they need not result in 
schismata, in particular if they are Christ-oriented, as exemplified in Jesus giving his body for 
believers. We can further find this theme of how to “come together” in haireseis without causing 
schismata in the pairs of opposed actions. 
(ii) Pairs of Opposition of Actions 
As can be seen below (see also Appendix 2 in Chapter 3), we have six pairs of opposed 
actions in 11:17-34. For our purpose, we will arrange them into a story progression and shift the 
“polemical axis” so that we may have a series of semiotic squares to analyze to show how the 
themes are conceptualized. The first four pairs of the opposed actions are in the dialogic level 
and the last two pairs are in the warranting level. Here, we include 1:10e and 3:3b into our 
analysis to show that the argument in 11:17-34 is closely related with that of the entire 1 
Corinthians. From these pairs of opposed actions, it is clear that Paul is concerned with how to 
respect and learn from each other in the Lord. Among these pairs of opposed actions, the first 
four pairs are from the dialogic level and the last two pairs are from the warranting level. 
(+) 1:10e – Paul urges no schismata     (no schismata  selves) 
(-) 3:3b – jealousy and strife among Corinthians  (jealousy and strife  selves) 
(-) 11:18 – schismata among Corinthians in gathering (schismata  selves) 
 
(+) 11:26 – those proclaiming the Lord’s death, remember it, receive the Covenant … corrected  
       at the Lord’s meal   (union of Lord’s death and covenantal vocation  selves) 
(-) 11:30 – those failing the test become weak, ill, and dead        (weakness, ill, death  selves) 
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(+) 11:31 – not judged if discern at the Lord’s meal  (no judgment  selves)  
(-) 11:29 – judged if did not discern the Lord’s meal   (judgment  selves 
 
(+) 11:33 – receiving from one another at the Lord’s meal (the Lord’s meal  selves) 
(-) 11:20-21 – individually eating one’s own meal        (individual meal  selves) 
 
(+) 11:19 – haireseis reveals the approved ones  (existence  haireseis) 
(-) 1:11 – strife among Corinthians    (existence  strife) 
 
(+) 11:24a – Jesus gave thanks    (thanksgiving  God) 
(-) 11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God   (betrayal  God) 
 
(iii) The Story Progression: (Re)-Telling the Pairs of Opposed Actions 
Here, we will re-arrange the above pairs of opposed actions according to how we 
understand the story progresses.  
First: (+) 11:24a – Jesus gave thanks    (thanksgiving  God) 
 
(-) 11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God   (betrayal  God) 
 
To be able to give thanks is to have the vision, knowledge, and willingness to 
acknowledge that one has indeed received something “good” (from the other/Other). Without the 
vision to see and know (that also establishes the desire), one will not be able to give thanks. We 
put “good” in quotation marks to indicate that the “good” may not necessarily be good in the 
present. In the case of Jesus, the situation was dire and bleak for anyone to consider it good as he 
would soon be betrayed. We put “from the other/Other” in a bracket because as long as one is 
inspired, one can still give thanks even if one does not know “who” or “what” to give thanks to 
and be thankful for. We may assume that it was God whom Jesus gave thanks to, but Paul does 
not tell us (11:24). In fact, the verb “giving thanks” is an aorist active participle that describes the 
circumstance of Jesus’s breaking the bread and speaking to the disciples (καὶ εὐχαριστήσας 
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ἔκαλσεν καὶ εἶπεν) (11:24). This gesture of thanksgiving and breaking the bread (i.e., Jesus’s 
own body) contrasts sharply with the betrayal that was under way at the same time. For Paul, 
these are the two paths presented before believers whenever they gather together to partake of 
the Lord’s meal. They are manifested, again and again, each time in every gathering of believers. 
Second:  (+) 11:26 – those proclaiming the Lord’s death, remember it, receive the Covenant …  
         corrected at the Lord’s meal   
(union of Lord’s death and covenantal vocation  selves) 
 
   (-) 11:30 – those failing the test become weak, ill, and dead        
(weakness, ill, death  selves) 
 
For those who remember and embody the sayings of Jesus at the Lord’s meal and for 
those who are corrected from their errors, the Lord’s meal (i.e., the eating of the bread and he 
drinking of the cup) is an event through which they proclaim the death of the Lord until he 
comes (11:26). In proclaiming it, believers profess their solidarity with Christ and the oppressed. 
The proclamation is dangerous and risky, as it speaks against the Roman Empire that executes 
the crucifixion. The proclamation is an act of faith, courage, and defiance; it is both an 
illocutionary and a perlocutionary speech-act. The present active indicative in the apodosis in the 
general condition of 11:26 stresses that the proclamation of the death of the Lord is to be 
repeatedly performed as often as they gather together to eat the bread and drink the cup.82 
Third: (+) 11:31 – not judged if discern at the Lord’s meal  (no judgment  selves) 
 
(-) 11:29 – judged if did not discern the Lord’s meal   (judgment  selves 
 
To partake of the Lord’s meal is to embody it: to incorporate the body and the blood of 
Christ. If one becomes what one eats and drinks, one needs to be careful with what one eats (or 
does not eat) and drinks (or does not drink). In eating and drinking, the subject is an object and a 




                                                          
receiver of eating and drinking. The food is certainly the object of one’s consumption (for 
oneself), but as one is changed by the food, one then becomes the object and the receiver of such 
a transformation. The boundary between the self as the subject and the self as the object and the 
receiver is not rigid and clearly drawn; it is deconstructed in the eating and drinking. What is 
outside (i.e., the food) becomes that which constitutes the self, as parts of the self and the outside 
are excreted in the process of digestion. 
Fourth:  (+) 11:33 – receiving from one another at the Lord’s meal (the Lord’s meal  selves) 
 
  (-) 11:20-21 – individually eating one’s own meal        (individual meal  selves) 
 
The partaking of the Lord’s meal is an event of call and response; an event of 
discernment. It is an event of fidelity to which believers must be faithful in taking action about it. 
It is an event that exposes the system that crucifies the Lord of glory. It is an event that marks the 
new covenant between believers and their Lord (11:25); an event that is a relationship of 
remembering and embodying the words and deeds of Jesus. It is an event of re-telling and re-
living the story of the Lord’s meal, again and again. It is not a dead ritual; a mechanical routine. 
It is not something that happened in the past. It is still happening now. It challenges believers to 
make the event their own event in their everyday life; to make it relevant and pertinent to their 
relationship with the other/Other. Therefore, for believers to trivialize, mock, and shame the 
partaking of the Lord’s meal (11:22) is to condemn themselves as believers. It is to discredit 
themselves because if they have already acknowledged the crucified Messiah as their Lord and 
accepted the logos of the cross as the power of God (1:18), then to shame the Lord’s meal is to 
shame themselves. No wonder Paul says that many of those who did so are weak, ill, and even 
dead (11:30). However, for those who discern and examine themselves, they would not be 
judged (11:31). That is to say, in giving judgment to themselves, believers would not be judged. 
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On the other hand, it is those who do not give judgment to themselves who end up receiving the 
judgment (11:29). Here, we see that judgment and discernment should not be hurled at the 
other/Other but at oneself, instead. This self-discernment echoes the thanksgiving of Jesus. The 
issue is not what one has given to the other/Other, but what one has received.   
Fifth: (+) 11:19 – haireseis reveals the approved ones  (existence  haireseis) 
 
            (-) 1:11 – strife among Corinthians    (existence  strife) 
 
This other-orientation of the believer’s life in the Lord, which contrasts sharply with a 
self-centered orientation, comes to the fore when Paul exhorts believers to receive food from one 
another at the Lord’s meal (11:33). Regardless of how we interpret τὸ ἴδιον δεῖπνον (“one’s own 
meal”) in 11:21 – that is, how the meal becomes one’s own meal – it is clear that those who eat 
their own meal are not considerate of other believers and their situations. They are not partaking 
of the Lord’s meal (11:20) because they are not concerned with what the Lord cares about: the 
life of people. They only care about themselves, as opposed to the Lord who entrusts himself to 
God in his thanksgiving. Thus, Paul asks believers to share and eat each other’s food. If we 
become what we eat (or do not eat), then eating each other’s food in a style of a potluck can be 
challenging to both the well-to-do and the less well-to-do believers. While the latter may at first 
be intimidated, they will be empowered as they are invited to eat the kind of food that they 
normally will not eat. The former, on the other hand, will probably be turned off by the kind of 
food that is of less quality than theirs. But that is exactly the point of doing the potluck at the 
Lord’s meal: to experience and embody what the Lord has done for them so that they too may 
live likewise. If the Lord does not show favoritism but can even give thanks in giving his life for 
believers (11:24), then believers need to observe the covenant that the Lord has made with them 
(11:25). This is how they can remember and proclaim the death of the Lord until he comes 
312 
 
(11:26). They need to experience and see the system that oppresses and even crucifies their Lord. 
It is through this ritual and its ritualization of receiving the food from each other that the doxa of 
the Empire can be exposed and the semantic habitus of believers can be challenged and 
transformed. This is why haireseis must exist among believers to make visible those who are 
tested (11:19). 
Sixth: (+) 1:10e – Paul urges no schismata     (no schismata  selves) 
            
           (-) 3:3b – jealousy and strife among Corinthians  (jealousy and strife  selves) 
            (-) 11:18 – schismata among Corinthians in gathering (schismata  selves) 
 
Haireseis basically means “choices,” and hence, “differences.” Without respecting and 
appreciating differences, we cannot distinguish anything. We will only see from our perspectives 
and consider that which is different from our viewpoint as strange and even wrong. But, why 
would anyone, without any reason, want to broaden her/his perspective and semantic habitus? 
Unless one is confronted with such a need to re-examine and even change one’s semantic habitus, 
there is no reason to be concerned with such a change. In fact, how will such a confrontation and 
change take place in a way that is not too drastic, and hence, repulsive to her/him, which then 
will probably make her/him to just reject the possibility of change? However, if the challenge 
takes places in the ritual of the Lord’s meal, then the power of ritual can provide a liminal space 
for believers to try out different ways of interacting with each other, without feeling too awkward 
or uncomfortable. This is how haireseis, through the sharing and eating of each other’s food in 
each other’s company, can reveal the approved ones. It is through receiving from one another 
that believers come to see that other believers have indeed what they do not have, and as a result, 
may be inspired to actually learn from them. If this happens, then there will not be schismata 
among believers who refuse to associate and be linked with other believers whom they want to 
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keep at a distance. In other words, Paul does not just tell believers not to create schismata among 
themselves, he urges them not to form schismata in the church of God. Such an exhortation is a 
(surface) manifestation of a deep underlying concern of Paul. 
In our reading of 11:17-34, we therefore can now re-arrange the pairs of opposed actions 
in the following order – presented from the bottom up for the convenience of making a series of 
semiotic squares for our semantic analysis below.   
(iv) A Semantic Analysis of 1 Corinthians 11:17-34 
As we did in Appendix 3 of chapter 3, we put the above pairs of opposed actions into the 
following way to form a series of semiotic squares.83 As we will see, the semantic value “other-
oriented” is repeatedly emphasized in all these semiotic squares. 
(+) 1:10e – Paul urges no schismata    (-) 3:3b, 11:18 – strife among Corinthians 
(+) 11:19 – haireseis reveals the approved ones (-) 1:11 – strife among Corinthians   
(+) 11:33 – receiving from one another at the (-) 11:20-21 – individually eating one’s own  
       Lord’s meal      meal 
(+) 11:31 – not judged if discern at the Lord’s meal  (-) 11:29 – judged if did not discern the 
      Lord’s meal  
(+) 11:26 – those proclaiming the Lord’s death,  (-) 11:30 – those failing the test become 
       remember it, receive the Covenant …         weak, ill, and dead 
       corrected at the Lord’s meal 
(+) 11:24a – Jesus gave thanks   (-) 11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God 
  
(a) Semiotic Square 1: Other-oriented (Christ-like) 
In our first semiotic square, the issue of judgment comes to the fore. In 11:31, Paul writes, 
“But if we judged ourselves (ἑαυτοὺς διεκρίνομεν), we would not be judged (ἐκρινόμεθα).” But, 
how does one judge oneself? By what standard of evaluation? According to our semiotic square, 
the answer lies in remembering “the new covenant” (ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη) that the Lord Jesus has 
made with believers (11:24-25). 
83 Since the story progression relies on the positive mediation of the actions, we shift the negative actions (“the 
polemical axis”) upward. As a result, we will have four semiotic squares. 
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11:31 – not judged if discern at the Lord’s      11:30 – those failing the test become 






11:26 – those proclaiming the Lord’s death,      11:23 – people betrayed Jesus and God 
remember it, receive the new covenant …       (non-S1): Non-Other-oriented 
corrected at the Lord’s meal (non-S2):  
Self-Discerning Judgment 
 
As the word “covenant” indicates, it is a contract that binds those who sign it. When one 
is in the contract, one is bound by its terms. In light of the repetition of εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν 
(“for my remembrance”) in 11:24 and 11:25 and the clarification in 11:26 that “as often as you 
eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the dead of the Lord until he comes,” this new 
contract is about remembering and proclaiming the words and deeds of Jesus. It is new because 
one becomes new like Christ when s/he proclaims the death of the Lord. That is to say, a new life 
is engendered when people hear the proclamation of the Lord’s death and respond to it positively. 
The one who proclaims the Lord’s death should also receive it and be transformed by it; 
otherwise one cannot remember and proclaim it. Recall the middle voice: the proclamation 
should take place in the proclaiming itself. The one who gives the proclamation should also be 
the “object” and the “receiver” of the proclamation. Thus, if one wants to judge the other/Other, 
one should first be the “object” and the “receiver” of one’s judgment (cf. 4:4; Rom. 2:1-4; Matt. 
7:1-5). The proclamation of the Lord’s death is a proclamation of one’s death as well (2 Cor. 
4:10-11; Phil. 3:7-11). This is why Paul says that Christ sends him to gospelize (or manifest the 




In this ritual of the Lord’s meal (from the eating of the meal to the drinking, conversation, 
and the singing of hymns, cf. 14:26), it is the remembrance of the Lord and the proclamation of 
his death that give rise to the meal gathering. Moreover, as the libation (after the meal) that is 
usually dedicated to the Roman emperor and the gods/goddesses is now poured out for the 
remembering of the new contract that is in the blood of Jesus, there is a strong sense of solidarity 
and defiance against the Empire that crucified the Lord.84 The gathering, eating, and drinking of 
the Lord’s meal are a ritualization that transforms believers by making them Christ-like: they are 
empowered to let go of themselves so that they can be empowered to let go. It is this trust in 
letting go of self that keeps one vigilant and Christ-oriented because in the letting-go of self, one 
can only rely on God for direction. This is why those who judge themselves in the remembrance 
of Jesus and the proclamation of his death are not judged because they are already transformed in 
the process of doing so. 
This paradox of being empowered (in response to the gift of Jesus) to let go of self comes 
to the fore in Paul’s re-telling of Jesus giving thanks on the night that he was betrayed (11:23). 
By giving and emptying himself for the sake of others, Jesus is not lost. He is not forgotten. 
Rather, he is remembered and incorporated into the life of believers. Paul writes, “Whenever you 
eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the death of the Lord until he comes” (11:26). In 
other words, the body and blood of Jesus are to be digested and lived out. They should constitute 
believers and make them new. Not being transformed by the consumption of the body and blood 
of Jesus is not partaking of the Lord’s meal. The gift of Jesus must be received and given at the 
same time. It is a gift that is constantly on the move, not owned by anyone.85 It cannot be 
84 For details, see Hal Taussig, In the Beginning was the Meal, 118-39. 
85 This notion of gift is apparent in the beginning of 1 Corinthians. Paul gives thanks to God not only because of the 
gifts that have been given to believers in Christ Jesus, but also because believers embody the gifts in their testimony 
of Christ (objective and subjective genitive; cf. 3:11-13) as they wait for the gift of revelation of Lord Jesus Christ 
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objectified. The gift is characterized by the acts of simultaneous receiving and giving. The 
receiving and giving of the gift of the body and blood of Jesus empowers both the giver and the 
recipient at the same time. This is why believers should examine themselves when partaking of 
the bread and of the cup (11:28), not to mention “whoever partakes of the bread and cup 
unworthily will be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord” (11:27). The gift of life can be a 
poison if it is not consumed and digested well. Instead of nourishing the body, it can cause 
indigestion, illness, and even death. Without embodying the life of Jesus, one puts her/his life at 
risk in partaking of the gift of life. 
(b) Semiotic Square 2: Other-oriented (Concrete Interaction) 
11:33 – receiving from one another at the      11:29 – judged if did not discern the 





11:31 – not judged if discern at the Lord’s      11:30 – those failing the test become 
meal (non-S2): Non-Self-centered       weak, sick, and dead (non-S1): Non- 
    Other-oriented 
 
In this second semiotic square, a sense of other-oriented is again emphasized. But it is 
stressed through a concrete interaction between believers. This concrete interaction is crucial to 
one’s perception of the self and the other/Other. Without the face of the other/Other in front of 
one’s face, one can easily erase the otherness of the other/Other. But, the other/Other is not an 
object of one’s gaze and imagination. When one objectifies the other/Other, one will also be 
objectified by one’s objectification. It is a vicious cycle; a loop with no exit. But, if believers do 
interact with each other regularly, then perhaps one will be less judgmental and be more 
(1:4ff). The movement of gift is not a closed circle of economy. Gift is only a gift when it is given, received, 
embodied, and given again, affecting both the giver and the recipients at the same time, as well as the quality of the 
giving. For those who refuse the gift of God, they treat the cross as foolishness (1:18), misunderstand the wisdom of 
God (2:6-8) and reject the free gifts of God (2:14). 
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understanding and compassionate toward each other, as one realizes that others could have 
misjudged oneself too. 
This is why Paul urges believers to receive food from one another (11:33), lest they 
cannot perceive the world otherwise. If believers do not interact with each other, then they are 
not gathering together, even if they may happen to share the same space (ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ) (11:20). 
Paul thus says that they are not partaking of the Lord’s meal. To be at the same place is to gather 
together, share, and receive from one another, as the Lord gathered believers together and shared 
with them what he had received from God in his thanksgiving. This receiving from the 
other/Other can help one breakthrough her/his own horizon of vision. For Paul, it is through the 
other/Other that one can see one’s blind spot and limitation. Without the other/Other, one cannot 
be transformed. This self-centeredness will only make one see the fault of the other/Other 
without realizing that the problem can lie with the self. Consequently, one’s horizon of 
understanding will only get narrower and narrower, eventually causing one to become weak, sick, 
and even dead. By asking believers to, at least, share and eat each other’s food, Paul hopes that 
they may come to see the difference and realize their self-centeredness. 
(c) Semiotic Square 3: Other-oriented (non-objectifying) 
11:19 – haireseis reveal the approved     11:20-21 – individually eating one’s own 





11:33 – receiving from one another at the     11:29 – judged if did not discern the  
Lord’s meal (non-S2): Non-Self-centered     Lord’s meal (non-S1): Non-Other-oriented 
 
Here, a sense of other-oriented is again highlighted. While Paul does not say how the 
haireseis can make visible the tested ones among believers (11:19), it appears that it is how one 
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deals with haireseis that reveals whether one passes the test or not. As Paul in 11:18 rebukes 
believers for forming schismata, we can assume that if haireseis must exist, then it cannot 
manifest the qualities of schismata that divide the church of God into various groups that do not 
interact with each other. When believers claim themselves to belong exclusively to a certain 
group, they define groups in relation to each other, instead of in relation to Christ. The standard 
of judgment is not in terms of “Christ and him crucified,” but in terms of the honor of the Empire 
that crucified Christ. As such, the existence of haireseis must be Christ-oriented.  
In the face of differences, haireseis can keep believers on their toes from objectifying and 
absolutizing any choice. They can also help believers to be cautious and vigilant of the choices 
that they make. Because when believers need to make a certain choice out of so many choices, 
they need to analyze the “pros” and “cons” of their decision and be able to explain the choice 
that they make. In other words, haireseis (or choices) can help believers to be keen to the 
contextual issues of their situation. In this articulation of their decision, believers must then take 
responsibility for their choices to show how it is a Christ-oriented decision. 
On the other hand, if believers are self-centered, haireseis can easily become a threat to 
the unity of the church of God; after all, it is very difficult for a group to operate effectively if 
there are too many choices pulling the group in various directions. One can easily imagine how 
haireseis can even lead to schismata, in particular if believers refuse to see the limit and 
contextual character of their preferred choice. This danger of causing schismata is inherent in 
haireseis. But, precisely because of this danger, haireseis can reveal the tested ones as they 
challenge believers to rely not on the wisdom of the world, but on he power of God (i.e., the 
logos of the cross) to discern how God works in different situations. Haireseis, as such, cannot 
and must not be objectified because one does not know how God will work. The existence of 
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choices and differences deconstructs any objectification. This non-objectifying quality is 
manifested in Paul urging believers to interact with one another in such a concrete way that they 
should share and eat the food of each other at the Lord’s meal. Paul does not want them to just 
eat their own food. Paul wants them to be exposed to the real conditions of life of different 
believers so that their proclamation is in terms of death of the Lord for people. 
(d) Semiotic Square 4: Other-oriented (non-absolutizing) 
1:10 – Paul urges no schismata (S1):       1:11 – Strife among believers (S2): 





11:19 – haireseis reveal the approved      11:20-21 – individually eating one’s own  
ones (non-S2): Non-Self-centered       meal (non-S1): Non-Other-oriented 
 
It is “through the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” that Paul urges believers not to have 
schismata among themselves (1:10). It is the name of Jesus that believers in every place calls 
upon (1:2), a name that they can only, in the Holy Spirit, confess to be that of their Lord (12:3). 
However, when we examine the strife among believers (1:11), we see how they use the names of 
the apostle and even of Christ to form their own group. As the name of Paul is even used by 
believers, it is clear that believers do not have the approval of the apostles and of Christ to use 
their names. 
Here, the objectification by believers is rather obvious. In a group-oriented culture, such a 
self-centeredness not only categorizes and alienates believers, it also sets the apostles against 
each other. But, Paul makes it clear that each apostle has her/his role and responsibility (3:5-8), 
just as each person receives her/his own gift from the spirit (12:7-11), not to mention each body 
part has its own indispensable role that cannot be substituted by the others (12:14-27). So when 
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each group thinks that it is alone to understand and represent God, it absolutizes itself at the 
expense of other believers. It objectifies God. 
For Paul, this overemphasis of any individuality is problematic because it can become a 
form of universalization that ends up rejecting individuality. This is the unfortunate result that 
we see with the schismata that believers form among themselves. In asserting its own 
particularity, each group denies other particularities. This is why haireseis must exist among 
believers. The problem is not with the variety of choices; it is with the discernment of choices. 
Perhaps this is why in all the four semiotic squares that we see in 11:17-34, a notion of other-
oriented is repeatedly emphasized in different ways. For Paul, a coming together that does not 
incur judgment is a coming together that share and learn from the otherness of each other.  
 
V. Conclusion 
When we recognize that a sense of other-orientation undergirds Paul’s exhortation in 
11:17-34, it becomes clear that Paul uses the word haireseis ambiguously to show that 
differences need not lead to the formation of schismata among believers. Given that there are 
already several groups in the church of God, each claiming “Christ,” “Cephas,” “Apollos,” and 
“Paul” as its primary leader, believers may have positive and negative evaluation of the grouping. 
It is thus intriguing that while Paul criticizes schismata, he also says that hairesesis must exist 
among believers. But, are schismata and haireseis not about groupings? For Paul, forming group 
is not necessarily divisive. The issue is how groups are formed. If birds of a feather flock 
together, it is expected that people tend to socialize more frequently with those whom they feel 
close to. What concerns Paul is that such a gathering ends up drawing boundaries and 
objectifying others whom one is not close to. Thus, we see that as the theme in 11:17-34 is about 
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“coming together,” Paul further conceptualizes it in terms of being Christ-like, concrete 
interaction, non-objectifying, and non-absolutizing. To concretize this theme, Paul then 
figurativizes it through the body of Christ, which is broken for everyone at the Lord’s meal, and 
which then signifies that just as everyone receives the body of Christ, one should also receive 
from one another as if one receives from Christ. It is through this receiving from one another that 
everyone comes together to partake of the Lord’s meal and proclaim the Lord’s death until he 
comes. 
Let us note the language of giving and receiving in Paul’s description of the Lord’s meal. 
First, in using the Lord’s meal tradition that is familiar to the enunciatee, Paul tells believers that 
what he has given to them is what he has received from the Lord (Ἐγὼ γὰρ παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ 
κυρίου, ὃ καὶ παρέδωκα ὑμῖν) (11:23). Then he tells them how Jesus, on the night that he was 
given over (παρεδίδετο), after giving thanks, took (or received) (ἔλαβεν) the bread and gave it to 
believers. Just as Jesus makes a new covenant with believers in giving them the bread and the 
cup (11:25), believers need to proclaim his death until he comes whenever they come together to 
receive the bread and the cup (11:26). In order to give such a proclamation of the death of the 
Lord believers must have already received an evaluation of themselves in light of the new 
covenant. As such, it only makes sense that believers should discern and judge themselves when 
they partake of the Lord’s meal. Not to discern oneself in the partaking of the Lord’s meal means 
that one does not remember the new covenant and does not proclaim the death of the Lord. The 
receiving of the bread and the cup, which is already an acknowledgement of the judgment 
because it signifies the acceptance of the new covenant, therefore becomes a forceful judgment 
unto those who do not judge themselves. 
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For Paul, if the body of Christ is broken for everyone, then discriminating against anyone 
is to be against Christ himself. If believers have received from Christ, then in welcoming each 
other and receiving from each other, believers also welcome and receive from Christ who gives 
himself to everyone. On the other hand, if to receive the bread and the cup is to proclaim the 
Lord’s death, then to shame those who have received the bread and the cup of the Lord is to 
shame the death of the Lord. If everyone has received from Christ, then differences need not be 
divisive. If everyone calls upon the name of the Lord in every place, then unity should be 
conceived of in a cross-like way. We thus need to remember that it in the name of the Lord Jesus 
that Paul urges believers to say the same thing and be restored in the same and in the same 
thought (1:10). 
Just as a body has different body members, we can envision unity in terms of differences. 
For Paul, unity is Christ-oriented. Differences are differences not because they are in relation 
with each other. The coming together of differences must proclaim the Lord’s death; that is, must 
embody the body of Christ that is broken for everyone. Differences are in relation with the body 
of Christ that is “parts beyond a part.” Differences can become divisive when we absolutize our 
particularity at the expense of other particularities. Therefore for Paul, the notion of haireseis is 
ambiguous. It should be neither reified nor absolutized. The haireseis exist when people come 
together. It is the outcome of differences. Without differences, there are no haireseis. This is why 
Paul writes that haireseis must exist in the sense that people must come together, face to face. 
Differences can be liberating as they remind believers that there are many members of the body 
of Christ and everyone is a part of it.86 Likewise, it is through different interpretations of 11:17-
34 that we see the multiple layers and aspects of the text that we actually privilege and bracket 
86 Paul makes this point very clear in the beginning of 1 Corinthians when he addresses the Corinthian believers, 
“To the church of God in Corinth, to those who have been sanctified in Chris Jesus, to those called saints, with 
everyone calling upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ in every place, both their Lord and ours” (1:2). 
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out in our interpretations. These different interpretations that foreground and background certain 
textual dimensions (by using pertinent exegetical tool that correspond to relevant worldview) 
help us examine and see how we and others interact with 11:17-34. Paul does not speak of love 
in 11:17-34, but from the qualities of love that we fleshed out in chapter 4, we can say that Paul 
envisions and embodies a love that is not only other-oriented but also self-oriented (not self-
centered) in the sense that just as one needs to receive and learn from the other, one also has 
something that one can teach the other. In chapter 6, we will see that this conflict at the meal 















Appendix A – The Notion of “Heresy” 
Overall, the New Testament Greek dictionary gives us two major meanings of hairesis: 
(1) “A group that holds tenets distinctive to it, sect, party, school, faction” and (2) “that which 
distinguishes a group’s thinking, opinion, dogma” (e.g., 2 Peter 2:1, which can “perhaps” refer to 
the “heretical sects”) (BDAG, 27-28). The examples under (1) are: the sect “of the Sadducees” 
(e.g., Acts 5:17), the sect “of the Pharisees” (e.g., Acts 15:5, 26:5), and the sect “of the 
Christians” (i.e., hairesis tōn Nazōraiōn) (e.g., Acts 24:5; cf. Acts 24:14 and 28:22). BDAG also 
notes that the hairesis tōn Nazōraiōn refers to a “heretical sect,”1 with which most modern 
Western scholars agree.2 Under (1), BDAG treats hairesis as having a “negative connotation, 
dissension, a faction” (e.g., 1 Cor. 11:19; Gal. 5:20). However, this pejorative use of hairesis 
marks a sharp difference with the neutral and positive uses of hairesis found in the classical 
Greek dictionary.3 Michel Desjardins’ review of scholarly works on the usage of hairesis in 
Greco-Roman and Hellenistic Jewish literature also highlights the positive and neutral meaning 
of hairesis.4 In her essay, Joan Taylor even argues for the positive and neutral meaning of all the 
occurrences of hairesis in Acts 5:17, 15:5, 24:5-6 and 14, 26:5, and 28:22 (see below). 
Derived from the verb hairein (“to take,” “to grasp,” or “to seize”), the noun hairesis 
generally means a “choice.” Being the result of choosing, hairesis or a “choice” can refer to 
one’s decision, disposition, and thought. For those who make similar choice or decision, they 
1 The examples that BDAG gives for this second meaning are Iren. Against Heresies 1.11.1, Orig. Contra Celsum 
5.54.9, Justin. Trypho 35, etc. 
2 Joan E. Taylor, “The Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in ‘Sectarian’ Judaism? A Reconsideration of the Current View Via 
the Narrative of Acts and the Meaning of Hairesis,” in Sects and Sectarianism in Jewish History. Edited by Sacha 
Stern (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 92-93. 
3 According to LSJ Supplement (1996: 41), hairesis has two major meanings: (1) a “taking, esp. of a town” and (2) (i) 
a “choice” (such as a “choice, election of magistrates” or an “inclination”), (ii) a “purpose, course of action or 
thought” (such as a “system of philosophic principles, or those who profess such principles, sect, school, or “corps 
of epheboi,” or “condition” in astrology), and (iii) a “proposed condition, proposal” (such as a “commission,” 
“freewill offering,” and “bid at auction”).  




                                                          
form a group “marked by common ideas and aims.”5 Gradually, hairesis comes to denote a 
medical and a philosophical school of thought and life style.6 The meaning of hairesis as a 
heretical group outside the established tradition and authority is a much later development.7 So 
unless we can show that the early church in the first century CE was already an established 
institution beleaguered by the issues of legitimacy and authority,8 it is anachronistic to speak of 
hairesis as a heretical group that holds erroneous doctrines.9 In fact, as the question of “heresy” 
touches upon whether “heresy” is an offshoot of “orthodoxy” or “orthodoxy” is the result of 
“heresy,”10 it points to the issues of unity and diversity. For example, Robert Royalty, Jr. argues 
that the rhetoric of heresy is an “ideology of difference” that identifies, excludes, and demonizes 
non-mainstream beliefs and practices through the use of tradition and Scripture.11 
5 David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model,” Vigiliae Christianae 53.2 (May 1999): 117-
47 (118). 
6 See Marcel Simon, “From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical 
Intellectual Tradition: In Honorem Robert M. Grant. Edited by William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: 
Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 101-16; Heinrich Von Staden, “Hairesis and Heresy: The Case of the haireseis 
iatrikai,” in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition. Vol. 3: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World. Edited by Ben 
F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 76-100. In reviewing major works on “the term 
hairesis and various aspects of its usage,” Runia writes, “John Glucker demonstrated that when, from the 2nd century 
BCE onwards, the term began to be used for philosophical schools, it indicated not schools in the institutional sense, 
based on a continuous succession in Athens, but rather ‘schools of thought.’ Heinrich von Staden reminded us of the 
fact that medical haireseis were no less prominent than philosophical ones, and that they corresponded to various 
degrees of organization and continuity. In a magisterial study Alain Le Boulluec has argued that Justine Martyr 
played a crucial role in adapting and transforming the model of Greek heresiography to the situation of the emerging 
Church.” See David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model,” 119. 
7 In fact, Simon argues that not only pre-Christian texts do not use the term hairesis pejoratively, philosophers also 
do not use the term to denote “teachings of an adversary which he considered erroneous.” See Marcel Simon, “From 
Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” 110. 
8 For the difference between authority and legitimacy, see John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic 
Authority. New Introduction by Wayne A. Meeks (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 1-34. 
9 Simon writes, “We know that the term in its original sense carried no value judgment. It simply meant, according 
to its etymology, “choice,” and specifically the choice of embracing a particular school of thought. There could be in 
the Greek, as well as in the Jewish view, depending on the point of view of the speaker, good and bad heresies. But, 
in principle, they are neither good nor bad, since there existed no universally recognized criterion of authority by 
which to classify them in two opposing categories and to distinguish truth from error.” See Marcel Simon, “From 
Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” 104. 
10 See Michel Desjardins, “Bauer and Beyond: On Recent Scholarly Discussions of Αἵρεσις in the Early Christian 
Era,” 66-69. For details, see Robert Royalty, Jr., The Origin of Heresy: A History of Discourse in Second Temple 
Judaism and Early Christianity. Routledge Studies in Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2012), 9-27. For 
Royalty, diversity marks the inception of the Jesus and Christian movements. 
11 He argues that “by the end of the first century, some Christians highlighted difference as a discursive move for 
group identity (‘we are the true Christians as opposed to those false Christians’) and for political posturing of the 
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Now, even when the negative notion of hairesis as a “heretical group” became dominant 
in the early Patristic Period,12 we still see the neutral and positive trace of hairesis. For instance, 
in Contra Celsum 3.12 and 3.13, when Celsus criticizes Christianity for its diverse sects,13 
Origen retorts that haireseis actually results from people seeing the value of Christianity and 
wanting to study it. If Christianity were not attractive to people, people would not have studied it. 
Without such a studying, there would not be various opinions or haireseis. Haireseis arise 
because Christianity is beneficial to people.14 Hence, for Origen, Paul speaks of haireseis in 1 
Cor. 11:19 because it is by studying various haireseis that one can recognize what is the best 
choice among them. 15  A similar explanation is also found in Stromata when Clement of 
ekkēsia (church) in the oikoumenē (Empire; ‘we the true Christians are Romans’). I understand difference here as 
neither a theological position nor merely a social conflict; although to be sure there were different ideological 
positions and extensive conflicts between these groups. Rather, difference is a discursive move, an ideological 
strategy (in Foucault’s parlance, a theory or theme).” See Robert Royalty, Jr., The Origin of Heresy, 18. 
12  For example, Desjardins writes, “In second-century non-canonical Christian literature, αἵρεσις, with few 
exceptions, is consistently used to depict false and dangerous choices made in the light of the preaching of the 
Christian message.” See Michel Desjardins, “Bauer and Beyond: On Recent Scholarly Discussions of Αἵρεσις in the 
Early Christian Era,” 74-75. 
13 “In the next place, since he [Celsus] reproaches us with the existence of heresies [αἱρέσεων, sectas] in Christianity 
as being a ground of accusation against it, saying that ‘when Christians had greatly increased in numbers, they were 
divided and split up into factions [σχίζονται, factionem], each individual desiring to have his own party;’ and further, 
that ‘being thus separated through their numbers, they confute one another, still having, so to speak, one name in 
common, if indeed they still retain it…’” See Ante-Nicene Fathers. Vol 4: Tertullian, Part Fourth; Minucius Felix; 
Commodian; Origen, Parts First and Second. Edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 469. 
14 He writes, “heresies [αἱρέσεις] of different kinds have never originated from any matter in which the principle 
involved was not important and beneficial to human life … So, then, seeing Christianity appeared an object of 
veneration to men, not to the more servile class alone, as Celsus supposes, but to many among the Greek who were 
devoted to literary pursuits, there necessarily [ἀναγκαίως] originated heresies, – not at all, however, as the result of 
faction and strife, but through the earnest desire of many literary men to become acquainted with the doctrines of 
Christianity. The consequence of which was, that, taking in different acceptations those discourses which were 
believed by all to be divine, there arose heresies, which received their names from those individuals who admired, 
indeed, the origin of Christianity, but who were led, in some way or other, by certain plausible reasons, to discordant 
views. And yet no one would act rationally in avoiding medicine because of its heresies; nor would he who aimed at 
that which is seemly entertain a hatred of philosophy, and adduce its many heresies as a pretext for his antipathy. 
And so neither are the sacred books of Moses and the prophets to be condemned on account of the heresies in 
Judaism.” Idem. 
15 “Now, if these arguments hold good, why should we not defend, in the same way, the existence of heresies 
[αἱρέσεων] in Christianity? And respecting these, Paul appears to me to speak in a very striking manner when he 
says, ‘For there must be heresies among you, that they who are approved may be made manifest among you.’ For as 
that man is ‘approved’ in medicine who, on account of his experience in various (medical) heresies, and his honest 
examination of the majority of them, has selected the preferable system, – and as the great proficient in philosophy 
is he who, after acquainting himself experimentally with the various views, has given in his adhesion to the best, – 
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Alexandria speaks of the good and bad haireseis.16 Likewise, in the “Edict of Milan,” Eusebius 
reports that Constantine Augustus and Licinius Augustus granted Christians and others free 
choice (hairesin) to keep their own worship and hairesis (The Ecclesiastical History 10.5.2).17 
Clearly, the notion of hairesis is not pejorative in this fourth-century-CE writing.  
In a recent essay, Taylor further contends that the notion of hairesis is not only neutral 
but also positive in the Acts of the Apostles. Arguing against the majority view, Taylors finds that 
“[t]he language of Acts is very much the same as Josephus, who defines groups holding 
jurisprudential authority as haireseis.”18 In Acts, we note that the Pharisees (15:5 and 26:5) and 
the Sadducees are called hairesis (5:17). This notion of hairesis as a Greek philosophical school 
of thought is common in the Hellenistic period. A TLG (Thesaurus Linguae Graecae) search will 
yield numerous examples. David Runia and Steve Mason point this out in the writings of Philo 
and Josephus, respectively.19 The fact that Philo and Josephus, for different reasons, use the 
so I would say that the wisest Christian was he who had carefully studied the heresies both of Judaism and 
Christianity.” Idem. 
16 See 7.15-16 of the Stromata in Ante-Nicene Fathers. Vol. 2: Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, 
Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire). Edited by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 549. 
17 For example, 10.5.4 mentions that the emperors “grant both to the Christians and to all the free choice [ἐλευθέραν 
αἵρεσιν] of following whatever form of worship they pleased, to the intent that all the divine and heavenly powers 
that be might be favorable to us and all those living under our authority.” 10.5.5: “Therefore with sound and most 
upright reasoning we resolved on this counsel: that authority be refused to no one whomsoever to follow and choose 
[τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι] the observance or form of worship that Christians use, and that authority be granted 
to each one to give his mind to that form of worship which he deems suitable to himself, to the intent that the 
Divinity … may in all things afford us his wonted cared and generosity.” 10.5.8: “And when thou perceivest that 
this has been granted unrestrictedly to them by us, thy Devotedness will understand that authority has been given to 
others also, who wish to follow their own observance and form of worship – a thing clearly suited to the 
peacefulness of our times – so that each one may have authority to choose and observe [τοῦ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ τημελεῖν] 
whatever form he pleases.” See Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History. Translated by J. E. L. Oulton and H. J. Lawlor. 
2 vols (Loeb, 1953), 447. 
18 Joan E. Taylor, “The Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in ‘Sectarian’ Judaism?,” 113. 
19 See Steve Mason, “Josephus’s Pharisees: The Philosophy,” in In Quest of the Historical Pharisees. Edited by 
Jacob Neusner and Bruce D. Chilton (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2007), 41-66. Also, see David T. 
Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek Hairesis-Model,”117-47; Joan E. Taylor, “The Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in 
‘Sectarian’ Judaism?,” 99ff.; Heinrich Schlier, “αἵρεσις,” 181. Unlike the frequent uses of hairesis in the writings of 
Josephus (e.g., War 2.119-62; Ant. 13.171-73; Ant. 18.12-22; Life 10-11; etc.), Runia notes that there are only four 
places where the word hairesis refers to the “school of thought” in Philo’s writing (e.g., De Plantatione 151, De Vita 
Mosis 1.21-9, De Vita Contemplativa 3.29, and Quaestiones in Exodum). 
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word hairesis for certain Hellenistic Jewish group indicates the positive notion of hairesis.20 
Taylor notes that “for Josephus the three schools proper [i.e., the Pharisees, Sadducees, and 
Essenes] not only interpret the law but play a role in public life within the city.”21 While Philo is 
more reserved than Josephus to use hairesis to present the Jewish groups as Greek schools of 
philosophy, he associates it with virtue in Who is the Heir of Divine Things 241. Philo writes, 
“virtue (ἀρετὴ) has derived its name not only from the word choice (παρὰ τὴν αἵρεσιν 
ὠνομάσθη), but also from the fact of its being lifted up (παρὰ τὴν ἄρσιν)…” 22  Here, the 
wordplay of “virtue,” “choice” (or “heresy”), and “lifted up” is rather obvious: that which is 
raised up is virtuous and of good choice. Given this usage of hairesis in the writings of Philo and 
Josephus, it is not a surprise that Acts uses the term positively in 5:17, 15:5, and 26:5. Now, let 
us examine the remaining three occurrences of hairesis in Acts 24:5-6 and 14, and 28:22. 
Regarding 28:22, Taylor argues that “the Jewish leaders in Rome use the term hairesis 
neutrally but respectfully.”23 If they had a pejorative view of Paul and the Way, they would not 
have gone to listen to him, let alone some were even persuaded (28:24). When it comes to the 
usage of hairesis in 24:5-6 and 24:14, Taylor foregrounds its neutral and positive notion in the 
verses we just read and stresses the legal feature of apologia in 24:14 when Paul speaks before 
Felix in defending the Way, which the lawyer Tertullus labels as hairesis (cf. 24:5). For Taylor, 
20 Taylor points out that Josephus only uses the term hairesis for Jewish groups that are well recognized in the 
public. While Philo also wants to present Judaism in terms of Greek school of philosophy, he is more reserved than 
Josephus in using the word hairesis because he also wants to stress the unity of Judaism. See Joan E. Taylor, “The 
Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in ‘Sectarian’ Judaism?,” 101, and David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria and the Greek 
Hairesis-Model,” 138-43. 
21 Joan E. Taylor, “The Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in ‘Sectarian’ Judaism?,” 101. For Taylor, Josephus also calls the 
‘fourth’ philosophy a hairesis because the group enjoys “legal authority in Jerusalem …” Ibid., 104.  
22 “For virtue (aretē) has derived its name not only from the word choice, but also from the fact of its being lifted up 
(para to airesthai), for it is lifted up (airetai) and borne on high because it always loves heavenly things; but 
wickedness (kakia) is so called from its tendency to go downwards (apo tou katōkechōrēkenai), and also because it 
compels those who practice it to fall down to the bottom (katapiptein).” See “Who is the Heir of Divine Things,” in 
The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged. New updated edition. Translated by C. D. Yonge (USA: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 2008), 296. 
23 Joan E. Taylor, “The Nazoraeans as a ‘Sect’ in ‘Sectarian’ Judaism?,” 98. 
329 
 
                                                          
if Luke-Acts tries to present the Way (like the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes) as a school of 
philosophy with public authority, then Luke-Acts may want to highlight this aspect through the 
mouth of Tertullus who accuses Paul as a ringleader of the Nazarene hairesis (24:5). So, as 
Tertullus “inadvertently grant[ed] the Nazoraeans the same status as another ‘school of Judean 
religion” with legitimacy,24 Paul confesses, “according to the Way that they call a hairesis, I thus 
worship the ancestral God, as I observe everything according to the law and those written in the 
prophets” (24:14). Note that Paul says “according to the Way that they call is a hairesis.” Taylor 
points out that as this is Paul’s legal apologia before Felix, it makes no sense for him to defend 
himself using hairesis as a pejorative term. Rather, Luke-Acts is consistent in using the term 
hairesis. Taylor summarizes, 
To highlight to Felix that ‘they call’ his beliefs a ‘wrong opinion’ or ‘heresy’ – as 
if offended – would not be a very effective method of defence … Tertullus 
‘himself says’ that Paul belongs to a ‘school [of Judaean religion],’ with its 
implications of legitimacy and authority, and Tertullus’ own credibility is agreed 
in this circumstances; therefore, Paul can use the language of Tertullus in his 
apologia, turned against his accusers.25 
 
Now, even if Tertullus’ notion of hairesis is negative (given the context of his accusation), 
Paul’s confession that he follows the Way that certain Jewish leaders allege to be a hairesis is 
noteworthy. If Paul uses hairesis negatively, then his explanation is subversive. How can the 
hairesis that Paul is involved in be condemned, if he observes everything according to the law 
and those written in the prophets? So, even if the notion of hairesis in Acts 24:5 and 24:14 is 
different from other usages of hairesis in Acts, Paul challenges the negative notion of hairesis. 
When it comes to the word haireseis in 1 Cor. 11:19, Taylor suggest that it “embraces 
both right and wrong ‘choices’ in theory, but there is an underlying presupposition that there is 
24 Ibid., 97. 
25 Ibid., 98. 
330 
 
                                                          
only one true way.”26 Here, we want to argue that this “one true way” is rather complicated. In 
11:19, Paul does not just use the word haireseis ambiguously, which Desjardins also finds,27 he 
also deconstructs the notion of hairesis. Hairesis can be good and/or bad. For Paul, hairesis can 
expose and destabilize the construction and maintenance of status quo. From what we have 
discussed so far, this meaning of haireseis is not impossible. In fact, it works quite well if we 
translate ἐκδέχεσθε as “to receive (food) from” one another. Now, let us turn to our structural 
















26 Ibid., 94. 




                                                          
Chapter 6 – Eat, Drink, and Love: 
Idol and Icon in the Issue of Eidōlothuta in 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1 
 
You know that when you were gentiles (ἔθνη), in being led astray (ἀπαγόμενοι), 
you used to be led (ἤγεσθε) to mute idols (τὰ εἴδωλα τὰ ἄφωνα). For this reason, I 
am making it known to you that nobody, when speaking in the spirit of God, says 
that “Jesus be cursed” (Ἀνάθεμα Ἰησοῦς) and nobody is able to say “Jesus is 
Lord” except in the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:2-3). – Paul 
 
My idol defines what I can bear of phenomenality … my idol exposes the span of 
all my aims – what I set my heart on seeing, and thus also want to see and do. In 
short, it denudes my desire and my hope. What I look at that is visible decides 
who I am. I am what I can look at. What I admire judges me.1 – Jean-Luc Marion 
 
I. Introduction 
From our discussion in the previous chapter, we can see how Paul’s notion of “coming 
together” can help implement his notion of the body of Christ as “parts beyond a part” (12:27). 
To prevent the body of Christ from being objectified, rigidified, and fixed, Paul urges the 
Corinthian believers to receive (food) from one another when they come together to observe the 
ritual of the Lord’s Supper (11:33). Paul tells them that haireseis (i.e., choices) must exist among 
them in order to highlight their limits and limitations. Without being confronted by differences, 
they might become lax and fail to discern the works of God among them. The haireseis in this 
sense can help believers transform their semantic habitus in their interaction with each other. 
They can provoke them to question their existing understanding. Thus at the core of “coming 
together” at the “Lord’s Supper,” Paul speaks of what he has received from the Lord, namely, 
how the Lord, despite the fact that he was betrayed, still gave thanks and made a new covenant 
with them through his body and blood (11:23-25). For Paul, this act of love for the other/Other 
(cf. Rom. 5:8) should always inform and undergird the believers’ semantic habitus. 
1 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Idol or the Radiance of the Painting,” in In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. 
Translated by Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 61. 
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In this chapter, as we address the “idol food” conflicts in 1 Cor. 8:1–11:1, we continue to 
see Paul’s concern for the believers’ semantic habitus. This time Paul is concerned about how 
believers come to know what they think they know. Note that, as we have seen (chapter 4) and as 
we shall further see below, Paul is not against gnosis per se. Neither is he pitching love against 
gnosis when he writes that “gnosis puffs up, but love builds up” (8:1). On the basis of our 
discussion of the modes of existence (e.g., autonomy, relationality, and heteronomy) in chapter 1, 
we find that Paul is concerned about the mode of existence in which we frame our process of 
knowing. Indeed, from our semantic analysis of Paul’s vision of love in chapter 4, we find that in 
associating gnosis with love, Paul wants believers to develop a heteronomous mode of knowing 
in their interaction with each other; a kind of knowledge that does not objectify the self and the 
other/Other but is always open to a new horizon of understanding. Once how we come to know is 
objectified, the “mercantilization of knowledge”2 is bound to happen, as Paul solemnly reminds 
believers not to let the exousia derived from their gnosis cause the weak to stumble (8:9). Thus 
Paul writes, “But for us there is one God the father, from whom are all things and for whom we 
are, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things are and through whom we are” (8:6). The 
dative voice “for us” is not merely relational. It also signifies a sense of responsibility and 
response-ability. That is to say, for whom is God the Father and Jesus Christ the Lord? If it is for 
all believers, then how can believers form factions and discriminate against anyone? The 
prepositional phrases “from whom,” “for whom,” and “through whom” highlight a heteronomous 
mode of perception that Paul wants the Corinthian believers to embrace and embody. 
 
 
2 See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi. Foreword by Fredric Jameson. Theory and History of Literature 10 (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 5. 
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II. Chinese Ancestor Veneration and the “Idol Food” Issue 
Chinese Christianity tends to condemn Chinese ancestor veneration as idol worship. The 
attack is considerable when the ritual, with more than 10,000 years of history, is inextricably 
related to the Chinese worldview, spirituality, and social identity.3 The denouncement can be 
tantamount to demonizing the Chinese heritage, causing unnecessary family dispute and hurt,4 as 
if a Chinese Christian must reject the ritual of ancestor veneration. The situation becomes more 
complicated when Chinese Christians are taught to accept Western traditional theology as the 
orthodox belief that holds the key to their “salvation.”5 When Chinese internalize the Western 
worldviews embedded in these doctrines, we distrust our own contextual interpretation of the 
Bible; after all, “What Has Jerusalem To Do With Beijing?” 6  Indeed, for many Chinese 
Christians, it is wrong to read the Bible through our socio-cultural values. But, if no Chinese 
would call their ancestors idols, then how is the ritual idolatrous? Did not the ancient Israelites 
observe ancestor veneration?7 Why are Chinese artifacts and images deprecated as idols, while 
3 See William Lakos, Chinese Ancestor Worship: A Practice and Ritual Oriented Approach to Understanding 
Chinese Culture (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 12-13. 
4  See Yak-hwee Tan, “Judging and Community in Romans: An Actions within the Boundaries,” in Gender, 
Tradition and Romans: Shared Ground, Uncertain Borders. Edited by Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte (London 
and New York: T&T Clark International, 2005), 39-60. 
5 For many Chinese Christians, “salvation” is often reduced to mean that one goes to heaven after s/he dies. But, to 
speak of “salvation,” we need to at least clarify from what and to/for what one is saved. For details, see Daniel Patte, 
“Salvation,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity. Edited by Daniel Patte (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 1125-126. In the beginning of 1 Corinthians, we see that “salvation” is related to receiving 
the logos of the cross, which is the power of God (1:18). 
6 In fact, even though the values of community and relationship are important to the Chinese cultures, which are also 
characteristic of the biblical worldview, many Chinese Christians are individualistic in their interpretation of the 
Bible. It is not difficult to find that most of the time, the real conditions of people’s lives are not mentioned in the 
sermon and adult Sunday school. What is highlighted are often abstract theological propositions and expositions. So 
for many Chinese churches, the answer to Yeo’s book, “What Has Jerusalem To Do With Beijing?”, is “nothing.” 
There is nothing that “Beijing” can contribute to our (critical) study and understanding of the Bible. It is, moreover, 
a taboo to connect both; this taboo is reinforced by the so-called “eisegesis” in the Western academy of critical 
biblical interpretation. However, see Khiok-khng (K.K.) Yeo, What Has Jerusalem To Do With Beijing? Biblical 
Interpretation From a Chinese Perspective (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998). Also, see Daniel 
Patte, “Contextual Reading of Mark and North Atlantic Scholarship,” in Mark. Texts@Contexts. Edited by Nicole 
Wilkinson Duran, Teresa Okure, and Daniel Patte (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 197-213. 
7 For example, see Brian B. Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite 
Religion and Tradition (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1996). 
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their Christian counterparts are admired as icons? For Paul, what are the features of an idol that 
mark it as idolatrous? While it is clear that Paul urges believers to flee from idolatry or “the 
worship of the idol” (εἰδωλολατρία) (10:14), it is not clear what makes an “idol” an “idol.”8 
Since Paul addresses the idol food conflict by first referring to the notions of gnosis and 
love, we need to understand how gnosis and love configure our notion of idolatry. With the word 
“idol” (εἴδωλον) coming from “to see” (εἰδ-),9 which is related to the word οἶδα (“to know”),10 it 
appears that the notion of idol concerns how we perceive and know the world. And, if our making 
sense of the world is inevitably bodily-oriented, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Pierre Bourdieu 
have shown (see chapter 2), our process of meaning production cannot overlook our flesh-and-
blood body. Indeed, if the difference between an idol and an icon hinges on how we see – which 
Jean-Luc Marion argues that an idol is an invisible mirror that reflects our gaze and in return 
captures it, whereas an icon challenges our gaze as it makes us shift our viewpoint until what we 
see can appear to us11 – the problem of objectifying the other/Other in our gaze comes to the fore. 
An inter(con)textual reading of 8:1–11:1 and the ritual of Chinese ancestor veneration can here 
help us deconstruct our gaze. This juxtaposition will reveal how each context envisions the 
notion of idol differently,12 as both contexts speak of loving and honoring the other/Other. 
8 Newton writes, “The term eidolon is used negatively and polemically by New Testament writers to oppose 
‘paganism,’ but although all of these texts condemn believers’ association or involvement with eidola, nevertheless 
they do not pinpoint the specific form, nature and significance of the actual eidolon intended by the writer, nor do 
they attempt to define the meaning of actual worship of eidola, and neither, finally, do they explain the relationship, 
if any, between the eidola and the concepts of divinity which they represent or involve.” See Derek Newton, Deity 
and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth. JSNT Supplement Series 169 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), 134. 
9 Friedrich Büchsel, “εἴδωλον,” TDNT 2: 375. Also, see Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 128-34. 
10 For example, Seesemann finds that “οἶδα is an Indo-Eur. Perf. of the root εἰδ-, ἰδ- ( εἶδος, εἰδέναι, ἰδεῖν), though 
always used in the pres.: ‘to have realized, perceived’ = ‘to know.’” See Heinrich Seesemann, TDNT 5: 116. 
11 See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being. Translated by Thomas A. Carlon (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-52; idem., “What We See and What Appears,” in Idol Anxiety. Edited by Josh 
Ellenbogen and Aaron Tugendhaft (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 152-68. 
12 Such a juxtaposition considers the ubiquity of religious artifacts and rituals in both Roman Corinth and Chinese 
Malaysian community. See Donald Engles, Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 92-120; Nancy Bookidis, “Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E,” in 
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 From our analysis of the semiotic squares in the complete discourse unit of 8:1–11:1 that 
focuses on Paul’s notion of love in handling the idol food conflict, we argue that, for Paul, just as 
one’s gnosis needs to be God-and-Christ-oriented, as love should also be, an idol or icon 
becomes idolatrous when it is not God-and-Christ-oriented. Paul is not against gnosis per se. He 
writes, “If anyone thinks that s/he has known something (ἐγνωκέναι τι), s/he has yet to know as 
s/he should know (οὔπω ἔγνω καθὼς δεῖ γνῶναι)” (8:2). Notice the tense of “knowing” changes 
from the perfect ἐγνωκέναι to the aorist ἔγνω  and γνῶναι.13 Also, in saying that “s/he has yet to 
know as s/he should know,” Paul points out that one’s knowing is always dynamic and on-going, 
and hence, partial. In fact, if knowing is a gift (1:5; 12:8), then it must not be objectified.14 Note 
that Paul does not clarify “we all have gnosis” (8:1) with “not everyone has this gnosis.” Rather, 
he writes that “not in everyone is this gnosis” (οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις) (8:7). The gnosis in 8:1 is 
changed from being an “object” to be possessed (and hence, that can be manipulated; cf. 8:10-11) 
to a “subject” in 8:7 that does its work. One may find the nuance trivial, but this phrase “in 
everyone” can signify that “this gnosis” has yet to take root in the believer’s semantic habitus 
Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Edited by Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. 
Friesen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 141-64. 
13 As Anthony Thiselton points out, “The use of the perfect infinitive (ἐγνωκέναι) signifies that the Corinthians, or 
some of them, perceive themselves to have achieved a present state of “having come to know,” i.e., having achieved 
knowledge. By contrast the ingressive use of the aorist (ἔγνω) represents Paul’s correction: he or she has not yet 
come to know. The aorist infinitive γνῶναι, which follows καθὼς δεῖ (as it is necessary, or as they ought), expands 
the contrast: just as it is necessary to come to know the difference between the Christian process of coming to know 
and quasi-gnostic, triumphalist claim to possess (v. 1), the completed process of having come to know, i.e., 
knowledge, probably as a ‘spiritual gift’ of revelation which is definitive.” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text. The New International Greek Testament Commentary 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 200), 624. 
14 Conzelmann writes, “It is a striking thing that, although γνῶσις, ‘knowledge,’ is a χάρισμα, ‘gift,’ both for Paul 
and for the Corinthians, 8:1-6 is concerned with objective knowledge which, while it does have consequences for the 
knower, nevertheless does not for that reason alone bring about a change.” See Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: 
Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Hermeneia – A Critical and Historical Commentary on the 
Bible. Translated by James W. Leitch. Edited by George W. MacRae (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1975), 140. 
For Newton, “In ch. 8 Paul agrees that ‘idols’ – by which he means ‘other gods’ – do not exist, but in 10.14-22 he 
affirms that demons nevertheless are very real. It is thus insufficient for the Corinthians merely to have ‘knowledge’ 
about the one God; they must rather be known by, and be in relationship with, that God.” See Derek Newton, Deity 
and Diet, 23. 
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(note the phrase “by habit, τῇ συνηθείᾳ” in 8:7). Whether “this gnosis” refers to 8:4-5 or 8:6,15 
for Paul, it must be God-centered and Christ-oriented, which he reiterates at the end of the 
complete discourse unit of 8:1–11:1,16 which also echoes the end of chapter 8 and chapter 9.17 
As we have already noted about the signifying system of food in the previous chapter, the 
issue of eating is very personal, in particular if we are what we eat (and do not eat). Paul thus 
shows that our knowing is not only a matter of a cognitive knowing. He writes, “But not in 
everyone is this gnosis; as some by habit (τῇ συνηθείᾳ) until now to the idol eat as if an “idol 
food” (ὡς εἰδωλόθυτον)…” (8:7). For Paul, if our knowing is informed by our semantic habitus 
(see our discussion of habitus in section 3.1 in chapter 2), then our knowing has to be God-and-
Christ-oriented. This bodily aspect of knowing, especially in dietary and eating, that marks a 
person so intimately, should not be overlooked. Thus from my Chinese context in Malaysia, 
Paul’s framing of the “idol food” issue in terms of a non-objectifying knowing is practical to 
address the conflict. 
 
 
III. A History of Interpretations of 1 Cor. 8:1–11:1 
In a recent article where Wendell Willis identifies seven areas of consensus in the critical 
study of 8:1–11:1, 18 we find that most scholars do not articulate their concepts of idol and 
15 Whether 8:4b is a Corinthian slogan (hence, the warranting level) – it is hard to decide whether οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν 
εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς εἰ μὴ εἵς, the slogan is οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ or just οὐδὲν 
εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ – really affect our analysis when we treat it as a part of the dialogic level. Likewise, even if the 
confession in 8:6 is certainly in the warranting level, we can also treat it as a part of Paul’s argument, and hence, in 
the dialogic level. 
16 Paul stresses that “whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God, become 
people who give no offense to the Jews and the Greeks and the church of God” (10:31-32). Indeed, Paul continues, 
“Just as I am pleasing everyone in everything not seeking my own benefit but of others so that they may be saved” 
(10:33). How? “Become imitators of me, just as I am of Christ” (11:1). 
17 Paul writes, “Therefore if food scandalizes my adelphos I do not eat meat forever so that I do not scandalize my 
adelphos” (8:13). Likewise, “I therefore in this way run as not uncertainly, I box in this way as not a person beating 
the air but I treat my body harshly and I bring it to subjection, lest somehow after preaching to others I myself may 
become disqualified” (9:26-27). 
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idolatry and do not examine the effect or power of idol in habitus. In his list of consensus – (1) 
“The Unity of 1 Corinthians 8–10;”19 (2) “The Function of 1 Corinthians 9;”20 (3) “Quotations 
from Corinthians;”21 (4) “The Reality and Possible Identity of Suggested ‘Parties’ in Corinth 
Related to the Topic of Eating Sacrificial Food;”22 (5) “The Possible Occasions of Eating Under 
Discussion;”23 (6) “The Nature of Pagan Religious Meals in the Greco-Roman World;”24 and (7) 
18 See Wendell Willis, “1 Corinthians 8-10: A Retrospective after Twenty-Five Years,” Restoration Quarterly 49 
(2007): 103-12. 
19 For scholars who posit the integrity of 1 Cor. 8:1–11:1 through historical and socio-rhetorical analyses, see John C. 
Brunt, “Love, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility: The Contribution of 1 Cor. 8-10 to An Understanding of Paul’s 
Ethical Thinking” in Society of Biblical Literature 1981 Seminar Papers. Edited by Kent H. Richards (Missoula, 
Montana: Scholars Press, 1981), 20; Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical 
Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992); 126-49; Ben 
Witherington, III., Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 186-91; Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline 
Legacy. JSNT 176 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 82-85; Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to 
the Corinthians, 607-12; David J. Rudolph, A Jew to the Jews: Jewish Contours of Pauline Flexibility in 1 
Corinthians 9:19-23 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 90; etc. For scholars who contend that 10:1-22 does not fit 
the style, theme, and the setting of idol food mentioned found in 8:1–13 and 10:23–11:1, see  Walter Schmithals, 
Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 92; 
Lamar Cope, “First Corinthians 8-10: Continuity or Contradiction?” ATR Supplementary Series 11 (1990): 114-123; 
Khiok-Khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10: A Formal Analysis with Preliminary 
Suggestions for a Chinese, Cross-Cultural Hermeneutic (Leiden: Brill, 1995): 75-83. 
20 Most scholars treat it as an exemplum, see Wendell Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 
Corinthians 8 and 10 (Chico: Scholar’s Press, 1985), 108; Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of 
Reconciliation, 130; David Horrell, “Theological Principle or Christological Praxis?  Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 
8.1-11.1,” JSNT 67 (1997): 83-114 (92); Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 610-12; John 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1 – 
11:1 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 2003), 223-27; etc. For those who argue that that it is an apologia of apostolic 
authority, see Gordon D. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again: An Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 8-10,” Biblica 61 (1980): 
172-97 (191-92); Khiok-Khng Yeo, Rhetorical Interaction in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10, 76; etc. Cf. Richard Liong-
Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority: A Study of 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1 in the Light of the Jewish Diaspora (London 
and New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 172-200; Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth, 137-39; David J. Rudolph, A 
Jew to the Jews, 107. 
21 Although differ in details, most scholars see 8:1 and 8:4 as Corinthian slogans. For details on the slogan in 8:1 and 
8:4, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 620-21, 629-30. 
22 Most scholars assign different social identity to the “weak” group and the postulated “strong” group. For an 
overview, see Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 1-28; John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in 
Roman Corinth, 4-48. Those who find the divisions hypothetical or rhetorical, see Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 
147; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians. The New International Commentary on the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 176; John C. Hurd, The Origin of 1 Corinthians (Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1983), 124-25, 147-48; Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food: 1 Corinthians 8-10 in Its Context 
(Ontario, Canada: Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion/Corporation Canadienne des Sciences Religieuses 
by Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1993), 62-68; and Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth, 87-89. 
23 For a recent discussion on this issue using archaeological evidence, see Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 1-26; 
Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 79-114; John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 49-178, 252-63. 
For the change of socio-historical circumstance in Roman Corinth, see Bruce W. Winter, “Kosher Food and Idol 
Meat (1 Corinthians 10:25-28),” in After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 287-301. For a summary of different views on how believers interact with each 
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“The Norms and Warrants Expressed by Paul in Response to the Situation in Corinth”25 – only 
(6) touches the notion of idol in terms of its socio-religious aspect in the “pagan religious meals.” 
However, if the term eidōlothuton (“idol food”) (8:1, 4, 7, 10, and 10:19) “is a Jewish Christian 
term, possibly coined by Paul himself,”26 then we have to ask: for Paul what makes the “idol 
food” idolatrous?27 While some may argue that the consumption of the idol food is a matter of 
other, see Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 387-90. For the role of Apostolic Decree in Acts 15 in Paul’s prohibition, 
see Charles K. Barrett, “Thing Sacrificed to Idols.” New Testament Studies 11 (1965): 138-53 (150); John C. Hurd, 
The Origin of 1 Corinthians, 253-70; Ben Witherington, III., Conflict and Community in Corinth, 190-91. 
24 On the little accessibility of meat by non-elites, see Gerd Theissen, “The Strong and the Weak in Corinth: A 
Sociological Analysis of a Theological Quarrel,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 121-43. Contra Theissen, see Justin J. Meggitt, “Meat Consumption and Social 
Conflict in Corinth,” Journal of Theological Studies 45 (1994): 137-41. For the political implication of such food in 
Roman imperial cult, see Bruce W. Winter, “The Imperial Cult, the Games, and Dining in a Temple (1 Corinthians 
8-10:21,” in After Paul Left Corinth, 269-86. 
25 When formulating an ethical or theological teaching on the issue of idol food, many biblical scholars stress the 
difference between the law and the gospel and argue that Paul was not forming a legalistic exhortation. See Gordon 
D. Fee, “Εἰδωλόθυτα Once Again,” 195-97; John C. Brunt, “Love, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility,” 27-28; 
Bruce N. Fisk “Eating Meat Offered to Idols: Corinthian Behavior and Pauline Response in 1 Corinthians 8-10 (A 
Response to Gordon Fee),” Trinity Journal 10 (1989): 49-70 (70); David Horrell, “Theological Principle or 
Christological Praxis?” 105-09; Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 205-08; etc. 
26 Ben Witherington, III., Conflict and Community in Corinth, 189. Conzelmann finds that the word “is a Jewish 
term, constructed with a polemical edge against the Greek ἱερόθυτον (10:28).” See Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 
139.  Similarly, Newton writes, “Eidolothuton does not occur at all in pre-Pauline Greek literature, except in the 
Septuagint at 4 Maccabees, which may or may not be pre-Pauline, depending on date. Its usage consistently carries 
the flavour of anti-pagan polemic and is emotive, negative, critical and decidedly non-neutral.” See Derek Newton, 
Deity and Diet, 183. Witherington, moreover, makes a distinction between eidōlothuton and hierothuton; the former 
is consumed in a pagan temple and the latter is not. See Ben Witherington, III, “Not So Idle Thoughts about 
Eidolothuton,” Tyndale Bulletin 44.2 (1993): 237-54 (240). Cheung, however, disagrees: “The idea that ἱερόθυτον, 
in contradistinction to εἰδωλόθυτον, denotes specifically sacrificed food removed from the sacrificial context, cannot 
be found in any early Christian writing which discusses 1 Corinthians 8-10.” See Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in 
Corinth, 320. And contra Thiselton, Gooch argues that the term refers to idol food instead of just idol meat. See 
Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 617-20. Gooch writes, “Idol-food in 1 Corinthians may 
include many foods: meat or grain, oil and honey.” See Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 55. Also, Fotopoulos 
writes, “However, meat was not the only kind of food offered in sacrifice to the gods in Greco-Roman religions. 
Items such as fruits, grains, cakes, fish, milk, oil, and wine were all offered to the gods in sacrificial rites.” See John 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 14. 
27 Phua writes, “But the issue of idolatry is a subjective one – different people will define idolatry differently and 
thus practise according to what they think is or is not idolatry. For example, does eating idol-meat constitute idolatry? 
Or does idolatry take place only when such eating involves actual idols? Thus, is a monotheist, who only views 
eating idol-meat but not visits to pagan temples as idolatry, committing idolatry when he or she conducts business 
transactions at a pagan temple? Similarly, a person may not think that eating idol-meat constitutes idolatry, only if 
one worships an idol. But to others who do not think so, that person is idolatrous. Even within the Jewish tradition, 
idolatry does not seem to be a clearly defined category. This shows that there is no single definition of idolatry.” See 
Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 29. 
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indifference for Paul, if it does not cause other believers to stumble,28 we cannot ignore that “the 
extant voices of other Christians in the first three centuries are virtually unanimous in their 
condemnation of the eating of idol-food”29 (cf. Acts 15:20, 29, and 21:25; Revelation 2:14 and 
20). But, does it mean that Paul must have also prohibited the eating of the “idol food”? Or, as 
John Brunt argues, Paul’s exhortation was “rejected, ignored, or misunderstood” by the early 
Christian writers?30 
(i) The Notion of “Idolatry”  
To argue that the idol food is idolatrous because it is tied to “pagan gods” or “demons” is 
tautological. It is a name calling that aims to slander and demonize the others. It does not help us 
understand what constitute an “idol” as such so that any association with it can risk becoming 
idolatry. From the Mesopotamian idol anxiety, exemplified in the “mouth-washing” ritual,31 to 
the polyvalence of the notion of the “idol” (or “image,” “representation”) in Greco-Roman 
literature,32 we find that people actually deliberately oppose idol worship. For them, if an idol is 
28 For example, see Charles K. Barrett, “Thing Sacrificed to Idols,” New Testament Studies 11 (1965): 138-53; 
Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, “Freedom or the Ghetto (1 Cor 8:1-13; 10:23-11:1),” Revue Biblique 85 (1978): 543-74; 
Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 381-84; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 137; Gerd Theissen, 
“The Strong and the Weak in Corinth,” 122; etc. 
29 See Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 121. For a critique of the traditional interpretation that claims that Paul 
permits the consumption of the idol food, see Alex T. Cheung, Idol Food in Corinth, 16-23. In noting “that while 
Jews in general abhorred idolatry, there were Jews in the Diaspora who were not altogether free from idolatrous 
behaviour and/or intention,” Phua finds that Cheung’s “thesis is based on a mistaken view that Jews always 
abhorred idols and abstained from idolatrous practices.” See Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 201. 
30 John C. Brunt, “Rejected, Ignored, or Misunderstood? The Fate of Paul’s Approach to the Problem of Food 
Offered to Idols in Early Christianity,” New Testament Studies 31 (1985): 113-24. 
31 For example, people were so concerned with idol that they made that they would even ritually and symbolically 
have their hands cut off and the tools used to craft the statue thrown into the river to signify that the “enlivened 
statue” was not human made. See Christopher Walker, and Michael B. Dick, “The Induction of the Cult Image in 
Ancient Mesopotamia: The Mesopotamia mīs pȋ Ritual,” in Born in Heaven, Made on Earth: The Making of the Cult 
Image in the Ancient Near East. Edited by Michael B. Dick (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 55-121; Cult Image 
and Divine Representation in the Ancient Near East. Edited by Neal H. Walls (Boston: American Schools of 
Oriental Research, 2005); and The Image and the Book: Iconic Cults, Aniconism, and the Rise of Book Religion in 
Israel and the Ancient Near East. Edited by Karel Van der Toorn (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1997). 
32 Newton argues that “the term eidolon was used in Greek literature fundamentally and consistently in a positive, 
neutral or merely factual manner … The term also overwhelmingly reflects the human, earthly dimension rather than 
the divine world. Only very rarely was eidolon used in pre-Christian Greek literature to indicate a representation of 
the divine. Above all, the term conveyed unreality. It indicated something which was an image or representation of a 
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not idolatrous but a representation of the divine, we should not assume that an idol is necessarily 
idolatrous. There must be something that makes one feel and think that an idol is idolatrous. We 
need to examine Paul’s notion of idolatry, and what makes idol food idolatrous. Was it related to 
the religious features of the eating space?33 The food itself? Or the cultic practices associated 
with it?34 It is also problematic to posit that Paul permits the eating of idol food because an idol 
is non-existent and as long as such behavior does not cause other believers to stumble. Not only 
does it ignore the power of the idol in forming one’s semantic habitus, it also assumes a 
metaphysical and dualistic view of existence.35 It may even suggest that Paul disregards his 
Jewishness, which is unlikely, not to mention that Paul’s notion of law was not monolithic. 
Indeed, if Paul has become all things to all people (10:22) and pleases all people in all ways 
(10:33), then how does he honor everyone’s singularity while pleasing “all people in all ways” in 
becoming “all things to all people”? 
The two scholars who pay most attention to Paul’s notion of idolatry are Derek Newton 
and Richard Phua. 36 In light of his nine-year experiences of working among the Torajanese 
people in Indonesia,37 Newton finds that the newly-converted Torajanese Christians have a wide 
range of perspectives on the issues of idol food and idolatry. This variety of perspectives comes 
from the interactions of different worldviews of the Torajanese and Christian missionaries. From 
his socio-historical and archaeological studies, Newton claims that the Corinthian believers, like 
real thing but not the real thing itself. It was employed in a wide variety of contexts, though very rarely of divine 
images and even then, the Greek mind would not automatically link the term eidolon with the actual receipt of 
cultus.” See Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 131. 
33 See John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 49-178; cf. Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 15-
26; contra Wendell Willis, Idol Meat in Corinth, 259-61. 
34 For example, Gooch thinks that “Paul believed idol-food to carry the contagion of demons in the same way that 
the meal of the Lord infects with the Lord’s blessing.” See Peter D. Gooch, Dangerous Food, 56. Also, see John 
Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 176-77, 258-59; David J. Rudolph, A Jew to the Jews, 93ff. 
35 See David W. Odell-Scott, A Post-Patriarchal Christology. American Academy of Religion Series 78 (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1991), 147. 
36 For example, in his survey of scholarship on the issue of idolatry in 1 Corinthians 8:1–11:1, Phua notes that only 
Newton addresses the definition of idolatry extensively. See Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 29. 
37 See Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 40–78. 
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the Torajanese believers, might also hold various beliefs and practices that are marked by “a 
wide range of ambiguities, boundary definition difficulties and conceptual differences.”38 As a 
result of such dynamic concepts of idols and idolatry, Newton argues that Paul (the outsider) 
perhaps misunderstands and miscommunicates with the Corinthian believers. Since there are so 
many opinions without a clear definition of idolatry, Paul thus has to prioritize the communal 
coherence over individual viewpoints.39 
While I appreciate Newton’s emphasis on the diverse notions of idol and idolatry, I find it 
hard to posit that Paul can miscommunicate with the Corinthian believers so badly, especially 
given his cross-cultural experiences of evangelism.40 Moreover, if our knowing is embodied, I 
doubt that we can so neatly distinguish Paul’s notion of an idol, which is a “false god” of 
physical representation with divine power, from the Corinthian conception of an idol as an 
unreality.41 It is Newton, after all, who consistently reminds us of the “wide range of ambiguities, 
boundary definition difficulties and conceptual differences” in our usage of such key terms as the 
38 He continues, “The result was a wide spectrum of viewpoints such that differences of opinion existed not only, as 
some scholars argue, between factions within the church, nor only, as others contend, between the Corinthians and 
Paul, but in fact in all directions. The root problem was not that one ‘party’ was right or wrong, but that a great 
range of possible and viable individual interpretations existed on the issue of Christian involvement in cultic meals. 
The elements of cultic festivals, namely images, sacrifices and communal meals, were each capable of multiple 
interpretation.” Ibid., 21. 
39 Ibid., 387. 
40  See John Fotopoulos, Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth, 31. However, from the perspective of 
hermeneutics, I disagree with the critique of Fotopoulos that “Newton’s work on 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1 is also 
unduly influenced by his contemporary case study from the Torajanese area of modern Indonesia.” Ibid., 32. On the 
contrary, I find Newton’s intertextual references insightful. 
41 “Paul is trying to portray eidolon in the sense of a ‘false god’ but did his use of eidolon actually communicate his 
intent? … The general ‘pagan’ use of eidolon in connection with humanity rather than divinity, together with the 
pagan preference for agalma to translate divine image raises the possibility that Paul’s use of eidolon in his previous 
dealings with the Corinthians, as well as in 1 Corinthians 8, may have caused confusion to the believers at Corinth. 
Paul clearly intended eidolon to have divine reference in 1 Corinthians 8. If, for the Corinthians, eidolon did not 
have divine significance, then they would see no harm in eating food offered to Paul’s eidola, because eidola for 
them had neither real existence nor divine significance … a Corinthian reading of v. 4 (οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ) 
may in Corinthian terms, sound something like ‘a non-existent thing is nothing in the world’ or ‘no non-existent 
thing exists in the world.’ A ‘non-existent thing’ is an ‘image’ in the sense in which ‘image’ is contrasted with 
‘reality,’ and as such constitutes a familiar Greek usage.” See Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 281. 
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“idol,” “god,” “conscience,” and “demons.”42 This reminder from Newton is also applicable to 
our notion of Chinese ancestor veneration because terms like ritual, ancestor veneration, and 
sacrificial food can be understood in various ways as well (see below). 
With this attention to the discursiveness and contextuality of the semantic range of the 
words used in understanding the idol and idolatry, we turn to Phua’s thesis. Using the work of 
Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, Phua argues that Paul views idolatry as 
an act that is contrary to the biblical ancestral tradition, a rebellious act that 
involves partnership with δαιμόνια [demons43] and breaks partnership with the 
Lord, an unloving act that can possibly cause a ‘weaker’ fellow believer to fall, an 
act that reflects spiritual indiscipline that invites God’s wrath and the possible loss 
of eschatological salvation.44 
 
This definition resembles the notion of idolatry that Halbertal and Margalit find in the Jewish 
sources, in which an idolatry is not just a worship of other gods (or alien cults), it is also a 
misrepresentation of God (Yahweh).45 At the center of this definition are the dynamic, changing 
conceptions of God (including the relation between such a God and other spiritual beings) and 
the relationship between the people of God and God. Equally significant to this definition is how 
these conceptions and relationships are expressed and represented, whether linguistically, 
pictorially, or materially (or artistically). 
In terms of worship, Halbertal and Margalit underscore the visual and cognitive errors in 
the method and intention of worship.46 Idolatry can take place in various ways when people fail 
42 For example, see Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 278-90, 292 n. 76, 295-96, 349-57. Cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, 
The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 640-44. 
43 “The word demons could refer to good spirits in secular Greek, but almost never in the New Testament (Acts 
17:18 is an exception.” See Paul Ellingworth, and Howard A. Hatton, A Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the 
Corinthians (Germany; New York: United Bible Societies, 1994), 230. Cf. Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 349-57. 
44 See Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 205. 
45 See Moshe Halbertal, and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry. Translated by Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992). 
46 Ibid., 3. Cf. Stuart Weeks, “Man-made Gods? Idolatry in the Old Testament,” in Idolatry: False Worship in the 
Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity. Edited by Stephen C. Barton (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 10-
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to worship God with the correct method and intention. So one may still commit idolatry even if 
s/he worships the true God with a wrong method. Similarly, even if one may worship God in a 
correct manner, if s/he does not have a proper understanding of God, s/he can still commit 
idolatry. In terms of representation – whether similarity-based, causal-metonymic, or 
convention-based47 – the use of metaphor is crucial to keep one’s notion of God and one’s 
relationship with God dynamic and pertinent because a metaphor, unlike a metonym, addresses 
two different semantic universes of the two terms (see section 3 in chapter 2). Two prominent 
metaphors used to describe this definition are the marital metaphor (God as the husband) and the 
political metaphor (God as the sovereign) that depict idolatry as unfaithfulness, betrayal, and 
rebellion against the God of Israel and the Israelite ancestral tradition. 
One thing that Halbertal and Margalit emphasize in their notion of idolatry is the 
discursiveness, dialectics, and fluidity of the definition. In reminding readers that “it is a mistake 
to articulate an account of what is the essential content of idolatry,”48 Halbertal and Margalit in 
the beginning of their book write: 
Idolatry, like many other religious and cultural concepts, belongs to the area 
called “sensibility.” This term describes a type of connection between intellectual 
conceptions on the one hand and perceptual and emotional experiences on the 
other. “Sensibility” refers to the esthetics of ideas and concepts, where “esthetics” 
is understood in its original meaning of “feeling.”49 
 
21; Nathan MacDonald, “Recasting the Golden Calf: The Imaginative Potential of the Old Testament’s Portrayal of 
Idolatry,” in Idolatry: False Worship in the Bible, Early Judaism and Christianity, 22-39. 
47 See Moshe Halbertal, and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, 39-66. Phua summarizes these representations as: “(1) 
similarity-based representation, which refers to the representation of one thing by another because it is similar to it; 
(2) causal-metonymic representation, which refers not to a relation of similarity but a relationship of possession; for 
example a handkerchief of someone represents him/her not because it resembles him/her but because it belongs to 
him/her; and (3) convention-based representation, which refers to the convention that permits something to be so 
called. For example, a cup is called a cup without (1) and (2) but because there is a convention that allows the word 
‘cup’ to represent the physical object.” See Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 30-31. 
48 They continue, “Our approach is therefore not to try to formulate one definition of idolatry that will capture its 
essence, but to show how diverse and problematic the concept itself is. The boundary drawn by the prohibition 
against idolatry marks different territories, which depend simultaneously different ideas of God and on different 
ideas of idolatry.” See Moshe Halbertal, and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, 241. 
49 Ibid., 4. 
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Note that for Halbertal and Margalit, idolatry “belongs to the area called ‘sensibility’” (i.e., the 
“semantics;” proprioceptivity) that tries to connect “between intellectual conceptions … and 
perceptual and emotional experiences.” In this area of connection, an aporia necessarily takes 
place, unless one can demonstrate that one’s “intellectual conceptions” can fully articulate to 
one’s “perceptual and emotional experiences.” In chapter 1, we have already seen this aporia in 
our notion of honor in terms of “honor felt,” “honor claimed,” and “honor paid,” where the latter 
two kinds of honor cannot fully represent the felt aspect of honor. Thus, when Halbertal and 
Margalit write that idolatry “belongs to the area called ‘sensibility,’” where sensibility “refers to 
the esthetics [i.e., the “semantics;” proprioceptivity] of ideas and concepts,” they rightly clarify 
that “‘esthetics’ is understood in its original meaning of ‘feeling’ [i.e., the “semantics;” 
proprioceptivity].” As this clarification highlights the limitation of “ideas and concepts” to define 
idolatry, Halbertal and Margalit write, “Those cultural concepts that are in the area of sensibility 
are the most difficult to analyze because of the complex connection between concepts and 
feelings, representations and impressions” 50  (see our discussion of typology in section 4 in 
chapter 2). Moreover, in writing that the rejection of idolatry is similar to the rejection of “an 
idea or feeling that arouses disgust,”51 Halbertal and Margalit seem to be describing a notion of 
abject that we see in the works of Julia Kristeva (see section 2.2 in chapter 2), in particular as 
they also speak of a dialectical relationship between correct belief and practice and idolatry, in 
which the former comes to define itself by demonizing and rejecting the latter.  
50 Ibid., 5 
51 They write, “Religious sensibility says that the rejection of idolatry is the rejection of a type of contact between 
faith and other forms of worship, similar to the esthetic rejection of a work embodying an idea or feeling that 
arouses disgust. The concepts of religious modesty – what sort of clothing it is permitted to wear and what form of 
hairstyle is permissible – are drawn to a considerable extent not from the realm of religious morality but from the 
realm of religious sensibility. Shared values, derived from the association of fixed visual perceptions, create a 
certain shared sensibility in people.” Ibid., 4-5. 
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This fluidity in the notion of idolatry is not always present in Phua’s work, however. For 
example, while Phua helpfully points out that not all Jews categorically oppose idolatry,52 he 
assumes a monolithic view of Paul’s notion of law when he posits that “the ‘Law’ is no longer to 
be the basis for ethical behavior, but rather the advancement of the gospel of Jesus Christ.”53 
Moreover, when he juxtaposes Christ’s ‘law’ against the Torah, 54  he contradicts his own 
definition of idolatry. If the Torah is so integral to “biblical ancestral tradition,” Paul would be 
guilty of idolatry. But, are the Torah and Christ’s ‘law’ necessarily incompatible? A hermeneutic 
of typology with a dynamic character of “sensibility” would say “no.” 
(ii) The Notion of “Typology” 
Here, we refer to typology for three reasons. First, Paul himself uses the word typos 
(“type”) in our complete discourse unit of 8:1–11:1 in 10:6 and 10:11 when he juxtaposes the 
narrative of Israelite wilderness with that of the Corinthian believers. While most translators 
render typoi as examples and typikōs as a “warning” or an “instruction” (e.g., NKJV, NAB, NAS, 
NIV, NRSV), we must be careful not to objectify the typological terms that are being juxtaposed 
in a typology.55 For Richard Hays, as this intertextual allusion is significant for Paul to see how 
God is working among the people of God,56 he finds that typology “is a central feature of his [i.e., 
Paul’s] interpretive strategy.”57  
Secondly, as Halbertal and Margalit point out that the notion of idolatry is in the “area of 
sensibility” that describes a “complex connection between concepts and feelings, representations 
52 See Richard Liong-Seng Phua, Idolatry and Authority, 91–125. 
53 Ibid., 205. 
54 Ibid., 206. 
55 For details, see our discussion on typology in section 3.4 in chapter 2. 
56 Hays writes, “For the rabbis, God’s word is a deposit stored up in time past and entrusted to the community’s 
ongoing interpretation; for Paul, God’s word is alive and active in the present time, embodied in the community’s 
Spirit-empowered life and proclamation.” See Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 171. 
57 Ibid., 161. 
346 
 
                                                          
and impressions,” we find this “complex connection” is characterized by a sense of ambiguity 
and ambivalence in the word typos, as Richard Davidson argues when he reviews Leonhard 
Goppelt’s definition of typos.58 For Davidson, this ambiguity and ambivalence comes from the 
fact that the typos (“impression”) is itself the product of an impression. We want to push further 
and contend that we cannot speak of typology in terms of a linear folding and unfolding, as if an 
antitype (i.e., the unfolding of a type) is superior to the type because it fulfills the type, which we 
find also embedded in the work of Hays.59 
Rather, we need to note that a typology is itself a transformative relation that 
interconnects a type and an antitype together, as Giorgio Agamben emphasizes.60 This is why in 
his reading with the Orthodox interpretations of Paul’s letter to the Romans, Daniel Patte speaks 
of typology as a “circular typology” where the type and antitype deconstruct one another in a 
metaphorical relation that they discursively extend, retract, and create meaning in their 
typological relation.61 In referring to John Hollander’s The Figure of Echo, Hays makes a similar 
point when he writes, “The twofold task of a criticism attuned to such echoes [i.e., intertextual 
allusions], then, is (a) to call attention to them so that others might be enabled to hear; and (b) to 
58  See Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical ΤΥΠΟΣ Structures. Andrews 
University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 2 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981), 129; 
Leonhard Goppelt, “τύπος, ἀντίτυπος, τυπικός, ὑποτύπωσις,” in TDNT 8:246. 
59 See our evaluation of Hays’ anti- supersessionist hermeneutics in note 137 in chapter 2. 
60 “What matters to us here is not the fact that each event of the past – once it becomes a figure – announces a future 
event and is fulfilled in it, but is the transformation of time implied by this typological relation. The problem here 
does not simply concern the biunivocal correspondence that binds typos and antitypos together in an exclusively 
hermeneutic relationship … rather, it concerns a tension that claps together and transforms past and future, typos and 
antitypos, in an inseparable constellation. The messianic is not just one of two terms in this typological relation, it is 
the relation itself.” See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary of the Letter to the Romans. 
Translated by Patricia Dailey. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 74. 
61 Daniel Patte, “A Western Biblical Scholar Reading Romans with Greek Fathers and Eastern Orthodox Biblical 
Scholars,” in Greek Patristic and Eastern Orthodox Interpretations of Romans. Romans Through History and 




                                                          
give an account of the distortions and new figuration that they generate.” 62  Note that an 
intertextual echo, which suggests a distance as it travels and reverberates through a medium, not 
only does not dismiss any intertextual references in the signifying process, but also highlights the 
relation that links them together. It foregrounds and brackets out meaning-producing dimensions 
that usually do not catch our attention.63 It is thus noteworthy that it is the “rhetorical and 
semantic effects”64 that the echo (or intertextuality or typology) aims to engender. Note the word 
“effects.” Thirdly, we have noted in the Methodological Appendix that a hermeneutics of 
62 See Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, 19. This summary of Hays is apparent in the 
“Preface” of John Hollander, The Figure of Echo: A Mode of Allusion in Milton and After (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1981), ix. Let us note two things. First, Hays does not distinguish an echo from an allusion, but he notes 
that an “allusion is used of obvious intertextual references, [whereas an] echo of subtler ones.” See Richard B. Hays, 
Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, 29. Secondly, while Hays does not elaborate what he means by “new 
figuration,” it is important to note that “to give an account” should not end up flattening the “new figuration.” In his 
textual analysis, Hays seems to mainly focus on the cross-referencing of the “figure” and its context. He does not 
examine how the theme embodied by the “figure” in one context is transformed or re-thematized (or re-
conceptualized) in another context that uses the same “figure.” Consider the last sentence in the following quote 
from Hays: “We must give due weight to the apocalyptic perspective of Paul’s hermeneutical dictum. He does 
believe himself to be living in the final age toward which the eternal purpose of God has been aiming from the 
beginning of time … His perspective from within this final chapter allows him to read the story whole from the 
standpoint of its ending, thus perceiving correspondences and narrative unities that would have been hidden from 
characters in the earlier chapters of the story, as well as from even the most perceptive readers before the climactic 
peripeteia of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Messiah. This astonishing event, completely unpredictable on 
the basis of the story’s plot development, is nonetheless now seen as the supremely fitting narrative culmination, 
providing unforeseen closure to dangling narrative themes and demanding a reconfiguration of the dianoia, the 
reader’s grasp of ‘what the story is all about.” Ibid., 100. Note that Hays does write that the theme is reconfigured in 
the reader’s grasp, in particular when he goes on to describe the metaphorical features in a typology.  But when we 
speak of a “figure,” we also need to address how the “figure” embodies the “theme,” lest we objectify and fix the 
“figure” as if it signifies the same conceptualization in different contexts. 
63 Hays writes, “Paul’s intertextual poiesis poses a formidable challenge for those who follow him. The Pauline 
letters, read as hermeneutical events, are evocative allusive reflections on a text (Scripture) that is in turn deemed 
allusive rather than overt in its communication strategies. Inevitably, such a complex intertextual matrix proves 
hospitable to the proliferation of metalepsis. Echoes linger in the air and lure the reader of Paul’s letters back into 
the symbolic world of Scripture … If meaning is the product of such intertextual relations, then it is – to alter the 
figure – not so much like a relic excavated from an ancient text as it is like a spark struck by the shovel hitting rock. 
Consequently, for Paul, original intention is not a primary hermeneutical concern. If Paul’s intertextual readings are 
metaphorical in character, the reader of Paul’s letters is assigned the same active responsibility that falls on readers 
of all figurative discourse: to articulate semantic potentialities generated by the figures in the text. Such potentialities 
can far exceed the conscious design of the author.” Ibid., 155-56. Also, see 173-78, in particular on the “dialectical 
imitation.” For the notion of “metalepsis,” see John Hollander, The Figure of Echo, 133-49. 
64 See Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, 19. “The volume of intertextual echo varies in 
accordance with the semantic distance between the source and the reflecting surface. Quotation, allusion, and echo 
may be seen as points along a spectrum of intertextual reference, moving from the explicit to the subliminal. As we 
move farther away from overt citation, the source recedes into the discursive distance, the intertextual relations 
become less determinate, and the demand placed on the readers listening powers grows greater. As we near the 
vanishing point of the echo, it inevitably becomes difficult to decide whether we are really hearing an echo at all, or 
whether we are only conjuring things out of the murmurings of our own imaginations.” Ibid., 23. 
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typology in terms A. J. Greimas’s “Narrative Semantics” not only underscores the dynamic 
relation that links and transforms the intertextual references. It also teases out the religious 
dimension of the text, which echoes the “area of sensibility” that Halbertal and Margalit 
foreground in their notion of idolatry. 
 
IV. A Semantic Analysis of Love in 1 Cor. 8:1–11:1 
To help us understand the typological relation in Paul’s hermeneutics, we will in this 
section analyze the semiotic squares in the complete discourse unit of 8:1–11:1, as 8:1-3 forms 
an inverted parallelism with 10:31–11:1. The theme highlighted here is about how to build a 
God-oriented community in the issues of knowing and loving in one’s eating and drinking. Paul 
writes, “Now concerning the idol food, we know that we all have gnosis. Gnosis puffs up, but 
love builds up” (8:1). As a verb, the word “to build up” appears in 1 Corinthians in 8:1, 10; 10:23; 
14:4, and 17. As a noun, it appears in 3:9; 14:3, 5, 12, and 26. Now, if believers are the field of 
God and the building of God (3:9), then how the building of God is built and maintained can 
manifest the characteristics of God. This is why Paul urges believers to do everything for the 
glory of God and not to become a stumbling block to the Jews, Greeks, and the church of God 
(10:31-32). How? By imitating him as he imitates Christ (11:1). 
To see how this theme is conceptualized in the discourse, we will arrange the pairs of 
opposed actions in the dialogic level of 8:1–11:1 to show how one action leads to another 
through the giving and receiving of objects. After we form a series of semiotic squares, we will 
then analyze the values highlighted in each semiotic square. 
(i) Pairs of Opposition of Actions in the Story Progression 
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 The pairs of opposed actions are arranged, from bottom up, in the order of the story 
progression. There are ten semiotic squares in 8:1–11:1, but we will focus on those that can help 
us flesh out Paul’s notion of love. In discussing these pairs of opposed actions, we bold the verse 
numbers (e.g., 8:6) to indicate that we are commenting on a particular pair of opposed actions. 
(+) 10:21 – not to drink the Lord’s cup and table  (-) 10:21 – [implied] drinking the Lord’s cup  
      and the daimonia’s cup and table                          and table and the daimonia’s cup and table 
(+) 8:13; 10:32 – not to scandalize in eating          (-) 8:9-11a – eating scandalizes people 
(+) 8:8; 6:13 – food will not offer us to God          (-) 8:8 – [implied] food will offer us to God 
(+) 8:9b, 10a – those with gnosis use the exousia  (-) 8:9c, 11a – gnosis and exousia cause 
      to eat at the idol’s temple        stumbling and destruction 
(+) 9:2b – Paul is an apostle to the Corinthians     (-) 9:2a – Paul may not be an apostle to others 
(+) 10:28-29 – not to eat because of conscience    (-) 10:25, 27 – conscience judged in eating 
(+) 6:12; 10:23a-b – not everything is beneficial   (-) 6:12a; 10:23 – everything is permitted 
(+) 10:24b – should seek the thing of other         (-) 10:24a – people seek their own thing 
(+) 8:1e – love builds up           (-) 8:1d – gnosis puffs up 
(+) 8:3 – those loving God are known by God       (-) 8:2 – those thinking they know do not know 
(+) 8:6 – for “us” there is one God … and one      (-) 8:5 – there are many gods and many lords 
      Lord Jesus Christ       many lords 
(+) 8:4-6 – we know that the “idol is nothing,”     (-) 8:7 – not everyone has this gnosis 
      that “there is no God but one,” and that there is  
      one God, the Father … and one Lord, Jesus Christ… 
 
 Now, beginning with 8:6, whether Paul is or is not citing the Corinthian slogans does not 
really affect our analysis as we treat them as a part of Paul’s argument in the dialogic level. It 
may be fundamental that believers know that an “idol is nothing in the cosmos,” that “no one is 
God but the one God,” and that “there is one God the Father … and one Lord Jesus Christ…,” 
but what undergirds this knowing and is most significant is that it is framed with respect to us or 
for our benefit (ἡμῖν). That is to say, this knowing is relational and personal; it has to form the 
believers’ semantic habitus. The issue is not whether there are many gods and many lords. Even 
if there are, indeed, many gods and many lords, for believers there is only one God and one Lord. 
Thus, even if one may have the gnosis and even the exousia (“choice,” “freedom,” or “ability”), 
her/his gnosis and exousia should be God-oriented. They should not be misused as if one were 
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gnosis-oriented, instead of God-and-Christ-oriented. To prevent the gnosis from being 
objectified and manipulated, Paul reminds believers that if they think that they have known 
something, then they are mistaken (8:2). It is those who love God who will be known by God; 
otherwise how will God give them the gifts and how will they, in return, receive them (2:9-15)? 
 As we noted, Paul does not say that believers will know God if they love God. He says 
that those who love God are known by God (8:3). To think of what one will get if one loves God 
is to treat God as an object that one can manipulate for one’s own benefits. God, however, is not 
an object under anyone’s subjection. When one is in love (i.e., when one falls in love), one is not 
in control of love. One is not even in control of oneself as one is drawn out of oneself towards 
the beloved. It is because of this vulnerability that love is characterized by risk and promise. One 
does not know what will happen in love. One can only be faithful and hopeful existentially that 
her/his love may bear fruits. Thus even if one is known by God when one loves God, one is not 
objectified by God. On the contrary, as God has prepared for those who love God (2:9) and as 
Christ died for people (cf. 8:11), believers are even empowered by the gifts of God to have 
exousia (8:9) as they are acknowledged by God (1:26-29). This is why Paul says that love builds 
up (8:1), as Jesus exemplifies in setting up the foundation. 
 It takes planning, dedication, collaboration, labor, time, and skill sets to build a building. 
Paul thus urges believers to work with one another in seeking the thing of the other (10:24). A 
building cannot be built without one being aware of how different parts of the building fit 
together. Without being in touch with other perspectives, one cannot see the limitation of one’s 
horizon of vision. One will not be able to see that not everything is beneficial (6:12; 10:23). Paul 
reminds believers that they need to be mindful of the other person’s conscience in their eating 
and drinking (10:28-29). He uses his examples as an apostle to the Corinthian believers (9:2), 
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since they are familiar with how he works with God among them. Some may view the examples 
as a deliberative rhetoric or a way to defend Paul’s authority. But, one can read these verses 
expressing that Paul is concerned to show that to care for others does not mean that one will be 
shortchanged. Rather, as the Scripture promises, God will provide. 
 With this focus on God and Christ, believers with gnosis should not use their exousia to 
eat in the idol’s temple (8:10). They should realize that it is not gnosis that gives them right and 
freedom. Rather, it is God who enriches them in Christ Jesus in every logos and every gnosis 
(1:4-5). Being endowed with the gifts of God, believers should not be puffed up and forget their 
calling and situation (1:26-29). Do they think that, by themselves and with their gnosis, they can 
now defeat the power of the idol (cf. 10:21-22)? No. For Paul, “Food will not offer us to God. 
We are neither lacking nor abundant if we eat” (8:8). This may be a Corinthian slogan, but 
incorporated into Paul’s argument, this saying shows that food should not become a means to 
mediate one’s relationship with God, as if God is implicated in the signification system of food. 
Rather, all things are from God and we are oriented toward God (8:6; 10:26). As such, believers 
should not, because of food, cause anyone to stumble (8:13). They should not in giving food to 
themselves and to God, give scandal to themselves and other believers. 
 This is why Paul tells believers that they are not able (οὐ δύνασθε) to drink the Lord’s 
cup and the daimonia’s cup or partake of the Lord’s table and the daimonia’s table (10:21). 
Their semantic habitus has to be fully God-and-Christ-oriented; it cannot be self-centered. In a 
group-oriented culture where an individual’s identity is tied to the reputation of the group with 
which s/he is associated, one cannot belong to two opposing groups at the same time. To do so is 
to betray both groups and give a bad name to them. It is to jeopardize the honor of those whom 
one is close to. But, as Paul expressed earlier in the letter, if believers are called and sanctified in 
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Christ Jesus (1:2), as Jesus, for their benefit, becomes the wisdom from God, justice and 
sanctification and redemption (1:30), then they should “cleanse out the old yeast” to become a 
new batch and remain unleavened by relying on God (5:7-8). Indeed, as believers are bought 
with a price (τιμῆς) (6:20; 7:23) with the honor of Jesus crucified, they should be “washed, 
sanctified, and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and in the spirit of our God” (6:11). 
They should not mix the unleavened bread with the “yeast of badness and wickedness” (5:8). It 
is poignantly ironic that while the Lord gives his life to believers, they give themselves the 
daimonia’s cup and table (10:21). 
(ii) Semiotic Square 1: Assurance and Commitment 
In this first semiotic square, Paul stresses that God’s assurance and acknowledgement of 
believers is what matters to them. To say that those who love God are known by God suggests 
that love is not without response and assurance. Such an assurance, however, should not be 
mistaken for a certainty, as if it was certain that I will be known if I love. To do so is to turn love 
into a means of calculation and exchange. It is like turning gnosis into an object, as if as long as 
one possesses gnosis, one will be empowered to do whatever one desires. Rather, both love and 
gnosis are relational.  
8:3 – those who love God are known by               8:5 – there are many gods and many  





8:6 – for us, there is one God … and one        8:7 – not in everyone is this gnosis 
Lord Jesus Christ (Non-S2): Committed       (Non-S1): Not assured 
For Paul, even if “we all” have gnosis (πάντες γνῶσιν ἔχομεν), this gnosis (which can 
refer to 8:4 or 8:6 or both), is not in everyone (ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις) (8:7). For Paul, 
having gnosis (as an object) is not enough. One must also embody and live it. Just as it is in 
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loving that knowing (by God) takes place, it is in living inside gnosis that gnosis is appropriated. 
This is why Paul says that even if one may have an incredible ability and gnosis, if one does not 
have love, one is nothing (13:2). Hence Paul speaks of commitment in 8:5-6 (note the emphatic 
transition ἀλλ’ἡμῖν in the beginning of 8:6). It does not matter whether there are many gods and 
many lords; believers must commit themselves to God and Christ. The contrast between “one” 
and “many” shows that believers cannot pick and choose whatever they like and do not like. To 
do so is not to love. Love demands commitment and loyalty. If there is only one God and one 
Lord, then believers must be God-and-Christ-oriented, even though there may be many gods and 
many lords. To be thus oriented is to let go of one’s egocentricity. 
(iii) Semiotic Square 2: Constant Discernment 
In this semiotic square, Paul stresses the need of hard work, patience, and persistency in a 
love relationship. In saying that love builds up (8:1), Paul shows that love not only requires effort 
and responsibility, it also needs constant investment and maintenance.  
For Paul, there can be many gods and many lords (8:5) and believers can pick and choose 
the one(s) that they like and from whom they can benefit, but with the one God and one Lord 
whom they worship (8:6), believers do not get to choose. In fact, they were called by God to 
participate in the fellowship of Jesus (1:9). And, the incredible thing is that they responded 
affirmatively, in spite of the tremendous scandal of the cross. As the building of God (3:9), 
believers thus should hang on to the foundation, which is Jesus Christ (3:11). Just as Jesus did 
not compromise but held on to God, “from whom are all things and for whom we are” (8:6), 
believers should also follow suit.65 Love is not a fleeting feeling that comes and goes according 
to the circumstance. It is about discernment, commitment, and perseverance. 
65 Hence, believers need to be careful with what they build upon it. They may build upon it with gold, silver, worthy 
stones, wood, hay, or straw (3:12), but their work will become visible (φανερὸν γενήσεται), for the day will show 
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8:1e – love builds up (S1): Constantly         8:2 – those who think that they have  
Discerning (hard work)         known something do not yet know (S2): 




8:3 – those who love God are known by       8:5 – there are many gods and many 
God (Non-S2): Non-Totalizing        lords (Non-S1): Non-Constantly  
             Discerning (opportunistic) 
 
To say that “love builds up” also means that love is able to connect and enable various 
materials to work together in the building project. This ability of love does not mean that love 
compromises. Rather, love allows individual materials to optimize their strength while reducing 
their weakness; otherwise the building materials will not be able to work together. For love to be 
able to discern the good and the bad of the building materials, it has to be able to see both the big 
picture and the small picture. Similarly, believers must not think they have already known what 
they need to know (cf. 8:2). For Paul, if it is according to the grace of God given to him that he 
lays the foundation (3:10), then one must rely on God to build the building. Even if one is good 
at the building project, one must still rely on God’s direction. The building is the building of and 
by God; it is not anyone’s building. Believers are God’s co-workers (cf. 3:9). They should not 
work by themselves as if God does not work with them. 
In telling believers that “those who think that they have known something do not yet 
know” (8:2), Paul reminds them not to totalize their knowing, making what is a partial knowing 
into a complete knowing. It is a mistake to think that one has already known something, as if one 
does not need to consult God anymore. On the contrary, they must constantly check whether they 
still love God and whether God acknowledges them (8:3). The issue is not so much about asking 
(δηλώσει) it, as it is disclosed in fire (ἐν πυρὶ ἀποκαλύπτεται) when the fire tests (δοκιμάσει) it (3:13). There is no 
way to hide what one builds. If one needs to build it anyway, one may as well make use of the foundation and build 
something that can last. 
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God as conversing with God, as it is through conversations that relationship is built and 
maintained. If one is in love, one will not think that one has already known the beloved and 
therefore does not need to know more about the beloved. In fact, the more one is in love, the 
more s/he will want to know about the beloved and be closer to the beloved. 
(iv) Semiotic Square 3: Non-Self-Centered 
10:24b – believers should seek the things       8:1d – gnosis puffs up (S2): Not 





8:1e – love builds up (Non-S2): Substantial      8:2 – those who think that they have  
           known something do no yet know (Non- 
            S1): Self-Centered 
 
In love, the lover naturally pays attention to the need and situation of the beloved so that 
the beloved may feel and receive the love of the lover. In trying to please the beloved, the lover 
cannot do whatever s/he desires and thinks is good for the beloved. If s/he does, s/he may 
actually displease the beloved. Rather, the lover needs to please the beloved in the way that the 
beloved wants to be pleased. Here, Paul’s saying in 9:19-23 readily comes to mind (cf. 10:33). 
For example, Paul writes, “And I became to the Jews as (ὡς) a Jew so that I might gain Jews; to 
those under law as (ὡς) one under law, not that I myself under law, so that I might gain those 
under law” (9:20). 
Indeed, if believers love God, they need to love what/whom God loves. This is especially 
so in a group-oriented culture, where everyone is interrelated. Thus, if God calls believers into 
the fellowship of Jesus (1:9), then believers should love one another, as they are all loved and 
called by God. It is contradictory for believers to love God but not those whom God loves. The 
more they love God, the more they should love those whom God loves and those who love God. 
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It is in light of this love that Paul exhorts believers to seek the things of others (10:24) so that 
they may continuously be transformed. It is when believers are confronted with the different 
ways other believers love and work with God that they can learn and grown. This is how 
believers keep their love towards God vibrant. 
However, believers should not seek the things of others from their own perspectives. To 
do so is to objectify others, thinking that they have known a truth about others while actually 
they do not yet know (cf. 8:2). Rather, they need to interact with and understand others from 
their situations. They need to see what God is doing in the lives of others and how others love 
God. It is in this sense that love can build up (8:1e); that is, build each other up in their love 
towards God. To seek the things of others only from one’s perspective will not build each other 
up. Such a seeking is egocentric. This is why in telling the Corinthian believers to seek the things 
of others, Paul warns them that they cannot partake of the table and cup of the Lord and of 
demons at the same time (10:21). 
 We could continue analyze the rest of the seven semiotic squares in 8:1–11:1, but the 
values of “assurance and commitment,” “constant discernment,” and “non-self-centeredness” 
that we have highlighted thus far would echo the characteristics of Paul’s notion of love in 
chapter 4.66 To concretize these values, Paul refers to the confession that believers will readily 
subscribe to: “there is one God the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we are, and 
one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things are and through whom we are” (8:6). For Paul, if 
God and Christ mark the semantic habitus of believers, then believers cannot objectify God and 
66  These characteristics of Paul’s notion of love are: “(1) performative (i.e., other-oriented, messianic, and 
charismatic) and communicative, (2) letting go and collaborative, (3) risky (but promising) and non-calculative, (4) 
Christ-oriented and a non-self-centered reasoning, (5) contextual (risky but promising) and not universalizing a 
particular context, (6) perseverance (in hard work and response-ability) and a relational knowing, (7) something that 




                                                          
Christ in knowing and loving them. Stressing that those who love God are known by God, Paul 
further contrasts God’s knowing with the believer’s knowing. In knowing believers, God not 
only provides for them, Christ even died for them. But in knowing God, not only do believers 
fail to care for God and other believers, they even become puffed up. 
 We may wonder why Paul does not just tell us whether believers can eat the idol food. If 
the gods and lords are subjected to the one God and one Lord, and if the idol is nothing, then the 
eating of the idol food should not be problematic. Paul does not give us this conclusion, however. 
With the gnosis concerning the idol causing so much trouble in the church of God, Paul does not 
want his writing to become another gnosis to be objectified for anyone’s purpose. As Halbertal 
and Margalit point out, the term idolatry is discursively dynamic as it tries to “describe a type of 
connection between intellectual conceptions on the one hand and perceptual and emotional 
experiences on the other.”67 Because of this discursiveness, in particular if the notion of idolatry 
is related to the method and intention of worship as well as the representation of God, Paul has to 
avoid objectifying God in dealing with the idol food conflict. By associating gnosis with love, 
Paul urges believers to be God-and-Christ-oriented. For Paul, the issue is not whether one has 
gnosis or not. What is the use to have gnosis if one is not God-and-Christ-oriented? So, while 
Paul does not explicitly tell us what makes an idol an idol (i.e., what makes an idol idolatrous), 
he contrasts the one God and one Lord with the many gods and many lords, and the Lord’s cup 
and table with the daimonia’s cup and table. In this contrast, where the words “idol,” “gods,” and 
“daimonia,” are used interchangeably,68 it is the fellowship in the blood and body of Christ 
(10:16) as Christ died for people (cf. 8:11) that distinguishes the one God and the one Lord from 
67 See Moshe Halbertal, and Avishai Margalit, Idolatry, 4. 
68 For example, Newton argues that “the Septuagint, Pseudepigrapha and New Testament fail to offer clear or 
detailed criteria for distinguishing between gods, demons, spirits and ‘idols, but rather portray δαιμόνια polemically 
as negative, evil phenomena which are set in opposition to the worship of the one Creator God.” See Derek Newton, 
Deity and Diet, 352. 
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the other gods and lords. The God and the Lord of Paul are the God and the Lord who not only 
take responsibility and provide for believers, but also help them to overcome their trials and 
temptations (10:13). Paul even uses the Israelite wilderness story to illustrate how the Corinthian 
believers are objectifying God and the gifts of God as their “fathers” did when all of them were 
under the cloud and went through the sea… (10:1-4). To prevent this story from being objectified, 
Paul writes the narrative typologically.  
 
V. Typology in Ritualization: The Ritual of Chinese Ancestor Veneration 
In framing his discussion of the “idol food” issue in terms of a heteronomous notion of 
love and gnosis that is God-and-Christ-centered, Paul urges the Corinthian believers to seek the 
things of other/Other in their handling of the idol food. Whatever believers say and do, it must be 
God-and-Christ-centered. This concern for others in their concrete context is also prominent in 
our understanding of the ritual of Chinese ancestor veneration, as the ritual is thematized 
differently in different figures by different groups of people. Here, our notion of typology in 
terms of Narrative Semantics is also at work in our view of Chinese ancestor veneration. 
In chapter 2, we have noted that there is no sharp dichotomy in Chinese worldview. Not 
only is everything (material and immaterial) made of Qi (breath or energy), the visible and 
invisible worlds are also a continuum where (1) yin-yang (a dynamic complementary system), (2) 
heaven-earth-humanity (a triadic verticality), (3) five phases (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water), 
and (4) nine fields or palaces (a horizontal division system) form the essential components of 
correlative thoughts. As such, gods, ancestors, ghosts, and human beings are not ontologically 
different.69 The departed “are not worshipped as transcendent powers;”70 they are interconnected. 
69 See Stephen F. Teiser, “Introduction: The Spirits of Chinese Religion,” in Religions of China in Practice. Edited 
by Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 32–36. 
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Certain performance of ancestor veneration can be seen as superstitious – such as burning paper 
goods to aid the underworld journey of the departed, the setting up of the “spirit tablet” at the 
family shrine for one of the seven souls of the deceased, the ritual bowing and the offering of 
food and incense before the “tablet,” etc.71 – but the ritual functions more “as a demand to fulfill 
the social and family responsibilities extended to the deceased person.”72 The past, present, and 
the future are existentially interdependent. 
Moreover, since the worship of Yahweh is tied to “ancestral tradition”73 and not viewed 
as an “ancestor worship,” then ancestor veneration should not necessarily be viewed as 
worshipping the dead. Choan-Seng Song argues that “we must distinguish between ancestor 
worship as the cult of the dead and ancestor worship as the consciousness of the living presence 
of the dead in our lives through some ritual.”74 The ritual is about honoring one’s heritage, 
“preserving family ties,” and giving meaning to life after death.75 It should not be about fearing 
or placating the departed.76 
However, the “supernatural” and “superstitious” elements in ancestor veneration cannot 
be simply bracketed out. Even if Xunzi, a fourth-century BCE Confucian philosopher, focused 
on the sociopolitical aspect of ritual (li) and called those who treated the ritual as supernatural 
70 See Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology: Theology in Formation in Asian Settings. Revised edition (New York: 
Orbis Books, 1991), 172. 
71 For details, see Leon Comber, Chinese Ancestor Worship in Malaya (Singapore: Donald Moore Singapore, 1956); 
C. K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their 
Historical Factors (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), 28-57. 
72 See Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology, 172. Emphasis added. 
73 Whether the “ancestral graves” in ancient Israel indicate ancestor cult, “the care, feeding, and commemoration of 
the dead … verifies the centrality of kinship and family in religious and social life. These rites, however, neither 
presupposed nor necessitated the belief in the supernatural beneficent power of the dead as expressed in ancestor 
veneration or worship or in the deification of the dead.” See Brian B. Schmidt, Israel’s Beneficent Dead: Ancestor 
Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and Tradition (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1996), 275. 
74 Choan-Seng Song, Third-Eye Theology, 171. 
75 Ibid., 173. 
76 Ibid., 172. 
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sad (xiong), 77  we cannot deny that the ritual has religious aspects. Likewise, even if the 
sacrificial food in the ritual of ancestor veneration has socio-psychological functions, its tie to 
honoring and feeding the spirits is irrefutable.78 But, as Noah Fehl points out about the change of 
the notion of ritual among Chinese, the concepts of ritual, ancestor veneration, and sacrificial 
food are dynamic.79 Different Chinese traditions have different understandings. For Xunzi the 
ritual comes from “ancient kings” who wanted “to curb it [disorder], to train men’s desires [yu] 
and to provide their satisfaction.”80 As such, ritual is “the means by which to rectify” a person’s 
character and emotions [qing]81 and “to apportion material goods.”82 
While ritual can be authoritative in the sense that it needs to be observed properly, the 
point is that as a group-oriented community, Chinese see family harmony as instrumental to the 
state stability. At the core of this family order is the value of filial piety in ancestor veneration.83 
The Doctrine of the Mean 19.2ff even asserts that perfect filial piety is serving the departed as if 
they were still among us.84 The Classic of Filial Piety further teaches that filial piety is the root 
of all virtue [de]: “it commences with the service of parents; it proceeds to the service of the ruler; 
77 See Xunzi, “A Discussion of Heaven,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 89-90. 
78 See Frederick J. Simoons, Food in China: A Cultural and Historical Inquiry (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1991), 28-
31; Roel Sterckx, Food, Sacrifice, and Sagehood in Early China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
79 See Noah Edward Fehl, Li: Rites and Propriety n Literature and Life: A Perspective for a Cultural History of 
Ancient China (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1971), 221. Given the space limit of this paper, 
I will focus on the work of Xunzi, who creatively synthesized the notions of ritual or li of different schools of 
thoughts before him. Also, see Masayuki Sato, The Confucian Quest for Order: The Origin and Formation of the 
Political Thought of Xun Zi (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
80 See Xunzi, “A Discussion of Rites,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings, 93. 
81 See Xunzi, “Improving Yourself,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings, 31. 
82 See John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. Vol. 3: Books 17-32 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 50. The self-cultivation through ritual assumes three bases [ben] of rites: (1) 
heaven and earth as the “basis of life,” (2) ancestors as the “basis of family [lei],” and (3) rulers and teachers as the 
“basis of order.” See Xunzi, “A Discussion of Rites,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings, 95. 
83  See Xunzi, “A Discussion of Rites,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings, 100-01. 
84 See James Legge, Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean (New York: 
Dover, 1971), 402-03. 
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it is completed by the establishment of character.”85 Concerning the supernatural elements in 
ancestor veneration, Xunzi writes: 
[T]he sacrificial rites originate in the emotions of remembrance and longing, 
express the highest degree of loyalty, love, and reverence, and embody what is 
finest in ritual conduct and formal bearing … The sage understands them, the 
gentlemen [shijunzi] finds comfort in carrying them out, the officials are careful 
to maintain them, and the common people [baixing] accept them as custom. To 
the gentleman they are a part of the way [dao] of man; to the common people they 
are something pertaining to the spirits [guishi].86 
 
In the same text Xunzi further maintains that one should perform ritual in “the middle 
state” between “form and meaning” and “emotional content and practical use.”87 While Xunzi’s 
notion of ritual is hierarchical and gendered, from the details that he gives regarding funeral rite, 
the mourning period, and ancestor veneration, Xunzi wants people to understand the logic of 
ritual when performing it.88 The ritual is not an end to itself. The ritual of ancestor veneration is a 
medium to cultivate social harmony and filial piety. This allusion to fundamental values in 
ancestor veneration is well noted in Daoism and Buddhism. 
When Ge Hong (ca. 283–363CE), a leading Daoist in the “Quest for Transcendence,” 
was accused of turning “back to traditions and abandon[ing] the world,” he replied, 
I have heard that keeping one’s body without harm is what is meant by fulfilling 
filial piety. Does not the attainment of the way of the immortals [or transcendent], 
which enables one to enjoy everlasting life … far surpass this?’ Furthermore, if 
one succeeded in attaining the Dao, his ancestors would be immensely proud of 
his achievement. In the realm of the immortals, nothing would be lacking.89 
 
85 http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/athornto/xiaojing.htm (accessed March 2, 2012). 
86 See Xunzi, “A Discussion of Rites,” in Xunzi: Basic Writings, 113. 
87 Ibid., 100. 
88 Ibid., 99. 
89 Mugitani Kunio, “Filial Piety and ‘Authentic Parents’ in Religious Daoism,” in Filial Piety in Chinese Thought 
and History. Edited by Alan K. L. Chan, and Sor-hoon Tan (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 117. 
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This response is a reconfiguration of the theme of filial piety, as Ge Hong addresses the Classic 
of Filial Piety that presents “the beginning of filial piety” is to not harm one’s bodies, since we 
receive them from our parents. 90 
Buddhism also makes a similar defense when stipulating that monks and nuns renounce 
their social identity, to get new names, to shave their head, to adhere to celibacy, and to leave the 
family to join the sangha at monastery. While these acts betray ancestor veneration and disrupt 
social order, Mouzi on the Settling of Doubt contends that such self-renunciation was actually 
filial piety!91 Ritual is important to observe, but we need to do things according to the situation, 
even if it means doing things contrary to ritual, an argument which Mencius, an older 
contemporary of Xunzi, also highlights.92 Another example is the defense of Ling Shou when her 
father told her to get married. She explained that she was actually being filial pious, since her 
nunnery life would free her parents from suffering.93 
The values in the ritual and ancestor veneration are not only reconfigured in different 
ways to express filial piety, they are also modified accordingly. Likewise, the sacrificial food in 
ancestor veneration signifies different things to different people, as Newton suggests about the 
notion of idolatry among the Corinthian believers. Indeed, if “[r]itualization is fundamentally a 
way of doing things to trigger the perception that these practices are distinct and the associations 
that they engender are special,”94 we should not be surprised that rituals “have many [messages 
and purposes], and frequently some of these messages and purposes can modify or even 
90 http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/athornto/xiaojing.htm (accessed March 2, 2012). 
91 For the rationale given in this text on discerning situation in observing ritual or propriety, see Kunio (2004: 115). 
92 Mencius, Li Lou I, 7.17. For the full text, see http://ctext.org/mengzi/li-lou-i (accessed March 15, 2012). 
93 See Lives of the Nuns: Biographies of Chinese Buddhist Nuns from the Fourth to Sixth Centuries. A Translation of 
the Pi-chu’iu-ni chuan, comp. Shih Pao-ch’ang. Translated by Kathryn Ann Tsai (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1994), 20–21. 
94 See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 220. 
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contradict each other.”95 For example, Hal Taussig argues that the meal gathering in the early 
church was a “laboratory” for early believers to test out the boundary of the social norms.96 The 
contradictions are the results of trials and errors in ritualization, which not only preserve heritage, 
but also provide conditions for assurance and change.97 This notion of imaginative construction 
and maintenance in ritualization is like the semantic habitus that forms and sustains the way we 
envision, perceive the world, and comport ourselves in it. 
 
VI. An Embodied Ritualization in A Non-Dualistic Worldview 
Although Bourdieu argues for a syntactic notion of habitus as “systems of durable 
transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring 
structures,”98 we find that in a proprioceptive and communal culture like the Chinese culture the 
semantic dimension that fundamentally characterizes habitus cannot be neglected and reduced 
(see section 3.1 in chapter 2). So, while we agree that habitus, produced by the material 
conditions societies, continually (re)inscribes its marks on our habitual bodies to the extent that 
we “wittingly or unwittingly … [become] a producer and reproducer of objective meaning,”99 as 
if “there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective 
principles of organization … [where] the natural and social world appears as self-evident,”100 we 
95 See Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 22. 
96  See Hal Taussig, In the Beginning was the Meal: Social Experimentation and Early Christian Identity 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 20. 
97 See Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, 222. 
98 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 72. This idea of habitus can be traced to Merleau-Ponty and 
Husserl. See Nick Crossley, “Sociology,” in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts. Edited by Rosalyn Diprose and Jack 
Reynold (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), 228-39; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. Translated 
by Colin Smith (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2005), 77-102, 112-70; idem., The Visible and the 
Invisible, ed Claude Lefort. Translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 130-
55; Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second 
Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 151-80. 
99 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78. 
100 Ibid., 164. 
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want to add that habitus is also marked for us by a semantic universe that cannot be represented 
(in Greimas’s actantial model). For us, this semantic habitus is a typological pattern that cannot 
be easily objectified. So while Bourdieu calls this self-evident correspondence doxa, “the 
universe of the undiscussed” where things are taken for granted for what they are,101 we want to 
add that the doxa is established as a vision through rituals and ritualization. 
Given our semantic-oriented notion of habitus as transformed (beyond Bourdieu) through 
ritual into one’s doxa, it is not surprising that those accustomed (τῇ συνηθείᾳ) to the idol would 
still treat the food as having the power of the idol (8:7). They were too used to it without 
realizing its doxa. This power of the idol becomes more forceful when “an ontological dualism in 
the Cartesian sense is not found in the ancient world,”102 where the visible and the invisible 
worlds are a “single continuum.”103 It is no wonder that one’s conscience (ἡ συνείδησις) or the 
“convicting consciousness”104 would be destroyed in such doxa.105 As Halbertal and Margalit 
rightly point out the bodily “feeling” (proprioceptive) aspect in the notion of idolatry, to address 
the issues of the idol and idolatry effectively, we must take the religious sensibility or conviction 
into account. But, when we render οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ in 8:4 as “an idol has no real 
existence” (RSV; cf. NJB), 106  we overlook the tangible effect of the idol. While the UBS 
Handbook also translates it as an idol “has no real existence,” the authors warn that “care should 
be taken not to translate this part of verse 4 in such a way as to conflict with verse 5, where Paul 
101 Ibid., 168. 
102 See Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 15. 
103 See Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament. Vol. 1 (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1984), 15. Cf. Kabiro wa Gatumu, The Pauline Concept of Supernatural Powers: A Reading from the 
African Worldview (Milton Keynes; Colorado Springs; India: Paternoster, 2008). 
104 See Richard Horsley, “Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10,” The Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 40 (1978): 574-89 (582). 
105 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 643. 
106 Whether we take οὐδὲν εἴδωλον “as attributive (‘no idol [exists]’) or as predicative (‘an idol is a nothing …’), as 
Thiselton suggests, these translations presuppose an ontological framework. Ibid., 630. 
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admits that other spiritual powers exist.”107 BDAG (591–92), however, tells us that οὐδέν has 
both substantive and non-literal meanings. It can also mean “worthless, meaningless, and 
invalid,” as the Chinese Bible takes it. This notion of οὐδέν is sidelined in English Bibles.108 
They seem to assume a metaphysical and Cartesian worldview, as opposed to a non-dualistic 
Chinese worldview where everything is made of qi. To make sense of οὐδὲν εἴδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ 
in 8:4 with 8:5 as well as 10:19–21, Gordon Fee, for instance, argues that 
Paul does not allow reality to the “gods” of idolatry. What he does rather is to 
anticipate the argument of v. 7 [8:7], that such “gods” have subjective reality for 
their worshippers; that is, they do not objectively exist, but they do “exist” for 
those who have given them reality by believing in them.109 
 
This constructed division of “objective reality” and “subjective reality” is common among 
biblical scholars.110 While David Garland follows this line of interpretation, he highlights “the 
intention of the worshippers.”111 Hans Conzelmann, on the other hand, as he argues that Paul 
sees idols as real beings, maintains that an idol is real insofar as we make it into “something.”112 
But, the main issue is not whether something is ontologically “real” or not. It is about the effect 
of what feels or seems good to be real, which is another possible mode of existence.113 
107 See Paul Ellingworth, and Howard A. Hatton, A Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, 185. 
108 NRSV: “no idol in the world really exists;” NKJV: “an idol is nothing in the world;” NAS: “there is no such thing 
as an idol in the world;” NIV: “an idol is nothing at all in the world;” NJB: “none of the false gods exists in reality;” 
NAB: “there is no idol in the world;” etc. The Chinese Union renders it as idol in the world does not mean much. 
109 See Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians. The New International Commentary on the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987), 370. 
110 See William F. Orr, and James Arthur Walther, 1 Corinthians: A New Translation. The Anchor Bible 32 (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1976); 233; Richard B. Hays, First Corinthians. Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching 
and Preaching (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1989), 139; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians. Sacra Pagina 
Series 7 (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1999), 319; Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter 
to the Corinthians. The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 379-80. 
111 See David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2003), 480. 
112 See Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 173. 
113 See Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical 
Exegesis (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 111–264; Timothy B. Cargal, “The Generative Trajectory in Certain Non-
Western Cultures,” in The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 265-75.  
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Indeed, if the notion of εἴδωλον (eidōlon) is related to seeing, and if an “idol never 
deserves to be denounced as illusory, since by definition, it is seen— eidolon,”114 our notion of 
an idol hinges upon how we see things and how they appear to us. While knowledge (oida) is 
primarily tied to seeing,115 most objects only become objects for us when we turn our attention to 
them. But, in our everyday life, what we aim at is often not present before our eyes; we see them 
in the sense of foreseeing them because of our semantic habitus. That is, objects “are simply the 
result … of expectation that gives access to an object without itself.”116 We can associate this 
notion of seeing the foreseen with the power of semantic habitus in idolatry. As semantic habitus 
shapes our comportment and perception, we forget that “what we see most often does not 
appear”117: our aim precedes our seeing of the object. The object no longer appears before us. At 
first, the idol lets us see the invisible, but as time goes on, it disguises the invisible by fixing our 
gaze upon the visible.118 Consequently, idol “allows no invisible.”119 Given Paul’s emphasis on 
being God-and-Christ-oriented, it appears that, for Paul, an idol is idolatrous because it is not 
other-oriented, as it becomes an invisible mirror that reflects and captures the objectifying gaze 
of believers, turning their partial knowing into a fixed, complete knowing. To deconstruct such a 
system of knowing that orders how believers perceive the world, Paul needs to speak of love to 
problematize an egocentric gaze that objectifies the other/Other, a heteronomous notion of love 
which we highlighted above in our semantic analysis. 
114 See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, 9. 
115 Idem. 
116 See Jean-Luc Marion, “What We See and What Appears,” 156. 
117 Ibid., 153. 
118 See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, 12. 
119 Ibid., 13. 
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Icon, on the other hand, as the Orthodox iconography teaches us,120 challenges our vision, 
as it does not conform to our aim or gaze. It keeps rendering the invisible visible without fixing 
the invisible. As such, “the invisible always remains invisible,”121 exceeding and transforming 
our gaze. In a similar way this is what typology does. It reveals the pattern without letting our 
gaze rest upon it. Marion further posits that icon and idol “indicate a manner for beings … [to] 
pass from one rank to the other.”122 As opposed to our fixated gaze upon the idol, the icon 
appears before us, captivates our gaze, unsettles and saturates our aim. In short, the icon is of the 
after-seeing; the idol is of the foreseen.123 In terms of Chinese ancestor veneration, the ritual is 
iconic when it works as a medium connecting Chinese to their heritage and value of filial piety. 
This feature of the icon works in Paul’s typology when it empowers believers to continually 
open up their horizons to see the works of God in different situations. 
 
VII. A Typological and Inter(con)textual Interpretation of 1 Cor. 8:1–11:1 
To assert that an idol is metaphysically non-existing not only discounts the power of the 
idol, it also presupposes a Cartesian worldview that further consolidates the bedazzling gaze of 
the idol. Given a more holistic worldview in the ancient world, it is unlikely that Paul held such a 
view. Even if Paul did, to effectively address the semantic habitus knowing in the idol food 
conflict would take more than a mere conveying of knowledge. So when Paul reminds believers 
of their previous way of being misled toward the mute idols (τὰ εἴδωλα τὰ ἄφωνα) (12:2), we see 
him highlight the doxa of the idol. The issue is not whether idols exist or not ontologically; the 
120 For example, see Leonid Ouspenksy, and Vladimir Lossky, The Meaning of Icons. Translated by G. E. H. Palmer 
and E. Kadloubovsky (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1982). 
121 See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being, 17. 
122 Ibid., 8. 
123 See Jean-Luc Marion, “What We See and What Appears,” 162. 
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issue concerns the manner we see and perceive the world, and more specifically the ways 
believers objectify and totalize their partial knowing into a system of knowing. 
Now, if the idols are mute, then how could communication happen? Yet communication 
did happen; people did worship idols. But, how did idols convey meaning if they are ἄφωνα? By 
doxa, because once we are bedazzled by the reflecting gaze of the idol, we foresee the objects 
without seeing them. It is only when things break down that we start to see them. Hence, when 
Paul in 12:3 stresses the contradiction in cursing and confessing Jesus as the Lord, he wants 
believers to see the “break down” of logic. While most scholars interpret 12:3 in terms of cultic 
ecstasy,124 Patte proposes that Jesus was indeed the Lord and the cursed. That is, if Jesus as the 
Lord is cursed, then Jesus exposes the idolatry of the system that curses and crucifies him.125 The 
tricky thing about the idol is that it will never appear as an idol – because it is validated in the 
way that we perceive and interact with the world – at least not until its contradiction is pointed 
out. It is only when one is in the spirit of God or in the holy spirit (12:2) that one can start to see 
the crack in the façade of the idol. Paul makes it clear that it is when one receives the spirit from 
God that one can see and receive the gifts of God (2:12). Thus Paul asks believers to “keep 
testing all things, and hold on to the good thing” (1 Thess. 5:21; cf. 1 Cor. 14:29-32). Without an 
otherness-orientation that challenges the mirror image of our gaze, our gaze can be fossilized. 
In light of this power of the idol, Paul therefore uses typology to address the issues of idol 
food and idolatry. In the complete discourse unit of 8:1–11:1, we note that the overarching theme 
comes to the fore when a self-oriented, active and confident stance in 8:1–2 is inverted into a 
God-centered, Christ-mediated, and other-oriented in 10:31–11:1 (cf. 8:6). This inversion shows 
Paul’s attempt to transform the believers’ faith by gradually exposing the contradiction in their 
124 For example, see Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 206; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, 447-48; Gordon 
D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 581. 
125 See Daniel Patte, Paul’s Faith and the Power of the Gospel, 306-10. 
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conviction. Thus, even if all possess knowledge (8:1), Paul tries to show that knowledge is God-
oriented as everything comes from God (1:6, 30; 3:11; 4:7). Not only does Paul stress the limit of 
one’s knowledge (8:2; cf. 13:8–9), he also ties knowledge to love: “But if anyone loves God, this 
person is known by him” (8:3). This change of active voice to middle/passive is significant. The 
Corinthians might think that they could fully grasp knowledge, as implied in the perfect tense of 
ἐγνωκέναι in 8:2a (cf. Gal. 4:9). But, as Anthony Thiselton argues, the aorist tense of ἔγνω and 
γνῶναι in 1 Cor. 8:2b can stress the “process of coming to know.”126 Indeed, 8:3 does not say 
that one knows God if one loves God. Paul suspends the result of loving. It is not within one’s 
determination.127 In being drawn out of oneself towards the beloved, one is simultaneously the 
subject, receiver, and object of love as s/he loves the beloved. 
This theme of being God-and-Christ-oriented in 8:1–11:1 is pronounced in the confession 
(8:6), especially if Paul “intentionally utilizes his understanding of the one God in order to 
underscore his overall argument.”128 When Paul writes that “for us (ἡμῖν) there is one God the 
father, out of (ἐξ) whom are all things and we are oriented toward (εἰς)129 him, and there is one 
Lord Jesus Christ, through (διά) whom are all things and we are from (διά) him” (8:6), he 
highlights the “father” and the “lord” figures in believers’ relationship with God and Jesus. This 
relationship is contrasted with the many “gods” and many “lords” (8:5). Whether the “gods” 
were the “traditional deities” in Greco-Roman religions and the “lords” the “deities of the 
mystery cults,”130 the concept of deity in Greco-Roman society, as Ron Fay points out, “is a 
loose term, allowing much flexibility while stressing power and accomplishment. Being a god 
126 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 624. 
127 “[T]he knowledge that the faction claims to possess and assumes is ‘substantive’ and ‘certain,’ is reversed and 
relativized by Paul in his reply.” See David W. Odell-Scott, A Post-Patriarchal Christology 144. 
128 See Suzanne Nicholson, Dynamic Oneness: The Significance and Flexibility of Paul’s One-God Language 
(Eugene: Pickwick, 2010), 4. 
129 “The preposition can be used in numerous ways; Paul most frequently uses εἰς to indicate purpose, although 
when speaking of God he usually specifies the purpose of God’s glorification.” Ibid., 54. 
130 See Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 373. 
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did not denote responsibility, instead it conferred on the person a special status and the 
responsibility was imported to the worshippers. 131  This notion that “a god did not denote 
responsibility” contrasts sharply with the Lord who died for the sake of the weak (8:11). If the 
cross is the core of the gospel (1:17) and the power of God to those who are saved (1:8) and if 
the kingdom of God is in this power (4:20), then believers should also have this characteristic of 
the cross. Furthermore, if Suzanne Nicholson is correct about the “subordination” of Jesus to 
God in 1 Corinthians to stress that God and Jesus must be understood in light of each other,132 
then believers should also imitate such relationship, instead of being self-centered. They should 
see through the lens of Christ in their handling of the idol food. 
Indeed, if individuals in the ancient Mediterranean world “owe [to their groups] loyalty, 
respect, and obedience of a kind which commits their individual honor without limit and without 
compromise,”133 then believers should imitate Paul just as he imitates Christ (11:1; cf. 4:16) in 
terms of letting Christ work through them. The metaphor of the one bread in 10:17 is a case in 
point (cf. the same spiritual food and the same spiritual drink in 10:3–4). Paul’s description of 
fulfilling the calling of God in fear and trembling in 1 Cor. 9 is a good example. Like an ox, Paul 
feels that he has nothing to boast about; he was just doing his duty (9:16) so that he may be a 
partner of the gospel (10:23). Just like those preparing for the Roman running contest, Paul 
enslaves his body so that he may not be disqualified (9:27). Thus even if the ox has worked hard 
in the past, it still needs to work hard. Instead of letting his past accomplishments become an 
invisible mirror to satisfy his gaze, Paul lets the cross-event provoke and transform him, lest the 
pistis of believers be not in the power of God (2:5). Paul realizes that the cross-like event is a 
131 See Ron C. Fay, “Greco-Roman Concepts of Deity,” in Paul’s World, 79. 
132 See Suzanne Nicholson, Dynamic Oneness, 47-104. 
133 See Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Kentucky: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1993), 45. 
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pattern that he needs to watch out for. So when he uses the word typos in 10:6 and 10:11, he sees 
the Israelite wilderness story as a typology that can help believers see the pattern (note βλέπετε 
in 8:9; 10:12, 18). In using δοκεῖ ἐγνωκεναι in 8:2, Paul in 10:12 warns those who think that they 
have stood firm to be alert, lest they fall (ὁ δοκῶν ἑσταναι βλεπέτω μὴ πέςῃ). 
When Paul writes that God is faithful (pistos) and will help them out in their trials (10:13), 
he also addresses the weak, just as he does in the confession (8:6), stressing that believers should 
live their lives through Christ (the mediating figure) toward God (the father or the source figure). 
The διά language in 8:6 shows that since believers exist through Christ, Christ should be their 
mediator. It is when believers, through Christ, see God as their source and orientation that an 
idol becomes οὐδέν. It is in this sense that Paul urges those who are still accustomed to the idol 
to have “this” kind of knowledge (ἡ γνῶσις). If this definite article ἡ in 8:7 refers to the 
knowledge in 8:1, as many have argued,134 Paul would be naïve to think that knowledge alone 
can effectively address the issue of “convicting consciousness.” The issue is not so much about 
the knowledge as about the orientation of knowledge. As the knowledge becomes a power (8:9), 
one needs to see through Christ to recognize the contradiction in such power. By removing food 
from the signification of power (8:8),135 Paul forces believers see beyond the idol food so that 
the gaze and the discussion do not rest upon the visible. His telling of his cross-like experiences, 
despite his seal of apostleship (9:2), further shows that to become all things to all people (9:22; 
cf. 1:18) is about recognizing cross-like events in others, learn from them, magnify them so that 
others will see them, and be cross-like to them as well. Without this other-oriented imitation 
through cross-like experiences, even an icon can become an idol. 
134 For example, see Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, 146; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 
379; and Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, 324). Contra Derek Newton, Deity and Diet, 290. 
135 For a discussion on whether 8:8 is partially or wholly a Corinthian slogan, see Anthony C. Thiselton, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, 647-49. 
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 VIII. Conclusion 
Love trumps knowledge and knowledge is at its best when it concedes what it 
does not know, whereas loving can never brag about not loving. Any given faith 
is  certainly a way to see and to know, one more among many, since indeed all 
genuine knowing is knowing ‘as,’ and all knowledge depends upon faith, and all 
faith is a way of seeing, construing, knowing. But faith lacks the wherewithal to 
absolutize its perspective, to lift itself up above the others in Capitalized form and 
cow the rest of us into submission.136 – John D. Caputo 
 
Instead of asking whether Paul allows the eating of idol food, we examined Paul’s notion 
of idolatry. But, as Newton and Phua argue for different notions of idolatry concerning idol food 
among Hellenistic Jews, we find that Paul is more concerned about whether believers orient 
themselves toward God through Christ in their dealing with idolatry. In light of the power of the 
idol in semantic habitus and ritualization in a non-dualistic worldview, Paul cannot give a 
universal answer to the issues of idol food and idolatry. To do so is problematic. It can turn such 
an instruction into an idol, in particular when we lose sight of the fundamental values that 
undergird the teaching and absolutize it into certain forms. To address the issue of idolatry that is 
in the area of “sensibility,” as Halbertal and Margalit argue, Paul emphasizes the work of God 
through Christ in typology. To consider others and to please all people in all manners challenges 
believers not to objectify and totalize their partial knowledge into a system but to continually 
look for cross-like events in the work of God. 
For Chinese Christians, we also need to see such cross-like events in ancestor veneration 
so that we do not just accept or reject our heritage. From what we have noted about the semantic 
habitus, there are no easy and quick answers to whether we can eat the offering food, in 
particular if the idol and the icon “indicate a manner for being” and if idol food is not necessarily 
136 See John D. Caputo, On Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 111-12. 
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idolatrous. The idol food can be a sign of heritage, a means of ritual, or/both a signification of 
interaction with the invisible world. But, what we have learnt in this inter(con)textual 
interpretation is that the validity of context in one’s interpretation does not exclude textual and 
hermeneutical analysis. It is when we are aware of the discursive process of interpretation that 
we realize that we all make choices in our interpretation! So even though everyone reads the 
same text, the text becomes different for different people. This awareness not only calls us to be 
accountable and responsible for our interpretation, it also reminds us to be open to other 
interpretations so that we may see their rationale, and not co-opt or criticize them outright. As 
contextual interpretation helps us see new aspects of the text and context, and thus, read it anew, 














Chapter 7 – The Stake of Love and Gifts in 1 Corinthians 12:1–14:40 
To love is to respect the invisibility of the other, to keep the other safe, to 
surrender one’s arms to the other but without defeat … To love is to give oneself 
to the other in such a way that this would really be giving and not taking, a gift, a 
way of letting the other remain other, that is, be loved, rather than a stratagem, a 
ruse of jealousy, a way of winning, eine vergiftete Gift. Then it would turn out 
that the passion for the impossible would be love.1 – John D. Caputo 
 
When, then, does the lover appear? Precisely when, during the encounter, I 
suspend reciprocity, and no longer economize, engaging myself without any 
guarantee of assurance. The lover appears when one of the actors in the exchange 
no longer poses prior conditions, and loves without requiring to be loved, and thus, 
in the figure of the gift, abolishes economy.2 – Jean-Luc Marion 
 
I. Introduction 
In this concluding chapter, we will focus on Paul’s notion of love in 1 Cor. 13:1-13, 
framed in the complete discourse unit of 12:1–14:40 that addresses the issues of singularity and 
plurality of the body of Christ and of various “charismata,” “services,” “workings,” and 
manifestations of the spirit. In this complete discourse unit, we continue to see that Paul is 
concerned with how the Corinthian believers come to know what they know. The inverted 
parallelism between 12:1-3 and 14:37-40 shows that the believers’ knowing must not be 
egocentric, but must be oriented toward God, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus (see below); after all, it 
was in God that believers were enriched in everything, in every logos and every gnosis (1:5). If 
the logos of gnosis is given (δίδοται) to believers through the spirit (12:8), then they should 
know that the logos of God neither comes from them nor goes to them only (14:36). 
For Paul, since everything comes from God (4:7), believers must not objectify gnosis into 
their own system of knowledge that they can manipulate for their own benefits (cf. 8:9). Thus in 
1  John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis Indiana University Press, 1997), 49. 
2 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon. Translated by Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 78. 
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12:1–14:40, Paul stresses that “the manifestation of the spirit” (ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος) is 
“given (δίδοται) to each person for the common good” (πρὸς τὸ συμ-φέρον) (12:7). Three things 
we need to note here. First, the manifestation must not be mistaken for the spirit itself. In 
pointing to the spirit and the common good, the manifestation appears by withdrawing itself 
(from not pointing to itself). Secondly, the manifestation is given to everyone. It is thus ironic for 
believers to flaunt and compare their gifts. Thirdly, as the manifestation is oriented towards the 
common good, it becomes contradictory when it is used for personal gains. Believers need to 
note that just as it is in the Holy Spirit that they can confess “Jesus is Lord” (12:3), they must be 
spirit-oriented, not manifestation-oriented. Just as both the spiritual gifts and believers become 
insignificant when the gifts are performed without love (13:1-3), the manifestation of the spirit 
ceases its purpose when it is not used for the common good. 
The genitive in 12:7 further shows that the manifestation can be rendered as the spirit that 
manifests itself (subjective genitive), highlighting not just the manifestation about the spirit 
(objective genitive) but also the spirit that gives. Similarly, the possibility of δίδοται in the 
middle voice with an “intransitive nonreflexivity”3 and the preposition συμ (“with”) in τὸ συμ-
φέρον that indicates an advantageous result of coming together stress “the manifestation of the 
spirit” taking place in the giving and receiving in the middle voice when believers come together 
for the benefits of each other. The common good is not an existing property but a figure of 
“togetherness” (see section 3.2 in chapter 2) that appears when believers come together seeking 
the things of others. This is why Paul urges believers to receive from one another when they 
come together for the Lord’s Supper (see chapter 5). It is in the face of choices that believers are 
challenged to discern and decide which choice manifests the works of God among them. 
3 See n. 11 in the Introduction chapter. 
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Now, just as it is in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit that believers are able (or have the potential) 
(δύνανται) to say that “Jesus is Lord” (12:3), believers should not judge by themselves (cf. 4:3-5). 
They should judge spiritual matters together with spiritual (people or matters) (πνευματικοῖς 
πνευματικὰ συγ-κρίνοντες) (2:13).4 Indeed, if believers cannot know the gifts given by God (τὰ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα) without receiving the spirit from God (2:12), then they must speak of 
them in (ἐν) the teaching of the spirit (2:13). Moreover, if God has prepared for those who love 
God (2:9), then loving God and the giving and receiving of gifts are intertwined. This intimate 
relation between love and gift is also prominent in 12:1–14:40. Just as the knowing of God’s 
gifts must be done through the spirit from God and the receiving of God’s gifts takes place in 
love, the gifts must also be performed with performative love (13:1-3). 
In this chapter we argue that as Paul’s vision of love is heteronomy-oriented (see chapter 
4), Paul’s notion of “spiritual gifts,” which frames the so-called love poem of Paul in 1 Cor. 13, 
is also heteronomy-oriented. Here, our usage of “spiritual gifts” is broadly conceived as “gift 
effects,” which not only stresses the dynamic relations of the giver, receiver, and gift, but also 
the common good that should mark the giving and receiving of gifts (12:7). The “spiritual gifts” 
in 12:1–14:40 may refer to various “charismata” (χαρίσματα) (12:4), “services” (διακονίαι) 
(12:5), “workings” (ἐν-εργήματα) (12:6), “manifestation of the spirit” (12:7), etc.5 But, what 
4 One can translate πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ συγκρίνοντες in several ways, depending on how one renders the 
gender and dative of πνευματικοῖς. Fitzmyer suggests four possibilities: (1) “comparing spiritual realities with 
spiritual realities,” (2) “interpreting spiritual realities in spiritual terms,” (3) “interpreting spiritual realities for 
spiritual people,” and (4) “fitting spiritual things to spiritual expression.” See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, First Corinthians: 
A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Yale Bible 32 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 181-82. 
5 Concerning the meanings of “services” and “workings” and their relations to charismata, Schatzmann argues that 
the former “denotes the fundamental purpose for God’s gracious bestowal of gifts. Only in different kinds of service 
exists the legitimization of charismata.” The latter “describes the concrete effects which occur when χαρίσματα are 
used in service” in the sense that “God energizes all enabling graces; thus charismata become demonstration of the 
power of God, effected in service.” See Siegfried S. Schatzmann, A Pauline Theology of Charismata (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1987), 34. Concerning the word “charismata,” Schatzmann lists three ways the word is 
used by Paul. First, he finds that “Paul employed the term in a ‘nontechnical,’ general sense. Typically, χάρισμα 
here overlaps considerably with χάρις, as in Rom. 5: 15, 16, as well as in 6:23” (ibid., 4). Secondly, he finds that 
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matters to Paul is not so much spiritual gifts as believers to whom they are given. As the gift 
cannot be objectified – after all, it is given by the spirit, which cannot be objectified – neither the 
giver nor the receiver can be objectified. Their relationship with the spirit, God, and Jesus should 
be vibrant. So instead of speaking of the identity/character of the giver, receiver, and gift, we 
find it more fitting to describe the interactions of giver, receiver, and gift as actants in A. J. 
Greimas’s actantial model (see section 3.3.c in the Methodological Appendix), where a character 
can play different actantial roles at the same time. Our semantic analysis will not focus on the 
notion of “gift” in 12:1–14:40, but because Paul’s vision of love is framed in his discussion of 
spiritual gifts, we will in the next section review how the gift can be conceptualized and 
configured in different modes of existence. We will first review critical interpretations of charis  
(“gift” or “grace”) and charismata in 1 Corinthians, 6  which biblical scholars have recently 
placed within Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity (i.e., benefaction and patronage 
relationships).7 We agree with Bruce Lowe that both diachronic and synchronic analyses are 
word is used twice “for specific gifts given to the believers” (e.g., 1 Cor. 7:7 and 2 Cor. 1:11) (ibid., 5). Thirdly, the 
word is used most frequently for “a manifestation of grace within the community of believers” (e.g., Rom. 1:11, 
11:29, 12:6-8; 1 Cor. 1:7 and 1 Cor. 12-14) (idem). 
6 BDAG defines χάρις as (1) “a winning quality or attractiveness that invites a favorable reaction,” (2) “a beneficent 
disposition toward someone,” (3) “practical application of goodness,” (4) “exceptional effect produced by 
generosity,” and (5) “response to generosity or beneficent” (1079-1081). It further notes that “χάρις is not always 
clearly differentiated in meaning from χαρά” (1079). This relationship between χάρις and χαρά is also noted by 
many scholars. For example, Conzelmann writes, “The basic of the usage [of χάρις] is the relation to χαίρω.” See 
Hans Conzelmann, “χάρις κτλ.,” in TDNT 9: 373. As of χάρισμα, BDAG defines it as “that which is freely and 
graciously given”: (a) “generally, the earthly goods bestowed by God,” (b) “of special gifts of a non-material sort, 
bestowed through God’s generosity on individual Christians” (1081). 
7 Emphasizing that Greek benefaction (“euergetism”) and Roman patronage are “two different but related forms of 
social interchange,” Joubert argues that while “both these relationships we have an exchange of goods and services 
that leads to mutual obligations, together with differentiations of status and power between the interlocutors … the 
contents of the goods exchanged and the nature of the ensuing social relationships (in terms of the status and 
reciprocal responsibilities of the  individuals/groups) are different.” See Stephan J. Joubert, “One Form of Social 
Exchange or Two? ‘Euergetism,’ Patronage, and Testament Studies,” in Biblical Theology Bulletin:  A Journal of 
Bible and Theology 31 (2001): 23. For Joubert, the benefactor-beneficiaries relationship in “euergetism” is less 
oppressive than the patron-client relationship. For him, the “status differentials between public benefactors and 
beneficiaries were not ‘entrenched’ by benefit-exchanges. The (collective) recipients of public benefits, for example, 
seldom took on a submissive role (which was often the case with clients of powerful Roman patrons). On the 
contrary, in honorary decrees they frequently state how they proudly fulfilled their obligations toward their 
benefactors, thus placing the latter in their debt once more. In order to maintain their public honor and status, 
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significant to our understanding of Paul’s notion of charis,8 in particular when “the material 
outside the NT tells us almost nothing” about charisma. 9  Therefore we will review the 
constitution of gift through the works of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. For concrete 
examples, we will briefly highlight different types of gifts in Western antiquity. These analytical 
steps to flesh out the conceptualization and configuration of gift are important to note because 
quite often it is not a textual but a hermeneutical distinction that frames our interpretation (cf. 
section 5 in chapter 1). Once we show that the gift can be envisioned in various modes of 
existence, we will proceed with our semantic analysis of love in 12:1–14:40 to argue that for 
Paul, both love and gift are heteronomy-oriented. Lastly, we will end with an evaluation of 
Paul’s heteronomous view of love in our context of a pluralistic environment in Malaysia. 
 
II. The Notion of “Gift” 
The law of benefits is a difficult channel, which requires careful sailing, or rude 
boats. It is not the office of a man to receive gifts. How dare you give them? We 
wish to be self-sustained. We do not quite forgive a giver. The hand that feeds us 
is in some danger of being bitten. We can receive anything from love, for that is a 
benefactors therefore had to confer further benefits on their communities.” Idem. By contrast, in a Roman patron-
client relationship, the patrons “remained in the superior social position, even if they failed to reciprocate their 
clients’ public bestowals of loyalty and honor. ‘Cliental gratitude’ did not place patrons in a submissive position.” 
Idem. Joubert therefore contends that Paul’s collection from the Gentile churches to the Jerusalem church should be 
understood within the dynamic benefactor-beneficiary relationship. For details, see idem., Paul as Benefactor: 
Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000). To address 
the social positions in the benefaction system, Joubert refers to J. Christiaan Beker’s idea of “coherency” and 
“contingency,” but he does not clearly explain how “Paul’s convictional framework” is distinguished from Paul’s 
rhetoric. As a result, Joubert thinks that “Paul at times fell prey to ‘ideological manipulation’ in order to promote his 
own interests. Therefore, one should be careful not to merely accept his ‘theologizing’ at face value.” Ibid., 11. For a 
critique of Joubert’s differentiation between benefaction and patronage, see Zeba A. Crook, Reconceptualization 
Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean (Berlin and New 
York: Walter de Gruyter), 60-66. Crook writes, “Joubert is perfectly correct that patronage and benefaction are not 
exactly the same phenomena. The differences between them, however, are both more general and more subtle than 
Joubert attempts to present.” Ibid., 64. 
8 See Bruce A. Lowe, “Paul, Patronage and Benefaction: A ‘Semiotic’ Reconsideration,” in Paul and His Social 
Relations. Edited by Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Land. Pauline Studies 7 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013), 57-
84. Lowe focuses on the relation between the signified and signifier in the signification of the word. 
9 See Hans Conzelmann, “χάρις κτλ.,” in TDNT 9: 403. 
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way of receiving it from ourselves; but not from any one who assumes to 
bestow.10 – Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
We are either glad or sorry at a gift, and both emotions are unbecoming. Some 
violence, I think, is done, some degradation borne, when I rejoice or grieve at a 
gift. I am sorry when my independence is invaded, or when a gift comes from 
such as do not know my spirit, and so the act is not supported; and if the gift 
pleases me overmuch, then I should be ashamed that the donor should read my 
heart, and see that I love his commodity, and not him.11 – Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
What is gift? This seemingly simple question has sparked numerous works and debates 
across various disciplines such as philosophy (in particular phenomenology), anthropology, 
sociology, theology, classical studies, biblical studies, etc.12 Linguistically, the ambiguity and 
ambivalence of the word “gift” are noted by Marcel Mauss and Emile Benveniste. For example, 
tracing the etymology of the word, Mauss shows that it can mean “present” and “poison” in the 
Germanic languages. For Mauss, these two senses of “gift,” within the système des prestations 
totales in the Germanic world,13 are related to “the gift of drink” – a “typical prestation for the 
10 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Gifts,” in Essays. First and Second Series. Second Series (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1883), 155-56. 
11 Ibid., 156. Likewise, Derrida writes, “For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift, or debt … Here we are anticipating another dimension of the problem, namely, that if giving is 
spontaneously evaluated as good … it remains the case that this ‘good’ can easily be reversed. We know that as 
good, it can also be bad, poisonous (Gift, gift), and this from the moment the gift puts the other in debt, with the 
result that giving amounts to hurting, to doing harm…” See Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. 
Translated by Peggy Kamuf (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 12. 
12 For example, see the essays in the following edited volumes: God, The Gift, and Postmodernism. Edited by John 
D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999); The Gift: An Interdisciplinary 
Perspective. Edited by Aafke E. Komter (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996); The Logic of the Gift: 
Toward an Ethic of Generosity. Edited by Alan D. Schrift (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); The Gift in 
Antiquity. Edited by Michael L. Satlow (UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); The Question of the Gift: Essays Across 
Disciplines. Edited by Mark Osteen (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); The Enigma of Gift and Sacrifice. 
Edited by Edith Wyschogrod, Jean-Joseph Goux, and Eric Boynton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). 
For recent works in theology, see Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005); J. 
Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, and the Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Stephen H. Webb, The Gifting God: A Trinitarian Ethics of Excess (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); Risto Saarinen, God and the Gift: An Ecumenical Theology of Giving (Collegeville, 
MN: Liturgical Press, 2005); Jan-Olav Henriksen, Desire, Gift, and Recognition: Christology and Postmodern 
Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2009). 
13 Concerning the role of the “system of total services” in his notion of gift, Mauss writes, “First, it is not individuals 
but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other ... Moreover, what they exchange 
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ancient Germans and Scandinavians” – which can be either a gift-present or a gift-poison.14 
Going further than Mauss, Benveniste argues that the root *do- that can mean “to give” in most 
Indo-European languages can also mean “to take,” depending on the syntactic construction of the 
verb. He writes, “*do- [as in French don or donner] indicated only the fact of taking hold of 
something; only the syntax of the utterance differentiated it as ‘to take hold of in order to keep’ 
(= take) and ‘to take hold of in order to offer’ (= give).”15 A similar linguistic phenomenon is 
also found in the Chinese character 受 (shou). Originally the word can mean “to give” or “to 
receive,” as indicated by the two radicals 爫 (read as 爪, zhao) and 又 (you) in the word – both 
signify “hand” – which signify the receiving and passing from one hand to another. While the 
context can determine the meaning, at times it can have both meanings.16 To avoid the semantic 
ambiguity, another word授 (shou) (“to give”) – a radical 扌(shou) (meaning, “hand”) + 受 (shou) 
– is then created to distinguish it from 受 (shou) (“to receive”). Both words, however, are 
pronounced the same. 
is not solely property and wealth, movable and immovable goods, and things economically useful. In particular, 
such exchanges are acts of politeness: banquets, rituals, military services, women, children, dances, festivals, and 
fairs, in which economic transaction is only one element, and in which the passing on of wealth is only one feature 
of a much more general and enduring contract. Finally, these total services and counter-services are committed to in 
a somewhat voluntary form by presents and gifts, although in the final analysis they are strictly compulsory, on pain 
of private or public warfare.” See Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
Foreword by Mary Douglas (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), 6-7. 
14 See Marcel Mauss, “Gift, Gift,” in The Logic of the Gift, 30. Mauss further finds it “unnecessary to refer here to a 
very substantial number of topics of Germanic law and mythology. But one can see that the uncertainty about the 
good or bad nature of the presents could have been nowhere greater than in the case of the customs of the kind 
where the gifts consisted essentially in drinks taken in common) in libations offered or to be rendered.” Idem. The 
ambiguity of gift is configured as the hau (“the spirit of things”) in Mauss’ notion of gift that drives and sustains the 
circulation of gifts. See Marcel Mauss, The Gift, 14-16, 115-16 n. 29-31. For a critique of Mauss’s translation and 
interpretation of hau, see Sahlins, who notes that Mauss should have addressed different types of hau instead of 
introducing an unnecessary element of uncertainty into the economy of gift exchange. Consult Marshall Sahlins, 
“The Spirit of the Gift,” in Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 149-68. 
15 See Emile Benveniste, “Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary,” in Problems in General Linguistics. 
Translated by Mary Elizabeth Meek. Miami Linguistics Series 8 (Coral Gables, FA: University of Miami, 1971), 
272. Also, see various chapters on the topic of gift in idem., Indo-European Language and Society. Translated by 
Elizabeth Palmer. Miami Linguistics Series 12 (Coral Gables, FA: University of Miami Press, 1973). 
16 Consider the saying qi yue liu huo, jiu yue shou yi (七月流火，九月受衣: in July the heat starts to abate, in 
September start to give out or receive clothing) in Shi Jing·Bin Feng·Qi Yue (“诗经·豳风·七月”). 
381 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
This semantic ambiguity of the word “gift” is also manifested in our everyday experience, 
as Emerson points out (see the epigraph). While Mauss finds the “charity-gift” in Emerson’s 
essay “curious,” 17  we find the following comment by Emerson curious: “We can receive 
anything from love, for that is a way of receiving it from ourselves; but not from any one who 
assumes to bestow.” Why are the giving and receiving in love exempted from potential problems 
implicated in the gift? Indeed, what does it mean that “[t]he gift, to be true, must be the flowing 
of the giver unto me, correspondent to my flowing unto him. When the waters are at level, then 
my goods pass to him, and his to me. All his are mine, all mine his”?18 It appears that when gifts 
are given and received in love, there is a sense of “[a]ll his are mine, all mine his,” and as a result 
of this flowing to and fro between the giver and receiver, gifts can be given and received without 
causing any hurt.19 If this is the case with Emerson, does Paul’s notion of gift also embody a 
similar character? If one cannot distinguish the beloved from the lover in a love relationship, 
then can one clearly tell the giver from the receiver in a love relationship? 
(i) The Notion of Charis 
In critical biblical studies, an increasing number of scholars has recently argued for the 
sociopolitical context of charis in Greco-Roman benefaction and patronage systems. For 
17 Mauss writes, “The unreciprocated gift still makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has 
been accepted with no thought of returning it. We are still in the field of Germanic morality when we recall the 
curious essay by Emerson entitled ‘Gifts.’ Charity is still wounding for him who has accepted it, and the whole 
tendency of our morality is to strive to do away with the unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver.” 
See Marcel Mauss, The Gift, 83. 
18 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Gifts,” 156-57. 
19 In his reading of Emerson, Schrift notes that for Emerson, “the only true gift is a gift of oneself, for a ‘real gift’ 
must be something painful to give. That gift must also be unnecessary to the receiver; it must be excessive, for if it is 
needed, it loses its status as gift. While gifts challenge the autonomy of the receiver, the true gift nevertheless unites 
the giver and receiver) and Emerson concludes that the gift finds perhaps its most perfect expression in the gifts of 
love.” See Alan D. Schrift, “Introduction: Why Gift?” in The Logic of the Gift, 7. Emerson presents a heteronomous 
notion of love in “Love,” in Essays, 161-79. 
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example, David deSilva speaks of three meanings of charis that “mark the patron-client 
relationship, friendship, or public benefaction” in Greco-Roman cultures.20 
First, “grace” was used to refer to the willingness of a patron to grant some 
benefit to another person or to a group. In this sense, it means “favor,” in the 
sense of “favorable disposition.” In Aristotle’s words (Rhetoric 2.7.1 [ 1385a16-
20]), “Grace (charis) may be defined as helpfulness toward someone in need, not 
in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself [or herself], but 
for that of the person helped.” In this sense, the word highlights the generosity 
and disposition of the patron, benefactor, or giver. The same word carries a 
second sense, often being used to denote the “gift” itself, that is, the result of the 
giver’s beneficent feelings. Many honorary inscriptions mention the “graces” 
(charitas) of the benefactor as the cause for conferring public praise, emphasizing 
the real and received products of the benefactor’s good will toward a city or group. 
Finally, “grace” can be used to speak of the response to a benefactor and his or 
her gifts, namely “gratitude” [charin echein].21 
 
From the perspective of a group-oriented culture, we are not surprised by the first meaning of 
charis. As we have noted about “the felt” (cf. heteronomy), “the claimed” (cf. autonomy), and 
“the paid” (cf. relationality) aspects of honor (see section 3 in chapter 1), we emphasize that in a 
culture where everyone is interrelated, the proprioceptive (i.e., bodily-oriented) and communal 
features are interwoven. For example, in the Chinese worldview, because our perception of the 
world is proprioceptive (see section 2 in chapter 2), our perception is correlative, and as such, 
communal. Consequently, the fact that charis “was used to refer to the willingness of a patron to 
grant some benefit to another person or to a group” because of personal relationships or network, 
instead of individual merit or credit, is expected, although it may be “distasteful” to many in the 
West that values individualism.22 Here, deSilva’s advice is helpful. 
20 See David A. deSilva, “Patronage and Reciprocity: The Context of Grace in the New Testament,” in Ashland 
Theological Journal 31 (1999): 32-84 (38). 
21 Ibid., 38-39. 
22 DeSilva writes, “The term ‘patronage’ refers to a system in which access to goods, positions, or services is 
enjoyed by means of personal relationships and the exchanging of ‘favors’ rather than by impersonal and impartial 
systems of distribution. People in the United States and Northern Europe may be culturally conditioned to find the 
concept of patronage distasteful at first, and not at all a suitable metaphor for talking about God’s relationship to us. 
When we say ‘it’s not what you know but whom you know,’ it is usually because we sense someone has had an 
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The world of the authors and readers of the New Testament, however, was a 
world in which personal patronage was an essential means of acquiring access to 
goods, protection, or opportunities for employment and advancement. Not only 
was it essential – it was expected and publicized! The giving and receiving of 
favors was, according to a first-century participant, the “practice that constitutes 
the chief bond of human society” (Seneca, De beneficiis 1.4.2).23 
  
 While deSilva briefly mentions “the felt” aspect of charis, we want to highlight it. We 
have already seen this felt aspect of charis in our discussion of philia (see section 5 in chapter 1), 
but let us refer to David Konstan again. 
Most societies, and certainly classical Greece and Rome, distinguish between gifts, 
which are freely granted without expectation of return or at least of return in kind, 
and commercial or economic exchanges, in which things are traded for other 
things of a comparable value.24 
 
Here, Konstan makes a distinction between “gifts” and “commercial or economic exchanges,” 
but the difference is not always clear in everyday experience because as “gratitude” – the third 
meaning of charis according to deSilva – is a response to charis, it can be treated as some kind 
of return to the gifts received. Konstan explains: 
This linking of gratitude to the bestowal of a favor is significant: it suggests that 
the altruism affirmed in the definition of a charis is not entirely unconditional. 
But it is important to observe that the response to a favor is not a return in kind, 
but rather an emotion or pathos that is elicited by the simple gesture of receiving 
such a present. Of course, this reaction is not automatic or inevitable; there are 
ungrateful people who do not respond in this way to help or services rendered, 
and this is clearly a vice. But the emotional response to receiving a gift is not 
understood by Aristotle or any other ancient thinker as a return of the favor, or as 
constituting an economic exchange. And this is the crucial element in the notion 
of charis.25 
unfair advantage over us or over the friend whom we console with these words. It violates our conviction that 
everyone should have equal access to employment opportunities (being evaluated on the basis of pertinent skills 
rather than personal connection) or to services offered by private businesses or civic agencies. Where patronage 
occurs (often deridingly called nepotism: channeling opportunities to relations or personal friends), it is often done 
‘under the table’ and kept as quiet as possible.” Ibid., 32. 
23 Ibid., 32-33. 
24 See David Konstan, “‘Can’t Buy Me Love’: The Economy of Gifts in Amorous Relations,” in The Gift in 
Antiquity, 96. 
25 Ibid., 97. 
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For Konstan, because “gratitude” is an emotional response, it “is not understood by 
Aristotle or any other ancient thinker as a return of the favor, or as constituting an economic 
exchange.” Konstan further stresses elsewhere that “[t]he emotion of gratitude is distinct from 
the act of reciprocation: it is felt, not due as compensation.”26 In his study of Roman reciprocity, 
Neil Coffee agrees with Konstan that “Roman gift-exchange cannot be viewed simply as a matter 
of self-interested jockeying for advantage because there was a real emotional dimension to 
giving and receiving.” 27 This “felt” aspect of charis in “gratitude” is expected, in particular 
because charis is tied to honor, as Zeba Crook points out (even though he argues that Paul’s 
notion of charis should be understood within the Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity).28 But, if 
“honor is too intimate a sentiment to submit to definition: it must be felt,”29 then “the felt” aspect 
26 Konstan continues, “Thus Socrates, in Plato’s Apology (20A), asserts that the disciples of the sophists ‘give them 
money and are grateful besides [khremata didontas kai kharin proseidenai],’ that is, over and above the payment 
that is required. The sentiment of course sustains the social system of reciprocity, but has its own grammar and role. 
Gratitude is never owed.” David Konstan, “Gratitude,” in The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle 
and Classical Literature (Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 167. 
27 See Neil Coffee, “Ovid Negotiates with His Mistress: Roman Reciprocity from Public to Private,” in The Gift in 
Antiquity, 78. 
28 Zeba A. Crook, Reconceptualization Conversion, 68, writes: “Patronage and benefaction worked in harmony with 
the values of honour and shame, for without the importance attached to accruing honour and without the hope of 
doing so within one’s own lifetime, patronage and benefaction would not have existed in the form or to the extent it 
did.” We have highlighted “the felt” aspect of honor and noted that Crook follows Bruce Malina’s functionalist 
definition of honor (see note 216 in chapter 1). This tendency to sideline heteronomy is also apparent in Crook’s 
functionalist notion of “loyalty” (pistis or fides), which according to him, undergirds the “ancient conversion” in the 
social context of patronage and benefaction. He writes, “Loyalty is an important feature of the model of ancient 
conversion, for without it, it appears that conversion in this cultural context was nothing more than a form of 
rationa1 choice theory – that human actors behave as if the world is a market in which decisions are made rationally 
based only on perceived outcomes and benefits.” Ibid., 9. For Crook, “Loyalty allows for the possibility of an 
emotional component to enter into the model of ancient conversion, but it is most helpful because it does not rely on 
emotion for its central or defining characteristic… [In fact] loyalty was a set of behaviours, it was not a feeling. The 
important distinction here is that loyalty was not an internal state of mind as much as it is an external set of actions.” 
Ibid., 200. It is obvious that Crook only focuses on a certain syntactic aspect of pistis or fides while neglecting (or 
perhaps rejecting?) its semantic aspects. By contrast, David Konstan (in “‘Can’t Buy Me Love,’” 98) points out that 
“all interpersonal exchange, according to Aristotle, is premised on trust and hence on a degree of affection. But the 
sign of true affection is a generosity that does not insist on return, but seeks the benefit of the other in a spirit of 
selflessness.” The relation between trust (pistis or fides) and economy is insightfully fleshed out by de Certeau, 
which for us highlights the modes of existence in the notion of “trust.” For details, see Michel de Certeau, “What 
We Do When We Believe,” in On Signs. Edited by Marshall Blonsky (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), 192-202. Also, see Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s 
Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990), 111-215. 
29 John G. Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Introduction,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology. Edited by J. G. 
Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1992), 4. Concerning the social 
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of charis cannot be reduced, as John Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers realize when saying that 
“honor has a kind of congenital relationship with grace which challenges our previous view of it 
as primordially a matter of social structure.”30 Given this intimate relation between honor and 
grace,31 Pitt-Rivers writes:  
The unverifiability of intentions and the state of the heart which are necessary to 
both honor and grace, the paradoxes which assail both and the uncertainty of 
divine judgment which refuses to submit to mundane reasoning have encouraged 
societies with writing to replace the reciprocity of the heart by the law of contract 
and provide sanctions for its enforcement. Taking reciprocity out of the field of 
grace detaches it from the sentiments and objectifies it, making it abstract and 
depersonalized.32 
 
Note that Pitt-Rivers does not say that there is no reciprocity in grace. Rather, in our language of 
modes of existence, reciprocity can also be conceived of in terms of heteronomy (see section 2.3 
in chapter 1).33 This is why even though we emphasize the heteronomous mode of love in 1 
aspect of honor, the authors write, “The paradox that honor is at the same time a matter of moral conscience and a 
sentiment on the one hand, and on the other, a fact of repute and precedence, whether attained by virtue of birth, 
power, wealth, sanctity, prestige, guile, force, or simony (or, to take another paradox, that those whose honor is 
greatest feel least obliged to defend it), implied that honor could not merely be reduced and treated as an 
epiphenomenon of some other factor, but obeyed a logic of its own which could dispel the paradoxes.” Ibid., 5. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31  Pitt-Rivers finds that grace “shares with honor the same tendency to be evanescent and self-contradictory. 
Sometimes the two words are almost interchangeable: you pay honor in offering grace, for it is an expression of 
sentiment freely willed. You expose your honor in doing so, precisely because there is no obligation to return grace 
unless it comes from the heart – and you are dishonored if you get a ‘brush-off,’ in which case you are justified in 
being offended. Hence it can be seen that exchanges of honor are very similar to exchanges of grace.” See Julian 
Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript: The Place of Grace in Anthropology,” in Honor and Grace in Anthropology, 240. 
32 Ibid., 241. Pitt-Rivers asks, “Can one explain systems of reciprocity adequately without considering the possibility 
of non-reciprocity, i.e. gratuity? … And are not thanks the common coinage of encounters between persons? Yet 
what do they imply? What is their logic? … This oversight might be accounted for simply by a regrettable tendency 
among those of a functionalist turn to mind to jump to conclusions regarding the significance of human actions on 
the basis of expressed intentions, without examining their mode of expression: to reduce each institution to ‘what it 
amounts to’ or ‘what it does’ in terms of practical results, ignoring its cultural roots, thinking that there is nothing 
more to be known about the culture of a people than what they themselves consciously recognize.” Ibid., 216. 
33 It is clear in the following remarks by Pitt-Rivers that we do have reciprocity in grace, but the reciprocity is not to 
be understood in the mode of relationality but of heteronomy. He writes, “To summarize: in the sense of benefaction, 
gift, demonstration of benevolence, concession, graciousness, pardon, or indulgence, grace is inspired by the notion 
of something over and above what is due, economically, legally, or morally: it is neither foreseeable, predictable by 
reasoning, nor subject to guarantee. It stands outside the system of reciprocal services. It cannot be owed or won, 
specified in advance or merited. Hence it can mean remission of a sin or a debt, mercy, pardon, or forgiveness and 
thus it is opposed to justice and the law. As gratitude it is the only return-gift that conserves the nature of the initial 
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Corinthians, we do not deny that Paul’s vision of love can be interpreted in other modes of 
existence. A “felt” honor cannot be separated from the claimed and paid honor. Given these 
different aspects of honor, we can perhaps also speak of the “felt,” “claimed,” and “paid” aspects 
of gift and love, to which Konstan alludes in the following: 
The idea of philia – “love” or “friendship” – extended over or underpinned a 
range of transactions running from a purely altruistic benefaction – our idea of a 
freely bestowed gift – to commercial or (as we might see it) quasi-commercial 
exchanges that looked to realizing some remuneration or even gain…34 
 
 
We italicize “running from … to …” to stress the different modes of existence of gift and 
love. As Yochanan Muffs has highlighted the felt and paid aspects of love in the legal texts of 
Ancient Near Eastern documents, he also stresses the felt aspect in the giving and receiving of 
gifts (see section 5 in chapter 1). Muffs even refers to 2 Cor. 9:5-7 as an illustration of his 
argument to underscore the indispensable element of chara (“joy”), which is closely related to 
charis, in the acts of giving and receiving to signify an inner attitude of volition and 
willingness.35 Likewise, in his analysis of the relation of charis with the verb ןנח (“grace”) and 
דֶסֶח (“loving kindness”) in the Hebrew Bible, Walther Zimmerli mentions the “heart-felt” quality 
of these Hebrew words. Zimmerli further argues that the noun ןֵח (which is different from the 
verb ןנח that “indicates the gracious act from the standpoint of the giver”) “manifests a wholly 
astonishing detachment from the giver and his gracious act and relates the value established 
prestation. You cannot pay for a favor in any way or it ceases to be one, you can only thank, though on a later 
occasion you can demonstrate gratitude by making an equally ‘free’ gift in return.” Ibid., 231. 
34 See David Konstan, “‘Can’t Buy Me Love,’” 102. Emphasis added. 
35 In his summary, Muffs writes, “the volitional metaphors of love and joy found in a wide range of legal situations, 
but their distribution in seemingly non-legal contexts is much wider than the traditional legalist would ever expect: 
not only Deuteronomy and Chronicles, but Ben Sirah and Philo, the sermons of Paul, early and late rabbinic midrash 
and piyyut, Jewish and Christian liturgy, Samaritan marriage documents and early Arabic deeds of sale.” See 
Yochanan Muffs, Love and Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel (New York and Jerusalem: The 
Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992), 122. 
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thereby to the recipient.”36 When it comes to דֶסֶח, Zimmerli notes that it “always contains an 
element of spontaneous freedom in the demonstration of goodness or in kindly conduct, and it 
cannot be reduced to what is owed or to a duty.”37 The heart-felt quality of דֶסֶח is further stressed 
by Uriah Kim as an “act of ‘affection and kindness’ that a person can perform for another for the 
sake of God or for the sake of human solidarity, irrespective of whether or not there is a close 
relationship between them.”1000F38  
 It is perhaps because of these aspects of charis that James Harrison, in his analysis of the 
usage of charis in Jewish and Greco-Roman sociopolitical and religious contexts, finds that 
“[a]lmost universally, Paul uses χάρις and its cognates in a benefaction context, but at times with 
reserve as far as reciprocity is concerned.”39 Note the “but,” which for us manifests the felt 
aspect of charis that cannot be systematized. It appears that while Harrison argues that “Paul 
36 See Walther Zimmerli, “χάρις κτλ.,” in TDNT 9: 379. “In the ןֵח given by Yahweh there is no longer reflected the 
relation between giver and recipient but that between the bearer of ןֵח and a third person in whose eyes the ןֵח of him 
who bears it has its effect.” Ibid., 380. 
37 Ibid., 382. Different from ןנח, “in which we have movement from the one to the other but not maintaining of a 
relation of fellowship,” דֶסֶח “presupposes an ongoing fellowship.” Idem. 
38 See Uriah Y. Kim, Identity and Loyalty in the David Story: A Postcolonial Reading (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix 
Press, 2008), 27. For a very helpful review of scholarship on ḥesed, see pages 30-60. 
39 See James R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Greco-Roman Context (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 
2. At the very beginning of his monograph, Harrison clearly states: “This thesis will argue that the Graeco-Roman 
benefaction context of χάρις is the backdrop for Paul’s understanding of divine and human grace. Paul’s language of 
grace would have been assessed by his auditors against the hellenistic reciprocity system that shaped the rituals of 
giving and receiving throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin. This was, after all, the area in which Paul founded 
and pastored his fledgling house churches. Paul’s Gentile converts were intimately familiar with the operations of 
Hellenistic beneficence. To be sure, the Roman patronal system was well known in the Greek East, initially through 
the benefactions of the republican luminaries and later through the munificence of the Caesars. But the traditional 
benefaction system of the Greek city-states continued to flourish well into the imperial period, along with its 
reciprocity conventions and terminology.” See James R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Greco-Roman 
Context, 1. He continues, “Paul’s Jewishness would not have insulated him against the impact of hellenistic 
reciprocity ideology. The very fact that Paul, in sharp contrast to the LXX, chose χάρις (‘grace’) over against ἔλεος 
(‘mercy’) as his central description of beneficence (divine and human) should alert us to this. Whereas ḥesed 
(‘mercy’) was the most frequently used Hebrew word for covenantal beneficence in the Old Testament, Paul rarely 
employs its LXX equivalents (ἔλεος, ἐλεεῖν). Instead, unexpectedly, he magnifies χάρις and its cognates…” Ibid., 2. 
Regarding Philo and Josephus, Harrison writes: “Both authors use an extensive range of inscriptional benefaction 
terminology and motifs (including χάρις) in contexts of human and divine beneficence. Philo leans towards a 
Graeco-Roman conception of merit in describing covenantal χάρις, whereas Josephus excises any LXX reference to 
covenantal χάρις and dresses the Old Testament narrative in benefaction garb. Each author critiques the Graeco-
Roman understanding of beneficence. Philo caricatures the χάριτες of the benefaction system and contrasts this in 
Stoic manner with the unconditioned generosity of God. Josephus compares the character of the true God with the 
χάριτες of the pagan gods and moralises about the self-interest of Graeco-Roman beneficence.” Ibid., 165-66. 
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endorses conventions from the honorific inscriptions that stress the obligation of the beneficiary 
to respond worthily of the Benefactor,”40 he considers (1) “Paul’s emphasis on the unilateral 
nature of divine grace,”41 (2) “Paul’s portrait of God as a dishonoured Benefactor (Rom. 1: 21-
22),”42 (3) “Paul’s avoidance of the inscriptional language of commensurability (ἄξιος, κατάξιος) 
in conjunction with the language of grace,” 43  etc. as Paul’s critique of the patronage and 
benefaction systems in the Roman Empire. Elsewhere, Harrison further claims that “Paul’s 
presentation of electing grace in Romans is aimed as much at the Julio-Claudian rulers mediating 
divine favours as at contemporary Jewish understandings of election … and the arrogance of 
Gentile Christians towards their Jewish brothers (Rom 11:17–21).”44 In the face of the unilateral 
and superabundant grace of God, Paul, according to Harrison, “continues to affirm the obligation 
of believers to each other and to their Graeco-Roman neighbours. But he transforms the dynamic 
of reciprocity by means of the debt of love.”45 In the language of deSilva, according to whom 
40 Ibid., 287. 
41 Harrison finds that this emphasis “was directed against the idea that God was compelled by acts of human piety to 
reciprocate beneficently, as was the traditional belief in antiquity regarding the Graeco-Roman pantheon and the 
underworld deities of the magical papyri.” Ibid., 18. While this “unilateral nature of divine grace” is important, Paul 
also emphasizes believers’ response and collaboration with God in light of the Christ-event. See John M. Barclay, 
“‘By the Grace of God I Am What I Am’: Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency in 
Paul and His Cultural Environment. Edited by John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (London and New York: 
T&T Clark, 2006), 140-57. Also, see idem., “Grace Within and Beyond Reason: Philo and Paul in Dialogue,” in 
Paul, Grace, and Freedom: Essays in Honor of John K. Riches. Edited by Paul Middleton, Angus Paddison, and 
Karen Wenell (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 9-21. 
42 Given this imagery of the crucified Lord, “what consequence does this have for the social fabric (cf. Rom. 1:24-
32)?” “To what extent did Paul embark on a radical re-definition of the Graceo-Roman honour system?” See James 
R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Greco-Roman Context, 18. 
43 Ibid., 20. “Why does Paul (almost universally) ignore the traditional range of terminology found with χάρις in the 
inscriptions? Why does he so often replace it with the language of abundance in his epistles? Or, more specifically·, 
in the case of Romans, with regnal language?” Ibid., 22. 
44 See James R. Harrison, “Paul, Theologian of Electing Grace,” in Paul and His Theology. Pauline Studies 3. 
Edited by Stanley E. Porter (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), 81. Here, Harrison refers to J. Rufus Fears, Princeps A 
Diis Electus: The Divine Election of the Emperor As A Political Concept at Rome. Papers and Monographs of the 
American Academy in Rome. Vol. 26 (American Academy in Rome, 1977). See James R. Harrison, “Paul, 
Theologian of Electing Grace,” 101-107. 
45 See James R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in Its Greco-Roman Context, 343. 
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charis must be met with charis in the “dance of grace,”46 it is crucial to examine how charis can 
be met by charis in its own logic of charis. For this purpose, we will turn to how charis can be 
conceptualized and configured, in particular in the mode of heteronomy, as Pitt-Rivers points out 
that the logic of charis is “not answerable to coherent reasoning.”47 
(ii) A Gift With(out) Present 
According to The New Oxford American Dictionary, a gift is “a thing given willingly to 
someone without payment” or “a natural ability or talent,”48 and the word “grace” refers to “(in 
Christian belief) the free and unmerited favor of God, as manifested in the salvation of sinners 
and the bestowal of blessings.”49 The tricky part of this definition is the word “free.” According 
to New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language, it primarily means 
“not bound by restrictions, physical, governmental, or moral; exempt from arbitrary domination 
or distinction; independent.”50 It appears that, contrary to this definition of the “gift” as “free,” 
even if a gift is given freely, it can still elicit repayment – such as the bestowal of reputation, 
self-esteem, indebtedness, etc. – when it appears as a gift. Note that the repayment need not only 
46 For deSilva, “Once favor has been shown and gifts conferred, however, the result must invariably be that the 
recipient will show gratitude, will answer ‘grace’ with ‘grace.’ The indicative and the imperative of the New 
Testament are held together by this circle of grace: we must respond generously and fully, for God has given 
generously and fully.” See David A. deSilva, “Patronage and Reciprocity,” 61. 
47 “Grace is a ‘free’ gift, a favor, an expression of esteem, of the desire to please, a product of the arbitrary will, 
human or divine, an unaccountable love. Hence it is gratuitous in yet another sense: that of being not answerable to 
coherent reasoning…” See Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Postscript: The Place of Grace in Anthropology,” 224. 
48 The New Oxford American Dictionary. 2nd ed. Edited by Erin McKean (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 711. 
49 Ibid., 730. 
50 See Funk & Wagnalls: New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English Language. Encyclopedic 
Edition. Edited by Allen Walker Read et al. (Newark, NJ: Publishers International Press, 1982), 503. Other 
meanings include (1) “Not enslaved or in bondage,” (2) “Not believing in or permitting slavery,” (3) “Self-
determining, whether as implying the absence of control through external causes in the form of physical forces, legal 
commands, or moral influences, or as asserting the mysterious and inexplicable spontaneity of the self as possessed 
of so-called free will,” (4) “Having, conferring, or characterized by political liberty,” (5) “Liberated, by reason of 
age, from the authority of parents or guardians,” (6) “Invested with certain franchises,” (7) “Exempt from or not 
subject to,” (8) “Characterized by disregard of conventionality, ceremony, or formality,” (9) “Characterized by 
disregard of duty or propriety,” (10) “Without impediment or restrain,” (11) “Without restriction; especially without 
charge or cost,” (12) “Employing or giving unrestrainedly or without parsimony,” (13) “Expending energy without 
stint; ready and prompt in action or movement without urging,” (14) “Not closely bound to an original or pattern,” 
(15) “Not attached, bound, or fixed,” etc. Idem. 
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come from the receiver, it can also come from the society and the giver her/himself. Derrida’s 
critique of the phenomenality of gift has well illustrated the problem with this “free” notion of 
gift, which for him cannot appear as a present.51 He writes: 
If there is gift, the given of the gift … must not come back to the giving (let us not 
already say to the subject, to the donor). It must not circulate, it must not be 
exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a gift, by the process of 
exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the form of return to the 
point of departure. If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift 
must remain uneconomic. Not that it remains foreign to the circle, but it must keep 
a relation of foreignness to the circle, a relation without relation of familiar 
foreignness. It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is the impossible.52 
 
Lest there be any misunderstanding, Derrida does not say that there is no gift.53 Rather it is in the 
circle of economy, where time is represented as a circle, “that the gift is the impossible.”54 That 
is to say, the gift, “if there is any,” “must not circulate,” “must not come back to the giving,” 
because if it does, the gift disappears. In fact, the three elements that constitute the conditions of 
possibility of gift – namely, the giver, gift, and receiver – also constitute the conditions of 
impossibility of gift. When a gift is understood in terms of the giver, gift, and receiver – since 
one cannot speak of gift without them – an identification of these elements can “come back to 
the giving,” which means that the gift is not freely given. It has strings attached to it.55 
51 Horner argues that the notion of “freedom” and “presence” are the two fundamental issues that undergird the 
discussion of gift. See Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 3-6. 
52 See Jacques Derrida, Given Time, 7. 
53 For example, Derrida clarifies: “I never said that there is no gift. No. I said exactly the opposite. What are the 
conditions for us to say there is a gift, if we cannot determine it theoretically, phenomenologically? It is through the 
experience of the impossibility; that its possibility is possible as impossible.” See “On the Gift: A Discussion 
between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion” (Moderated by Richard Kearney), in God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernism, 60. 
54 This is why immediately before this citation, Derrida writes, “Now the gift, if there is any, would no doubt be 
related to economy. One cannot treat the gift, this goes without saying, without treating this relation to economy, 
even to the money economy. But is not the gift, if there is any, also that which interrupts economy? That which, in 
suspending economic calculation, no longer gives rise to exchange? That which opens the circle so as to defy 
reciprocity or symmetry, the common measure, and so as to turn aside the return in view of the – no-return?” See 
Jacques Derrida, Given Time, 7. 
55 As the gift cannot be (a) present, Derrida argues that an absolute forgetting is constitutive of gift. Ibid., 15-23. 
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For Derrida, this paradox of gift does not mean that the gift can “[remain] foreign to the 
circle” of economy, as if it can be outside the circle. If it does, then one cannot speak of it. Yet, 
one does speak of it, but in the sense that it “must keep a relation of foreigners to the circle, a 
relation without relation of familiar foreigners.” Thus right after the above citation, Derrida 
continues, “Not impossible but the impossible. The very figure of the impossible. It announces 
itself, gives itself to be thought as the impossible.”56 Note the word “figure,” which we can 
understand in terms of a semantic, not syntactic, metaphor (see sections 3 and 4 in chapter 2) that 
signifies meaning discursively as a meaning effect. This notion of gift as the figure of the 
impossible is further fleshed out by Derrida. He writes: 
In order for there to be gift, gift event, some “one” has to give some “thing” to 
someone other, without which “giving” would be meaningless. In other words, if 
giving indeed means what, in speaking of it among ourselves, we think it means, 
then it is necessary, in a certain situation, that some “one” give some “thing” to 
some “one other,” and so forth. This appears tautological, it goes without saying, 
and seems to imply the defined term in the definition, which is to say it defines 
nothing at all. Unless the discreet introduction of “one” and of “thing” and 
especially of “other” (“someone other”) does not portend some disturbance in the 
tautology of a gift that cannot be satisfied with giving or with giving (to) itself [se 
donner] without giving something (other) to someone (other).57 
 
Here, the semantic elements that are implicit in Greimas’s (syntactic) actantial model is readily 
seen (see section 3.3.c in the Methodological Appendix). How? We will refer to Derrida again. 
Let us suppose that someone wants or desires to give to someone. In our logic and 
our language we say it thus: someone wants or desires, someone intends-to-give 
something to someone. Already the complexity of the formula appears formidable. 
It supposes a subject and a verb, a constituted subject, which can also be 
56 Ibid., 7. Derrida explains, “If we are going to speak of it [i.e., the impossible], we will have to name something. 
Not to present the thing, here the impossible, but to try with its name, or with some name, to give an understanding 
of or to think this impossible thing, this impossible itself. To say we are going to ‘name’ is perhaps already or still to 
say too much. For it is perhaps the name of name that is going to find itself put in question. If, for example, the gift 
were impossible, the name or noun ‘gift,’ what the linguist or the grammarian believes he recognizes to be a name, 
would not be a name. At least, it would not name what one thinks it names, to wit, the unity of a meaning that would 
be that of the gift. Unless the gift were the impossible but not the unnameable or the unthinkable, and unless in this 
gap between the impossible and the thinkable a dimension opens up where there is gift…” Ibid., 10. 
57 Ibid., 11-12. 
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collective … in any case, a subject identical to itself and conscious of its identity, 
indeed seeking through the gesture of the gift to constitute its own unity and, 
precisely, to get its own identity recognized so that that identity comes back to it, 
so that it can reappropriate its identity: as its property.58 
 
As noted, in an actantial model, when a “subject” gives an “object” to a “receiver,” the “subject” 
is helped or opposed by the actant “helper” or “opponent” – which also includes time, space, 
knowledge, ability, and will – in giving the “object” to the “receiver.” In fact, the “subject” is not 
only sent by the “sender” to perform such a giving, s/he may also be moved by the “object” 
and/or the “receiver” to do so. The example of a lover giving “love” to the beloved is a case in 
point. Here, the “subject” is de-subjectified by the “beloved” (the intended “receiver”) and/or by 
the “being in love” feeling (the “object”) as s/he is attracted – that is, no longer acting as a 
“subject” but a “receiver” of such an attraction –  to show her/his love toward the beloved. In this 
scenario, the giver is also the receiver. Similarly, the “receiver” of love given by the “subject” 
can also be the “sender” who moves the “subject” to give her/his love to the “receiver.” 
Regarding the love (i.e., the “object”) that the lover desires to give, it cannot be exhausted by the 
gift that the lover wants to give to the beloved. It is only a manifestation of love. It is not love 
itself. Derrida speaks of the complicated relation among giver, gift, and receiver in the following:  
These three elements, identical to themselves or on the way to an identification 
with themselves, look like what is presupposed by every gift event. For the gift to 
be possible, for there to be gift event, according to our common language and 
logic, it seems that this compound structure is indispensable. Notice that in order 
to say this, I must already suppose a certain precomprehension of what gift means. 
I suppose that I know and that you know what “to give,” “gift,”  
 “donor,” “donee” mean in our common language. As well as “to want,” “to 
desire,” “to intend.”59 
58 Ibid., 10-11. 
59 Ibid., 11. The self-deconstructive relation of gift and desire is also highlighted in a middle voice by Jean-Luc 
Nancy, “Gift, Desire. ‘Agathon,’” in The Sense of the World. Translated and Foreword by Jeffrey S. Librett 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 50-53. Nancy finds that “the pure desire of the gift can 
only be a desire without object, incapable of ‘envisaging’ in any way whatsoever that which, of the gift and in the 
gift, must remain foreign not only to the giver but also – absolutely surprising – to the receiver of the gift. The desire 
of the gift programs an appropriation from which the gift as gift escapes – and desire as well. How could one 
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Given this inherent ambiguity in what it means for some “one” to give some “thing” to 
some “one other” – where “one,” “thing,” and “one other” cannot be objectified and neatly 
identified – Derrida finds that “the conditions of possibility of the gift (that some ‘one’ gives 
some ‘thing’ to some ‘one other’) designate simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of 
the gift.”60 Note that here Derrida is not talking about the gift as such but the conditions of the 
(possibility and impossibility of the) gift, which is one of the complaints that Marion has against 
his teacher.61 In light of these conditions, Derrida concludes:  
appropriate a gift? Reciprocally, the gift given to desire, in order to be a gift given to what desires in desire, cannot 
give anything that would fulfill desire. It has to be a gift of desire itself. The appropriation of giving and the giving 
of the inappropriable configure the originary chiasmus of philosophy – and of sense… the desire of the gift should 
desire essentially not to appropriate its ‘object,’ and that the gift of desire should give that which cannot be given 
and should give no ‘subject’ of an ‘object.’” Ibid., 52. 
60 See Jacques Derrida, Given Time, 12. Derrida writes, “The simple intention to give, insofar as it carries the 
intentional meaning of the gift, suffices to make a return payment to oneself. The simple consciousness of the gift 
right away sends itself back the gratifying image of goodness or generosity, of the giving-being who, knowing itself 
to be such, recognizes itself in a circular, specular fashion, in a sort of auto-recognition, self-approval, and 
narcissistic gratitude. And this is produced as soon as there is a subject, as soon as donor and donee are constituted 
as identical, identifiable subjects, capable of identifying themselves by keeping and naming themselves. It is even a 
matter, in this circle, of the movement of subjectivation, of the constitutive retention of the subject that identifies 
with itself. The becoming-subject then reckons with itself, it enters into the realm of the calculable as subject. That 
is why, if there is gift, it cannot take place between two subjects exchanging objects, things, or symbols. The 
question of the gift should therefore seek its place before any relation to the subject, before any conscious or 
unconscious relation to self of the subject … There where there is subject and object, the gift would be excluded. A 
subject will never give an object to another subject. But the subject and the object are arrested effects of the gift, 
arrests of the gift. At the zero or infinite speed of the circle. If the gift is annulled in the economic odyssey of the 
circle as soon as it appears as gift or as soon as it signifies itself as gift, there is no longer any ‘logic of the gift,’ and 
one may safely say that a consistent discourse on the gift becomes impossible: It misses its object and always speaks, 
finally, of something else.” Ibid., 23-24. 
61 Marion writes: “How can this be understood, if the ‘conditions of the possibility of the gift … simultaneously 
designate the conditions of the impossibility of the gift?’ Quite simply, one can note that this objection contains its 
own refutation: it only establishes the conditions under which the gift becomes impossible. In no way does it 
establish that what thus becomes impossible merits the name of gift. I respond, therefore, that the conditions of 
impossibility only prove that what was studied does not merit the title of gift and that, if there is to be a gift, it will 
necessarily have other conditions of possibility than this, namely, conditions of impossibility. Positively, this means 
that the gift is not given in the system of exchange maintained by the reciprocity that links giver and recipient: in 
this supposed economy of gift, it is the letter of the gift that one saves [fait l’économie] by transforming it into a 
subsistent being, permanently present, accorded value (of use and/or exchange) and finality  (useful, without end, 
etc.), produced or destroyed by efficiency and calculation, shut in by the stranglehold of its causes, in short, by 
transforming it into a common being. Such a common being can never appear as a gift, not because the concept of 
gift is contradictory but precisely because this being in no way gives rise to a gift. Any effort that tries to begin with 
an already obvious and settled concept of ‘gift’ in order to reach the gift never analyzes anything other than a 
common being under this name.” See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift” 
(translated by John Conley and Danielle Poe), in The Visible and the Revealed (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), 87-88. 
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At the limit, the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the donee or to the 
donor. It cannot be gift as gift except by not being present as gift. Neither to the 
“one” nor to the “other.” If the other perceives or receives it, if he or she keeps it 
as gift, the gift is annulled. But the one who gives it must not see it or know it 
either; otherwise he begins, at the threshold, as soon as he intends to give, to pay 
himself with a symbolic recognition, to praise himself, to approve of himself, to 
gratify himself, to congratulate himself, to give back to himself symbolically the 
value of what he thinks he has given or what he is preparing to give.62 
  
For Antonio Malo, this insistence on the non-identification of the giver and receiver is not 
practical in our everyday life. As we are “corporal relational beings, we are needy and at the 
same time able to give. We can give because we have first received from others.”63 Derrida 
would not disagree with Malo, as he also speaks of our indebtedness to our heritage.64 But, the 
issue is the “what” the “giver” (if it can be clearly identified) gives and the “receiver” (if it can 
be clearly identified) receives. Does the “receiver” receive exactly “what” the “giver” intends to 
give? If not, then how do we speak of the “gift”? However, Malo’s point is well taken, in 
62 See Jacques Derrida, Given Time, 14. This critique of the presence of the gift is further tied to the notions of 
secrecy, mystery, responsibility, and sacrifice in Derrida’s reading of the works of Jan Patočka. See Jacques Derrida, 
The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 29-34, 
40-46, 51, 61-64, etc. 
63 See Antonio Malo, “The Limits of Marion’s and Derrida’s Philosophy of the Gift,” International Philosophy 
Quarterly 52.2 Issue 206 (June 2012): 149-68 (165). 
64 For example, Derrida argues that “the heir must always respond to a sort of double injunction, a contradictory 
assignation: It is necessary first of all to know and to know how to reaffirm what comes ‘before us,’ which we 
therefore receive even before choosing, and to behave in this respect as a free subject … What does it mean to 
reaffirm? It means not simply accepting this heritage but relaunching it otherwise and keeping it alive … This 
reaffirmation, which both continues and interrupts, resembles (at least) an election, a selection, a decision.” Jacques 
Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Choosing One’s Heritage,” in For What Tomorrow … : A Dialogue. Translated 
by Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3-4. In other words, for Derrida, the gift is a matter “of 
responding faithfully but also as rigorously as possible both to the injunction or the order of the gift (‘give’ [‘donne’]) 
as well as to the injunction or the order of meaning (presence, science, knowledge): Know still what giving wants to 
say, know how to give, know what you want and want to say when you give, know what you intend to give, know 
how the gift annuls itself, commit yourself [engage-toi] even if commitment is the destruction of the gift by the gift, 
give economy its chance.” See Jacques Derrida, Given Time, 30. Or, in the words of Caputo: “Know everything that 
is about in the gift, know how the gift is surreptitiously converted into economy, know how much the gift is inclined 
to produce the circle of debt, know all of this – and then give. Don’t give up, give! For the gift does not belong to the 
order of truth as knowledge but to the order of the event, of doing or making the truth, facere veritatem, and the 
same thing that is said of ‘give’ can be said of ‘love.’” See John D. Caputo, “Love Among the Deconstructibles: A 
Response to Gregg Lambert,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 5.2 (April 2004): 37-57 (56). 
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particular as he speaks of the love and care that one receives in different stages of life. He 
continues: 
Without the giving of others (nourishment, physical and spiritual care, love) we 
cannot develop ourselves as humans: we cannot walk, speak, love. Later on, 
without giving we cannot nourish as personalities: as friend, husband/wife, 
father/mother. Although receiving physical and spiritual care and giving love 
have in many cases a different referent (a receiver and a giver), they are equally 
necessary for us – not only because for each of us to be loved and to love are 
equally necessary, but above all because the virtues that others put into practice to 
love us are the same as those that we need to acquire in order to love others. So, 
both receiving and giving are needed in a double way: naturally and ethically. In 
other words, the mutual exchanges of giving and receiving are necessary not only 
in an economic and social way, but in every personal relation, especially in 
human love, where eros and agape are two faces of the same love.65 
 
In saying that “the mutual exchanges of giving and receiving are necessary not only in an 
economic and social way, but in every personal relation, especially in human love,” Malo points 
to different modes of existence, which then highlights the priority of the mode of heteronomy in 
Derrida’s notion of gift. The question is not that “mutual exchanges” contradict the notion of gift 
as “free.” Rather the question is: In what mode of existence are they understood? As we have 
noted, heteronomy does not exclude mutuality (see section 2 in chapter 1). Cristina Grenholm’s 
example of an asymmetrical but mutual relationship between the pregnant woman and her child 
is a case in point.66 In giving care, love, protection, and nourishment to the child, it is unlikely 
that the mother thinks that she is “giving” to the child; the child is not only part of her life (inside 
her), the child is her (life). In fact, as the “what” that the mother gives and that the child receives 
cannot be objectified, it is strange to speak of an economy between the mother and her child. The 
relationship can certainly be thought in such a way, but it is a syntactic assertion or negation of 
the mother-child semantic relationship. The relationship between the mother and her child is in 
65 See Antonio Malo, “The Limits of Marion’s and Derrida’s Philosophy of the Gift,” 165. 
66 See Cristina Grenholm, Motherhood and Love: Beyond the Gendered Stereotype of Theology. Translated by Marie 
Tåqvist (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 27-60, 162-88. 
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the mode of middle voice without a clear distinction between the giver and receiver. In the words 
of Derrida, “No one knows who is thanking whom for what.”67 
In his response to Derrida’s analysis of what constitutes the conditions of gift,68 Marion 
argues that one can phenomenologically reduce – that is, re-ducere (“to lead back”) – the gift to 
its pure givenness that gives the gift itself (cf. Fundamental Semantics) (not constrained by 
metaphysics and the Heideggerian question of Being)69 “by bracketing the transcendence of the 
giver, the transcendence of the recipient, and the transcendence of the objectivity of the 
exchanged object.”70 For example, in showing that the gift cannot be objectified in our lived 
67 See “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion” (Moderated by Richard Kearney), 
in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 77. 
68 For Marion, Derrida’s analysis is based on the principle of sufficient reason that governs the law of economy. He 
writes, “Let me underline more than Derrida does that this schema, which dominates all the anthropologies of the 
gift (first among them that of Mauss) remains entirely metaphysical: the giver gives the gift as an efficient cause, 
uses a formal cause and a material cause (corresponding to the gift), following a final cause (the good of the 
recipient and/or the glory of the giver). These four causes permit givenness to satisfy the principle of sufficient 
reason. Reciprocity repeats this sufficient reason right up to the perfect application of the principle of identity in 
bringing the gift back to itself. It is also by reference to this model that one can measure all the apparently extreme 
or aberrant forms of givenness, which never really put anything into question. Thinking through givenness always 
comes down to thinking about the system of exchange, regulated by the terms of causality and the principles of 
metaphysics. Now as Derrida firmly demonstrates, this model not only enters into self-contradiction with each of its 
elements, but it actually succeeds in making givenness disappear entirely. The very phenomenon of givenness 
collapses before our eyes.” See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 81-82. For 
details on Marion’s phenomenological analysis of the gift, see Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness. Translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky. Cultural Memory in the Present series (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 71-118. In this chapter, we will just focus on “Sketch of a Phenomenological 
Concept of the Gift.” 
69 For a succinct and informative representation of Marion’s reduction of the gift to givenness, ultimately in an 
amorous relationship in which the lover and beloved give each other her/his flesh (that is, the lover to the beloved 
and the beloved to the lover) as they receive each other’s and their own when they encounter each other face to face 
in the giving and receiving at the same time, see Christina Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion: Exceeding 
Metaphysics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 205-224. For a debate between Derrida and Marion 
on the notion of givenness (Gegebenheit), see “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion” (Moderated by Richard Kearney), 66-73. 
70 He continues, “If one can manage to practice εποχη on the gift, it will be practiced by liberating the gift from the 
terms and the status of object, from any notion of transcendence or of economic exchange. Thus, it will lead the gift 
back to pure and simple givenness, at least if such a givenness can occur. In this operation, the reduction of the gift 
to givenness does not come about despite the triple objection raised against the gift by Derrida but quite clearly 
because of it: the alleged ‘conditions of the impossibility of gift’ (neither recipient nor giver nor gift) would actually 
become the conditions for the possibility of the gift’s reduction to pure givenness, by εποχη of the transcendent 
conditions of economic exchange.” Ibid., 89. Caputo points out that Derrida and Marion “have very different 
conceptions of just what constitutes an ‘economy’ of the gift … Marion does not dispute the contention that from the 
very moment that any of the three elements of the gift [i.e., the giver, receiver, and the gift] appear the movement of 
debt is set in motion. That does not present a problem to Marion because debt enters into the very definition of the 
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experience, Marion foregrounds the “givability” (with respect to the giver) and “acceptability” 
(with respect to the receiver) of gift and argues for the conditions of impossibility of gift as the 
conditions of possibility of gift.71 For Marion, however, the gift does not appear “at the moment” 
when the giver gives it to someone. Rather, it appears “at the moment” when the giver finds it 
“for the first time” to be “givable.”72 In other words, the giver becomes the giver when s/he 
responds to the gift in recognizing its givability. Marion writes, “The gift decides the giver. The 
gift itself decides: it resides in the decision of the giver, but this decision rests upon the 
obligation motivated by an anterior gift.”73 One can object that it is not the gift that gives itself in 
its giving but the giver who decides the gift as givable. But we cannot deny our lived experience 
of being drawn to a gift that we find givable. 
Similarly, when it comes to the gift-receiver, Marion contends that as the gift can be 
refused or overlooked, we need to address the “acceptability” of gift. A gift may be imposed 
upon the receiver, but if the receiver refuses or ignores it, it “could not fulfill itself perfectly, 
although it does fulfill the real conditions of givability (objectivity, availability, etc.).”74 On the 
other hand, even if a gift is not given, its “availability” can be provoked when the receiver 
gift for him – ‘donability,’ he says, means the duty (devoir) to give – while for Derrida debt is poison to the gift, 
Vergiftung, and the very definition of economy, which annuls the gift. For Marion, to escape economy it is enough to 
give a non-objectivistic phenomenological description of the gift outside the chain of the four causes [see note 69], 
while for Derrida the defining feature of an economy of exchange is the link or chain between credit and debt, even 
if the chain (catena, cadeau) is composed of invisible-moral links, not causal or objectivistic ones… Marion is 
worrying about causality, Derrida about credit.” See John D. Caputo, “Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the 
Gift in Derrida and Marion,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, 212. 
71 For a sustained evaluation of Derrida’s and Marion’s notion of the gift, see Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift. 
While Horner’s evaluation leans towards Derrida’s position, Gschwandtner’s evaluation is more hospitable. See 
Christina Gschwandtner, Reading Jean-Luc Marion, 59-76.  
72 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 91. 
73 Ibid., 92. 
74 Idem. Here, we can think of Butler’s interpretation of Althusser’s notion of “interpellation” that seeks to subvert 
the attempted subjugation of interpellation. See Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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accepts it as gift.75 Here, we can think of the phenomenon of “unintended meaning” in our 
process of meaning production,76 in particular in the case of hidden and public transcripts.77 For 
Marion, in fact, in recognizing and deciding the givability of gift, the giver is already a gift-
receiver, since “making oneself a giver cannot be decided without the obligation (weighing upon 
the giver) of the gift that [s/he] has first received.”78 Here, one can complain that the recognition 
can be egocentric. But, for Marion, the recognition, like anamorphosis, is iconic as the viewer 
needs to her/his perspective accordingly to the viewpoint demanded by the “object.” 
Given this phenomenological reduction of gift to givenness, Marion wants to show that 
the gift still takes place in our lived experience even with the bracketing of the receiver and giver. 
Marion further argues that “the bracketing of the recipient belongs intrinsically to the possibility 
of gift,”79 because there is no receiver to restrict and inscribe it into an economy of exchange. 
75 “If we reflect upon the business of love, it often happens that acceptance provokes the availability of the gift; 
acceptance does not always hinge on the banal duplicity of seduction, but often on the evidence that I, I alone and 
more than another, affirm the capacity to let myself be seduced and freely consent to this seduction, like a call 
inverting the usual chronology. I consent to the possibility of a gift of this person and not of another to me, thus 
provoking his or her availability.” See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 93. 
76 As Marion uses the example of the “reception of the call,” we can think of the relationship of call and response 
between God and believers in 1 Corinthians (see section 4 in chapter 1). We find that Marion’s notions of 
“givability” and “acceptability” echo his notion of “self” as a “dative self” in which the self is a dynamic product 
and production in the sense of being called and responsive to the call (see section 4 in the Introduction chapter). The 
“self” is not only de-subjectified by the call; s/he also manifests the calls as s/he registers and reconstitutes the call. 
77 See James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1990). 
78 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 91. Marion writes, “Seeing the gift 
implies seeing it from the starting point of givenness. If the gift decides itself, it decides from the power of givenness, 
which weighs equally upon the giver and the recipient. Both only devote themselves [s’adonnent] to the gift 
inasmuch as they yield to the moment of givenness. The instant power of givenness makes the gift determine itself 
as gift through the double consent of the giver and of the recipient, who are less often agents of the gift and are more 
often acted upon by givenness.” Ibid., 94. One may argue that the “seeing” is already an interpretation, which then is 
perspectival, if not also ideological, but for Marion, hermeneutics “involves less a gift of meaning than the meaning 
of gift – coming from the gift, or rather, seeing the fact as a gift, because it is envisioned from the starting point of 
givenness.” Idem. 
79 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 95. One may wonder whether this 
bracketing supports Derrida’s argument that the gift cannot appear as such, in particular if the notion of gift is 
constituted by the giver, receiver, and gift. 
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Marion uses three figures – i.e., an enemy, an ungrateful person, and an anonymous person – to 
show the necessity, possibility, and desirability to bracket the receiver.80 
First, citing Luke 6:33 – “If you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that 
to you?” (ποία ὑμῖν χάρις ἐστίν) – Marion points out that since the gift “would lose all gratuity 
and hence also all grace if it were given to a recipient liable to ‘return’ it,”81 one’s enemy 
becomes “the ally of the gift”82 as s/he is incapable or unwilling to reciprocate the gift that s/he 
has received. Even when one’s enemy rejects the gift, the refusal indirectly attests to the 
(appearance of the) gift. Secondly, as Marion cites John 4:10 – “… If you knew the gift of God 
(τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ θεοῦ)…” – to show that the gift can be ignored or unacknowledged. But, even if 
someone is ungrateful, her/his ingratitude reveals her/his encountering with the gift.83 Thirdly, 
referring to Matthew 25:37 (cf. v. 44) – “… Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you or 
thirsty and gave you drink?” – Marion speaks of the desirability of an invisible receiver in a 
situation where the figure who wants to be received and whom people want to receive and yet 
fail to receive or fail to realize that they have received. For Marion, the anonymity of the receiver 
in the case of Matthew 25:31-46 not only universalizes the gift, since no one can tell through 
whom Christ works and hence must treat everyone as if s/he were Christ. It also lets the gift give 
“without making distinctions between people, in complete indifference to the recipient’s merit or 
80 Here, we find that Paul’s description of the crucified Christ echoes Marion’s illustration of these figures. For 
example, the world undoubtedly wants to receive the (hidden) wisdom of God and the Lord of glory, but because of 
ignorance, it killed him (1 Cor. 2:8). Indeed, because the world has its own notion of wisdom and power, it rejects 
and against the wisdom of God (1:21), even though God, Holy Spirit, and Jesus apparently want people to receive 
and acknowledge the call of God into the fellowship of Jesus (1:9; 2:2; 12:3). In spite of the world’s derision, 
rejection, and condemnation, the call of God remains, as God is pistos (cf. 1:9, 10:13). 
81 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of the Gift,” 95. 
82 Ibid., 96. 
83 Marion writes, “The ungrateful person suffers from the principle and the very possibility that a gift might affect 
and come to him or her. He does not refuse this or that gift with this or that objective support; he refuses the debt, or 
rather, the self-avowal of being indebted. In his obstinate effort to reestablish the principle that ‘I owe no one 
anything,’ he thus confirms a contrario the sudden appearance of the gift, which decides itself from itself and which 
places this principle in question. By this principle, the ungrateful person reveals negatively the gift reduced to 
givenness in all of its purity.” Ibid., 97. 
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demerit, in perfect ignorance of any possible reciprocity (in other words, in complete conformity 
with the gratuity of givenness).”84 
In the case of charity and inheritance, the figures of an anonymous receiver and of an 
anonymous giver share similar qualities. Just as the receiver is unknown to the giver in the case 
of charity, the giver is also unknown to the receiver in the case of inheritance. For Derrida, as we 
noted, both these scenarios do not make the gift “free” without presence. As long as the giver is 
aware of her/his gift, the gift disappears. In the case of the anonymous giver, the situation is 
worse because now the receiver is forever indebted since s/he will never be able to repay the 
unknown giver. However, citing Matthew 6:3 – “… do not let your left hand know what you 
right hand is doing” – Marion argues that for a “giver who gives according to the mode of 
givenness does not know what he gives.”85 That is to say, the giver is not the “subject” who 
gives, but a “subject” who in “the mode of givenness” accepts the gift and gives accordingly. In 
the words of Marion, “Perhaps [the giver] does not even know if he is giving … He gives not in 
order to know or to make it known or to make himself seen – but rather in order to give.”86 Is 
such a giving is possible? Let us recall Paul’s saying in 1 Cor. 9:16-17: 
For if I gospelize (εὐαγγελίζωμαι), it is not for me a boasting because the 
necessity (ἀνάγκη) presses upon me; for woe to me if I do not gospelize 
(εὐαγγελίσωμαι); for if I do this willingly, I have a wage, but if not willingly, I 
have been entrusted the stewardship (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι). 
 
84 Ibid., 98. For Paul, this last description of the gift poses a tremendous demand upon believers to be always 
vigilant towards the works of God among people. We can see why Paul would go to the Corinthian believers in 
weakness, fear, and much trembling (1 Cor. 2:3). If no one can possibly be responsible and response-able to all 
situations, the discernment and decision that one makes is necessarily delimited, if not also flawed. Perhaps this is 
why Paul desperately wants the pistis of believers to be in the power of God (2:5). Paul realizes that since only the 
spirit from God knows the things of God (2:12), believers must speak of the gifts in the teachings of the spirit as 
they discern spiritual matters with spiritual people (or matters) (λαλοῦμεν ... ἐν δικακτοῖς πνεύματος, πνευματικοῖς 
πνευματικὰ συγκρίνοντες) (2:13). The gifts, in other words, cannot be objectified and possessed. They can only be 
spoken of in the teachings of the spirit. Believers cannot discern by themselves. They must discern spiritual matters 





                                                          
We have already noted the middle voice of “gospelize” (see section 3.3 in chapter 2). “To 
gospelize” does not mean to give the gospel to someone as if one possesses it. Rather, to 
gospelize means to manifest the gospel so that one may become its participant (ἵνα συγ-κοινωνὸς 
αὐτοῦ γένωμαι) (9:23). Herein lies the wage of the gospel. We can go beyond Marion’s 
explanation and say that Paul gospelizes as he is gospelized (i.e., the gospel presses upon him). 
This is why Paul is careful not to gospelize (εὐαγγελίζεσθαι) in the wisdom of logos, lest the 
cross of Christ may be emptied (κενωθῇ) (of its power) (1:17). Paul is aware that he is only a 
medium of the gospel and as a medium he is vigilant that he is not the owner of the gospel, lest 
the (gift of the) gospel is emptied of its potentiality. In the language of Marion, the middle voice 
of “gospelize” points to the bracketing of the receiver and the giver at the same time. 
This notion of giving in terms of “in order to give” introduces a sense of indebtedness in 
Marion’s notion of gift, which then can circum-scribe the gift into an economy of exchange. But 
in his clarification, Marion writes, “The debt here does not designate an act or a situation of the 
self, but rather its state, its definition – possibly, its manner of being.”87 This indebted “manner 
of being,” for Marion, highlights the fact that “[i]t is in recognizing its debt that consciousness 
becomes conscious of itself, because the debt precedes all consciousness and defines the self: the 
self, as such, the self of consciousness, receives itself right away as a gift (given) without giver 
(giving).”88 In a group-oriented culture where everything is always already interrelated, we can 
agree with Marion that “[t]he debt brings about the self so that the self discovers itself already 
there – that is, as a fact and thus as given.”89 The notion of “debt,” in other words, is like a 





                                                          
middle voice that does not clearly define the “subject,” “object,” and “receiver.” The “subject,” 
“object,” and “receiver” co-arise at the same time,90 as they are always already interrelated. 
(iii) The (Conditions) of Possibility of Gift in the Mode of Heteronomy 
Given the ambiguity and ambivalence in the notion of gift – that is, whether a gift is 
really free or disguised as a “down payment” for further benefit – we see instances in Western 
antiquity where gift discourse and terminology were developed to identify different types of gifts 
to ensure that gifts are freely given without obligations and expectations of reciprocation. For 
example, in pointing out different gift-giving relationships, Marcel Hénaff further categorizes 
gifts into three types: (1) “ceremonial,” (2) “gracious,” and (3) “solidarity-based.”91 For Hénaff, 
the first type of gift “is always described as public and reciprocal” with the “lexical field … of 
dosis/antidosis in Greek, in which anti always indicates the action in return that is called for by 
the initial action.”92 The second type is “a spontaneous generosity toward those close to the 
giver” and its “lexical field is that of charis in Greek (one of the primary meanings of which is 
90 Concerning the relation between time and gift, Derrida writes, “There would be a gift only at the instant when the 
paradoxical instant (in the sense in which Kierkegaard says of the paradoxical instant of decision that it is madness) 
tears time apart. In this sense one would never have the time of a gift. In any case, time, the ‘present’ of the gift, is 
no longer thinkable as a now, that is, as a present bound up in the temporal synthesis.” See Jacques Derrida, Given 
Time, 9. This importance of the “instant” comes to the fore in the work of Bourdieu: “It is the lapse of time between 
the gift and the counter-gift that makes it possible to mask the contradiction between the experienced (or desired) 
truth of the gift as generous, gratuitous, unrequited act, and the truth that emerges from the model, which makes it a 
stage in in a relationship of exchange that transcends singular acts of exchange. In other words, the interval that 
makes it possible to experience the objective exchange as a discontinuous series of free and generous acts is what 
makes gift exchange viable and acceptable by facilitating and favoring self-deception, a lie told to oneself, as the 
condition of the coexistence of recognition and misrecognition of the logic of the exchange.” See Pierre Bourdieu, 
“Marginalia – Some Additional Notes on the Gift,” in The Logic of the Gift, 231-32. Through his notion of habitus 
that explains the recognition and misrecognition of the gift that are supported by social conventions, Bourdieu 
criticizes that “if some writers can go so far as to say that the intention of giving destroys the gift … this is 
because … they are seeing the two agents involved in the gift as calculators who assign themselves the subjective 
project of doing what they are objectively doing … an exchange obeying the logic of reciprocity. To put it another 
way, such an analysis puts into the minds of the agents the model that science has had to construct in order to 
account of their practice (here, the model of gift exchange). This amounts to producing a kind of theoretical monster, 
impossible in practice…” Ibid., 234. 
91 See Marcel Hénaff, “Ceremonial Gift-Giving: The Lessons of Anthropology from Mauss and Beyond,” in The 
Gift in Antiquity, 16-17. 
92 Ibid., 16. 
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‘joy’), that of unilateral giving (there is no such thing as ‘anti-charis’).”93 The third type, “as 
opposed to the second, expresses a much more social dimension of generosity toward either 
close associates … or strangers…: this would be the field of the philia or philanthropia 
discussed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics.”94 One may disagree with Hénaff’s classification 
and definition, but our analysis of gift must be diachronic and synchronic. Since the gifts are 
often understood within the system of reciprocity, we will in the following examples show how a 
notion of free gifts was attempted in Roman, early rabbinic, and early Byzantium periods. 
First, in pointing out that “Roman gift practices were not only diffuse but also uniquely 
institutionalized,”95 Coffee argues that “Romans rejected the intrusion of the instrumental, goa1-
directed gift-giving so common the public sphere into affectionate relations between men and 
women. This rejection took the practical form of a legal ban on large gifts between husbands and 
wives.”96 From Coffee’s analysis of Ovid’s love poem that he finds supporting his argument, we 
see that the affective aspect of gift was so widely abused that the Romans had to ban the gifts 
(exchange) in marriage, lest it became utilitarian and transactional, which could then hurt the 
moral integrity of family (cf. Lex Julia). One may find the legal ban ideologically constructed, 
but one cannot deny that the ban shows that certain Romans were concerned with the “misuse” 
of gift in supposedly genuine relationships. This trouble with the gift is also found in early 
rabbinic Judaism, where early rabbis instructed the benefactors to convert their charitable gifts to 
the poor into loans “secured by pledges” so that the poor may not be insulted when receiving 
93 Idem. 
94 Idem. Focusing on the first type of gift, Hénaff argues that the gift functions as a symbolic third party that 
mediates and binds the two parties in the gift-giving relationship together. He writes, “To form an alliance – a pact –
means bringing together one’s own self and the otherness of the other person through a thing that comes from 
oneself and is desirable to the other. This third party brings the two sides together: there is no alliance without an 
Ark of the Covenant. The thing given binds the two parties primarily by bearing witness that the bond has been 
accepted.” Ibid., 20. 
95 See Neil Coffee, “Ovid Negotiates with His Mistress,” 77. 
96 Ibid., 78. 
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them.97 Thirdly, in early Byzantium period, an interpretation of 2 Cor. 9:5-12 that highlights the 
superabundance of God’s grace introduced a gift-giving called “blessing” as “an alternative 
Christian model of disinterested religious gift-giving.”98 Different from “alms” and offerings,” 
the “blessing” not only “made charitable generosity seem easy for all but also made 
asymmetrical giving seem possible without need for replenishing one’s supplies through labor or 
reciprocity.”99 These examples show that the gift, like love, can be thematized and configured in 
various ways that highlight different modes of existence. 
 
III. A Semantic Analysis of Love in 1 Cor. 12:1 –14:40 
In this section we will first address the theme of 12:1–14:40, manifested by the inverted 
parallelism between 12:1-3 and 14:37-40. Then we will present our understanding of the story 
progression from the pairs of opposed actions in the dialogic level (see Appendix 3 in chapter 3) 
so that through this syntactic analysis we can formulate a series of semiotic squares on the topic 
of love for our semantic analysis. 
 
97 “This enabled the poor to save face, maintaining at least the appearance of independence and a modicum of 
personal dignity. It completed the transaction, which, in turn, enabled the giver to fulfill his obligation of ṣedaqah – 
‘a monetary or material support for the living poor (t. Pe’ah 4.19)’ (175). Because gifts were prone to creating 
dependency and other hierarchical relationships that challenged rabbinic ideals of an egalitarian Israelite society, 
converting the gift into a loan diminished this particular threat.” See Gregg E. Gardner, “Charity Wounds: Gifts to 
the Poor in Early Rabbinic Judaism,” in The Gift in Antiquity, 174. 
98 See Daniel F. Caner, “Alms, Blessings, Offerings: The Repertoire of Christian Gifts in Early Byzantium,” in The 
Gift in Antiquity, 25. 
99 Ibid., 28. In his summary of different kinds of gift-giving, Caner writes, “Alms were charitable gifts given either 
to display mercy or to obtain mercy, which it did by prompting positive remembrance among those likely to have 
suffered from a donor’s past transgressions or sins. Because they were closely associated with sin, it was not 
appropriate that they be received by either God or holy people. Offerings were sacrificial gifts given to thank God 
and obtain future benefits through liturgical remembrances of holy people; because such gifts were meant to thank 
God, they could not be given to thank a holy person, and therefore sometimes had to be rejected or converted. 
Fruitbearings, however, though little discussed here, were sacerdotal gifts that seem to have been given to thank 
holy people, perhaps for some intercessory service. Yet, as one example suggests, if given to thank a saint for God’s 
work – a healing performed through a saint – then this too had to be rejected or given away by the saint. Blessings, 
finally, reflected only God’s own divine, impersonal benevolence. They therefore carried no human taint or need to 
reciprocate. This made them ideal not only as charitable gifts but as sacerdotal gifts, whether given by lay people to 
support holy people, or by holy people to support others.” Ibid., 36-37. 
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(i) “A Non-Objectifying Knowing”: An Inverted Parallelism and Its Theme 
The theme of “a non-objectifying knowing” comes to the fore when we examine the 
inverted parallelism between 12:1-3 and 14:37-40. For example, notice all the γινώσκειν-related 
(“to know”) words in these verses. In 12:1, Paul tells believers that he does not want them to be 
ignorant (ἀγνοεῖν) and that he wants to make it known (γνωρίζειν) to them that no one is able 
(δύναται) to say “Jesus is Lord” except in (ἐν) the Holy Spirit (12:3). Likewise, in the end of the 
complete discourse unit, Paul challenges believers: “If anyone thinks that s/he is a prophet or 
spiritual, let her/him acknowledge (ἐπιγινωσκέτω) what I am writing to you is a command of the 
Lord” (14:37).100 “If,” Paul continues, “someone disregards (ἀγνοεῖ), let her/him be disregarded 
(ἀγνοεῖται)” (14:38). These verses show that, for Paul, to know is to be addressed by and to be 
responsive to the other/Other. This echoes 13:12: “I will know fully (ἐπιγνώσομαι) insofar as 
(καθὼς καὶ) I am fully known (ἐπεγνώσθην)” (see section 2 in chapter 2). Indeed, if it is in the 
Holy Spirit that believers are empowered to confess “Jesus is Lord” and if gnosis is the gift of 
God and the spirit (cf. 1:5; 12:8), then believers, including Paul himself, must not think that they 
possess gnosis. They must be able or enabled (empowered by the Holy Spirit) to be addressed 
and corrected by the other/Other. Paul makes this point rather clear in 14:40: “But let everything 
become proper (εὐσχημόνως) and according to order (κατὰ τάξιν).” According to whose order? 
Paul’s? No. Because as Paul mentions, “God is not of disorder (ἀκαταστασίας) but of peace 
(εἰρήνης), as (ὡς) in all the churches of the holy ones” (14:33).101 Paul underscores this God-
orientation in 14:36: “Did the logos of God go out from you or did it go to you only (εἰς ὑμᾶς 
100 For the possibility that the person is a female prophet, see Antoinette Clark Wire, The Corinthian Women 
Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990). 
101 Given that the sociopolitical and military connotations of the words τάξις and εἰρηνη in the Roman Empire, one 
can suggest that Paul is perhaps pitching God’s order against the imperial order. 
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μόνους)?”102 Moreover, in posing the challenge to believers in 14:37 – “If anyone thinks that 
s/he is a prophet or spiritual (πνευματικός)…” – Paul brings us back to the beginning of the 
complete discourse unit: “Περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν …” (12:1). Now, as τῶν πνευματικῶν can be 
a masculine, feminine, or a neuter noun, scholars have debated whether it refers to spiritual 
people or spiritual matters. “Most interpreters, however, believe that the term denotes spiritual 
gifts … This is adopted by AV/KJV, RSV, NRSV, JB, and NIV (cf. NJB, REB, gifts of the 
Spirit).” 103  Ralph Martin and Siegfried Schatzmann further argue that the term πνευματικά 
(when πνευματικῶν is taken as a neuter noun) was used by the Corinthian believers, whereas 
Paul “introduced χάρισμα[τα] as an apostolic corrective.”104 Anthony Thiselton, however, points 
out that “if both the writer and the readers well knew that the Greek ending included both 
genders (i.e., excluded neither), why should the meaning be construed in either-or terms at 
all?”105 
From the perspective of our structural semiotic analysis, we agree that it is not necessary 
to determine whether Paul refers to spiritual people or gifts – actually it is impossible to establish 
it one way or the other. But, we are not surprised by this ambiguity. This ambiguity can help 
Paul get the attention of his enunciatee (i.e., the Corinthian believers) so that, at least, they will 
102 For Odell-Scott, 14:36 is Paul’s reply to the Corinthian saying to refute “the self-righteous assumptions of the 
men voiced in vv 34 & 35.” See David W. Odell-Scott, A Post-Patriarchal Christology. AAR Academy Series 78 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991), 188. Odell-Scott further points out that “when the text was transcribed into 
Byzantine characters and punctuation, the H which introduces v 36 was marked to be a particle ἤ and not an adverb 
ἦ.” Ibid., 186. Iannaccone also argues that 14:34-35 is a quotation that Paul retorts in 14:36. See Laurence R. 
Iannaccone, “Let the Women Be Silent,” Sunstone 7 (May-June 1982): 38-45. 
103 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids, 
MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2000), 909-10. 
104 Siegfried S. Schatzmann, A Pauline Theology of Charismata, 4. As of the relationship between πνευματικά and 
χαρίσματα, some claim that they are “completely synonymous,” others a “qualified synonymity between the two 
terms,” or “not equivalent” to each other. Ibid., 6-7. As of the meaning of χάρισμα, Schatzmann lists five 
possibilities: (1) “concrete expression of grace” (cf. Ernst Käsemann), (2) “experiential” (cf. James Dunn), (3) 
“idealistic-naturalistic” (cf. F. C. Baur), (4) “dogmatic-institutional” (cf. Karl Rahner), and (5) “multiplex” (cf. John 
Koenig). For details, see pages 7-10. Also, see Ralph P. Martin, The Spirit and the Congregation: Studies in 1 
Corinthians 12-15 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984), 65. 
105 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 910. 
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hear him out. We find a similar situation in the complete discourse unit of 11:17-34 when we 
read Paul telling believers that “it is necessary for haireseis to exist among them” (11:19) (see 
chapter 5). The ambiguous meaning of haireseis could lead the Corinthian believers, both the 
wealthier and the less well-off, to think that Paul is speaking from their perspective. But as 
believers continue to listen, they are then put in a position to hear what Paul wants to say about 
haireseis, namely that the differences (and thus the choices that become apparent when they 
gather together) can help them not to objectify their relationship with the other/Other. So perhaps 
Paul’s usage of τῶν πνευματικῶν in 12:1 has similar effects. Yet at the end of the complete 
discourse unit in 14:37 the word πνευματικός may lend support to the argument that τῶν 
πνευματικῶν in 12:1 refers to spiritual people. Yet our position is that in using τῶν πνευματικῶν, 
Paul is simultaneously pointing to both spiritual people and spiritual gifts. This becomes clear in 
light of our discussions of the constitution of gift through the interaction of giver, receiver, and 
gift. Since, for Paul, none of the three constitutive elements of gift can be objectified – they only 
interact “in love,” when to give is to receive and to receive is to give for the common good (12:7) 
– then we cannot separate spiritual gifts from spiritual people. Paul’s notion of the body of Christ 
as “parts beyond a part” (12:27), where believers are continuously hyphenated with each other 
and with God, spirit, and Christ (12:12-13), also shows that what makes believers “spiritual” are 
not the gifts but the hyphenated relations of believers with God, spirit, Christ, and people. 
(ii) Pairs of Opposition of Actions and the Story Progression 
This theme of “non-objectifying knowing” is manifested in Paul’s dealing with the 
problems of speaking in tongues in the church of Corinth. Note that Paul is not against speaking 
in tongues. As Paul readily admits, he also speaks in tongues (14:18). The main issue is that the 
one who speaks in tongues speaks not to people but to God; in fact, it is in the spirit that s/he 
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speaks the mystery (πνεύματι δὲ λαλεῖ μυστήρια) (14:2). Whether we take the dative of πνεύματι 
as an instrumental dative or a dative of sphere, it appears that the one who speaks in tongues is 
not totally in charge of the speaking in tongues. First, it is in the sphere of the spirit or by the 
spirit that s/he speaks in tongues. Secondly, s/he speaks to God. Thirdly, s/he speaks mysteries. 
Hence, it does not make sense for the person speaking in tongues to flaunt and objectify the gift 
as if s/he possessed it. In fact, s/he should not speak to others in tongues. Since speaking in 
tongues is a conversation between the person and God, it is not a surprise that it becomes 
meaningless when it is performed in public. Since mystery cannot be articulated, speaking in 
tongues becomes a mere noise. Paul makes this point rather clear in 13:1 and 14:6-11. 
Paul’s metaphor of musical instruments producing their own distinctive sounds is a case 
in point. The flute (αὐλός) should produce the “flute” sound. The harp (κιθάρα) should produce 
the “harp” sound. Regardless of how great the flute may be, if it produces the “harp” sound, it is 
not a flute. The “harp” sound can be wonderful, but the flute is a “malfunctioning” flute. The 
point is not that the flute must produce the “flute” sound; rather, each musical instrument has its 
own singularity and purpose that cannot be replaced. Similarly, it is not that speaking in tongues 
produces noise. Rather, when it is not performed in the spirit, it becomes nonsensical. In the 
words of Paul, speaking in tongues becomes like speaking into the air (14:9). Here, Paul’s notion 
of the body of Christ as “parts beyond a part” (12:27) is another case in point. In this example, 
the eye is the eye and the ear is the ear. The eye and the ear are intimately interrelated. However, 
they have their own singularity and purpose. 
Moreover, for Paul, singularity comes to the fore when all the singularities are in relation 
with each other. But, how can singularity and plurality work together? This is why in the midst 
of his discussion of spiritual people, spiritual gifts, and the body of Christ, he speaks of love. For 
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Paul, love bears all things (or always bears), trusts/believes all things (or always trusts/believes), 
hopes for all things (or always hopes), and endures all things (or always endures) (13:7). But, 
how does love do so? This is “what” we flesh out below in our semantic analysis of love in 12:1–
14:40 (cf. section 2 in chapter 4).  
With this introduction, we now present our story progression from the fourteen pairs of 
oppositions of actions in the dialogic level. For the sake of convenience to form our semiotic 
squares later, the order of our story progression is presented from the bottom up. 
(+) 14:37 – believers should acknowledge (-) 14:38 – should not disregard Paul’s command 
               Paul’s command      
(+) 14:24-25 – prophecy causes conviction (-) 14:23 – speaking in tongues causes confusion 
                        and worship 
(+) 14:3 – the one who prophesies speaks (-) 14:2 – the one speaks in tongue does not speak  
                 to people          to people  
(+) 14:3, 4b – the one who prophesies   (-) 14:4a – the one who speaks in tongue builds up  
                       builds up the ekklēsia          her/himself 
(+) 14:16 – people can respond if  (-) 14:16 – people will not understand if blessing  
          blessing with the mind          in spirit 
(+) 14:22b – speaking in tongues are a sign (-) 14:22a – speaking in tongues are not a sign “for”  
         with “for” unbelievers           believers 
(+) 14:5 – speaking in tongues and    (-) 14:5 – [implied] speaking in tongues [alone] will  
                 interpretation build up the ekklēsia      not build up the ekklēsia 
(+) 14:6b – prophecy… gnosis, apocalypse (-) 14:6a – speaking in tongues is not beneficial 
       benefit believers 
(+) 13:2 – I should have love when I have  (-) 13:2 – I have prophecy… without love  
     prophecy, know all mysteries…  
(+) 13:1 – I should have love when I speak  (-) 13:1 – I become a roaring brass… when I speak  
                 in tongues          in tongues without love 
(+) 13:3 – I should have love when I give (-) 13:3 – I “benefit” nothing when I give away all  
                 away possession and body        possession and body without love  
(+) 13:13a – faith, hope, and love will (-) 13:8b-d – prophecy, tongues, and gnosis will 
                     remain (with them)                        pass away 
(+) 14:20c – believers should become (-) 14:20a – do not become children in prudence  
                     mature in prudence  
(+) 12:3c – people in the Holy Spirit say (-) 12:3b – people say anathema concerning the  




Below, in the discussion of these pairs of oppositions, we bold the verse numbers (e.g., 
12:3) to indicate that we are commenting on a particular pair of opposed actions. 
In 12:1–14:40, Paul focuses on the believers’ relationship with God, Holy Spirit, and 
Christ, whereas the Corinthian believers focus on the spiritual gifts. They mistake the 
manifestation of the spirit as the spirit itself and ignore the purpose of the manifestation (cf. 
12:7). Paul has to remind them that it is only in the Holy Spirit that they can confess that Jesus is 
Lord (12:3). Without being in the Holy Spirit, they are not able to make such a confession. Such 
a confession, in other words, is spirit-enabled. This orientation of being addressed by the Holy 
Spirit and responsive to the Holy Spirit contrasts sharply with the believers’ previous lifestyle as 
gentiles (ἔθνη), when they, being used to their semantic habitus, were led to mute idols (τὰ 
εἴδωλα τὰ ἄφωνα) that do not address them and do not challenge their objectifying gaze (12:2). 
Now, if believers acknowledge and submit to the lordship of Jesus, which is itself beyond 
human comprehension (as the crucified Lord is a contradictory name, if not also a scandalous 
name), they should become mature (τέλειοι) in “the process of careful consideration” (ταῖς 
φρεσίν; BDAG 1065) (14:20). With this new orientation provided by this renewed semantic 
habitus, believers should come to see that what really matters is their relationship with the 
other/Other. If in the end (τὸ τέλειον) (13:10), it is pistis, hope, and love that remain (13:13) – 
i.e., that stay with them – and the greater of these is love, then it only makes sense for believers 
to be love-oriented. After all, it is in love that Jesus died for/concerning them (cf. 2 Cor. 5:14-15; 
Rom. 5:8).106 Indeed, if love is not delimited by time and space, believers should always be “in 
love” (namely, be God-spirit-Christ-oriented) regardless of their circumstances. This is why Paul 
stresses that love must be performative (13:1-3). It is not that prophecy, speaking in tongues, and 
gnosis are not important (cf. 13:8). Rather, as they are marked by and framed with love (cf. 13:1-
106 For our discussion of the notion of “dying for/concerning,” see note 36 in chapter 4. 
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3), they should be the embodiment of love. As manifestations of love, they withdraw from 
themselves in their manifestations, lest love be obscured by them. Thus, whether in giving away 
possession and even body (13:3), in speaking in tongues (13:1), or in prophesying, in knowing 
all mysteries and gnosis, and in having all pistis to move mountains (13:2), believers must have 
love. As noted in our semantic analysis in chapter 4, “having” (love) is not possessive but 
performative; “having love” is attentive and considerate of the other/Other. 
For example, when Paul implies that speaking in tongue is not beneficial (14:6a), it is 
because it cannot be understood in public. In fact, it is by contrast with the speaking of 
apocalypse, gnosis, prophecy, and teaching that can be understood in public (14:6b) that the 
speaking in tongue is not beneficial. Paul’s focus is upon the edification of the community. This 
is why the gift of speaking in tongues, if it were to be performed in public in the church, must be 
accompanied by its interpretation (14:5); otherwise such a private-oriented gift will not benefit 
the public. Thus Paul thinks that speaking in tongues is not (a sign) for (the benefit of) believers 
in the church (14:22a), but a sign “for” unbelievers (14:22b).107 Paul makes this point when he 
alludes to Isaiah 28:11-12 in 14:21; even though the Lord tries to address the Israelite believers 
“in foreign tongues and in the lips of others” they will not listen. Here, Paul is practical and 
other-oriented. Likewise, concerning the blessing in spirit, Paul asks: “how will the one in the 
position of an inquirer (i.e., a non-initiated) say ‘amen’ to your thanksgiving since s/he does not 
107 Thiselton calls 14:22 as “one of the most difficult verses in our epistle.” See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, 1122. The dative in αἱ γλῶσσαι εἰς σημεῖόν εἰσιν οὐ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀπίστοις 
in 14:22 can be taken as a dative of reference or a dative of interest (whether as “to the advantage of” or as “to the 
disadvantage of”). Here, the word “sign” can also be taken positively or negatively. Now, with respect to those who 
believe, they already have a certain perspective and know that the gift of speaking in tongues is a manifestation of 
the spirit. As a result, the speaking in tongues probably will not cause too much misunderstanding for believers, by 
contrast with those who do not believe and do not know about the manifestation of the spirit. The gift of speaking in 
tongues can thus cause misunderstanding among non-believers. They may think that the speaking in tongues is a 
“madness” (probably in a negative sense, although “madness” can also be understood aesthetically) (14:23) or they 
may mistake it as a sign demonstrating the reputation of the person speaking in tongues and her/his recognition by 
the spirit, and as such, these unbelievers would objectify the gift. Paul seems to say that speaking in tongues is not 
beneficial in a public setting, as it can easily be misunderstood. Believers may be able to handle it and not to 
objectify the sign, but non-believers will not have the understanding to handle it. 
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know what you say?” (14:16). This is why, for Paul, the one who prophesies can build up the 
church because s/he speaks to people in a language that they can understand (14:3), as opposed 
to the one who speaks in tongues. Paul is not against the benefit of speaking in tongues that 
edifies oneself. Rather, the issue is that both prophesying and speaking in tongues have their own 
specific avenue and venue. Just as it is in the Holy Spirit that believers confess “Jesus is Lord” 
and it is the spirit that gives a varieties of charismata – which are probably manifestations of the 
spirit (cf. 12:7-11) – then believers need to be in the Holy Spirit to receive the gifts. Here, as 
believers also need to examine their own gifts and the other’s gifts (12:10; 14:29, 32), the 
receiving of gifts is not a receiving without examination. In the language of Marion’s 
“givability” and “acceptability” that highlights the “dative” orientation of the self, it is in the 
Holy Spirit that believers recognize the “givability” and “acceptability” of gifts. The Holy Spirit 
neither imposes gifts upon believers nor gives without reasons. In light of the common good and 
the coming together of the Holy Spirit and believers that we find that the giving and receiving of 
spiritual gifts take place in a middle voice. There are no fixed “subject,” “object,” and “receiver” 
in this giving and receiving of spiritual gifts. For this reason, Paul asks believers to examine and 
recognize his command to them (14:37) so that everything may be done properly focusing on 
God (14:33, 40). 
In view of this relation between gifts and love, gifts for Paul certainly cannot be 
objectified. They are not to be treated as if one can earn them, possess them, flaunt them, and use 
them for their own gains. The gift is not an object. It should not be used to objectify and 
pigeonhole the giver and the receiver. The manifestations of the gift are only parts of the gift. 
The gift, moreover, as the manifestation of the spirit (12:7), is the fruit of the relationship 
between believers and the spirit, Lord, and God. It signifies the relationship between believers 
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towards the common good. When there is no relationship, there is no gift and there is no giver 
and no receiver. Just as it is only in the spirit that believers can confess “Jesus is Lord,” it is only 
in a love relationship between believers and God (cf. 2:9-14) that the gift is given and received. 
As Paul tells us that God has prepared for those who love God (2:9) and that whatever believers 
receive comes from God (cf. 4:7), believers must not lose their love towards the other/Other. It is 
“in love” and in the coming together of all these factors that believers can speak of gifts without 
objectifying, categorizing, and misusing them. 
(iii) A Semantic Analysis of Love in 1 Cor. 12:1 –14:40 
In this concluding section we only focus on the pairs of opposed actions that are related 
to love. Since we have addressed most of the verses in 1 Cor. 13 in our semantic analysis in 
chapter 4, these concluding remarks can be brief and to the point. The values that we find in the 
following five semiotic squares are: (1) Love is Enduring, (2) Love is to Let Go and be 
Transformed, (3) Love Cannot be Reduced to Giving A Gift-Object, (4) Love is Interactive, and 
(5) Love is Response-Enabling.  
(a) Semiotic Square 1: Love is Enduring 
13:13a – pistis, hope, and love will remain        14:20a – do not become children in 
(S1): Enduring            prudence (S2): Non-Future-oriented  
      (Past-oriented) 
 
 
14:20c – believers should become mature                 12:3b – people say “anathema Jesus” 
in prudence (Non-S2): Future-oriented        (non-S1): Non-Enduring 
 
In this semiotic square, the value of being able to last until the end comes to the fore. If it 
is pistis, hope, and love that remain in the end (τὸ τέλειον) (13:10) and if love is the greatest 
among them (13:13), then believers are to be marked by love if they want to remain in the end. 
Note, however, it is not a certainty that one can remain till the end. It is “in” pistis, hope, and 
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love that one remains till the end. In other words, to remain till the end is to remain steadfast, 
faithful, and hopeful regardless of the situation. Paul thus urges believers to be very careful with 
what they build on the foundation of the building of God. Whatever they build must be able to 
withstand the test of fire (3:12-15). Believers cannot just think of the present gains and 
convenience and avoid making difficult decision and commitment. They must also consider the 
present in terms of the future, that is, of the outcome of what they say and do, even though they 
cannot guarantee that the outcome is what they desire. Thus Paul says that nobody in the spirit of 
God says “Anathema Jesus”108 (12:3b). Paul, however, does not tell us how one can be in the 
spirit of God. Thus, even though God glorifies Jesus (cf. 2:8), Jesus can still appear to be rejected 
and cursed by society. There is no guarantee that Jesus will not be cursed. It is only in pistis and 
hope that as time goes on, people will come to see the past differently and therefore recognize 
that there is no “Anathema Jesus.” 
For this reason, Paul does not want believers to dwell in the past in the perspective of the 
past. He wants believers to become mature (τέλειοι) in “the process of careful consideration” 
(ταῖς φρεσίν; BDAG, 1065) (14:20). To be mature is to make sure that whatever one does can 
withstand the test, so that one does not regret and need to redo what one has done. It is to learn 
from the past and re-imagine the past so that the present – as the future of the past and the past of 
the future – can redeem the past (i.e., from “Anathema Jesus” to “Jesus is Lord”) and prepare for 
the future. For Paul, time is not linear; the past still haunts the present and the future is embedded 
in the present (cf. 15:36). This interweaving of past, present, and future comes to the fore in love. 
Love changes one’s perspective and one’s perception of time and history. There may be a sense 
of causality of the past into the present but the causality is not a necessity; it can be thought 




                                                          
otherwise. This is what Paul means by there is no “Anathema Jesus” in the spirit of God. This is 
what Paul means by saying that in the end pistis, hope, and love remain. Note that none of these 
three elements can be ascertained. The future cannot be ascertained and objectified. Just as the 
present is passing away into the past, the future is also passing into the past in the moment of the 
present. For Paul, to say that believers should become future-oriented – that is, ταῖς δὲ φρεσὶν 
τέλειοι γίνεσθε; 14:20 – instead of past-oriented is to say that they should always be open to new 
possibilities. 
(b) Semiotic Square 2: Love is to Let Go and be Transformed 
13:3 – I should have love when I give away       13:8b-d – prophecy, tongues, and gnosis 




13:13a – pistis, hope, and love will remain       14:20a – do not become children in 
(non-S2): Non-Time-Limited         prudence (non-S1): Non-Letting Go  
     (Insistence) 
 
Just as the past can be re-imagined otherwise, the present can also be thought otherwise. 
To remain till the end is to not be caught up in the past, present, and even the future, as if they 
were fixed. To remain till the end is to be contextually dynamic; it is not only to be vigilant 
regarding one’s and other’s situations, but also to be careful not to objectify one’s and other’s 
contexts, as if these contexts did not change. To remain till the end does not mean to be rigid and 
inflexible. Neither does it mean to be opportunistic, without principle. 
As noted above, one’s giving not only can insult the intended recipient, it can also be a 
“disguised giving” that returns to the giver in the forms of reputation, self-congratulations, 
gratitude, etc. For Paul, to let go of one’s possession and even of one’s body is to avoid being 
constrained by them. But, such an extreme giving, which can hurt oneself, can be risky and 
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dangerous, in particular when it is given without love. It can invite exploitation and abuse. It is 
not a necessity, lest it becomes objectified. The basic point is that one must still have love in 
such an extreme giving; otherwise the giver will not “be benefited” (ὠφελοῦμαι). Why? Because 
one’s possessions and one’s body will not last, just as prophecy, tongues, and gnosis will not last 
(13:8b-d). Only pistis, hope, and love will last. Note the middle voice of ὠφελοῦμαι. The benefit 
takes place in the benefiting itself. Thus Paul urges believers not to become children in prudence 
(14:20a). He wants them to be prudent in considering their and other’s situations. He wants them 
to let go and not to insist on their perspective so that they may see other possibilities. This is why 
Paul says that prophecy will pass away (καταργηθήσονται), tongues will cease (παύσονται), and 
gnosis will pass away (καταργηθήσεται) (13:8b-d). With the time change, the forms and ways of 
communication also change. Believers must not insist and focus on the forms at the expense of 
what they seek to convey. 
(c) Semiotic Square 3: Love Cannot be Reduced to Giving A Gift-Object 
13:1 – I should have love when I speak        13:3 – I “benefit” nothing when I give  
in tongues (S1): Fundamental                  away all possessions and body without  
      love (S2): Non-Sincere 
 
 
13:3 – I give away all possessions and        13:8b-d – prophecy, tongues, and gnosis 
body with love (non-S2): Sincere         will pass away (non-S1): Non- 
      Fundamental 
 
Since we have discussed most of the characteristics of love in 1 Cor. 13 in chapter 4, we 
will just highlight what stands out for us in this semiotic square. First, note the dative in ταῖς 
γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων in 13:1, which for Thiselton, “is a 
straightforward instrumental use: to speak with human or angelic tongues.”109 We are not 
arguing against this notion of dative. But, in a proprioceptive and group-oriented culture, the 
109 See Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1033.  
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dative can highlight the fact that an individual is always already an individual-with-others in the 
world, where “others” are not delimited to human beings. Thus, whether the tongues are human 
or angelic, one does not speak by oneself. It is with and in the sphere of these tongues that one 
speaks. This communal orientation comes to the fore as Paul reminds believers that everything 
that they have received comes from God (cf. 4:7). If this is the case, then “what” do believers 
give when they give all their possessions and even their body? Likewise, if the spiritual gifts are 
the gifts of the spirit, then “what” do believers give when they perform them? If God has 
prepared for those who love God (2:9), then the giving and receiving of gifts take place in love. 
If, in the first place, all the giving and receiving happens in love, whatever believers say and do 
must be done in love. Indeed, if it is in loving that God gives and that believers receive, believers 
should also, in loving, give so that whatever they give is marked by love, which is the source of 
their relationship with God in the first place. In the language of sign, Paul is wary that the 
signifier (i.e., the gift) be detached from the signified (i.e., love). The gift must not obscure and 
replace love. It should manifest love. But, it is not love. Love cannot be objectified into a gift-
object. 
(d) Semiotic Square 4: Love is Interactive 
13:2 – I should have love when I have                  13:1 – I become a roaring brass when I   
prophecy, know all mysteries and all gnosis,                  speak in tongues without love (S2): Non- 
and have all pistis to move mountains        Relational (noise)  
(S1): Meaning-full    
 
 
13:1 – I should have love when I speak in       13:3 – I “benefit” nothing when I give all 
tongues (non-S2): Relational               possessions and body without love       
                                  (non-S1): Non-meaning-full 
 
This semiotic square shows that since love fundamentally marks the performance of the 
gift, the performance of the gift should manifest love. Here, the focus is not on the gift, giver, 
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and receiver; it is on the giver and receiver experiencing love in the performance of the gift. As 
the gift, giver, and receiver are oriented towards the common good (cf. 12:7), love can transform 
the giver and receiver and build them up (8:1). Note that Paul does not say that love is a spiritual 
gift. For Paul, love is “the far better way” (καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν) (12:31). It is a venue and an 
avenue that empowers the spiritual gifts to be meaning-full. It is a way that is always on its way. 
Love, in other words, takes place in loving itself. When the believer performs the gift with love, 
s/he does not just give her/his love to the other/Other, s/he also receives her/his love. The love of 
the believer is not just her/his love towards the other/Other. It is, moreover, the fruit (or the 
dynamic result) of her/his love and the love of the other/Other as s/he performs the gift. This is 
the feature of the middle voice of ὠφελοῦμαι that we struggle to highlight in 13:3. That is to say, 
one can give all possessions and even one’s body to the other/Other because such a middle-voice 
giving in love is not calculative, self-congratulatory, self-abusive, and condescending. 
(e) Semiotic Square 5: Love is Response-Enabling 
14:16 – people can respond if bless with        13:2 – I am “nothing” when I have  
the mind (S1): Response-Enabling              prophecy, know all mysteries … without  




13:2 – I should have love when I have prophecy,            13:1 – I become a roaring brass when I  
know all mysteries and all gnosis, and have all       speak in tongues without love (non-S1): 
pistis to move mountains (non-S2): Non-Meaning-less   Non-Response-Enabling 
 
Paul’s concern for others comes to the fore in this semiotic square, whether they are 
believers or not (cf. 14:16). For Paul, just as others cannot benefit from the believers’ blessing in 
the spirit if they cannot understand it, they also cannot benefit from believers who perform the 
gifts without love. It is clear that the gifts are given for the common good (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον) 
(12:7). We have already noted the figure of “togetherness” in συμφέρον; this “togetherness” is 
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the “coming together” of God, Holy Spirit, Jesus, and believers towards the common good. It is 
not a fixed common good or a common good only from one perspective. In fact, it is a common 
good that includes non-believers, since believers should not perform gifts without being 
considerate of the effects on non-believers. Performed in love, the believers’ gifts are to trigger 
and enable a positive response towards the common good. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In a group-oriented culture where everyone is interrelated, Paul reminds believers that 
they are hyphenated with each other towards the common good. In performing their gifts, they 
need to be responsible for the response of others. Even God does not impose gifts upon believers, 
but give the spirit from God so that those who love God may receive it and know the gifts of God 
for their benefits (2:9, 12). Indeed, if believers love God, they should also love those whom God 
loves. They cannot love God and not love those whom God loves. If the body of Christ is “parts 
beyond a part” (12:27) (see the conclusion in the Introduction chapter) that keeps expanding its 
border and limit as God calls people from every place to participate in the fellowship of Jesus (cf. 
1:2, 9), then believers cannot just love the hand and not the foot. The hand is a hand insofar as it 
is hand-foot-eye-ear-etc. To love one is to love those who are hyphenated with her/him. It is 
because of these (conjunctive-disjunctive) hyphens, which are not unlike our notion of typology 
in Narrative Semantics (see section 3 in chapter 2 and section 3.3.a in the Methodological 
Appendx), that believers cannot objectify love and spiritual gifts. For Paul, as everything is tied 
to love (cf. 13:1-3), both the gifts and believers are insignificant without the performative love 
(see chapter 4). This love is, moreover, a cruciform love (see the conclusion of section 3.2 in 
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chapter 3). Paul writes, “God demonstrates his love toward us, in that even though we are sinners 
Christ died for/concerning us” (Rom. 5:8; cf. 2 Cor. 5:14-15). 
Now, if the Lord is the Lord of everyone who calls upon “the name of our Lord Jesus 
Christ” in every place (1:2), then nobody has the exclusive claim upon the Lord. It is ironic for 
anyone to make such a claim, as if the Lord can be lorded. This is why throughout 1 Corinthians, 
Paul’s frequent usage of “every” or “all” (πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν) seems to signify the dynamics of 
singularity and plurality. For example, in 12:1–14:40, after saying that no one can confess “Jesus 
is Lord” without being in the Holy Spirit (12:3), Paul tells believers that there are many kinds 
(δι-αιρέσεις) of charismata but the same spirit, many kinds (δι-αιρέσεις) of services but the same 
Lord, and many kinds (δι-αιρέσεις) of workings, but the same God who works all things in 
everyone (τὰ πὰντα ἐν πᾶσιν) (12:4-6). Indeed, not only “the body is one and has many 
members” and “all the members of the body are many but are one body” (12:12), “all believers 
were baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks or slaves or free, and we all were given 
drink by one spirit” (12:13). Thus, when believers come together (συν-ἐρχησθε) – notice the 
middle voice and the preposition συν (“with”) – all the believers’ gifts should gear towards 
building each other up (πάντα πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν γινέσθω) (14:26). In the words of Paul, “love 
builds up” (8:1). As the building of God, with the crucified Christ as the foundation, believers 
must build each other up in love (3:9-11), just as it is because of his love for life that Christ was 
crucified (see section 3.2 in chapter 3). 
In a multiracial, multicultural, and multireligious environment in Malaysia, the issues of 
singularity and plurality are always foregrounded, whether in terms of sociopolitical, economic, 
religious, education, etc. policies. It is because of this contextual concern that this study focused 
on Paul’s notion of love in his handling of conflicts in the church of Corinth. How can 
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singularity be honored without being reified and absolutized? How can plurality be honored 
without relativizing and erasing singularity? Here, we find that neither singularity nor plurality 
should not be objectified. There are singularity and plurality when both come together face-to-
face. It is nonsensical to speak of one without the other. This is why in emphasizing a 
heteronomous mode of love in our interpretation of 1 Corinthians, we stressed that love can also 
be conceived of in the modes of autonomy and relationality. We also stressed that heteronomy is 
not without mutuality; after all, in a group-oriented and honor-and-shame culture, communal 
values are always foregrounded as everyone is always already interrelated. 
For Paul, this dynamic tension between singularity and plurality is founded upon the 
cruciform love that cannot be objectified. Thus, in our semantic analysis of different passages in 
1 Corinthians, we find that Paul keeps emphasizing a non-objectifying knowing in the believers’ 
relationship with the other/Other. Such a knowing comes to the fore in Paul’s usage of the 
middle voice, in particular when he speaks of εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, where believers are gospelized in 
gospelizing. This is why when believers “come together” to observe the Lord’s Supper, Paul says 
that haireseis are necessary among them. Without being confronted with choices, believers can 
easily objectify the other/Other. The conflict over the “idol food” issue further highlights the 
utmost importance of an iconic seeing in Paul’s semantic universe, in which believers must be 
able to be both addressed and corrected. It is this sense of response-enabling that we also find in 
Paul’s discussion of the spiritual gifts. If the giving and receiving of gifts takes place in response 








The semiotician’s know-how … helps them to deconstruct the way they read in 
order to try to elucidate, to imagine, to describe the operations that we accomplish 
in spite of ourselves when we construct as text and as discourse whatever we 
read.1 – Jean Delorme 
 
Deconstruction … never proceeds without love…2 – Jacques Derrida 
 
I. Introduction 
 In this appendix, we will show that A. J. Greimas’s “Generative Trajectory” can help us 
clarify the different modes of existence of our meaning-producing dimensions in our textual 
analysis, in particular the mode of heteronomy that is characteristic of a proprioceptive and 
communal culture of honor and shame. We will highlight the important difference between the 
“semantics” and the “syntax,” in which the latter is the assertion or negation of the former (the 
semantic being the “gut feeling” or religious experience). We foreground this difference not only 
because of “the felt” (cf. heteronomy), “the claimed” (cf. autonomy), and “the paid” (cf. 
relationality) aspects of honor, but also because of the plurality of possible and plausible views 
of Paul’s love in 1 Corinthians (see section 1 in chapter 1). As an introduction, let us first refer to 
the debate of “faith vs. reason” in biblical studies, exemplified by the so-called “quest for the 
historical Jesus,” so that we may find a way of presenting the various meaning-producing 
dimensions of the text without confusing them with arguments made primarily from the 
perspective of a single mode of existence – namely an autonomous mode of existence. 
 
1  See Jean Delorme, “Orientations of a Literary Semiotics Questioned by the Bible” (translated by Jean-Paul Pichot, 
Daniel Patte and Victoria Phillips), Semeia 81: Thinking in Signs: Semiotics and Biblical Studies … Thirty Years 
After. Edited by Daniel Patte (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1998), 52. Emphasis added. 
2 Jacques Derrida, “The Almost Nothing of the Unpresentable,” in Points … Interviews, 1974-1994. Edited by 
Elisabeth Weber. Translated by Peggy Kamuf and others (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 83. 
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II. The Heritage of Critical Biblical Studies 
 The Christian Scripture has multiple layers of traditions and meaning effects. In light of 
the different ways biblical texts (re-)interpret one another in the Scripture, 3 we need to be 
cautious not to foreclose the “hermeneutical circle” of our interpretive process. The multiplicity 
of the Scriptural meaning effects was well illustrated in the early patristic period by the conflicts 
between the Alexandrian School (that privileged the allegorical-mystical interpretations of 
Scripture)4 and the Antiochene School (that emphasized the historical and literal interpretations 
of Scripture) 5  as well as by the “fourfold sense” of the Scripture (e.g. literal, allegorical, 
tropological, and anagogical) in the late patristic period and the Middle ages,6 by the Catholic 
Renewal Movement and by the European Reformation that argued for such notions as sola 
scriptura, etc.7 All these indicate that, depending on the contexts and the perspectives of the 
interpreters, biblical texts, for various reasons, can be interpreted differently. 
3 This becomes manifest, for instance, in the case of the re-interpretation of the Deuteronomistic History by the 
Chronicler. See Thomas Römer and Albert de Pury, “Deuteronomistic Historiography (DH): History of Research 
and Debated Issues,” in Israel Constructs Its History: Deuteronomistic Historiography in Recent Research. Edited 
by Albert de Pury, Thomas Römer, and Jean-Daniel Macchi. JSOT Supplement Series 306 (Sheffield, England: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 24-141; Thomas C. Römer, The So-Called Deuteronomistic History: Sociological, 
Historical and Literary Introduction (London and New York: T & T Clark International, 2005); Raymond F. Person, 
Jr., The Deuteronomistic History and The Book of Chronicles: Scribal Works in An Oral World (Atlanta, GA: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2010); Isaac Kalimi, The Reshaping of Ancient Israelite History in Chronicles 
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005). 
4 For example, based on 1 Thess. 5:23 that speaks of a human being in terms of spirit, soul, and body, Origen (185-
254CE), the most famous representative of the Alexandrian school, argues that the Scripture has threefold senses. 
These are (1) spiritual or allegorical-mystical sense, (2) psychical or moral sense, and (3) bodily or literal sense. The 
level of understanding goes from the bodily sense to the spiritual sense. See Robert M. Grant with David Tracy, A 
Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2005), 52-62. “In the West, such Latin Fathers as Hilary of Poitiers (315-67), Ambrose (339-97), the early 
Jerome (3291-419), and especially Augustine (354-430) made liberal use of the A1exandrian mode of allegorical 
exegesis.” See Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical ΤΥΠΟΣ Structures. Andrews 
University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 2 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981), 23.  
5 See Robert M. Grant with David Tracy, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 63-72.  
6 The four senses are represented in the following saying: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, moralis quid 
agas, quo tendas anagogia, meaning, “the letter shows us what God and our fathers did; the allegory shows us 
where our faith is hid; the moral meaning gives us rules of daily life; the anagogy shows us where we end our 
strife.” See Robert M. Grant with David Tracy, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 85. 
7 “The Bible is not one standard of authority among others, as it was for medieval Catholicism. It is the sole standard. 
And it is not an objective standard, as it was for Thomas Aquinas. It is a standard at once objective and subjective, 
for in it and through it God himself speaks to the human heart. The Bible authenticates itself.” Ibid., 99. Grant 
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 The critical analysis of Scripture, along with “the rise of philosophy as an autonomous 
science and its gradual divorce from theology” in the seventeenth-century Europe,8 opens door 
for non-confessional studies of Scripture. The works of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) 9  and 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-77)10 are some of the representatives. Their focus on reason questions the 
legitimacy of the divine authority of the ecclesiastical institution (cf. autonomy vs. relationality). 
It further renders the religious experience recorded in the Scripture superstitious and obstructive 
to a judicious state governing. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), however, in pointing out 
the infinite character of religion (cf. heteronomy),11 argues that one’s horizon of vision is always 
further writes, “In Luther’s insistence on the subjective element in interpretation we are close to modern theories of 
exegesis which stress the ultimate impossibility of ‘objective’ analysis of human thought” (ibid., 104). This 
“subjective element” of biblical interpretation does not mean that the social locations of the interpreters are 
foregrounded. Not yet. It will take a few more centuries until the late twentieth century. Neither does it mean that the 
critical studies of the Scripture are sidelined. To the contrary, the historical and grammatical analyses are 
emphasized. The “subjective element” refers to the illumination of the Holy Spirit upon the interpreters (i.e., the 
Reformers) that are not constrained by the Church dogma and traditions (i.e. the Catholic Church). 
8 Ibid., 104. 
9 While Hobbes argues that we “Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction,” his 
notion of the Leviathan as the justification for the sovereignty of the Commonwealth is a mystical figure in the 
Hebrew Bible. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Revised student edition. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge Texts 
in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 256 (chapter 32). Given 
the nature of human being against each other (i.e., competition, diffidence, and glory) (ibid. 88, chapter 13), the 
figure of Leviathan as a body politic makes people entrust their individual interest and sovereignty unto the 
sovereign power that will preserve peace and prevent conflicts and wars. Also, see Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age 
Economics (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 171-80. Here, Hobbes’s critical reading of the Scripture that reduces 
the revelation of God to the socio-political function of the revelation helps justify the sovereignty of the 
Commonwealth from being subjected by the Catholic Church and the Protestant movements. 
10 Highlighting the importance of nature and reason in our interpretation of the Scripture, Spinoza explains away 
biblical events that contradict the laws of nature and argues for the moral lessons of these events. He writes, “If 
anything be found in Scripture which can be conclusively proved to contravene the laws of Nature, or which could 
not be possibly follow from them, we have to believe that this was inserted into the Holy Scripture by sacrilegious 
men. For whatever is contrary to Nature is contrary to reason, and whatever is contrary to reason is absurd, and 
should therefore be rejected.” See Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise. Gebhardt Edition. Second edition. 
Translated by Samuel Shirley. Introduction and Annotation by Seymour Feldman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing, 2001), 80 (chapter 6). This focus on reason aims to create and preserve peace and safety among the 
people of the state. Spinoza also speaks of a check and balance of power between the people and the sovereign. 
11 Schleiermacher writes, “You cannot say that your horizon, even the broadest, comprehends everything and that 
nothing more is to be intuited beyond it, or that nothing within this horizon escapes your eye, even the best aided. 
You find limits nowhere and are not able to think of any. This is true of religion in an even far higher sense … 
Religion is infinite not only because acting and being acted upon ceaselessly alternate between the same limited 
matter and the mind … not only because it is, like morality, internally incapable of completion; it is infinite in all 
respects, an infinity of matter and form, of being, of vision, and of knowledge about it. This feeling must accompany 
everyone who really has religion. Each person must be conscious that his religion is only a part of the whole…” See 
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partial and delimited. Given this limitation of human understanding, “[r]eligion’s essence is 
neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling”12 that are in an utter dependence on God.  
 The conflicts between institutionalized theology (cf. heteronomy in the framework of 
autonomy and relationality) and secular philosophy (cf. autonomy) in Western critical studies of 
the Scripture continue into the eighteenth, nineteenth, and mid-twentieth centuries.13 A great 
illustration of this division are the three phases of the search for “the historical Jesus” in the 
West.14 The first phase of the quest that dismisses supernatural stories in the Scripture on the 
ground that they contradict the laws of nature and reason15 (cf. autonomy) ends with the critique 
of Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965): “The historical investigation of the life of Jesus did not take 
its rise from a purely historical interest; it turned to the Jesus of history as an ally in the struggle 
against the tyranny of dogma.”16 Schweitzer, in fact, writes, “There is no historical task which so 
reveals [an interpreter’s] true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus.”17 One should recognize what 
the historical method can and cannot accomplish.18 However, the critical tools often aim to 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. Translated and edited by Richard 
Crouter. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27. 
12 Ibid., 22. For Schleiermacher, “All intuition proceeds from an influence of the intuited on the one who intuits, 
from an original and independent action of the former, which is then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the 
latter according to one’s own nature.” Ibid., 24-25.  
13 For details, see Robert M. Grant with David Tracy, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 110-33. 
14 For a concise review on these quests of the historical Jesus, see Colin Brown, “Historical Jesus, Quest of,” in 
Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels. Edited by Joel B. Green, Scot McKnight, and I. Howard Marshall (Downers 
Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 326-41. 
15 Herman Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), for example, “stripped the Gospels of all supernatural trappings,” and 
“subtracted any materials said to be in fulfillment of Scripture, claiming that all such material was back-projected by 
the disciples.” See Clinton Bennett, In Search of Jesus: Insider and Outsider Images (New York: Continuum, 2001), 
96; Reimarus: Fragments. Edited by Charles Talbert. Translated by Ralph S. Fraser (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1970), 64, 151-52. Likewise, Strauss (1808-74) also explains the supernatural phenomena in the Gospels as mythical 
imaginations. See David Friedrich Strauss, The Life Of Jesus Critically Examined. Translated by George Eliot (New 
York: Macmillan, 1892). 
16 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. Translated by W. Montgomery. Preface by F. C. Burkitt 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005), 4. 
17 Idem.  
18 “The study of the Life of Jesus has had a curious history. It set out in quest of the historical Jesus, believing that 
when it had found Him it could bring Him straight into our time as a Teacher and Saviour … The historical 
foundation of Christianity as built up by rationalistic, by liberal, and by modern theology no longer exists; but that 
does not mean that Christianity has lost its historical foundation … Jesus means something to our world because a 
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construct a “safe” Jesus who confirms the ethos of the world;19 someone who is not in the grip of 
the ecclesiastical institution.20 In the words of Martin Kähler (1835-1912), the “historical Jesus” 
was created by modern scholars “to set the biblical Christ over against the dogmatic Christ.”21 
But in pushing for an eschatological Jesus, Schweitzer may have overreacted to the rationalistic 
and liberal renderings of Jesus that, for him, have domesticated Jesus’s revolutionary 
teachings. 22  His argument could suggest that historical analyses are not important to our 
understanding of Jesus.23 This argument is made explicit by Kähler. He contends that “we do not 
possess any sources for a ‘Life of Jesus’ which a historian can accept as reliable and adequate.”24 
Highlighting “the conditions of historical knowledge,”25 Kähler argues against that one’s faith is 
mighty spiritual force streams forth from Him and flows through our time also. This fact can neither be shaken nor 
confirmed by any historical discovery. It is the solid foundation of Christianity. The mistake was to suppose that 
Jesus could come to mean more to our time by entering into it as a man like ourselves. This is not possible. First 
because such a Jesus never existed. Secondly because, although historical knowledge can no doubt introduce greater 
clearness into an existing spiritual life, it cannot call spiritual life into existence. History can destroy the present; it 
can reconcile the present with the past; can even to a certain extent transport the present into the past; but to 
contribute to the making of the present is not given unto it.” Ibid., 397. 
19 “We modern theologians are too proud of our historical method, too proud of our historical Jesus, too confident in 
our belief in the spiritual gains which our historical theology can bring to the world. The thought that we could build 
up by the increase of historical knowledge a new and vigorous Christianity and set free new spiritual forces, rules us 
like a fixed idea, and prevents us from seeing that the task which we have grappled with and in some measure 
discharged is only one of the intellectual preliminaries of the great religious task.” Ibid., 398. 
20 The search “was concerned with presenting a historically true life of Jesus that functioned theologically as a 
critical force over against churchly Christology.” See Gerd Theissen and Dagmar Winter, The Quest for the 
Plausible Jesus: The Question of Criteria. Translated by M. Eugene Boring (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2002), 1. “To the extent that criteria for Jesus research were formulated, their content approximated a 
‘criterion of dissimilarity.’ Such criteria were one-sidedly applied to distinguishing Jesus from early Christianity: 
that which contradicted the later church’s exalted view of Jesus was considered especially authentic.” Idem. 
21 See Martin Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ. Translated, edited and with 
an introduction by Carl E. Braaten. Foreword by Paul J. Tillich (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), 44. 
22 For example, he writes, “But the truth is, it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen within 
men, who is significant for our time and can help it. Not the historical Jesus, but the spirit which goes forth from 
Him and in the spirits of men strives for new influence and rule, is that which overcomes the world … The abiding 
and eternal in Jesus is absolutely independent of historical knowledge and can only be understood by contact with 
His spirit which is still at work in the world.” Ibid., 399. 
23 It is, however, important to note that, as Brown points out, Schweitzer’s work “did not show, as is often assumed, 
that recovery of the historical Jesus was impossible. Rather, it presented a massive critique of the views of the 
theological establishment, set out in such a way as to show that all paths but Schweitzer's proved to be dead ends.” 
See Colin Brown, “Historical Jesus, Quest of,” in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, 332. 
24 Martin Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ, 48. 
25 Ibid., 145. Kähler even writes, “There is no more effective method for securing the gradual triumph of a political 
party than to write a history of one’s country… Stripped of its historical dress, the bare thesis of the ‘historian’ 
would arouse too many suspicions. Disguised as history, the historian’s theory passes imperceptibly into our thought 
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subjected to the authority of the discipline of history. He also claims that the “historical Jesus” 
cannot be known apart from the “Christ of faith;” the Gospels are confessional accounts of Christ 
as the Lord. Implied in this argument is that the “Jesus of history as such is no longer considered 
of decisive importance,” a mistake that Ernst Käsemann finds also suggested in the works of his 
teacher, Rudolf Bultmann.26 
 However, in pointing out the dialectics in-between the “historical Jesus” and the “Christ 
of faith” argued by the critical and conservative schools of thought, Käsemann finds that “the 
two might be more than mere opponents; they might be partners in a genuine theological 
conversation.”27 This dialectic movement shows that the “historical Jesus” and the “Christ of 
faith” actually inform one another. One cannot be separated from the other. 28  Käsemann 
highlights this intertwining relation by showing how the eschatological character in the Gospels 
of Mark and Matthew fades out in the Gospels of Luke and John.29 In his exposition, Käsemann 
and convictions as an authentic piece of reality, as a law emanating therefrom … when Christology appears in the 
form of a ‘Life of Jesus,’ there are not many who will perceive the stage manager behind the scenes, manipulating, 
according to his own dogmatic script, the fascinating spectacle of a colorful biography.” Ibid., 56. 
26 Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” in Essays on New Testament Themes. Studies in Biblical 
Theology 41. Translated by W. J. Montague (London: SCM Press, 1971), 16. Käsemann writes, “after sixty years, 
[Kähler’s The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ] is hardly dated and, in spite of many 
attacks and many possible reservations, has never really been refuted. In essence, Bultmann has merely, in his own 
way, underpinned and rendered more precise the thesis of this book.” Idem. 
27 Ibid., 18. He continues, “Such an assumption … simply postulates the dialectic of two distinct standpoints. An 
over-emphasis on the one aspect is then met by a like over-emphasis on the other, and the change of posture by the 
first partner leads, provided that the conversation is conducted on a reasonable basis, to a corresponding change on 
the part of the other.” Idem. 
28 Käsemann writes, “Primitive Christianity is obviously of the opinion that the earthly Jesus cannot be understood 
otherwise than from the far side of Easter, that is, in his majesty as Lord of the community and that, conversely, the 
event of Easter cannot be adequately comprehended if it is looked at apart from the earthly Jesus. The Gospel is 
always involved in a war on two fronts.” Ibid., 25. Indeed, we “cannot do away with the identity between the exalted 
and the earthly Lord without falling into docetism and depriving ourselves of the possibility of drawing a line 
between the Easter faith of the community and myth. Conversely, neither our sources nor the insights we have 
gained from what has gone before permit us to substitute the historical Jesus for the exalted Lord.” Ibid., 34. 
29 Ibid., 25-29. In light of the representation of eschatology into history, Käsemann writes, “To cleave firmly to 
history is one way of giving expression to the extra nos of salvation. Yet Luke proves how dangerous this method is, 
by making the kairos into a mere epoch, predestination into the initial impulse of a development and the givenness 
of salvation to our faith into the accessibility of verifiable facts to our knowledge; and by making grace (which is 
our destiny, compelling every one of us to make the decision between faith and unbelief) into the validation of the 
Church as the organization of the religio christiana.” Ibid., 33. 
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further displays an “analogical imagination” (see chapter 2).30 Here, let us cite a part of an essay 
presented by Käsemann in 1953 that jumpstarted the second phase or the “New Quest” for the 
“historical Jesus.” This long quotation is important because it shows that just as a same figure 
can be conceptualized differently in different narratives, different figures may also be 
conceptualized similarly.31 He writes: 
The community [of primitive Christianity] did not inadvertently and senselessly 
amalgamate its own message with that of its Lord, much less did it merely repeat 
the latter … It interprets out of its own experience what for it has already become 
mere history and employs for this purpose the medium of its preaching. It is 
precisely by this method that the community rescues the facts of the past from 
being regarded only as prodigies and wonders … To state the paradox as sharply 
as possible: the community takes so much trouble to maintain historical continuity 
with him who once trod this earth that it allows the historical events of this earthly 
life to pass for the most part into oblivion and replaces them by its own message. 
It is not only at this point in its history that the community does this. The same 
process is always being repeated in the course of Church history. Time and again, 
continuity with the past is preserved by shattering the received terminology, the 
received imagery, the received theology – in short, by shattering the tradition … 
There is an ever-present temptation into which many have fallen, to infer form 
this variation the complete discontinuity of Christian history. The truth is that it is 
this variation which makes continuity possible at all.  For mere history becomes 
significant history not through tradition as such but through interpretation, not 
through the simply establishment of facts but through the understanding of the 
events of the past which have become objectified and frozen into facts … Mere 
history only takes on genuine historical significance in so far as it can address 
both a question and an answer to our contemporary situation…32 
 
Here, we note that Scripture comes to life in preaching: in the reinterpretation of Scripture for the 
contemporary audience. As a result, the “continuity with the past is preserved … by shattering 
30 See David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: 
Crossroad, 1981), 246 n. 25 
31 Let us use the example of the figure “baptism” as an illustration. The belief and practice of baptism may appear in 
various contexts and our study of these appearances can certainly inform us of, let us say, the nature and function of 
John’s baptism in the four Gospels, and hence provides us a tentative range of possible notion of “baptism.” But this 
diachronic study does not mean that John’s baptism cannot be conceptualized otherwise. A synchronic study that 
analyzes the paradigmatic pattern in the four Gospels is still needed to show how the baptism of John is similar or 
different from the figure of “baptism” in other contexts. A mere inter-textual allusion to a same figure without 
examining how the figure is conceptualized in various contexts can lead to an ossification of the figure. 
32 Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” in Essays on New Testament Themes, 20-21. 
429 
 
                                                          
the tradition.” Without this deconstruction (that takes places because of the change of contexts), 
the tradition will become a mere relic. It is when history and tradition are re-interpreted to the 
audience’s situation that they become meaningful to them. Bultmann’s demythologization that 
renders the biblical stories relevant to the audience is a case in point, albeit he, unfortunately, 
tends to subsume his contemporary situation to that of the biblical narratives. 
 A sense of discontinuity with the past may appear, but it also signifies a continuity with 
the past. We inherit the past. We are the product of the past, but we are also the production of the 
past as we inherit it. A similar argument is made by Günther Bornkamm in 1956.33 In his words, 
the task of the critical biblical scholars “is to seek the history in the Kerygma of the Gospels, and 
in this history to seek the Kerygma. If we are asked to differentiate between the two, that is only 
for the purpose of revealing more clearly their inter-connection and interpenetration.”34 This 
inter-connection and interpenetration of “the Kerygma of the Gospels” and history supports Van 
Harvey’s argument that history “is not so much itself a field as a field-encompassing field.”35 
This “field-encompassing field” notion of history is inevitable given that our perception of the 
33 He argues that “what belongs to the past in the history of Jesus should always be investigated and understood in 
relation to its significance for the present time and for the coming time of God’s future.” A good example of this 
contemporariness the parallel stories that we see in the Gospels. See Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Translated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James M. Robinson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), 17. 
“Because the earthly Jesus is for the Church at the same time the Risen Lord, his word takes on, in the tradition, the 
features of the present. From this standpoint are to be explained two apparently conflicting characteristics of the 
tradition which nearly every page of the Synoptics presents: an incontestable loyalty and adherence to the word of 
Jesus, and at the same time an astonishing degree of freedom as to the original wording. The word of Jesus is 
preserved, and yet not with the piety of an archivist, nor is it passed on like the utterances of famous rabbis with 
expositions attached. 4 In fact, one can go on to say this: the tradition is not really the repetition and transmission of 
the word he spoke: once upon a time, but rather is his word today.” Idem. 
34 Ibid., 21. Consider this: “Did not the Church fall into a strange anachronism? She made herself contemporary with 
her earthly pre-Easter Lord. She made herself contemporary with the Pharisees and high priests of long ago. She 
made herself contemporary with the first hearers of Jesus who heard his message of the coming of God’s kingdom, 
with the disciples who followed after him, with the sick whom he healed, with the tax collectors and sinners with 
whom he sat down at table. But what may appear here as anachronism corresponds exactly with the Church’s 
understanding of herself and her situation. She made herself one with those who did not already live by faith, but 
who at the beginning were called to obedience and faith by the word of Jesus. In this she confessed at the same time 
that her faith can be nothing else but following her earthly Master who is yet to face the cross and resurrection.” 
Ibid., 23-24. 
35 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief. With 
a New Introduction by the Author (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996), 81. 
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world is proprioceptive and correlative. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it, our “body … is the 
point of view upon the world”36 in which “to look at an object is to inhabit it, and from this 
habitation to grasp all things in terms of the aspect which they present to it.”37 
 Commenting on the search for the “historical Jesus” in the West, Kwok Pui-Lan’s 
remarks are noteworthy, as she links the search with the East-West encounters. She writes,  
Isn’t it interesting that the quests are always located in Europe and North America? 
I have not seen such obsession in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean. 
People living outside the metropolitan centers do not seem to be terribly 
concerned with the quest. Some African Christians have even said: ‘We do not 
need to quest for Jesus, we have never lost him.’ I have also observed that the first 
quest took place in Europe when the colonization of the world was at its zenith. 
Today, the United States has become the only Superpower and the newest quest 
has caught the popular imagination. Do you think this is mere coincidence?38 
 
For Kwok, the quest is not a simple “quest for origins.” It is, moreover, a quest for power; 
an Orientalist quest that seeks to justify the Western superiority. Again, in her words: 
The first quest could not have taken place without the new knowledge brought to 
the metropolitan centers about the myths, cultures, and religions of the colonized 
people … the search for Jesus must be read against the search for ‘natives’ to 
conquer and subdue. The encounter with the ‘natives’ created anxiety and 
necessitated the quest for self-identity. The epistemological framework of the first 
quest was constructed out of a combination of Orientalist philology, racist 
ideology, and Eurocentric study of other people’s mythology and religions.39 
 
 When asked whether the first quest was conducted as a means to challenge “the doctrinal 
authority of the church,” Kwok’s response is likewise remarkable. 
For a long time I was taught to read the historical quest in that way. But I have 
come to see that that was basically a European script. Where in the Third World 
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Collin Smith (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 81. 
37 Ibid., 79.  
38 Kwok Pui-Lan, “On Color-Coding Jesus: An Interview with Kwok Pui-lan,” in The Postcolonial Bible. The Bible 
and Postcolonialism. Edited by R. S. Sugirtharajah (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 177. 
39 Ibid., 178. 
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did you see people using the historical quest to challenge the church, except 
maybe in very tiny academic enclaves?40 
 
 With this observation that focuses on power relations, Kwok finds the “Third Quest,” 
mainly conducted in the United States since 1970s, reflects the anxiety of the “straight white 
males in America” when they feel that “they have lost a lot of ground to women, minorities, and 
gays and lesbians.”41 So for her, “the newest quest of Jesus in America is simultaneously a quest 
for the Jews, the blacks, the gays, the dangerous women, the immigrants, the Indians, the women 
with brown skin, the loss, the decline…” 42 Consequently, “Jesus has many identities in the 
newest quest: a political revolutionary, a magician, a Galilean charismatic, a rabbi, a proto-
Pharisee, an Essene, an eschatological prophet, a healer, a sage, and so on.”43 
 One may brush aside Kwok’s comment as too general and exaggerating, but if the “Third 
Quest” calls attention to the first-century Jewish religious, cultural, sociopolitical, and economic 
contexts of the Jesus movements, then the social locations of the interpreters should come to the 
fore as well.44 This is precisely what Kwok does. Our critical studies of the biblical texts cannot 
be conducted without critical examinations of the contexts of the interpreters. The voyeurism of 
40 Idem. Of course, one may point out the different sociopolitical and religious contexts in different countries. 
41 Idem. Echoing the conclusion of Dieter Georgi’s comments on the search for the historical Jesus in the US, 
Koester writes, “It indeed seems that the recent wave of attempts to recover the historical person of Jesus of 
Nazareth unwittingly mirrored a movement that reached its apex in Newt Gingrich’s ‘Contract with America.’ There 
is a considerable movement from the very guarded steps, taken by German scholars in the first two decades after 
World War II, to the confidence of the last fifteen years; especially in the United States, the victorious leader of the 
capitalist world. It is perhaps no accident that almost all the major recent works on the historical Jesus have been 
produced by American scholars.” See Helmut Koester, “The Historical Jesus and the Cult of the Kyrios Christos” 
(The Annual Faculty Research Lecture at HDS), Harvard Divinity Bulletin 24.3 (1995): 13-18 (14). Also, see Dieter 
Georgi, “The Interest in Life of Jesus Theology as a Paradigm for the Social History of Biblical Criticism,” The 
Harvard Theological Review, 85.1 (January 19912): 51-83 (83). 
42 See Kwok Pui-Lan, “On Color-Coding Jesus: An Interview with Kwok Pui-lan,” 181. 
43 Ibid., 183. For details on these different portrayals of Jesus, see Ben Witherington, III, The Jesus Quest: The Third 
Search For the Jew of Nazareth. 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press, 1997). 
44 Ithe beginning of his article, Georgi notes that “Historians, including biblical critics, are not known for exposing 
themselves to the same kind of historical criticism that they apply to everything and everyone else. The historical 
situation of contemporary exegetes and their social conditions usually remain uninvestigated and thus – from a 
historical-critical and socio-historical perspective – unquestioned.” See Dieter Georgi, “The Interest in Life of Jesus 
Theology as a Paradigm for the Social History of Biblical Criticism,” 51. 
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the interpreters that objectifies the others should be exposed. The multiple biblical criticisms 
used to analyze the texts in the “Third Quest” do not arise without their social locations. 
Fernando Segovia points this out rather clearly as he foregrounds the power relations entailed in 
the en-gendering of Western modern biblical criticisms.45 Critical biblical studies are not without 
ethical46 and political47 impacts upon their audience. We cannot deny that it is the product and 
production of certain configurations of power relations. 
 However, it appears that many in the field of Western critical biblical studies fail to see 
that the biblical texts have multiple textual elements and levels that render a same biblical text 
polyvalent in meanings. We sideline the “fourfold sense” of Scripture (e.g. literal, allegorical, 
tropological, and anagogical). We ignore the religious dimensions of the Jesus Movement and of 
Scripture that Alfred Loisy (1857-1940)48 highlights in the interweaving of the “historical Jesus” 
and the “Christ of faith,” as foregrounded in the “New Quest” (the second quest) that are mainly 
led by Bultmann’s students. We disregard Eastern Orthodox’s interpretations of the Scripture 
that remind us of the religious dimension of the biblical texts. We forget about the works of 
Baron Friedrich von Hügel (1852-1925) that foreground three intertwining elements of religion – 
(1) “historical and institutional,” (2) “emotional and volitional,” and (3) “analytic and 
speculative” elements – which for von Hügel, echo the “three elements or forces of our nature, 
45 See Fernando F. Segovia, Decolonizing Biblical Studies: A View from the Margins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2000), 3-52. 
46 See Daniel Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Reevaluation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1995). 
47 See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1999). 
48 See Alfred Firmin Loisy, The Birth of the Christian Religion and The Origins of the New Testament. Two books 
in one volume. Translated by L. P. Jacks (New Hyde Park, New York: University Books, 1962). Consider the last 
words in The Origins of the New Testament, “What matters is the fire they [Jesus, Peter, Paul or John] kindled, and it 
is a fire that will never die till mankind is no more. Men pass away, but humanity remains; religion die, but religion 
shines for ever. Man would have perished long ago, victim of his own folly, had not the religious ideal of humanity 
rescued him from the edge of the abyss. May he mend his ways and himself establish this law of his progress on an 
ever firmer foundation.” Ibid., 330. 
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the sensational, the rational, [and] the ethico-mystical.” 49  Depending on which element is 
privileged, the other elements recede to the background.50 This history of different trajectories in 
biblical interpretation, even if most of them are Western White Male centered, should not be 
simply dismissed as irrelevant or oppressive. To dismiss them is to deny their contextuality and 
to forget our own contextuality. 
  This heritage of critical biblical studies, whether we like it or not, offers us many lessons. 
The quests of the “historical Jesus” teach us the ethics and politics of biblical interpretations. 
They enlighten us that meaning is multidimensional and relational. We certainly want to reject 
the parts of our heritage that marginalize the others. But, we cannot discard it entirely; it already 
marks us. We need to engage it and learn from its positive and negative influences. Let us recall 
Käsemann’s argument that “continuity with the past is preserved by shattering the received 
terminology, the receive imagery, the received theology – in short, by shattering the tradition.”51 
To be faithful to the past is to be “unfaithful” to it: to engage it in the contemporary situation. In 
the words of Jacques Derrida,  
the heir must always respond to a sort of double injunction, a contradictory 
assignation: It is necessary first of all to know and to know how to reaffirm what 
comes ‘before us,’ which we therefore receive even before choosing, and to 
behave in this respect as a free subject … What does it mean to reaffirm? It means 
49 See Baron Friedrich von Hügel, The Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and Her 
Friends. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Introduction and Biographies (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co; London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 
1923), 55-56. He writes, “Religion is at all times more or less both traditional and individual; both external and 
internal; both institutional, rational, and volitional. It always answers more or less to the needs of authority and 
society; of reason and proof; of interior sustenance and purification. I believe because I am told, because it is true, 
because it answers to my deepest interior experiences and needs.” Ibid., 54. In light of our discussion of the modes 
of existence in chapter 1, we can further say that (1) is a mode of relationality, (2) is heteronomy, and (3) is 
autonomy. Just as the modes of existence are intertwined, for von Hügel too, these elements are interwoven. 
50  For example, speaking of the potential challenge of “emotional and volitional element” (heteronomy) to 
“historical and institutional element” (relationality) and “analytic and speculative element” (autonomy), von Hügel 
writes: “To the external force this emotional power will tend to appear as akin to revolution; to the intellectual side it 
will readily seem mere subjectivity and sentimentality ever verging on delusion. And the emotional-experimental 
force will, in its turn, be tempted to sweep aside both the external, as so much oppressive ballast; and the intellectual, 
as so much hair-splitting or rationalism. And if it succeeds, a shifting subjectivity, and all but incurable tyranny of 
mood and fancy, will result, – fanaticism is in full sight.” Ibid., 55. 
51 Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” in Essays on New Testament Themes, 20. 
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not simply accepting this heritage but relaunching it otherwise and keeping it 
alive … This reaffirmation, which both continues and interrupts, resembles (at 
least) an election, a selection, a decision.52 
 
To be faithful to one’s heritage is to keep it alive. But to keep it alive is to engage it. To engage it 
is to transform it; to save it from being left behind as a relic collecting dust.53 In order to save the 
tradition, the shattering must take place within the tradition. This resurrection of the tradition is 
rather common in new renditions of the classic songs and movies. Reaffirmation is “not simply 
accepting this heritage but relaunching it otherwise and keeping it alive.” To relaunch it 
otherwise and to keep it alive is to be responsible for it. Derrida writes, 
The concept of responsibility has no sense at all outside of an experience of 
inheritance … One is responsible before what comes before one but also before 
what is to come, and therefore before oneself … It is always a question of a sort of 
anachronism: to come before [devancer] in the name of what came before us, and 
to come before the name itself! To invent one’s name, to sign otherwise, uniquely 
in each case but in the name of the name passed down, if that’s possible!54 
 
For Derrida, this double “before” is a gesture of love. It is to let heritage be heritage; to let it go; 
to leave it. “Not to leave it safe: to save it, perhaps, yet again, for a time, but without the illusion 
of a final salvation.”55 This is why for Derrida, deconstruction “never proceeds without love” 
(see the epigraph). 56 This is another reason why we use structural semiotics to interpret the 
theme and figure of love in 1 Corinthians and scholarly rendering of them. It helps us “to 
52 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Choosing One’s Heritage,” in For What Tomorrow … : A Dialogue. 
Translated by Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3-4. 
53 “It is always by reaffirming the heritage that one can avoid this putting to death. Even at the moment … when this 
very heritage, in order to save its life … demands reinterpretation, critique, displacement, that is, an active 
intervention, so that a transformation worthy of the name might take place: so that something might happen, an 
event, some history, an unforeseeable future-to-come.” Ibid., 4. 
54 Ibid., 6. 
55 Ibid., 4. 
56 “To know how to ‘leave’ and to ‘let’ [laisser], and to know the meaning of ‘leaving’ and ‘letting’ – that is one of 
the most beautiful, most hazardous, most necessary things I know of. It is in close proximity with giving up and 
giving over, the gift, and forgiveness. The experience of a ‘deconstruction’ is never without this, without this love, if 
you prefer that word.” Ibid., 4-5. 
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elucidate, to imagine, to describe the operations that we accomplish in spite of ourselves when 
we construct as text and as discourse whatever we read” (see the epigraph). The prepositional 
phrase “in spite of ourselves” highlights our construction “as text and as discourse [of] whatever 
we read” is only one possible representation. This one possibility should not exclude other 
possibilities. We do not live in a vacuum. Paul makes this point rather clearly in 1 Corinthians. 
As Paul argues for the singularity and plurality of believers in Christ through the calling 
of God (cf. 1 Cor. 1:9 as contrasted with 7:17-24), he exhorts them not to forget what they have 
experienced in Christ (1:4-6). He reminds them of their situations before the call (1:26). The 
partaking of the Lord’s Supper in the gatherings should further remind them of the body of 
Christ (11:24-26) that gives them life. Remembering is not a mere cognitive recollection. It is 
above all a habitus – which can be a semantic or a syntactic habitus (see chapter 2) – that marks 
one’s body and mind. Paul thus speaks of the remembering as a proclamation of the Lord’s death 
until he comes (11:26). Similarly, our interpretation of love in 1 Corinthians recalls the history of 
interpretation. Because of various voices in Malaysia and 1 Corinthians, we use Greimas’s 
semiotic theory, in particular his model of the “Generative Trajectory,” to engage the text and its 
interpretations. Not only does the trajectory highlight the meaning-producing dimensions and 
how they are produced, it also underlines the proprioceptive (or convictional) aspect of meaning 
production. Greimas’s “semiotic square” further fleshes out this aspect in Paul’s notion of love, 
which is often sidelined in scholarly interpretations (see chapter 1). 
For Julia Kristeva, the convictional aspect also marks the text, as she speaks of a text in 
terms of a genotext (the “semiotic”) and a phenotext (the “symbolic”). She writes: 
The genotext can thus be seen as language’s underlying foundation … The 
phenotext is constantly split up and divided, and is irreducible to the semiotic 
process that works through the genotext. The phenotext is a structure … it obeys 
rules of communication and presupposes a subject of enunciation and an 
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addressee. The genotext, on the other hand, is a process; it moves through zones 
that have relative and transitory borders and constitutes a path that is not 
restricted to the two poles of univocal information between two full-fledged 
subjects … one might say that the genotext is a matter of topology, whereas the 
phenotext is one of algebra.57 
 
Here, we see that while the genotext undergirds the phenotext, the latter manifests the former. 
Such a manifestation is only one possibility. Regardless of how much “the phenotext is 
constantly split up and divided” to represent the genotext, it is “irreducible to the semiotic 
process that works through the genotext.” To marginalize the genotext is to objectify the “subject 
of enunciation and an addressee” and reduce the text to a mere “punctual presentation of 
meaning in words” instead of an “engendering of meaning.” 58  What we have learnt from 
Käsemann, Bornkamm, and Derrida is that tradition and heritage are not relic precisely because 
those who inherit and engage them are flesh-and-blood people. 
Paul Ricoeur’s notion of “the symbol gives rise to thought” (le symbole donne à penser)59 
further shows that the genotext can be hermeneutically fleshed out in something else than symbol, 
namely “thought” – syntactically articulated thought. If “the immediacy of the symbol and the 
mediation of thought” are held together in the symbol itself,60 then the dialectic of the symbol 
giving rise to thoughts and thoughts returning to the symbol (in a second naïveté) allows us to 
access the symbol.61 This place of the symbol in the hermeneutical circle is crucial; “the symbol 
57 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language. Introduction by Leon S. Roudiez. Translated by Margaret Waller 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 87. Emphasis added. 
58 See John Lechte, Julia Kristeva (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 128. 
59 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. Translated by Emerson Buchanan (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969), 
3-24, 347-57; idem, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I” (translated by Denis Savage) 
and “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: II” (translated by Charles Freilich) in The Conflict 
of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 
287-334. 
60 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 350. Emphasis added. 
61 Or as Berger and Luckmann put it, “Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly 
abstracted from everyday experience, but also of ‘bringing back’ these symbols and appresenting them as 
objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and symbolic language become essential 
constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the common-sense apprehension of this reality. I live in a world of 
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is the movement of the primary meaning which makes us participate in the latent meaning and 
thus assimilates us to that which is symbolized without our being able to master the similitude 
intellectually.”62 As the symbol draws us into its world as we try to explain it, we can only 
explain and understand it better in relation to its own logic. Ricoeur writes: 
[While] we can no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance 
with the original belief in them [first naïveté], we can, we modern men [sic], aim 
at a second naïveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by interpreting that we 
can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and 
the endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.63 
 
For Ricoeur, we can “communicate with the sacred” because our understanding “proceeds from a 
prior understanding of the very thing that it tries to understand by interpreting it.”64 While we 
disagree with Ricoeur’s tendency to overemphasize the articulation of thought in the second 
naïveté (see section 3 in chapter 2),65 we nonetheless find Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of symbols 
helpful to highlight the vital role of symbols in our articulation of thought. Given this 
hermeneutics of symbols, our use of structural semiotics is further justified to textually and 
analytically flesh out the proprioceptive and religious dimensions of 1 Corinthians. 
 
III. What Is A Structural Semiotics? 
[T]he production of meaning is meaningful only if it is the transformation of a 
meaning already given: the production of meaning is consequently a signifying 
signs and symbols every day.” See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), 55. 
62 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 16. Emphasis added. 
63 Ibid., 351. 
64 Ibid., 352. In his reading of Ricoeur, Bourgeois further points out that “hermeneutics and interpretation of texts 
must be instructed by a structural approach to the text” as it brings us “from a naïve or superficial interpretation of a 
text to a depth or critical interpretation.” See Patrick L. Bourgeois, “From Hermeneutics of Symbols to the 
Interpretation of Texts,” in in Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Edited by Charles E. Regan (Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 1979), 91, 93. 
65 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 351. Also, see Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, Metaphoric 
Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 
1984), 64-65, 196 n. 8. 
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endowment with form indifferent to whatever content it may be called on to 
transform. Meaning, in the sense of the forming of meaning, can thus be defined 
as the possibility of the transformation of meaning. 66 – A. J. Greimas 
 
In this section, we will explain Greimas’s semiotic square and each of the six components 
in the “Generative Trajectory.” This explanation is crucial. In chapters 3-7, we will use them to 
analyze and interpret Paul’s love in 1 Corinthians. 
The word “structural” often gives people the bad impression that it is mechanical, 
ahistorical, anti-material, colonialist, universalizing, etc. Even until now, we still come across 
scathing criticism of structural (semiotic) exegesis that seriously mischaracterizes it.67 So, let us 
first note that structural semiotics delineates the discursive structuration of meaning so that we 
can deconstruct not just the text and context, but also the way we interpret.68 In his review of the 
development of semiotics in biblical studies, Jean Delorme points out that the field in 1980s 
66 Algirdas Julien Greimas, “The Meaning of Meaning,” in The Social Sciences: A Semiotic View. Foreword by 
Paolo Fabbri and Paul Perron. Translated by Paul Perron and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990), 9. 
67 For example, Hurtado argues that “although handbooks and student guides on NT exegesis continue to include 
references to and descriptions of structuralist exegesis, it appears to have peaked some time ago in NT studies and is 
no longer the ‘now’ fashion that it was for Patte in 1976. This is for two reasons. First, ‘structuralism’ simply 
suffered the fate of fashions, which is to be superseded by subsequent fashions, in this case ‘post-structuralism’ and 
‘deconstructionism.’ Indeed, already in 1975 (ironically for the date of Patte’s book), Roland Barthes (sometimes 
credited with the founding publication of structuralism in his book S/Z/ in 1953) asked, ‘Who is still a structuralist?’ 
(Barthes 1977: 117).” See Larry W. Hurtado, “Fashions, Fallacies, and Future Prospects in New Testament Studies,” 
JSNT 36.4 (2014): 299-324 (301). The book by Barthes in 1997 is Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes (ET; New York: 
Macmillan, 1997; French original: 1975). Here, Hurtado only cites one book by Patte and problematically ignores all 
the subsequent development in structural semiotics. Moreover, the title of the book that Hurtado refers to should be 
“What is Structural Exegesis?” instead of “What is Structuralist Exegesis?” To be fair, in this book, Patte makes it 
clear that the book is still in an experimental stage to see how the synchronic studies in semiotics can be applicable 
to critical biblical studies (which tends to focus on the diachronic studies of the text) to flesh out the paradigmatic 
pattern or the semantic universe of the text. Patte does this by showing how meanings are mediated and produced in 
the religious discourse. 
68 Patte succinctly points out that structural exegesis “is self-consciously developed on the basis of semiotic theories 
– that is, the theories that extend structural linguistic theories (how meaningful communication takes place in and 
through language; the grammar of sentence) to encompass all means of human communication (including through 
entire discourses and texts) and semantic theories (how meaning is produced and communicated). It is called 
‘structural’ because, according to these theories, a text is meaningful for readers only insofar as they recognize (1) 
different features in this texts and (2) an interrelation – a structure – among different features.” See Daniel Patte, 
“Structural Criticism,” in To Each Its Own Meaning: An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application. 
Revised and expanded edition. Edited by Steven L. McKenzie and Stephen R. Haynes (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1999), 183. 
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already stressed the subject of enunciation in the discourse: how meaning is engendered 
discursively in a particular situation between the flesh-and-blood enunciator and enunciatee.69 
Further clarification. First, a semiotic theory is not a fossilized formal language about a 
static structure. Insofar as it is viewed in the way that it presents itself, namely as a “theory”70 – a 
“meta-language” (or more specifically, a “hierarchy of meta-languages”), it is open to critical 
analysis, even as it is ever in process (see “Generative Trajectory”). It should be clear that the 
semiotic theory treats both the text and context as sociopolitical and socio-religious productions, 
which involve the interplay of forces and relations. Both text and context not only reflect a 
reality (each time from a certain perspective), but also (re)produce and even (re)inscribe a certain 
representation of this reality as the norm for their enunciatee or the flesh-and-blood reader. 
Secondly, the word “semiotics,” for Greimas’s, refers to a systematic study of the 
signifying process – the production of meaning – which includes among many other things the 
study of signs. It is different from Kristeva’s notion of “semiotic,” which from Greimas’s 
perspective, would be one of the many features of semiotics as a theory. Thirdly, the term 
“structural” underscores how meaning-producing dimensions are interrelated in the signifying 
process. As such, it foregrounds meaning as meaning effects. 
Fourthly, at the core of Greimas’s semiotic theory is the “Generative Trajectory” that 
highlights the interaction in the signifying process of the “semantics” and the “syntax.” The 
“semantics” is for Greimas where feelings (i.e., Fundamental Semantics) are thematized 
(organized around certain conceptualization of themes in Narrative Semantics) and figurativized 
(represented by certain figures that embody the themes in a discourse) in Discursive Semantics. 
69 See Jean Delorme, “Orientations of a Literary Semiotics Questioned by the Bible,” 27-61; Louis Panier, “From 
Biblical Text to Literary Enunciation and Its Subject,” Semeia 81: 63-75. 
70 Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Joseph Courtés, “Theory,” in Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary, 
Vol. I. Translated by Larry Crist, Daniel Patte, James Lee, Edward McMahon II, Gary Phillips, and Michael 
Rengstorf (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 344-46. 
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Given this signifying process, Greimas suggests that semiotics “is first and foremost a state of 
mind before it is a method. It is an ethic which expresses the demand for rigor both with respect 
to itself and to others…”71 
Fifthly, as the proprioceptive features of signifying are fleshed out in our analysis of the 
semiotic square, it is noteworthy that the square is not a logical square;72 the values in the square 
are semantically invested. The semiotic square is primarily a symbolic square that helps us 
visualize the interrelation of the values at each corner of the square.73 
(i) What Is A Semiotic Square? 
In a thymic-oriented culture such as Paul’s, features of human existence are intuitively 
felt “to have a value.”74 They are so embodied in our perception that we call these felt values our 
convictions (i.e., self-evident truths). Following Timothy Cargal, who points out the 
contextuality of Greimas’s semiotic theory in privileging the veridictory instead of the thymic 
category, we put the predicate in quotation marks to indicate the felt value of a “feature of human 
existence” or a “reality” in terms of an euphoria (feeling good) or a dysphoria (feeling bad).75 A 
good example is the value of holiness. It is because certain sayings, doings, and states are felt to 
71 See A. J. Greimas, “Postface,” in Signs and Parables: Semiotics and Gospel Texts, with a Study by Jacques 
Geninasca. The Entrevernes Group. Translated by Gary Phillips (Pittsburgh, PA: The Pickwick Press, 1978), 297. 
72For example, see Paul Ricoeur, “Greimas’s Narrative Grammar,” in A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. 
Edited by Mario J. Valdés (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 256-86. For Greimas’s 
response, see “On Narrativity: Debate with A. J. Greimas,” in A Ricoeur Reader, 287-99. 
73For Greimas, the semiotic square is not appropriately used for presenting how an ideology functions, although it is 
possible as is suggested for example by Fredric Jameson, “Foreword,” in On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic 
Theory. Introduction by Paul J. Perron. Translated by Paul J. Perron and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987), vi-xxii. 
74 We can think of the values of sacredness, purity, goodness, glory, honor, etc. in the biblical world. For example, 
addressing the classification of dirt, Douglas writes, “biologists have thought that dirt, in the form of bodily 
excretions, produces a universal feeling of disgust. They should remember that there is no such thing as dirt; no 
single item is dirty apart from a particular system of classification in which it does not fit … But what counts as dirt? 
It depends on the classification in use.” See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concept of Pollution 
and Taboo (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), xvii-xviii. In a veridictory semiotic system, features 
of human existence are intuitively felt “to be.” 
75 See Timothy B. Cargal, “The Generative Trajectory in Certain Non-Western Cultures,” in Daniel Patte, The 
Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts: Greimas’s Structural Semiotics and Biblical Exegesis (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1990), 265-75. 
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be holy that they are then felt to be real and true. Holiness is not a state of being but a state of felt 
being but a state of felt value. Since Western cultures are veridictory-oriented,76 it is important to 
stress that the terms in a semiotic square are felt “to be” (seem to exist) in relations with each 
other. Let us use Daniel Patte’s example of the “traffic light” to explain.77 
First, this semiotic square is situated in a US context. The color of the traffic lights may 
signify different things in different countries. Secondly, we can arrange these light-values in the 
way that seems to be good to us. Thirdly, how we relate these light-values signifies certain 
values in our context. By putting the green and flashing yellow lights on the left of the square, 
we indicate that they are euphoric, good, or desirable. Most drivers probably prefer the green 
light. The usage of the lights may also imply that our context perceives the “green” to be 
approving while “red” to be less approving, and hence, a warning. Fourthly, the way the light-
values are interrelated indicates a certain conception that links them together. One can think of 
other conceptualizations to explain how these light-values are interconnected. In the US context, 
one potential theme that we can think of is “progress” as a desirable value. Lastly, each value at 
the four corners of the square is in three relations: contrariety, contradiction, and implication.78 
While a semiotic square focusing on the “semantics” privileges the contrary relationship (Green 
vs. Red), a semiotic square highlighting the “syntax” prioritizes the contradiction relationship 
(Green vs. Yellow/Non-Green). 
 
 
76 Scott writes, “In metaphysical traditions, for example, a person wants to know what is real and what is not real. 
One feels obligated to find norms of judgment. One feels acutely the danger of despair if ultimate reality and 
meaning and threatened…” See Charles E. Scott, The Language of Difference (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press International, 1989), 7. 
77 See Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 15. 
78 For linguistic details concerning the duality in language between contrast and combination in Greimas’s semiotic 
theory, see Ronald Schleifer, A. J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning: Linguistic, Semiotics and Discourse Theory 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 1-43. 
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                    Macro-Universe (S) 
 






               Non-Red Light (Non-S2)   Non-Green Light (Non-S1)  
               ≈ Flashing Yellow Light   ≈ Yellow Light  
 
        Micro-Universe (Non-S) 
 
More explanations. First, the Green Light (S1) is in a contrary relationship with the Red 
Light (S2). There is no particular reason why we juxtapose the Green Light and the Red Light. 
Remember, a semiotic square is a symbolic square, not a logical square. Secondly, the Green 
Light (S1) is also in a contradiction relationship with the Non-Green Light (Non-S1) ≈ Yellow 
Light. As is readily seen, the Yellow Light is the logical negation of the Green Light. Hence we 
say that the contradiction relationship is underscored by the syntax, as the syntax is about logical 
rules. Thirdly, the Green Light (S1) is also in an implication relationship with the Non-Red Light 
(Non-S2) ≈ Flashing Yellow Light. Fourthly, while this implication relationship is metaphorical, 
note that the Flashing Yellow Light (Non-S2) is also in a contradiction relationship with the Red 
Light (S2). Thus, fifthly, the sub-contrary relationship that we see between Non-S2 and Non-S1 
can become complicated. 
Now, if we are to translate all these technical terms into our everyday life experience in 
the US that privileges “progress,” we see that we desire “moving” (the Green Light) and do not 
like “stopping” (the Red Light). “To go” is euphoric and “to stop” is dysphoric. In life, the Green 
Light (“to go”) and the Red Light (“to stop”) are often mixed with setbacks and successes. They 














Light and the Red Light as the Yellow Light (Non-S1) and the Flashing Yellow Light (Non-S2). 
That is to say, we do not always get to progress smoothly. More often than not, we need to 
proceed with caution (the Flashing Yellow Light) and be prepared to halt the progress (the 
Yellow Light). While the Flashing Yellow Light (Non-S2) and the Yellow Light (Non-S1) are not 
ideal – and hence, the sub-contrary indicates a Micro-Universe (non-S) – they are realistic. 
As the Flashing Yellow Light is like the Green Light, it implies the Green Light. But, it 
also contradicts the Red Light, as it signifies “do not stop,” but “proceed with caution.” Similarly, 
the Yellow Light is like the Red Light in the US context, as it implies “prepare to stop.” But, it 
also contradicts the Green Light that means “go,” as it indicates “do not go.” 
While the Macro-Universe is ideal, it is not necessarily better than the Micro-Universe. 
Some cultures may prefer the Micro-Universe to the Macro-Universe.79 One last thing to note is 
the symbolic feature of the square. As a symbolic square, the arrangement and interpretation of 
the values at each corner of the square are contextual. Depending on how we place and interpret 
the values in relations with each other, the conceptualization that links these values varies. Given 
these features of a semiotic square, we thus call it an “elementary structure of signification.” 
In the semiotic square below, the honor and shame values are felt to be real and true. 
Because honor is felt euphoric, it is assessed to “be” good. And, because it “is” good, we should 
acquire and maintain honor. Note that this feeling of honor does not concern whether honor is 
associated with “real” or “illusory” situations/contexts. Now, since Malaysia takes prides (or 
perceives honor) in its multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual society, the 
particularity of each culture, whatever it might be, is celebrated. It is a shame when distinctive 
characteristics of individual culture are marginalized, even when unity is advocated for the 
79 Patte illustrates this point as he deconstructs and reconstructs the story of Luke 10:30-35. See Daniel Patte, The 
Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 81-102. 
444 
 
                                                          
advantage of the Malays. Nonetheless, the strategy to retain and promote differences has become 
a communal tactic of survival and success. 
              Macro-Universe (S) 
 
        Honored (S1)             Shamed (S2) 





                  Non-Shamed (Non-S2)    Non-Honored (Non-S1)   
          ≈ Different/Particular   ≈ Same/Universal 
 
       Micro-Universe (Non-S) 
As we noted about the relations in a semiotic square, the value “honored” (S1) contrasts 
“shamed” (S2), contradicts “non-honored” (Non-S1), and implies “non-shamed” (Non-S2). We 
want to stress that the implication relation is a metaphorical relation that creates a simulacrum 
that can be readily perceived. That is to say, since the value “honored” is so fundamental, it is 
often mediated by other values so that it can be expressed concretely in real life.80 As such, the 
values “different” and “same” can mediate the ideal world (the Macro-Universe) and the realistic 
world (the Micro-Universe) and negotiate their differences. 
Concerning the interrelation of the values on a semiotic square, Ronald Schleifer suggests 
that the position of Non-S1 is an operation of a “both-and,” while the position of Non-S2 is an 
operation of a “neither-nor,”81 which Fredric Jameson calls the “fourth term, the negation of the 
negation.”82 So if “honored” is contrary to “shamed,” then the value “non-honored” (Non-S1) 
80 For an illustration of how this works, see Daniel Patte, What is Structural Exegesis?, 53-83. Also, see Ronald 
Schleifer, A. J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning, 30-33. 
81 See Ronald Schleifer, A. J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning, 28-29. 
82 Jameson writes, “This must be (where the operation is successful) the place of novelty and of paradoxical 
emergence. It is always the most critical position and the one that remains open or empty for the longest time, for its 
identification completes the process and in that sense constitutes the most creative act of the construction. Once 
again, it is simply a matter of experience that the first three terms are relatively ‘given’ and demand no great acts of 














                                                          
can be conceived in terms of both “honored” and “shamed.” If non-honored (Non-S1) is seen as 
“same/universal,” then it has the qualities of both “honored” and “shamed.” While the notion of 
hybridity has been greatly employed in postcolonial theory and criticism, it can be dysphoric in 
Malaysia if it is used to win votes. We see too many politicians making blank promises to please 
many groups without delivering on them. If each “race” and “religion” has its own uniqueness, is 
it not suspicious that we can bring everyone together without respecting their distinctions? 
On the other hand, the “neither-nor” possibility (Non-S2) is appealing; it underscores the 
difficulty to bring differences together. What common ground can we share as we celebrate our 
differences? Can differences be our commonality? We can see why Jameson calls this “fourth 
term” in the semiotic square (Non-S2) most explosive and disruptive. It calls for a creative 
imagination. This operation of a “neither-nor” does not trivialize differences. Neither does it say 
that all differences are welcome. The challenge is how to engage differences creatively not in 
oppositional but complementary terms. To do this, the value of “both-and” must be qualified by 
a “neither-nor.” We will see this being done in a series of semiotic squares, where the sub-
contrary terms (i.e., Non-S2 and Non-S1) in a semiotic square become the contrary terms (e.g., a 
new S1 and a new S2) for the following semiotic square (see the “Narrative Semantics” below). 
(ii) The Semantics and The Syntax 
For Greimas, the “semantics” refers (1) to the “gut feeling” or self-evident truths or 
values that are imposed upon and shape one’s identity and (2) to their figurative expression, such 
as honor and shame values in the Chinese worldview. Following Merleau-Ponty’s embodied 
perception of the world, Greimas and Jacques Fontanille write: “It is by means of the perceiving 
body that the world is transformed into meaning (into language), that the exteroceptive figures 
ceiling, or from heaven.” See Fredric Jameson, “Foreword,” in On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory, 
xvi. For more illustration, idem, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 163ff. 
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are internalized, and that figurativity can be envisaged as the subject’s mode of thinking.”83 Our 
perception of the world is not only initially proprioceptive, it is also proprioceptive as we reason 
and articulate it. Greimas and Fontanille thus find that “what is most remarkable is that the 
figures of the world can ‘make sense’ only through the sensitization imposed on them by the 
mediation of the body.”84 Note that the “sensitization” is “imposed … by the mediation of the 
body.” As “feeling is directly experienced as a self-evident mode of existence, prior to any 
impressions received,”85 it makes sense for Greimas to give priority to the “semantics.”86 
The “syntax,” on the other hand, is the rule and grammar that seeks to make sense, 
organize, and systematize the felt and intuited values or perceptions imposed upon our body. The 
Lacanian “mirror stage” illustrates this identification and differentiation between the subject and 
the other in our attempt to make sense of our subjectivity and to interact with the other in the 
world. As such, the “syntax” refers (1) to the demonstrated truths that results from asserting or 
negating the felt, self-evident truth or convictions (of the semantics) and their narrative 
expression and (2) to the verisimilitudinous discursive expressions that relate these demonstrated 
truths to historical realities (characters, times, spaces) recognizable by an intended audience. 
To use our example from chapter 1 about “honor felt,” “honor claimed,” and “honor 
paid,” we can say that the dynamic relationship between “honor felt” and “honor claimed” and 
“honor paid” depict the discursive relation between the “semantics” (“honor felt”) and the 
83 Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions: From States of Affairs to States of 
Feeling. Translated by Paul Perron and Frank Collins. Foreword by Paul Perron and Paolo Fabrri (Minnesota, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xxi. Emphasis added. 
84 Emphasis added. They continue, “This is why the epistemological subject of theoretical construction cannot 
present itself as a pure rational cognitive subject. In fact, during its trajectory that leads to the advent of signification 
and to its discursive manifestation, it automatically encounters a phase of thymic ‘sensitization.’” Idem. 
85 Ibid., 2. 
86 While Porter and Robinson most recently give a fair review of Greimas’s “Generative Trajectory” and Patte’s 
structural semiotics, they miss out the proprioceptive or thymic aspect of meaning production that characterize their 
works. This blunder is perhaps not too surprising given that Western cultures are primarily metaphysical or 
veridictory, i.e., non-thymic, centered. See Stanley E. Porter and Jason C. Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction 
to Interpretive Theory (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2011), 179-82. 
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“syntax” (“honor claimed” and “honor paid”). As “honor claimed” and “honor paid” cannot fully 
represent “honor felt,” in trying to articulate and manifest “honor felt,” something is created and 
missed out in our definition of honor through “honor claimed” and “honor paid.” 
In sum, Patte writes: “Syntactic components involve those relations that contribute to the 
production of the narrative or discourse development (e.g., the unfolding of a story, the unfolding 
or an argument) … the semantic components involve those relations that govern values and 
symbolic systems.”87 Note that the “syntax” concerns how to present the narrative plot in a way 
that is real – verisimilitude – so that the audience may be convinced by the validity of the ideas 
and ideologies of the story. On the other hand, the “semantics,” as it is governed by those 
feelings, drives, and convictions that undergird the narrative world, is not at the forefront of the 
text but is expressed through the symbolic and figurative relations in the text.88 
(iii) The Generative Trajectory 
We began with the semiotic square in our discussion of the semiotic theory because it 
underlines the dynamic feature of the “Generative Trajectory.” As a textual analytical framework, 
the trajectory highlights the generation and transformation of meaning. As the name indicates, 
the trajectory is not a superstructure of meaning production. Rather, it highlights the trajectory 
and characteristics of the meaning-producing dimensions, which can then help us identify the 
pertinent textual dimension that warrants our interpretation so that we do not make unwarranted 
claims.89 A syntactic analysis of Paul’s love, for instance, should not be mistaken for a semantic 
87 Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 77. “The syntactic components are the necessary re-
expressions (in a new form) of the semantic components. No syntax can exist apart from the semantics that it re-
expresses. Conversely, no semantic system can be maintained if it is not re-expressed in a syntactic form.” Ibid., 174. 
88 Patte finds that “the distinction between ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics’ and between ‘syntagmatic’ and ‘paradigmatic’ 
are more or less equivalent.” Greimas prefers to syntax and semantics because he “wants to avoid predetermining 
the structure of these dimensions [of the text] (by calling them syntagmatic and paradigmatic).” Ibid., 77, n. 8. 
89  For an excellent demonstration of this point, see Mieke Bal, Murder and Difference: Gender, Genre, and 
Scholarship on Sisera’s Death. Translated by Matthew Gumpert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 
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analysis. The diagram of the generative trajectory below illustrates the modes of generation and 
existence of meaning effects.90 








Deep             Fundamental Syntax (3) 
level 
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It is important to reiterate that the “Generative Trajectory” does not aim to show “in any 
way the process through which somebody produces a discourse.” 91  The term “generative” 
highlights the “mode of production” of every semiotic object, “from the simplest to the most 
complex, from the most abstract to the most concrete.”92 The trajectory illustrates the production 
of meaning from potential conditions such as the “felt sense of incomprehension” 93  to 
virtualization and actualization of such sense in the text before realized in the discourse before 
the enunciatee, the flesh-and-blood reader.94 Greimas argues that “the production of meaning is 
90 See Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 78. Also, see Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph 
Courtés, “Generative Trajectory,” in Semiotics and Language, 132-34. 
91 Patte clarifies, “it should be noted that the term ‘generative’ does not intend to connote that this model represents 
in any way the process through which somebody produces a discourse. This model aims rather at representing the 
hierarchical interrelation of the components that together participate in the production of the meaning-effect.” See 
Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 74-75. 
92 Algirdas Julien Greimas and Joseph Courtés, “Generative Trajectory,” in Semiotics and Language, 132. 
93 Ronald Schleifer, A. J. Greimas and the Nature of Meaning, 86. 
94 “To conceive semiotic theory in terms of a trajectory thus consisted in imagining it as, on the one hand, a pathway 
crossed by markers but, on the other, as a coagulating seeping of meaning, meaning continuously taking on 
substance, starting from its original nebulosity and ‘potential’ [fundamental and narrative semantics], and continuing 
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meaningful only if it is the transformation of a meaning already given.”95 As meaning is always 
in the process of transformation, from Fundamental Semantics (1) to Discursive Semantics (6), it 
is noteworthy that depending on the sub-components or meaning producing dimensions that we 
focus on, we construct different texts out of a same text, and hence, interpret the text differently. 
We call this analytical phenomenon “textualization” because it shows how we, in trying to make 
sense/meaning of the text, actually create different texts out of the same printed text. We create 
different texts because in highlighting certain sub-components, we read the text as if it only has 
those highlighted meaning producing dimensions. 
Secondly, the hierarchical relationship from the “deep level” to the “surface level” in 
enunciation is not only a question of strategy. It is also “related to the passage from meaning to 
signification” that points to the modalities and the “fundamental element of the modulations of 
sentences constituted by aspectualities.” 96 That is to say, as the “subject of enunciation” is 
saturated with passion, s/he is given to the elements of “modulations” and “aspectualities” in 
meaning production.97 Here, the words “modulations” and “aspectualities” highlight the mood 
and feeling of the flesh-and-blood subjects. 
With these clarifications, let us go over the “Generative Trajectory.” The trajectory has 
two components: the “semantics” and the “syntax.” Under each of them, we have three sub-
components. The numeral in the parenthesis behind each sub-component indicates the trajectory 
of meaning generation and transformation. For example, the number (2) in Narrative Semantics 
(2) indicates that it is built upon the Fundamental Semantics (1). Likewise, the Narrative Syntax 
with its ‘virtualization’ and ‘actualization’ [fundamental and narrative syntax], before finishing with its ‘realization’ 
[syntactic and semantic discursive manifestations], passing from epistemological preconditions to discursive 
manifestations.” See Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, xx. 
95 Algirdas Julien Greimas, “The Meaning of Meaning,” in The Social Sciences: A Semiotic View. Translated by 
Paul Perron and Frank H. Collins (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 9. 
96 See “On Narrativity: Debate with A. J. Greimas,” in A Ricoeur Reader, 296. 
97 For details, see Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, 1-16. 
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(4) goes through the trajectories of the Fundamental Syntax (3), Narrative Semantics (2), and 
Fundamental Semantics (1). So the numeral (1) of the Fundamental Semantics (1) indicates how 
meaning is first felt. Depending on how we interpret this felt meaning in our first semiotic square, 
we derive a basic pattern that makes sense of it.98 As this pattern is applied and “actualized” in 
different aspects of life, we have a series of semiotic squares manifesting a similar pattern of the 
first square. These squares that form the Narrative Semantics (2) is what we will try to flesh out 
in chapter 2 about the notion of typology. In light of our discussion of modes of existence in 
chapter 1, all the components of the “semantics” – i.e., Fundamental, Narrative, and Discursive 
Semantics – are heteronomy-oriented, whereas the Fundamental Syntax is autonomy-centered, 
and Narrative Syntax and Discursive Syntax are relationality-centered. 
When the individuals affirm, either assert or negate, the basic pattern of the Fundamental 
Semantics (1), they transform the felt meaning. This logical transformation of meaning in 
Fundamental Syntax (3) is like an individual’s subjectivity is formed as s/he tries to profess the 
meaning for her/himself (cf. the “mirror stage”). When this affirmation of the felt meaning is 
“actualized” in the text, with various social positions assigned to different characters/actants, we 
see Narrative Syntax (4) at work. Because Narrative Semantics (2) and Narrative Syntax (4) 
manifest the “deep level” that we see in Fundamental Semantics (1) and Fundamental Syntax (3), 
they are at the “surface level.” Just as a symptom may point to this or that illness and different 
symptoms can be triggered by one illness, the representation of the “deep level” at the “surface 
level” is also dynamic. 
The dynamic representation comes to the fore at the “Discursive Structures,” where the 
enunciator tailors her/his message to the enunciatee’s situation so that the enunciatee can engage 
98 As we noted, while many Western scholars privilege the veridictory category of Fundamental Semantics (1), we 




                                                          
it. As the words “enunciator” and “enunciatee” indicate the dynamic flesh-and-blood subjects, 
where an enunciator is the writer/speaker and the enunciatee is the reader/audience, it would be 
naïve to simply assume that Paul’s enunciation to different churches of God is similar. Unless 
these churches have the same contexts and issues, it is unlikely that Paul’s enunciation is 
context-free. Paul’s convictions remain the same, but it does not mean that his enunciation will 
remain the same. The way he expresses his convictions will vary according to the context of the 
church of God that he addresses. J. Christiaan Beker makes this point rather clear in his notions 
of the “coherence” and “contingency” of the gospel.99 
To be persuasive in his message, Paul would use real life examples, pertinent to the 
specific enunciatee, to substantiate the validity of his message, a prominent feature highlighted in 
the Discursive Syntax (5). The “actorialization,” “temporalization,” and “spatialization” not only 
familiarize us to the verisimilitude and validity of the story,100 they also create a “safe” distance 
for the enunciatee to engage the story since it happens somewhere else to somebody at a certain 
time. But, for the enunciatee to immerse her/himself in the story and be transformed through it, 
“thematization” 101  and “figurativization” have to take place, as we see in the Discursive 
Semantics (6). “Thematization” and “figurativization” have to take place especially if the 
enunciator wants to persuade the enunciatee’s convictions or instinctive views of life be 
transformed. Just making the story verisimilitude through Discursive Syntax (5) will probably 
not convince the enunciatee to change her/his convictions. If the enunciator wants her/his story 
99 See J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1980). 
100 For details, see Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative. 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009). 
101 I find Tracy’s “analogical imagination” comparable to Greimas’s notion of thematization (see chapter 2). See 
David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination. 
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to be real, plausible, and valuable to the enunciatee, s/he must also transform the themes and 
figures of the story (see below).102  
(a) Fundamental Semantics (1) and Narrative Semantics (2) 
In this sub-section we focus on the notions of convictions and typology. In an early 
collaborated work, Daniel and Aline Patte illustrate the difference between syntax and semantics 
in terms of ideas (i.e., Narrative Syntax) and deep values (i.e., Fundamental Semantics and 
Narrative Semantics). Using the language of sign, they point out that as the relation between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary and relational in signification, the relation is slippery and 
can be manipulated. They write: “Because a distance separates these two elements [i.e., the 
signifier and the signified], the sign can be manipulated by the intellectual activity that governs 
the (syntagmatic) logic of any discourse. Therefore an idea is manifested by a sign (or by a series 
of signs).”103 This manipulation of the sign, however, does not work in the case of a conviction 
because the self-evident quality of a conviction means that one cannot tell the signifier from the 
signified. They are non-differentiated, non-representable, and indifferent. They are felt and lived. 
We can think of the numinous experience that Rudolf Otto speaks of in which one is 
overwhelmed by a feeling. The feeling is so intense that it is simply a “pure feeling” that we 
cannot even tell whether it is euphoric or dysphoric.104 Or in the words of Jean-Luc Marion: 
102  For details on how thematization and figurativization work in transforming the semantic universe of the 
enunciatee, see Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Joseph Courtés, “Figurativization,” “Figure,” “Thematic,” 
“Thematization,” and “Theme,” in Semiotics and Language, 118-20, 120-21, and 343-44. Also, see Daniel Patte, 
The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 98-101. 
103 See Aline Patte and Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice (Exegesis of Mark 15 and 16: 
Hermeneutical Implications) (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978), 101. “By contrast, a deep value cannot be 
directly manifested by a sign … A deep value is an ‘immediate’ truth that as such cannot tolerate the distance 
separating signifier from signified. We could say that it refers to nothing other than itself ... Instead of being 
manifested by a sign (as is an idea) it is manifested by the relations that exist between the signs of a given system. 
Because of its self-evidence and immediacy, a deep value has the power to impose itself upon a person apart from 
conscious intellectual activity. Such activity cannot manipulate a deep value because, in its case, there is no distance 
comparable to that which exists in the sign between signifier and signified.” Ibid., 101-102. 
104 For details, see Algirdas Julien Greimas and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, xvii-16. 
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In the case of saturated phenomena, I no longer see anything by an excess of light; 
I no longer hear anything by an excess of sound; I no longer sense, taste, or smell 
anything by an excess of excitations – at least nothing objectifiable, realizable as a 
thing other than myself and able to be looked at as placed before me. Here it must 
be emphasized that these excesses never face the danger of being illusory – for 
example, of imagining there to be excess of intuition while there is “nothing.”105 
 
In stressing and explaining why “saturated phenomena” are not illusory,106 Marion shows the 
self-evidence of the Fundamental Semantics (1) that is thymic-oriented in many non-Western 
cultures. Patte and Patte’s language of the opaque relation between the signifier and the signified 
further explains why convictions are like “feeling [that] is directly experienced as a self-evident 
mode of existence, prior to any impressions received.”107 
How can we flesh out convictions without reducing their otherness? How can we map out 
convictions without reducing their quality of immediacy? We noted the potential problem in 
Bultmann’s demythologization when the immediacy of the “myth” is explained away for the 
sake of the existential concerns. But, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics the symbols show that the 
immediacy can be somehow mediated. That is to say, if we want to flesh out the conviction, it is 
within and from “the relations that exist between the signs of a given system” that we see how 
105 See Jean-Luc Marion, “The Banality of Saturation,” in The Visible and the Revealed. Translated by Christina M. 
Gschwandtner and others (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 138. 
106 “This is so, first because the (supposed) illusion of an intuitive excess becomes at once an intuitive excess of the 
illusion itself, since I undoubtedly undergo this excess (it alters me, perturbs me, disappoints me, etc.) as genuine 
and verifiable. If I believe I see too much light, even if no excess of ‘objective’ light can be found, I do indeed 
undergo an excess. Second (and the excess is verified precisely for this reason), the ordeal of excess is actually 
attested by the resistance, possibly the pain, that it imposes on the one who receives it, and this resistance can no 
more be disputed than on can doubt undergoing one’s own pain (for we ‘feel our pain’ without any doubt or 
separation. This resistance suggest a wholly other sense of objectivity: objectivity would no longer mean access to 
an objective that is targeted, foreseen, and constructed according only to the demands and possibilities of 
intelligibility, such that ‘object’ ends up designating precisely what does not resist the cognitive intention but yields 
to it without offering any resistance whatsoever, to the point that the object designates the alienation of the thing 
from itself and its seizure by method…” Idem. For Marion’s notion of the “saturated phenomena” (e.g., “event,” 
“idol,” “icon,” “flesh,” and “revelation”), see his In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomenon. Translated by Robyn 
Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002). 
107 Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, 2. 
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signs are interrelated to manifest the deep values.108 To highlight this “self-evident mode of 
existence,”109 we thus examine how values are interrelated in the semiotic square. Depending on 
how we interpret the relations of the values at the four corners of the square, we can get a 
glimpse of a possible undergirding or overarching value that links the values together. 
The first and fundamental semiotic square that delineates the basic pattern of convictions 
is characteristic of Fundamental Semantics (1). The values expressed in the basic pattern cannot 
be fully thematized, however; there are various ways to conceptualize the relations of these 
“potential” and “virtual” values at the four corners of the square. When the values of this initial 
semiotic square (or elementary structure of signification) are further “actualized,” they give rise 
to a series of semiotic squares that cover different aspects of life following the same basic pattern 
in the Fundamental Semantics (1). We call this series or homologation of squares the Narrative 
Semantics (2). It is in terms of this homologation of semiotic squares that we define typology. 
In this notion of typology, the conception manifested in each semiotic square is 
interlinked to another semiotic square like a dynamic, open-ended hermeneutical circle. It is 
open-ended because each square is both like and unlike the previous and the following squares. 
One can think of a Freudian das Unheimliche (the uncanny) that is unfamiliar and familiar at the 
same time, as each destabilizes and shatters each other. The semiotic squares are interdependent 
of each other, with each square pointing toward its new possible squares and backward to its 
preceding squares, simultaneously. Like the Derridean notion of “heritage,” as every person 
inherits her/his tradition, “it is necessary first of all to know and to know how to reaffirm what 
comes ‘before us.’”110 To reaffirm does not mean to accept everything. It means to decide what 
to do with what comes “before” us, what is presented to us as a gift. In the face of what comes 
108 See Aline Patte and Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis, 102. 
109 Algirdas Julien Greimas, and Jacques Fontanille, The Semiotics of Passions, 2. 
110 Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, “Choosing One’s Heritage,” in For What Tomorrow, 3. 
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before us, we are already indebted as we respond to what is before us with what comes before us. 
This responsibility towards memory and what is to come is an essential quality of typology in 
Narrative Semantics (2). Let us refer to the following series of semiotic squares as an example. 
And, this is one of the main points that Patte and Patte try to highlight to show how a semiotic 
square contextually gives rise to a series of semiotic squares. 





                        Non-S2  sub-contrary     Non-S1 
 
Second Square:        Non-S2            Non-S1 
 
 
          Non-(Non-S1)            Non-(Non-S2) 
 






          Non-[Non-(Non-S1)]            Non-[Non-(Non-S2)] 
     
 
      Etc. 
 
Note that the values of Non-S2 and Non-S1 that are in a sub-contrary relation of the “First 
Square” are in a contrary relation of the “Second Square.” Likewise, the values of Non-(Non-S1) 
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and Non-(Non-S2) that are in a sub-contrary relation of the “Second Square” are in a contrary 
relation of the “Third Square.” So on and so forth. 
As we have noted that the contrary-relation is “semantics”-oriented (because it is 
juxtaposed according to one’s conviction) – whereas the contradiction-relations is “syntax”-
oriented (since it is a logical relation) – this overlapping of contrary-values can prevent the 
conceptualization of the theme of each semiotic square from being fixed. Because the contrary-
values of the preceding square are being re-interpreted in the following square that has different 
sub-contrary values. Consequently, the conceptualization of a theme in each square is dynamic 
and discursive. It cannot be objectified. The linkage between the semiotic squares, as a result, is 
also dynamic. It, in fact, manifests a correlative thinking and an embodied perception of the 
world. In the words of Merleau-Ponty: “The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of 
something else, it always forms part of a ‘field.’”111 This simultaneous connection and separation 
between semiotic squares is what makes David Tracy’s “analogical imagination” possible (see 
chapter 2). This is how one can be faithful to one’s heritage by being “unfaithful” to it. This is 
how the “continuity with the past is preserved by shattering the received terminology, the receive 
imagery, the received theology – in short, by shattering the tradition…”112 
(b) Fundamental Syntax (3) and Narrative Syntax (4) 
On the other hand, this linkage can be easily mistaken for an ideology (see the next 
subsection). We will see this danger in chapter 2 when we discuss Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus, namely, “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and 
organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
111 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 4. 
112 Ernst Käsemann, “The Problem of the Historical Jesus,” 20. 
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presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in 
order to attain them.”113 As systems and principles that can “generate and organize practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends,” habitus according to Terry Eagleton, can highlight the 
unconsciousness and the forms of power and capitals at work in each social field.114 
This focus on the embodiment of practice in terms of structuring and being structured by 
social norms115 leads Bourdieu to stress the difficulty to analyze the corporeal, temporal, and 
spatial aspects of practice.116 The difficulty is further compounded by the artificiality of our 
analytical model and our flesh-and-bloodness. Bourdieu writes, “The unanalyzed element in 
every theoretical analysis … is the theorist’s subjective relation to the social world the objective 
(social) relation presupposed by this subjective relation.”117 This “unanalyzed element” points to 
our embodied mode of existence that is so integral to our being that we can only speak of it in 
terms of an analogy-metaphor or a typology (see chapter 2, where I argue that while Bourdieu’s 
habitus can be understood in terms of Fundamental and Narrative Syntax, my proprioceptive and 
113 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice. Translated by Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 53. Emphasis added. 
114 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 156-58. Also, see Pierre 
Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton, “Doxa and Common Life: An Interview,” in Mapping Ideology. Edited by Slavoj 
Žižek (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 265-77. Although many have critiqued the Marxist notion of ideology 
as “false consciousness,” Eagleton parses various understanding of “false” in this definition. In pointing out the 
internalization and externalization of our beliefs and practices in our lived relations with others, Eagleton cautions us 
that not all ideology involves falsehood or delusions in its attempt to justify and sustain certain domination of social 
order. See Terry Eagleton, Ideology, 1-31. 
115 Žižek also highlights the “doing” aspect of ideology. He writes, “If our concept of ideology remains the [Marxist] 
classic one in which the illusion [or false consciousness] is located in knowledge, then today’s society must appear 
post-ideological: the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism; people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do 
not take ideological propositions seriously. The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion 
masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself.” See Slavoj 
Žižek, “How did Marx Invent the Symptom?” in Mapping Ideology, 316. 
116 Bourdieu argues that “one has no chance of giving a scientific account of practice – and in particular of the 
properties it derives from the fact that it unfolds in time – unless one is aware of the effects that scientific practice 
produces by mere totalization.” See Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 82. For more details, see pages 98-111. 
117 He continues, “Intellectualism, is, so to speak, an ‘intellectualocentrism’ in which the observer’s relation to the 
social world, and therefore the social relation which makes observation possible, is made the basis of the practice 
analyzed, through the representations constructed to account for it (rules, models, etc.).” Ibid., 29. 
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communal culture envisions habitus in terms of Fundamental and Narrative Semantics). Given 
that habitus is the site of the “externalization of internality” and the internalization of 
externality,”118 where the subject is both acting and being acted upon, Bourdieu writes: 
Probably the only way to give an account of the practical coherence of practices 
and works is to construct generative models which reproduce in their own terms 
the logic from which that coherence is generated; and to devise diagrams which, 
through their synoptic power of synchronization and totalization, quietly and 
directly manifest the objective systematicity of practice and which … may even 
have the merit of speaking directly to the body schema (as all those who have to 
transmit motor skills are well aware).119 
 
To address “probably the only way” to speak “directly to the body schema,” Bourdieu then uses 
homological and analogical approach to analyze the embodiment of practice.120 In his study of 
practices in the Kabyle tradition,121 for example, Bourdieu notes that “the generative schemes 
[used to explain the logic of practice] are interchangeable in practice. This is why they can only 
generate systematic products, but with an approximate, fuzzy coherence that cannot withstand the 
test of logical criticism.”122 He writes, “Practice has a logic which is not that of the logician. This 
has to be acknowledged in order to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, thereby 
condemning oneself either to wring incoherences out of it or to thrust a forced coherence upon 
it.”123 Since we cannot cut “practices off from their real conditions of existence,”124 Bourdieu 
thus highlights the symbolic and analogical features of practice. 
For us, this homological feature in practice resembles the mode of production and 
existence of Fundamental Syntax (3) and Narrative Syntax (4), in particular when we note the 
interrelated production of alethic, deontic, epistemic, and ethical modalities in veridictory 
118 Ibid., 45. 
119 Ibid., 92-93. Emphasis added. 
120 Ibid., 87-97. 
121 Ibid., 200-70. 
122 Ibid., 87. Emphasis added. 
123 Ibid., 86. 
124 Ibid., 98. 
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semiotics (viz., metaphysics-oriented),125 and the interrelated production of valuative, deontic, 
epistemic, and ethical modalities in thymic semiotics (viz., feeling-oriented).126 Of course, the 
homologation is also prominent in Narrative Semantics (2) where a series of semiotic squares are 
interlinked after a pattern of convictions. This homologation that we find in the “semantics” and 
the “syntax” should not surprise us; after all, our perception of the world is proprioceptive and 
correlative. 
The crucial difference between semantic and syntactic homologations is that in 
Fundamental Syntax (3) and Narrative Syntax (4), the power relations among characters/actants 
are assigned and represented through a series of social positions (see the actantial model below). 
By contrast, the homologation in Narrative Semantics (2) delineates a pattern, not a 
representation, of values without positing social positions and hierarchy. In Fundamental Syntax 
(3) and Narrative Syntax (4), the positioning of characters/actants is problematic not because we 
are “always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects”127 or “the existence of ideology and 
the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing.” 128 It is 
problematic when it becomes “a matter of fact” (and thus fixed), as if certain subjects by nature 
should be in certain social positions. 
(c) The Actantial Model129 
The power relations that characterize the Narrative Syntax (4) come to the fore in 
Greimas’s actantial model. The model helps us see the interaction among different 
125 For details, see Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of the Biblical Texts, 230-39, 243-58. 
126 For details, see Timothy B. Cargal, “The Generative Trajectory in Certain Non-Western Cultures,” 267-75. 
127 See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in Essays 
on Ideology (London: Verso, 1984), 50. 
128 Ibid., 49. Note that for Althusser, ideology is not static but dynamic. Compare this notion of ideology with 
Bourdieu’s descriptive notion of doxa (“the undiscussed universe”) in Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice. Translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 159-71. 
129 Here, the actantial model manifests the “surface” Narrative Syntax that anthropomorphizes the “deep” Narrative 




                                                          
characters/actants and how an object is (or is not) given and received from one character/actant 
to another. We wrote “character/actant” to denote the function and role of the characters 
(whether in the text or the context) because a character can play many actantial roles (i.e., sender, 
subject, object, receiver, helper, and opponent). The word “actant” can also refer to the roles of 
ability, knowledge, will, or vision that helps or opposes the “subject” to give the “object” to the 
“receiver.” It is important to note that an actantial role is not limited to one character. A same 
character can be the “subject” and “object” at the same time in certain situations. In some 
situation, a same character can even ironically be a “sender” and an “opponent” to the “subject” 
whom s/he sends to give a certain “object” to the “receiver.” As we can see from the Greimas’s 
actantial model below, the roles can make visible the power relations among the actants as we 
trace how an “object,” whether abstract (e.g., power, honor, money, etc.) or concrete, is 
transformed and transferred from one actant to another. 




Helper   Subject   Opponent 
 
Note that these actants are not concretized. If we assign characters to these roles, then we 
have a notion similar to that of ideology propounded by Louis Althusser: “a ‘representation’ of 
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” 130  This 
representation, of course, consists of a series of actantial models, as the “object” is given from a 
130 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” 36. In his 
critique of Althusser’s definition as lacking the critical edge to expose the power relations in domination, 
Thompson’s definition of ideology, which highlights the interrelations of meaning and power where meaning is in 
the service of power, seems to put the “semantics” at the service of “syntax.” He writes: “to interpret ideology is to 
explicate the connection between the meaning mobilized by symbolic forms and the relations of domination which 
that meaning serves to maintain.” While Thompson alludes to Greimas’s syntactic analysis, he does not mention 
Greimas’s “semantics.” He focuses on the communication process. But, what do we do with the affective and 
unconscious features of ideology in Althusser’s definition? See John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 23, 287-88; Terry Eagleton, Ideology, 18-19. 
461 
 
                                                          
“subject” to a “receiver,” and the “receiver” in turn becomes the “subject” who gives the 
“object” to another “receiver,” so on and so forth. In this syntactic representation of power 
relations, where Fundamental Semantics (1) and Narrative Semantics (2) are affirmed in a 
syntactic way (viz., logically asserted or negated) and reformulated, we note that the role of the 
“sender” can be complicated, in particular when the “sender” is a heteronomous other (such as 
the divine, feeling, mood, etc.) that cannot be objectified. In fact, this originally syntactic 
actantial model can be saturated by the “semantics” when we consider the mood and feeling of 
the actantial roles. In other words, this syntactic model is periodically transgressed and 
supplemented by the “semantics,” like what we shall see in Kristeva’s notions of the “semiotic” 
and the “symbolic.” 
We highlight this actantial model because a syntactic analysis of the text focusing on the 
“pairs of opposition of actions” can verify our semantic analysis of the text (see chapter 3). If the 
enunciator’s conviction is so integral to her/his “being,” then s/he would want to be very clear in 
conveying it to her/his enunciatee. S/he would probably try to contrast two opposing actions to 
make her/his conviction clearly perceived. An examination of these “pairs of opposition of 
actions” will help us interweave a picture of the enunciator’s conviction. To highlight the “pairs 
of opposition of actions” in the text, we can simplify the actantial model into the following: 
(Object  Receiver), meaning, an “object” is given to a “receiver.” In receiving an “object,” the 
“receiver” is then transformed by the reception. This successful receiving can be contrasted to 
three failures of receiving: (1) the “object” is not given to the “receiver” (Object / Receiver), 
(2) the “object” is given to the wrong “receiver” (Object  non-Receiver), or (3) the wrong 
“object” is given to the “receiver” (non-Object  Receiver). 
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When the enunciator contrasts two actions, the juxtaposition signals something is at stake. 
Whether the enunciator is intentional or not in contrasting these actions, the oppositions indicate 
that s/he wants to stress what s/he thinks is important and cannot be mistaken for.131 Hence 
different from the reader-response criticism that focuses on what is not made explicit in the text – 
which then means that we cannot verify the existence and importance of the assumed – the stark 
presence of the oppositions of actions calls our attentions simultaneously to the situations of both 
the enunciator and the enunciatee. An analysis of these “pairs of opposition of actions” can 
further help us analyze the system of convictions of the enunciator (see chapter 3). 
(d) “Thematization” And “Figurativization” in Discursive Semantics (6) 
When the actants in the Narrative Syntax (4) are concretized with credible and verisimilar 
characters that interact with each other in time and space – viz., the process of “actorialization,” 
“temporalization,” and “spatialization” in Discursive Syntax (5) – they are then portrayed to 
interact in such a way to express a certain conceptualization of a theme that the enunciator wants 
to convey to the enunciatee. Note that as the Discursive Syntax (5) and Discursive Semantics (6) 
are discursive, they bring to the fore the dynamic contextuality of both the narrative and its 
interpretation. For an illustration, we will use Patte’s example of how the theme and figure of 
“the Good Samaritan” story in Luke 10:30-35 are presented to transform the vision of the 
enunciatee.132 
First of all, a figure can be anything or anyone; even a place, time, abstract noun, etc. can 
be a figure. To make her/his enunciation believable, the enunciator chooses a figure that makes 
sense to the enunciatee. This figure is the site of the common ground between the enunciator and 
the enunciatee. While it is a site of shared connotation, it is also a site of difference, as the 
131 See Daniel Patte, Structural Exegesis for New Testament Critics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990), 9-72. 
132 For details, see Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 98-101. 
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enunciator wants to convey a different notion of the figure to the enunciatee. As we noted that 
the conviction is manifested in a series of homologated semiotic squares in Fundamental 
Semantics (1) and Narrative Semantics (2), if the enunciator wants to transform the enunciatee’s 
convictions, s/he needs to transform the homologation of the semiotic squares in the semantic 
universe of the enunciatee. To do so, s/he needs to get the enunciatee to re-conceptualize or re-
thematize the interrelation of the values of the four corners of the initial semiotic square and to 
dissociate the set of values from the figures so that the figures do not necessarily carry certain 
connotations. Hence, the choice of the figure is crucial as the point of departure. 
Note that as this figure is familiar to both the enunciator and the enunciatee, it functions 
like a metaphor that bridges the semantic universes of both the enunciator and the enunciatee. It 
can extend, retract, and create new meanings. The fluidity and symbolic features of the figure 
allow the figure to be configured and refigured in various ways. 
In our narrative, the enunciatee (the Jewish audience) probably views the figure 
“Samaritan” negatively and the figures “priest” and “Levite” positively. The enunciatee would 
very likely assume the Samaritan to do bad things while the priest and Levite doing good things. 
If the enunciator simply says that that the Samaritan is good while the priest and Levite are bad, 
the enunciatee would treat the story as a non-sense. 
For her/his message to be trustworthy to the enunciatee, the enunciator needs to first 
highlight the values that both s/he and the enunciatee hold to be self-evident. These basic values 
include compassion, altruism, and courage. Note the participial and finite verbs in Luke 10:33-35, 
as if the enunciator wants to highlight the circumstances of the actions.133 The finite verbs may 
133 Luke 10:33-35: While a certain Samaritan was on the road (ὁδεύων) he came down to the place and when he saw 
him (ἰδὼν) he was deeply moved by pity, and when he went to him (προσελθὼν) he bandaged his wounds as he 
poured upon (ἐπιχέων) oil and wine. After putting him on (ἐπιβιβάσας) his on animal, he led him to an inn and took 
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be the main actions, but they are qualified by the participles. It is notable that piety and devotion 
are less fundamental than the basic values of being compassionate and altruistic. 
In this story, as the enunciator tries to transform the enunciatee’s convictions, s/he 
describes how an unidentified person was terribly robbed and beaten. This beaten person thus 
can be anyone. As many have noted: “The road from Jerusalem to Jericho was notoriously 
dangerous. It descended nearly 3,300 feet in 17 miles. The roads ran through narrow passes at 
points, and the terrain offered easy hiding for the bandits who terrorized travelers.”134 If this is a 
common knowledge to first-century Palestinians, then the story will probably hit home more 
closely. The enunciatee will probably be more sympathetic to the beaten person. Something must 
have happened that made the person take such a route by himself. However, the beauty of the 
story is that as none of this background information is spelled out, the imagination of the 
enunciatee can run in any direction. If such a terrible misfortune happened, one would certainly 
hope that s/he would be helped. 
Thus what the Samaritan did for the beaten person was really unexpected. This surprise is 
further dramatized by what the priest and the Levite did. However, notice that their actions were 
briefly noted. This passing comment may seem to steer the enunciatee away from the response of 
the priest and the Levite to the situation of the victim and the Samaritan, but it actually 
accentuates it. The enunciatee is gradually changing the concept of the “neighbor” figure from a 
self-centered notion to an other-oriented notion; after all, Jesus told this story in response to the 
question of the expert in the law “who is my neighbor.”135 Consequently, the question is not 
care of him. The next day, taking out (ἐκβαλὼν) two denarii, he gave to the innkeeper and said, “Take care of him, 
and whatever extra you spend, I will repay you when I come back (ἐν τῷ ἐπανέρχεσθαί με).”  
134 R. Alan Culpepper, “The Gospel of Luke: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in The New Interpreter’s 
Bible. 12 vols. Vol. 9: The Gospel of Luke and The Gospel of John (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1995), 229. 
135 Needless to say, this relation between law and justice is very significant and complicated. The notions of law and 
justice are not equivalent. 
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“who is my neighbor.” Rather, “am I a neighbor?” If a “neighbor” is someone who is hospitable 
to the others, then am I hospitable? Or should I first define what the others mean? If so, is my 
hospitality conditional? But, if we do not know anything about the others, in this case, the beaten 
person, then how do I know whether he fits my definition and condition? 
Now, if the beaten person is deformed into an abjection by the bandits (the abjection of 
the society), then the well-respected priest and Levite (who are not the abjections of the society) 
should have helped transformed the beaten up and abjected person (into the society?). Are they 
not the ones who are more holy; after all, they sound and look authoritative in religious, legal, 
and political matters. But, this expectation is not fulfilled. So, who is the “subject” who gives the 
“object” (“transformation”) to the “receiver” (“the beaten person”)?136 It was simply a certain 
Samaritan; an abjection to the Jewish enunciatee. The enunciator does not tell us any background 
information about him. But, we are told about the “helper,” namely, his compassion, altruism, 
and courage. So, what kind of “object” that the Samaritan gives to the beaten person. It is a 
healing. Indeed, the healing scene is depicted in details. We know that the Samaritan was deeply 
moved when he saw the beaten person. He went to him, poured out oil and wine onto his wounds, 
bandaged him, put him onto his mount, took him to the inn to take care of him, gave two denarii 
to the innkeeper the next day to take care of the person, promised to pay back any extra that the 
innkeeper spent, and left. Apparently, the Samaritan had to go somewhere to do something too. 
Yet, he stopped. Something more urgent caught his attention: the beaten person. It could be a 
ploy or a trap; after all, the place was known for banditry activities. Yet, he stopped. And, he 
went through so much trouble to get the beaten person healed and taken care of. 
136 Of course, we can ask this question for each action when an “object” is (or is not) given and received and how 
that “object” is given and received. 
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Note that we are not told of anything about the beaten person either. So the 
transformation is not about a restoration to a certain social status, etc. Rather, it is a fundamental 
restoration: a renewal of life. It is not a restoration or a re-integration into the society. Why not? 
Because the social norm that create and maintain our notions of honor and shame fail to work. If 
the social norm is good, it will surely take care of the fundamental issues: the well-being of 
people. But here, the system breaks down. The priest and the Levite did not take care of the 
beaten person. For the pries and the Levite, obviously something is more important and urgent 
than to approach and to take care of him. They saw him but they passed him by and avoided him 
through the opposing path. The beaten person is further abjected; in fact, triply abjected. First, by 
the bandits, then the priest, and finally the Levite. Is the social norm an operation of abjection? It 
is a system that excludes the other (i.e., the foreign) so that its integrity can be upheld? 
In summary. What we see in this story is how the fundamental values are highlighted, 
embodied through the figures, and then re-thematized through the figures. While such value as 
the compassion is highlighted, it is re-thematized in relation to other social values like order, 
chaos, purpose, purity, etc. 137 This intertwining of thematization and figurativization is well 
captured by Cargal: “a figure can be invested with new meanings and nuances by being set in 
new relations of meaning, or conversely a theme can be invested with additional nuances by 
finding expression through new figures.”138 
In light of the fluid and discursive features of Discursive Syntax (5) and Discursive 
Semantics (6), it is important to note that the “Discursive Structures” of the diagram is reiterative. 
The diagram is an open-ended diagram, as another “surface level” – e.g., Narrative Semantics (2) 
and Narrative Syntax (4) – and “discursive level” – e.g., Discursive Syntax (5) and Discursive 
137 For details, see Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimensions of Biblical Texts, 81-92. 
138 Timothy B. Cargal, Restoring the Diaspora: Discursive Structure and Purpose in the Epistle of James. SBL 
Dissertation Series 144 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993), 39. 
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Semantics (6) – are interconnected to it (see below). If we can imagine this diagram as a 
“semiotic square,” then the “surface level” and the “discursive level” is another “semiotic 
square” that is in a relation of implication or homologation with the diagram. That is to say, 
depending on the context of the flesh-and-blood enunciatee, one may interpret the theme and 
figure accordingly. As such, one may “actualize” the Fundamental Semantics (1) and 
Fundamental Syntax (3) differently at the “surface level.” Given one’s context, one may also 
“realize” differently and discursively the Narrative Semantics (2) and Narrative Syntax (4). Let 
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The “textualization” of a same text on a printed page should be apparent by now. 
Depending on which semantic or syntactical components that one focuses on, different texts and 
meanings can then be generated and transformed. The conflicts of interpretations from how the 
Chronicler interpret the Deuteronomistic History in the Hebrew Bible139 to the debates between 
the Alexandrian School and the Antiochene School to the three phases in the quests of the 
“historical Jesus,” etc. are clear demonstrations of this hermeneutical and semiotic phenomenon 
of “textualization.” In fact, the power relations in the ethics and politics of biblical interpretation 
always characterize the critical biblical studies, whether in the background or the foreground. 
Because of the polyvalence of meanings, the polyphony of renditions of Paul’s notion of 
love in 1 Corinthians, and most importantly, because of the intersectionality of so many racial, 
religious, gender, cultural, political, and economic issues in Malaysia and Roman Corinth, we 
need to use Greimas’s “Generative Trajectory” and thymic-oriented “semiotic square” to flesh 
out all the explicit and implicit meaning-producing dimensions in our process of meaning 
production in biblical interpretation. This attention and examination of how meaning is produced 
helps us critically appreciate and learn from different interpretations. It helps us from making 
unwarranted claims as if an interpretation derived from a “syntactical analysis” of 1 Corinthians 
can speak for and even against the semantic universe of the text. It can, however, certainly speak 
with an interpretation derived from a “semantic analysis” of 1 Corinthians, and vice versa. Why 
am I so concerned with the intertwining of these two meaning-producing dimensions? Because 
when they are confused and collapsed together, misunderstanding and violence happen; a rather 
unfortunate experience that is not uncommon in Malaysia. 
 
139 See n. 3. 
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